Classics and the Western Canon discussion

I'm posting this a little early because I won't have much time tonight. Also, sorry for the length. This book is packed with delectables. It's hard to pick and choose.
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Nietzsche begins his critique of morality by asserting that morality itself has always been given and philosophers have merely attempted to provide a rational foundation for it, to provide a "science of morals." N. finds this absurd because there is no problem if morality is already a matter of faith. The problem is that morality itself has never been examined as a problem. N. thinks that the fundamental proposition that is taken on faith by moralist philoosphers is "Hurt no one; rather, help all as much as you can." He says this proposition is "insipidly false and sentimental in a world whose essence is will to power." (186)

On what basis does he say that the world's essence is "will to power"? Or is this also to be taken as given?

He seems to answer this in 188, where he argues that every morality is "a bit of tyrrany against nature." But tyrrany is not necessarily a bad thing. Some tyrannies are good, as long as they are "free" and "natural." He uses as an example the artist. The emphasis seems to be self-determination, as opposed to the discipline "laid down by a church or court, or under Aristotelian presuppositions."

Does the non-moralist trust nature to take him where he wants to go? How does the non-moralist decide, or does he decide, what to do in life? Are there any moral "problems" left to be solved?

The next few sections focus on how morality harnesses power for control. The institutions of the sabbath and fasting serve to purify and sharpen the morality that imposes them. He suggests that the romantic notion of love is the net effect of value judgments imposed by Christianity on the sex drive. Next, he objects to the Platonic notion that evil actions are the result of an error. In particular, he disagrees with the idea that the good is "identical to the useful and agreeable."

But the Platonic formulation also implies that knowledge guides the will. Does Nietzsche object to this as well? He addresses this in 191-193. He brings up the "hermeneutic circle" problem (that Plato deals with in the Meno) which he doesn't solve as much as affirm. Basically, the question is: how do we learn new things? N says that at the root of every science one finds "rash hypothese, fictions, and the good dumb will to believe." If one believes this, it is easy to see the problem of morality as "given".

At 194 the discussion turns to how the non-moralist might conduct his life. Men are not determined by knowledge, but by their desires, by "what they take for really having and possessing (as good.)" Primarily what a man wants is possession of other people, and he discusses various types of possession: of women, men, and children. One of his recurring ideas is that compassion is an expression of power over the needy, a kind of contempt or disrespect.

In the next few sections he develops the idea that conscience is a function of a herd mentality. The instinct for obedience is "inherited best, and at the expense of the art of commanding." And when those who command fail to exercise independence (by following the laws of right or the constitution or God), the result is "moral hypocrisy." As an example of the one who commands unconditionally he gives Napoleon. (199) The military theme continues: racial miscengenation results in a war of drives and values, and those mixed people only wish that the "war they are should come to an end." Happiness for some of these people consists in peace, but others who master this internal war are "enigmatic men bound for victory and seduction." (200.) (The racial component here seems to me beside the point, but it's also hard to ignore.) Examples given here are Alcibiades, Caesar, Frederick II, and Leonardo da Vinci.

How is this "possession" of others different from the control exerted by morality?

The remaining three sections argue for the supremacy of the strong man over the morality of the herd. Among the striking claims he makes are that "love of neighbor' is illusory and secondary to "fear of neighbor." Strength is valued and needed to protect the herd, but is also viewed by the herd as dangerous. "Fear again is the mother of morals."

While Nietzsche derides "democratic man" as mediocre and weak, he doesn't examine how the relationship between the strong man and the herd works. He mostly shows how herd morality is inferior to whatever the strong man dictates. Is there a functional relationship between them, or is it a continual state of war and control, as in a master-slave relationship?

The last section returns to the "new philosophers." He begins by describing democracy as a form of decay. This sounds to me like an echo from Plato's Republic, which leads me to wonder if Nietzsche's "new philosopher" isn't a Philosopher King. The difference here seems to be that Plato's philosopher king was a master of transcendental ideas; Nietzsche's seems to be the opposite: they are "spirits strong and original enough to provide the stimuli for opposite valuations and to revalue and invert 'eternal values.'" (203)

Again, I wonder... where do the inversions of these values come from? Is there any foundation for these values or anti-values? Nietzsche makes it very clear what he is against, but what is he for?

Thomas, I can't tell if you're being sarcastic when you say "This book is packed with delectables," but let me get the ball rolling a little further with some choice quotes from this chapter (with more waiting in the wings):

The singular fact remains, however, that everything of the nature of freedom, elegance, boldness, dance, and masterly certainty, which exists or has existed, whether it be in thought itself, or in administration, or in speaking and persuading, in art just as in conduct, has only developed by means of the tyranny of such arbitrary law, and in all seriousness, it is not at all improbable that precisely this is “nature” and “natural”—and not laisser-aller!

[...]
The long bondage of the spirit, the distrustful constraint in the communicability of ideas, the discipline which the thinker imposed on himself to think in accordance with the rules of a church or a court, or conformable to Aristotelian premises, the persistent spiritual will to interpret everything that happened according to a Christian scheme, and in every occurrence to rediscover and justify the Christian God:—all this violence, arbitrariness, severity, dreadfulness, and unreasonableness, has proved itself the disciplinary means whereby the European spirit has attained its strength, its remorseless curiosity and subtle mobility; granted also that much irrecoverable strength and spirit had to be stifled, suffocated, and spoilt in the process (for here, as everywhere, “nature” shows herself as she is, in all her extravagant and indifferent magnificence, which is shocking, but nevertheless noble).

Is he taking back, or modifying, what he said about the Stoics in the first chapter? There he said that the Stoics tyrannized over nature as they tyrannized over themselves, they made the world in their own image... Now, he says this is 'natural' (although he says 'natural' in quotes, because it is also artificial).

I read this chapter, and I think, Nietzsche is talking about our own times as well as his. He SAW political correctness, and extremely intolerant and puritanical condemnation of "intolerance," and snowflakes who cannot bear, and want to abolish, any sort of opposition, even verbal- "speech is violence"- to their worldview.

Nietzsche just asserts a lot of things without giving us reason to believe them: that the Will to Power is the basis of all drives, that conscience is the debased result of herd mentality, that compassion is really an expression of the desire to dominate, and so on. What happens if we say, "No, that's not true"? Does the conversation just end at that point?

Christopher wrote: "Thomas, I can't tell if you're being sarcastic when you say "This book is packed with delectables," but let me get the ball rolling a little further with some choice quotes from this chapter (with ..."

No, I'm not being sarcastic. Nietzsche is a wonderful writer, and there is discussion-inspiriing material on every page. I just can't tell how any of this stuff pulls together, if it does, or if he even wants it to. He's like someone who votes for "other candidate" in every race. I appreciate his visceral cry for independence, as romantic as it is, but it strikes me as form without content.

Thomas wrote: No, I'm not being sarcastic. Nietzsche is a wonderful writer, and there is discussion-inspiring material on every page. I just can't tell how any of this stuff pulls together, if it does, or if he even wants it to.

I can't tell how it pulls together either! There is a definite temptation to take the aphorisms as cute, post-it note observations. Which... isn't the case... I think...

These seem like polemical Facebook posts from a pre-Facebook era.

Again this reminds me of Physics and Politics, or, Thoughts on the application of the principles of natural selection and inheritance to political society:

199. Inasmuch as in all ages, as long as mankind has existed, there have also been human herds (family alliances, communities, tribes, peoples, states, churches), and always a great number who obey in proportion to the small number who command—in view, therefore, of the fact that obedience has been most practiced and fostered among mankind hitherto, one may reasonably suppose that, generally speaking, the need thereof is now innate in every one, as a kind of formal conscience which gives the command “Thou shalt unconditionally do something, unconditionally refrain from something,” in short, “Thou shalt.” This need tries to satisfy itself and to fill its form with a content, according to its strength, impatience, and eagerness, it at once seizes as an omnivorous appetite with little selection, and accepts whatever is shouted into its ear by all sorts of commanders—parents, teachers, laws, class prejudices, or public opinion.[...]

If one imagine this instinct increasing to its greatest extent, commanders and independent individuals will finally be lacking altogether, or they will suffer inwardly from a bad conscience, and will have to impose a deception on themselves in the first place in order to be able to command just as if they also were only obeying. This condition of things actually exists in Europe at present—I call it the moral hypocrisy of the commanding class.

Nietzsche lays a lot of contempt on man as a "herd" animal. Would he view him that way if he called him a "social" animal? Or perhaps a "political" animal?

A society could not function if everyone in the "herd" decided to go his own way and be a "free spirit". It's hard enough to govern two herds, let alone one of thousands, or millions.

This makes me think that maybe Nietzsche is engaging in a kind of thought experiment, one that isn't at all practical but is meant to portray a "paradigm" of human greatness. Plato does a similar thing for the city in the Republic, where the paradigm fails, but the process of examining the paradigm is fruitful in itself. Maybe the "free spirit" fails as well, but we can learn something from his failure. (Or perhaps he doesn't fail, but must live outside society. That's a condition that Socrates considered worse than death, but maybe Nietzsche feels differently.)

Roger wrote: "Nietzsche just asserts a lot of things without giving us reason to believe them: that the Will to Power is the basis of all drives, that conscience is the debased result of herd mentality, that com..."

N. seems to be saying that the Will to Power is natural. (I would use the phrase "in the genes" if I thought genetics were commonly known at this time.) Morality as practiced and embraced by philosophers contradicts Will to Power and therefore is unnatural and a tyranny. Thus the criticism of morality as being rational.

And you are right; he offers no justification for taking the position that Will to Power is natural and therefore the proper way to behave.

Before I thought N was saying Will to Power was a choice or at least some sort of something some had, the Ubermensch, while the many, slaves, hadn't. But if Will to Power is natural or in nature, then it must be something we all have or have access to. Is he saying that everyone has the potential to Will to Power, even the slaves?

I haven't finished the chapter yet, so perhaps this is explained, but right now he seems to be saying we all are living lives we weren't meant to live, and morality is a big reason why. But he provides precious little evidence for a believer to hang his hat on.

EDIT: And we are a social animal, so how would that work if everyone practiced (is that the right word?) Will to Power?

Thomas wrote: "He's like someone who votes for "other candidate" in every race. I appreciate his visceral cry for independence, as romantic as it is, but it strikes me as form without content."

Exactly.

And I didn't contribute to aphorisms because I think of them as those old Hollywood cowboy town facades. They look good until you get close and realize they have no guts. But boy from a distance they sure do look good.

Patrice wrote: "the herd is what is wrong with democracy. wasn’t that what plato was all about? the need to think for yourself? the masses are asses, right?"

Cphe wrote: "I can't see why being part of a herd is so disparaging. There is safety, belonging, survival, protection in being part of a herd.

I'm part of a herd......and I like it.....there I've said it. ..."

There is safety in a herd, and being part of one is a natural function of humans as social animals. We protect our families, our communities, and our nation because we are part of that herd. We also do positive things together that would be impossible to do as individuals.

That said, do we go along with our herd, right or wrong? Do we question it or do we fall in line with whatever the herd leader tells us to do?

I think this gets back to the second chapter on "free spirits," which N. used in a dual sense.- like the masonic members of the masons- the freer than free... He is asking how much the free spirits are still "sheep."

I hate to keep mentioning Bagehot, who, as far as I know, did not know of Nietzsche, as Nietzsche did not know of him, but he also says that the conformist tendencies were bred into human beings for so long that they seem 'innate.':

Experience shows how incredibly difficult it is to get men really to encourage the principle of originality. They will admit it in theory, but in practice the old error—the error which arrested a hundred civilisations—returns again. Men are too fond of their own life, too credulous of the completeness of their own ideas, too angry at the pain of new thoughts, to be able to bear easily with a changing existence; or else, having new ideas, they want to enforce them on mankind—to make them heard, and admitted, and obeyed before, in simple competition with other ideas, they would ever be so naturally. [...]

The point I am bringing out is simple:—one most important pre-requisite of a prevailing nation is that it should have passed out of the first stage of civilisation into the second stage—out of the stage where permanence is most wanted into that where variability is most wanted; and you cannot comprehend why progress is so slow till you see how hard the most obstinate tendencies of human nature make that step to mankind.

Physics and Politics, or, Thoughts on the application of the principles of natural selection and inheritance to political society

Patrice wrote: "so true. any new idea, scientific or philosophical, is met with such intense resistance. people just love to cling to the familiar."

I wonder though if there is any philosophical justification for this observation. It seems to me a matter of psychology -- in fact, almost everything of value (for me) in Nietzsche has a psychological basis, and almost nothing can be justified on the basis of principle.

Clinging to the familiar is sometimes called strength of character, or moral strength. Sticking up for what you believe in, regardless of whether no one or almost everyone believes in it. If something is true, what does it matter if it is familiar and unoriginal and something the herd also believes?

Cphe wrote: "He mentions Napolean but I wondered how many through history have thought that Napoleon was one of the last great tyrants/commanders."

I've been reading Ron Chernow's biography of Ulysses Grant, and thought it interesting that Grant greatly admired Napoleon as a general and despised him as a man.

"I think if Napoleon had been a thoroughly unselfish man, a patriot, and one who cared about his country, not about the advancement of his family and his personal power, he would have been without comparison, the greatest man in history, but as it turned out, he was one of the worst. I never had any sympathy for him nor respect for his achievements, although, of course, I cannot but wonder at his marvelous genius."

When asked which two characters in history he despised the most, Grant answered "Robespierre and Napoleon."

And then of course, there was Beethoven, who dedicated his 3rd Symphony, "Eroica" to Napoleon, but when Napoleon declared himself emperor violently scratched out the dedication.

Cphe wrote: "Are you referring to faith?"

What a great question! How we arrive at principles is a big question, but for many people this is a matter of faith, or trust in something bigger than themselves, whether that is established religion, or the philosophic tradition, or science, or something more esoteric. For Nietzsche it seems to be purely personal, independent of all those things -- though this too may be a matter of trust. I guess the question is who you trust more : the traditions you encounter in life, or your own independent opinion, formed in whatever way it happens to form.

I still have problems with Nietzsche's ideas, but I'm beginning to appreciate his observations of human behavior.

Patrice wrote: "so true. any new idea, scientific or philosophical, is met with such intense resistance. people just love to cling to the familiar."

Some people. Others seem infatuated by any new idea they hear.

Again, this reminds me of Ayn Rand:

“…everything that raises the individual above the herd and makes the neighbor quail is henceforth called evil; the fair, modest, obedient, self-effacing disposition, the mean and average in desires, acquires moral names and honors." (Sect. 201)

Thomas wrote: I wonder though if there is any philosophical justification for this observation. It seems to me a matter of psychology -- in fact, almost everything of value (for me) in Nietzsche has a psychological basis, and almost nothing can be justified on the basis of principle..."

I keep thinking of Piaget and some of the other educational theorists. In Sect. 192 he talks about how we see a tree- not in its entirety as individual leaves, branches, etc. Instead we put it all together into the concept of "tree."

What makes me uneasy is that N seems to equate this kind of sense-making with fabrication/invention/lying when I think of it as... um.. learning(?) He also says "lying" instead of the other options I prefer. Is he using emotionally charged language just to goad me? To force me to see that "lying" isn't always "bad"?

By the way, I'm a total sucker for the way N takes me by the hand and brings me with him on a journey of such seeming-importance. The end of Part 1 is this crazy call to action reminding me to "Clench your teeth! Keep your eyes open! Keep a firm hand on the helm!" As we sail past morality.

Here in Part 5 (sect. 203) he's sweetly addressing me, dear reader, as though we are together, using these eyes of ours to see past the BS.

I don't usually like the 2nd person address, but N definitely makes it charming!

Ashley wrote: "I keep thinking of Piaget and some of the other educational theorists. In Sect. 192 he talks about how we see a tree- not in its entirety as individual leaves, branches, etc. Instead we put it all together into the concept of "tree."

What makes me uneasy is that N seems to equate this kind of sense-making with fabrication/invention/lying when I think of it as... um.. learning(?) "

The tree example is apt. I think N is arguing that for people who only know oaks and elms, a juniper is not a tree. The juniper doesn't fit the deciduous tree concept, and so the person for whom the juniper is truly a tree must fight the herd of oak and elm people for his juniper "truth." The oak and elm people of course will say that calling a juniper a tree is "lying."

Just as older generations used to say that jazz was just noise, not music, and then rock, and now hip hop. (Well, they might have a point about hip hop. And with that I reveal my age... )

By juniper "truth" I assume you mean gin. : )

Ashley wrote: "By juniper "truth" I assume you mean gin. : )"

Oy. Talk about a free spirit!

I've read this section, but I'm not prepared to comment just yet. I'm finding N. a slippery eel--enough so that I feel a constant need to retrace my steps up to this point. I started re-reading through chapter 1 this morning, and am surprised at how much more it seems to cohere to me.

I was particularly interested in what N. had said up to this point about the 'Will to Power', because my first assumption was that it meant gaining power over others. It seems to me now that N's idea meant more in the way of gaining power over oneself, and of throwing off the constraints that society imposes, especially when those constraints can be arbitrary (I'm sure everyone else has already understood this, as I'm rather late to the philosophy party). This arbitrariness is what N, to me, has spent the majority of the book showing, up to this point.

I'm not a Nietzsche apologist--considering the empirical observations he made about his time and the people around him, I think he is extremely insightful; the flip side is I think we've seen some of the results of throwing off 'arbitrary' constraints, evidence that--on the that scale we've seen--was not available to N. So I am not an advocate of throwing morality (traditional, arbitrary, what have you) out the window. I do think, though, that N. raises points that are worth looking at. It may not be a basis for society, but I think philosophical systems thought out on paper have a bad track record--look at the different utopian settlements attempted in the past in America; Marxism; etc. Think of what a living hell it would be to actually live in Plato's Republic, yet he's a cornerstone of Western Philosophy.

At this point, N. reminds me of the fellow in Plato's cave that was unchained and saw something different, and tried to come back and tell those still chained to their seats that they might be only looking at illusions.

Bryan wrote: "I've read this section, but I'm not prepared to comment just yet. I'm finding N. a slippery eel--enough so that I feel a constant need to retrace my steps up to this point. I started re-reading thr..."

I also find him slippery. Someone quotes him, and I say to myself, "Wait, did he say that?"

He doesn't hold back--Jews, Epicureans, Christians, Buddhists, liberal democrats, anarchists, socialists, utopians of any description.... By the time we get through 202, they've all been denounced as representing a degenerate order which has been sterilized of danger, courage, excellence, autonomy, etc. I found parts of his critique a bit reminiscent of early Dostoevskian writings against socialist techno-utopianism.

It's revealing that he calls Frederick II the first European to his taste--builder of a powerful state, militant opponent to Papal privilege, crusader, megalomaniac, intellectual, and a reputed atheist (he was both skeptical and sensuous for his age, though modern historians agree he was still in fact a committed Christian).

Some of Nietzsche's evaluations here may be 'trolling' the anti-Semites. So, if the Old Testament was degenerate compared with the New, N. says "au contraire."

If Frederick II was 'degenerate,' N. says he was an exemplar of manly Enlightenment.

(One thing I hope people don't forget about Frederick is his toleration of dissent.)

This started when he dedicated Human All-too Human to Voltaire, to signify his break with Wagner.

Christopher wrote: "If Frederick II was 'degenerate,' N. says he was an exemplar of manly Enlightenment.

(One thing I hope people don't forget about Frederick is his toleration of dissent.)...."

For those who don't have an annotated edition, it may be useful to point out that the Frederick II Nietzsche mentions here is not an eighteenth-century King of Prussia (Frederick the Great, a Hohenzollern), but a medieval Holy Roman Emperor, a Hohenstaufen, and a descendant of the Norman kings of Sicily, known as Stupor Mundi, Wonder of the World.

His court was notable for accepting, even welcoming, Jews and Muslims, and part of his army was made up of Sicilian Muslims. His relations with the Papacy were, not unexpectedly, complicated, initially good, later extremely bad.

He was also the author of a celebrated book on falconry.

There is a Nietzsche-influenced biography, Frederick the Second: 1194–1250, by Ernst Kantorowicz. (The English translation does not include the second volume, of documentation.) This is available on Amazon in a recent reprinting, which doesn't seem to be recognized by Goodreads.

For those who don't mind PDFs, there is a free copy on the Internet Archive (archive.org): see https://archive.org/details/frederick...

(As a side-note, the fantasy writer (among other things) E.R. Eddison had one of his fictional heroes write a multi-volume biography of the medieval emperor.)

Ian wrote: "Christopher wrote: "If Frederick II was 'degenerate,' N. says he was an exemplar of manly Enlightenment.

(One thing I hope people don't forget about Frederick is his toleration of dissent.)...."

..."

Oh, thanks Ian. I had no idea. *Never mind!*

In the opening post, Thomas says, "He says this proposition is "insipidly false and sentimental in a world whose essence is will to power." (186)

On what basis does he say that the world's essence is "will to power"? Or is this also to be taken as given?"

Back in para 36, N says, "Granted, finally, that we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification of one fundamental form of will--namely, the Will to Power, as my thesis puts it; granted that all organic functions could be traced back to the Will to Power, and that the solution of the problem of generation and nutrition--it is one problem--could also be found therein; one would thus have acquired the right to define all active force unequivocally as Will to Power.

By use of the word granted, I take it that he's asking us to follow along--in bits and pieces I think he gives hints as to what this Will to Power is, though I don't see it explicitly defined. The little outside reading I've done suggests that there is still a lot of push/pull over what N. actually meant by the phrase. Based only on what I've read here in BG&E, I interpret it (provisionally) to mean a universal urge within nature--including man--to increase, to have dominion over circumstances, to be more than he is at present.

The OP then suggests that para 188 answers this, but it strikes me that the most important part of that paragraph has not been addressed: namely what N regards as the essential and invaluable component to any system of morals: its long constraint. Here we are back to that tension--Moral systems actually bring out the best in mankind through constraint. "The singular fact remains, however, that everything of the nature of freedom, elegance, boldness, dance and masterly certainty, which exists or has existed...has only developed by means of the tyranny of such arbitrary law." He even repeats it, to emphasize--"The essential thing 'in heaven and earth' is, apparently [...] that there should be long obedience in the same direction, there thereby results, and has always resulted in the long run, something which has made life worth living." The emphasis here is not self-determination (yet), but that "The long bondage of the spirit, the distrustful constraint in the communicability of ideas, the discipline which the thinker imposed on himself to think in accordance with the rules of a church or a court, or conformable to Aristotelian premises, the persistent spiritual will to interpret everything that happened according to Christian scheme, and every occurrence to rediscover and justify the Christian God: --all this violence, arbitrariness, severity, dreadfulness and unreasonableness, has proved itself the disciplinary means whereby the European spirit has attained its strength, its remorseless curiosity and subtle mobility...This tyranny, this arbitrariness, this severe and magnificent stupidity, has educated the spirit..."

From this, N. derives the moral imperative of nature, "Thou must obey some one, and for a long time, otherwise thou wilt come to grief, and lose all respect for thyself"--which is not addressed to the individual but to the 'animal' man--the herd.

As you say, N goes on to explain how this instinctual imperative imposes customs and rites that serve to strengthen its hold on people, and how Plato helped knock aside the limit to instinct--reason--by declaring that they both sought the same thing, which allowed this instinct to triumph.

The next few paragraphs buttress the idea that a)fear is the mother of morals, and b) morality in Europe at present is a herding-animal morality--a morality designed to protect the community, but not necessarily offer anything to the individual. That morality up to that point had provided many good things, N is clear, but he seems remarkable prescient as to what happens when this kind of morality is allowed to continue to its logical conclusion. Thus his search for something ultra-moral.

Bryan wrote: " That morality up to that point had provided many good things, N is clear, but he seems remarkable prescient as to what happens when this kind of morality is allowed to continue to its logical conclusion. Thus his search for something ultra-moral. "

Great summary of the argument, and it makes sense to me up to this point. The free spirit must oppose conventional morality in order to develop and grow strong (there is a tacit assumption that one cannot be both conventional and independent, or conventional and strong) but when that strength reaches its maturity, it breaks free and.... what? What then? What is its purpose? How does it live?

Is it possible to live in an "ultra-moral" sense, without a sense of right and wrong, or does the free spirit create its own right and wrong based on its will to power? This would paradoxically be just another form of morality which other free spirits would resist, creating a endless cycle of struggle and resistance... Is this the conclusion he's leading to, or have I lost the thread somewhere?

Ashley wrote: "What makes me uneasy is that N seems to equate this kind of sense-making with fabrication/invention/lying when I think of it as... um.. learning(?) He also says "lying" instead of the other options I prefer. Is he using emotionally charged language just to goad me? To force me to see that "lying" isn't always "bad"? "

I suspect you’re right about this. When we moralize and brand something as “evil”, we’re suppressing something that we all have the capacity to do well, that is even beneficial — such as being an inventor, “one is much more of an artist than one knows,” Nietzsche says. And “artist” — the creator of something new and tasteful — sounds a lot like this “You Free Spirit” he’s cultivating and speaking to.

Patrice wrote: "a herd sounds worse. a herd just follows, like lemmings off a cliff. totally unthinking. a social animal cooperates, has conflicts, maintains some sense of itself.

i do believe we have some herd ..."

I think Nietzsche wants to keep the herd. Based on his portrait of “almost all human history” (BGE 199), “herds” of human beings who have felt the need to obey someone, something, have always been there. The point is not to eradicate them, but to clarify the herd-minded person as not the ideal type to be the legislator.

The herd is great for comfort, for stability, for standing still, for preservation; similar to what Chris was saying, the herd-mentality is not so great for creating anything new, for envisioning the future.

Thomas wrote: “Is it possible to live in an "ultra-moral" sense, without a sense of right and wrong, or does the free spirit create its own right and wrong based on its will to power? This would paradoxically be just another form of morality which other free spirits would resist, creating a endless cycle of struggle and resistance... Is this the conclusion he's leading to, or have I lost the thread somewhere?”

In the Preface to Dawn, Nietzsche says that morality is the greatest of all mistresses of seduction, and that all philosophers from Plato to Kant have been building “majestic moral structures” under its seduction. In BGE 29, Nietzsche calls independence the privilege of the strong, and conscience is the minotaur of the labyrinth that “torn piecemeal” the independent soul.

I think for Nietzsche, morality is the weapon of the herd. Morality wants to preserve the status quo. In BGE 62, Nietzsche calls human the uniquely yet undetermined animal, the problem with morality seems to be that it tends to fix the unfixed, to prefer stability so much it stifles change.

To become a free spirit requires you to sail past the Siren songs of morality and resist seduction. It’s comforting to stand with the herd, to share their opinions, their tastes. In Nietzsche’s present age (again, echoing Chris), morality sees the will to stand alone as dangerous (BGE 201), and what elevates one above the herd as evil. And I think that’s what it means to go beyond good and evil — not good and bad, but good and evil. Nietzsche isn’t against value judgments, Nietzsche is treating the charges of “evil” as hostile to Free Spirits, to the small population within a total economy of a healthy society whose task is to stand alone, to resist morality, resist old taste, and develop new ones.

Going back to your (rhetorical?) question, I think a FS knows what morality is, he just looks at it from outside the herd. He will probably want to develop new taste for the future human herd, the same way Homer subverted the pessimist taste of Hesiod; and Socrates subverted the life-affirmming taste of Homer; and Christianity subverted the taste for conquest and strength and heroism of the Masters; and Buddhism is ostensibly poised to subvert the post-Christian Europe. Tides do change, the herd will come to support different sets of value judgements, but it’s still FS’s job to stand outside of it in order to develop the ear to hear the new music, to develop the new taste.

Lia wrote: "Patrice wrote: "a herd sounds worse. a herd just follows, like lemmings off a cliff. totally unthinking. a social animal cooperates, has conflicts, maintains some sense of itself.

i do believe we..."

The herd is the great majority of humanity. It is not "good for" anything. Things are good because they are good for the herd. Or so I say.

I suppose Nietzsche would disagree. What does Nietzsche think things are good for? Free spirits?

Thomas wrote: "Is it possible to live in an "ultra-moral" sense, without a sense of right and wrong, or does the free spirit create its own right and wrong based on its will to power?..."

One of the things I'm not very clear about is N. meaning of 'ultra-moral'. On the one hand, the word itself immediately suggests that, yes, someone 'ultra' moral should be beyond morality as we have it now. But then I think of how N has described morality up to this point--essentially as articles of faith that people have had to go back and support with some kind of system or basis. So do we even have morality today? or is it really a collection of pragmatic solutions people have streamlined throughout the past that, at one time or another, has been useful for the social success of mankind? Or is that the same thing as morality? Either way, it seems N believes some people are capable of operating beyond this 'long constraint' (as it is now), but I haven't read enough to know what that would look like. It may be that he is simply identifying a weakness in previous systems--and at that, I think he is insightful. He could be advocating, as Lia points out, for a more efficient way of understanding right and wrong--if nature has imposed this moral imperative on mankind, it could be that N thinks we are at the point in our evolution where we could wrest this function out of nature's hands and assume the duties ourselves. If that's what he's shooting for, then I disagree with that idea. Again, as I mentioned above, I think we have access to empirical data that N didn't have, and we've seen what happens when groups set themselves up as the arbiters of morality.

At this point, I'm interested to keep reading--N seems to be very aware of certain psychological traits in mankind that I've not read in such a bold, critical presentation before. He hasn't answered all my questions, but he's certainly made me think about how I interpret the world around me, and, I would say, opened my eyes to some things as well.

Lia wrote: "And I think that’s what it means to go beyond good and evil — not good and bad, but good and evil. Nietzsche isn’t against value judgments, Nietzsche is treating the charges of “evil” as hostile to Free Spirits, to the small population within a total economy of a healthy society whose task is to stand alone, to resist morality, resist old taste, and develop new ones. "

I'm coming around to the idea that Nietzsche isn't against judgments, but I still don't see how they carry any "value." The free spirit objects to the standard by which any value may be judged, inasmuch as that is the standard of philosophers, or religion, or "the herd." He makes up his own standard, which is either a mark of genius or a complete catastrophe. Either way, his judgments have no intrinsic value -- they are worth only as much he wants them to be worth, and no one else is bound by them ... unless he imposes them on others. (And this seems to be inevitable, given the instinctive will to power. )

Bryan wrote: "At this point, I'm interested to keep reading--N seems to be very aware of certain psychological traits in mankind that I've not read in such a bold, critical presentation before. He hasn't answered all my questions, but he's certainly made me think about how I interpret the world around me, and, I would say, opened my eyes to some things as well. "

This is why I think he's worth reading. I usually try to discount an author's biography and psychology when reading a book, but I'm finding it irresistable now to understand the oppression and fear that he must have felt. When he says that " 'love of the neighbor' is always secondary... to 'fear of the neighbor' " (201) it reminds me of the Frost poem about fences. What is he walling in or walling out?

Thomas wrote: "I'm coming around to the idea that Nietzsche isn't against judgments, but I still don't see how they carry any "value." The free spirit objects to the standard by which any value may be judged, inasmuch as that is the standard of philosophers, or religion, or "the herd." He makes up his own standard, which is either a mark of genius or a complete catastrophe. Either way, his judgments have no intrinsic value -- they are worth only as much he wants them to be worth, and no one else is bound by them ... unless he imposes them on others. (And this seems to be inevitable, given the instinctive will to power. ) “

I’m convinced that Nietzsche isn’t against value-judgments. If you grab a free PDF and do a Ctrl+F, “value” pops up everywhere. I think it’s fair to say that Nietzsche presumes value is a thing, and an important part of his treatise.

Take BGE 203, for example:

We who have a different faith –, we who consider the democratic movement to be not merely an abased form of political organization, but rather an abased (more specifically a diminished) form of humanity, a mediocritization and depreciation of humanity in value : where do we need to reach with our hopes? – Towards new philosophers, there is no alternative; towards spirits who are strong and original enough to give impetus to opposed valuations and initiate a revaluation and reversal of “eternal values”; towards those sent out ahead; towards the men of the future…

He isn’t questioning “value” itself, only his contemporary dogmatists who treat their current valuation as eternal. And his project involves a re-valuation, value itself is at the center of his task.

Can values be non-eternal? I think Nietzsche is especially critical of the privileging of timeless ultimate final truth that vilifies any challenge to its dogma (as “evil”.) What if value is what humans give to what’s plonked out there — nature, neighbors, gin, truth — and humans are unfixed animals, ergo, values can be a coherent, meaningful concept, but its content changes with its community.

Like depending on your nation’s sense of security against outside invaders, the community’s beliefs about “right” attitudes towards their neighbors change! Right now there are scholars worried about a generation of youths whom have never experienced cold war and are meh about democracy.

And if Nietzsche diagnosed the west as no longer able to believe in the “truth” of metaphysics, christianity, and he asks us to reconsider whether Herodotus was right about man as the “measure of things”… (BGE 3)

Well, let’s see, if we were to throw away a priori assess to “knowledge”, and we were to throw away the gods, have we thrown away all outside standards then? What’s left but “man?”

Yes, Nietzsche was not rejecting values as such -- just (mostly) the values officially sanctioned by Christian Europe, and usually ignored by those who thought they could get away with it.

When, at the end of his working life, Nietzsche abandoned the projected book "The Will to Power," sometimes subtitled "Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values," he started on another work, as just "The Revaluation of All Values." It was supposed to have four parts, of which he finished one, "The Antichrist."

(When his sister got control of his papers, she reinstated the more aggressive title of "The Will to Power," and, with the editorial help of others, filled it with selected notes, and even discarded drafts for books already published. When she finally published "Antichrist," she added to the confusion by calling it Part One of "The Will to Power," a label dropped in later editions.)

Nietzsche seems to have had the idea that he could come up with a value system more in tune with basic human psychology, as summed up in the Will to Power, instead being derived from the characteristics of special individuals, as, in his opinion, Christianity was based on the psychological needs of Jesus. (He was also unhappy with the priest-promoting caste system of Hinduism, summed up in "The Law of Manu," one of the few works on Dharma that was available in translation.)

198 & 199:

N is good at pointing out flaws and hypocrisy, but he either doesn't see, or sees, but ignores, what's right about what he's picking apart. I find his Will to Power, his free spirit, to be a lot like a half-baked ideology that works better in the vacuum of the ideolog's mind than in real life where it must face the forces of practical consequences.

N. derides morality as practiced because it favors the herd at the expense of the free spirit, which the herd fears. He claims this entire system of rules has been invented by the herd to eliminate the free spirit from expressing itself in its midst. For the sake of argument, let's say this is so. Has he considered the possibility that the herd has developed morality because it well knows what a malignant free spirit is capable of doing when there are no rules it is willing or must live by?

And there is a more important reason for morality. What N. calls obedience is the social animal making compromises to live and work together because he knows he's better off in the herd than living alone. To organize, to cooperate, to build sophisticated and complex societies, people must trust one another, and isn't morality a set of rules that we agree to follow (most of us, most of the time) so that we can trust one another?

How do we trust these free spirits if they won't agree to the rules? How do they trust one another? Do they all live alone like hermits and act like Highlanders when they cross one other's path?

Morality is always a work in progress, and its practitioners can be quite hypocritical, but on balance isn't it a net plus, or wouldn't we abandon it and live like Free Spirits? Aren't we better off not being free spirits? How does this Free Spirit even feed itself?

N. misses the point that the herd isn't just how we survive, but how we thrive.

If Nietzsche the pontificating academic ever came up against a real over-man who rejected all conventional morality in favor of his own will to power . . . he'd get squished like a bug.

Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "N. misses the point that the herd isn't just how we survive, but how we thrive...."

I'm not sure--I think he stated pretty clearly that morality gave the world everything that's worth living for. It seems to me that he's saying that morality should evolve.

Christian morality was kind of a surprise to the prevailing ideas at the time--I think one could say as Christianity took root, morality evolved into something different than it had been before. And it was the 'long constraint' which men operated under while Christianity was a powerful force that molded them to rise above what they would have been capable of had they not had to resist this 'tension'.

But, to N.'s eyes, Christianity had been overcome. What's going to take its place? Anarchy? Nihilism? He seems to reject that. He also sees democracy as not the answer--and I do think I can see elements of his forecast in our society now. (That's going to depend a lot on a person's worldview. Others may not see a problem at all). I think he's leading up to a way of replacing the old morality (which he saw as fading away anyway), with something that went beyond good and evil. But there were only certain people who would be able to see this need and be able to formulate the next step in the evolution of morals--and that would be the free spirits.

(This is more or less off-the-cuff. I'm still trying to formulate what I think N is trying to say, but I'm really enjoying everyone's input, because it makes me think harder about what I think about it.)

Lia wrote: "And if Nietzsche diagnosed the west as no longer able to believe in the “truth” of metaphysics, christianity, and he asks us to reconsider whether Herodotus was right about man as the “measure of things”… (BGE 3)

Well, let’s see, if we were to throw away a priori assess to “knowledge”, and we were to throw away the gods, have we thrown away all outside standards then? What’s left but “man?” "

I agree. I think he is asking us to reconsider Platonic ideals or a priori concepts, but I don't think he considers the social consequences of validating competing schemes of subjectivism. Or perhaps he does...

But without going into the political ramifications, perhaps I should first ask how anyone knows, subjectively, after throwing out objectivity and the a priori, that he is wrong about anything? How do I know that my subjectivity is right, and your subjectivity is wrong? How do we resolve our differences without either "leveling" or throwing down the gauntlet? (I can't seem to avoid the political here... it just seems to me that the "philosophy" of Protagoras leads inexorably to the politics of Thrasymachus. I will admit that I find this troubling.)

Thomas wrote: "perhaps I should first ask how anyone knows, subjectively, after throwing out objectivity and the a priori, that he is wrong about anything? How do I know that my subjectivity is right, and your subjectivity is wrong?..."

William James would say pragmatism. But pragmatism as he initially conceived it, not what it morphed into

Bryan wrote: "Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "N. misses the point that the herd isn't just how we survive, but how we thrive...."

I'm not sure--I think he stated pretty clearly that morality gave the world everything..."

Where does Nietzsche say morality gave the world everything worth living for? I thought he viewed morality as a stern upbringing that toughened up humanity, but now can be discarded. Is that it?

Bryan wrote: "I'm not sure--I think he stated pretty clearly that morality gave the world everything that's worth living for. It seems to me that he's saying that morality should evolve."

I don't recall N saying it gave the world everything ... but it wouldn't surprise me if he did say it. He does contradict himself. Whether he said that or not, N does despise the collective morality the herd practices to protect itself. Since N is a Free Spirit advocate, If he believes morality must evolve, then he must believe it must evolve to accommodate the Free Spirit.

Since the Free Spirit and Will to Power are highly individual and subjective ideas, the new morality must be highly individual and subjective. Each Free Spirit would practice his own form of morality and, therefore, would always be in conflict with the herd's. I see no way the Free Spirit can exist within the herd, and I see no way a Free Spirit is better off without it. N's whole philosophy seems self-defeating to me. Where he goes wrong, I think, is with his hatred for the herd. We are social animals. This is fundamental to our being.

By the way, does anyone besides me think the Free Spirit would live a very lonely life? Didn't N live a very lonely life?