Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Nietzsche returns to the subject of philosophy in Book 6. He has no respect for most philosophers and scientists, believing that they have reduced philosophy to "mere knowledge." I think part of his argument is that "herd" philosophers rely on received knowledge, which impedes their creativity and development. (205) He goes on to declare that "the objective man is indeed a mirror: he is accustomed to submit before whatever wants to be known, without any other pleasure than that found in knowing and "mirroring;..." (207)

The objective ideal seems to be something to be used as a tool by the more powerful; i.e. the powerful are not complacent with objective knowlege but are instead called to creativity. Toward the end of the chapter he says as much when he distinguishies the "philosophical laborer" from the "genuine philosopher": the genuine philosopher goes beyond the laboring of logic or political or moral thought to actually create values.

Genuine philosophers, however, are commanders and legislators: they say "thus it shall be!" [...] Their "knowing" is creating, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is -- will to power.(211)

Is he substituting truth for power? Do I have this right?

It would be nice if Nietzsche would give us some examples of what he means by "genuine philosophy," or an example of a value that has been created by a genuine philosopher. Perhaps this is not yet known because such philosophers do not exist yet. In any case they seem to be an unknown quantity:

What a philosopher is, that is hard to learn because it cannot be taught: one must "know it, from experience -- or one should have the pride not to know it. (213)

He says that the genuinely philosophical combination is one of exuberant spirituality and dialectical severity. He says then that "artists seem to have more sensitive noses in these matters," which makes sense given that his philosophy is grounded in subjectivity and executed by will to power.

I find his nod to artists intriguing because so much of this work strikes me as aspiring to an aesthetic excellence rather than a philosophical one. His poeticism, his wit, his emotional disdain for the ordinary -- even his dashes -- all seem to be to aspire to beauty. He speaks of ideas having smells (and the artist has a more sensitive nose.) Truth is seductive. Subjectivity is the realm of the artist; as such, a free spirit must be beautiful. But how does dancing relate to the art of command?

Again, N. seems to be talking about our time as much as his own.

The declaration of independence of the scientific man, his emancipation from philosophy, is one of the subtler after-effects of democratic organization and disorganization: the self-glorification and self-conceitedness of the learned man is now everywhere in full bloom, and in its best springtime—which does not mean to imply that in this case self-praise smells sweet. Here also the instinct of the populace cries, “Freedom from all masters!” and after science has, with the happiest results, resisted theology, whose “hand-maid” it had been too long, it now proposes in its wantonness and indiscretion to lay down laws for philosophy, and in its turn to play the “master”—what am I saying! to play the philosopher on its own account.
[...]
On one occasion it was the specialist and the Jack Horner who instinctively stood on the defensive against all synthetic tasks and capabilities; at another time it was the industrious worker who had got a scent of otium and refined luxuriousness in the internal economy of the philosopher, and felt himself aggrieved and belittled thereby. On another occasion it was the color-blindness of the utilitarian, who sees nothing in philosophy but a series of refuted systems, and an extravagant expenditure which “does nobody any good.” At another time the fear of disguised mysticism and of the boundary-adjustment of knowledge became conspicuous, at another time the disregard of individual philosophers, which had involuntarily extended to disregard of philosophy generally.

[...]
After all, how could it be otherwise? Science flourishes nowadays and has the good conscience clearly visible on its countenance, while that to which the entire modern philosophy has gradually sunk, the remnant of philosophy of the present day, excites distrust and displeasure, if not scorn and pity Philosophy reduced to a “theory of knowledge,” no more in fact than a diffident science of epochs and doctrine of forbearance a philosophy that never even gets beyond the threshold, and rigorously denies itself the right to enter—that is philosophy in its last throes, an end, an agony, something that awakens pity. How could such a philosophy—rule!

Christopher wrote: "On one occasion it was the specialist and the Jack Horner..."

Kaufmann simply renders the phrase "Sometimes it was the specialist and nook dweller...."

I'm not sure what translation you are using: I assume that the reader is supposed to recall the nursery rhyme which tells us that "Little Jack Horner sat in a corner." I doubt that this has a precise German equivalent: I have yet to find the line in a (Kindle) German edition, but there don't seem to be any proper names, except Schopenhauer, in the passage. (I no longer have even the limited vocabulary I once acquired.)

Whoever was responsible was clever, but it is pretty opaque for the reader who doesn't remember the verse, or never encountered it as a child. (Fortunately, Wikipedia has an article on the subject.)

Just thinking out loud — if I were to read the Platonic soul into this — Sophia used to be the highest ruling component that organizes the other drives within the human soul. But Sophia has since been tamed, downgraded, like Hecuba.

The love of wisdom used to be a thing of beauty, it was driven by eros, the highest form of human activity. Now, it’s a mere academic faculty (and an inconsequential one at that, toady of the sciences.) The academic institution of philosophy demands objectivity, stripped of personal biases, passions, “values.” Philosophers used to apprehend things that are “just there” being meaningless, and bestow values to these things, they brought values into an otherwise dreary, indifferent world. Today, philosophers discipline themselves to be free from such creative acts, they submit to the demand to be indifferent.

Ian wrote: "Christopher wrote: "On one occasion it was the specialist and the Jack Horner..."

Kaufmann simply renders the phrase "Sometimes it was the specialist and nook dweller...."

I'm not sure what trans..."

Ian, I am using the Zimmern translation. I have not done a detailed comparison of Zimmern and Kaufmann, but I believe WK beat down the early 'amateur' translators more than they (some of them) deserved.

Here is the sentence in German:

Bald war es der Spezialist und Eckensteher, der sich instinktiv überhaupt gegen alle synthetischen Aufgaben und Fähigkeiten zur Wehre setzte; bald der fleissige Arbeiter, der einen Geruch von otium und der vornehmen Üppigkeit im Seelen-Haushalte des Philosophen bekommen hatte und sich dabei beeinträchtigt und verkleinert fühlte. Bald war es jene Farben-Blindheit des Nützlichkeits-Menschen, der in der Philosophie Nichts sieht, als eine Reihe widerlegter Systeme und einen verschwenderischen Aufwand, der Niemandem "zu Gute kommt".

eta: from BGE 204- the first paragraph in "We Scholars."

Lia wrote: "Today, philosophers discipline themselves to be free from such creative acts, they submit to the demand to be indifferent. ..."

Lia, isn't Nietzsche saying more than this? That the 'philosophers' of today (his day and ours) aren't really up to the task. OF COURSE they want limits to what philosophers are capable of 'knowing,' because they themselves are limited.

The 'inner chambers' are guarded by doors which cannot be battered down. Whereas practically anyone can become a (mere) scientist.

I bet he is saying more than that, when I wrote that comment I was only reflecting on Thomas’ prompt on the objective ideal.

Have we reduced philosophical activities to pure cognition/ rationality, with no eye on targetting some value? Have we exiled the other parts of the soul, the balancing (ruling? governing?) of the appetitive and the phronesis and the nous and sophia and techne and episteme and what not from the philosophy department?

The thing we call philosopher today are no longer up to the task, but they are still part of Nietzsche’s program, they have a subservient role to play, they are a kind of slave to ... to what? The tyrant-artist?

I usually I have to read these chapters two or three times before I feel competent enough to comment on them--but para 212 struck me as interesting--"the philosopher...has ever found himself...in contradiction to the day in which he lives; his enemy has always been the ideal of the day. Hitherto all those extraordinary furtherers of humanity whom on calls philosophers...have found their mission...in being the bad conscience of their age." The implication being that the real philosopher is always leading the way toward an evolution of current ideals. This seems to lend credence to the idea that N was in BG&E outlining a way that new philosophers would also lead the way to a new conception of the world and it's values.

As the philosophers lead the world to new ideas, are these new ideas better than the old ideas, or just different?

Roger wrote: "As the philosophers lead the world to new ideas, are these new ideas better than the old ideas, or just different?"

Well, I would think N would say "different." But... " - experience always means bad experience, does it not?- "
BGE sect. 204

Note the expressive dashes.

What is with N's nay-saying of skeptics in sect. 208? I understand that N embraces the affirmation of life - Yes! Encore!- and he sees skeptics as actively denying life with their No. But... aren't we supposed to be questioning (i.e. skeptical of) that which comes before?

By sect. 210 I begin to understand he may have been setting up a contrast between skeptics and critics. The critic applies rationale. (Is that it?) Subtleties. Oh, bother.

Roger wrote: "As the philosophers lead the world to new ideas, are these new ideas better than the old ideas, or just different?"

The better ideas are the more authentic ones, and authenticity is inborn. I think Nietzsche believes that christian moralists, scientists, and enlightenment philosophers have restrained and inhibited the talents and achievements of his contemporary geniuses, those with natural talent and inborn greatness.

For every high world one must be born; or to speak more clearly, one must be cultivated for it: a right to philosophy -- taking that word in its great sense -- one has only by virtue of one's origins; one's ancestors, one's 'blood' decide here, too. 213

The great man is the opposite of the herd animal -- "He shall be greatest who can be loneliest, the most concealed, the most deviant, the human being beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues..." 212

If the new philosophy makes this elite practitioner harder and more severe, more elevated, more inspired, then these new ideas will be "better". For that individual, anyway.

I think what Nietzsche was saying, as the bad conscience of his time was that, far from making progress- and "the idea of progress" in the 19th C. was considered indisputable. (cf. "The Proud Tower," The Idea of Progress An inguiry into its origin and growth (a very bad book), et al.)- that the tendency of the 19th C was NOT toward progress but toward degeneracy.

Philosophy in particular, was consciously in decline- the very name of Duehring is a joke, right? Landmarks of Scientific Socialism "Anti-Duehring"- much like Carnap in the 20th C.- philosophy was renouncing all the 'errors' of the previous 2,000 years.

I think some of his "Christianity bad, Christianity good" is likewise trolling the free spirits who wanted to throw out the 'insupportable' parts of Christianity, and yet keep the "peace to men of goodwill," "love thy neighbor," and so on... au contraire, says N.- Christianity was good discipline for the finest minds- a few centuries in a monastery, and you will be able to count angels on the head of a pin (although he doesn't say this, exactly).

But Nietzsche also says here somewhere (and also in The Gay Science(, that every new idea is regarded as evil at first.

"He shall be greatest who can be loneliest, the most concealed, the most deviant, the human being beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues..." 212

Is this not the description of a psychopath?

Roger wrote: ""He shall be greatest who can be loneliest, the most concealed, the most deviant, the human being beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues..." 212

Is this not the description of a psychopath?"

Perhaps, but not necessarily. Most criminals are described in this way by those who hold the political power to create and enforce laws, but that does not mean their laws are true or just.

For example, the historical Jesus of Nazareth could be described as deviant and concealed, at times lonely, someone who set himself beyond the standards of good and evil established by his community. That is from the viewpoint of his persecutors, of course, but from that viewpoint Jesus could be seen as a psychopath. An old Jesuit used to tell us in class that Jesus was either the Son of God or a madman. There's some validity to that statement.

On the other hand, it's not unusual for "true" deviants and psychopaths to justify their actions this way. There are plenty of people in prison for heinous crimes who think themselves "masters of virtue" and "beyond good and evil." Just ask a public defender or forensic psychologist. (Best to do this after a few drinks. Also best that you pick up the tab.)

Yes. It reminds me that Leopold and Loeb purportedly strangled their roommate to prove they were supermen.

But that was "trial of the century" sensationalism.

Does a psychopath really feel lonely?

I suppose the idea was in the air around certain circles that a "great man" could dispense with "traditional morality." Raskolnikov and Nietzsche took the idea to its logical conclusion, the former in action, the latter in thought.

Ashley, Nietzsche doubts philosophers wrote what they meant; questions the possibility of truth (or “being” for that matter), it’s hard to imagine Nietzsche being against skepticism-as-such.

Kaufmann says this in a footnote:

27 It is essential for understanding Nietzsche to realize that he is not "for" or "against" skepticism, but that he analyzes one type of skepticism with disdain (section 208) before describing another with which he clearly identifies himself. It is equally characteristic that when he joins his countrymen In admiration of Frederick the Great, he pays tribute to him not for his exploits and conquests but rather for his skepticism, and that his praise of “tough virility" is aimed at the sublimated spiritual version found, for example, in philologists and historians.

And I agree — Nietzsche isn’t against skepticism in itself, just like Nietzsche isn’t against religion, or valuation (“pre-judgments”), or “truth” ... he’s simply against certain version or definition or conception of what religion / truth is, or what it means to be skeptical.

Specifically, because skepticism is one important constitution of Free Spirits, I think he’s clarifying how skepticism IS popularly being misused: to avoid annoying everybody, to avoid being seen as dangerous, to use it as poppy for good sleep, for quiet peace and security, because they are too delicate, too frightened, too answerable to their conscience, too afraid to Yes-saying that goes against their morality.

I think he’s warning his FS: don’t be *that guy* who misuses skepticism to excuse indecisiveness, to become satisfied with skepticism itself as consolation. Merely being skeptical is by no means enough, his FS will still have to decisively affirm.

Nietzsche tends to attack concepts that are important to his project: because he’s going to recruit the service of religion, truth, skepticism, scholars, value — he attacks them all, in order to “purify” them for new-and-improved repurposing, I think. In this case, he’s attacking “weak” skepticism, but affirming a stronger kind.

Patrice.. The penny drops.