Philosophy discussion

Hello,
I have just begun reading Being and Nothingness by Sartre and have not found adequate definitions for percipi, percipere, and percipiens. I have been able to grasp the point through context as well as applying the meaning from its identification in Berkeley's quote "Esse est percipi" but I am hoping someone here might be able to clarify these terms which he analyzes in the first section of the book.
Thanks

I'd also like to use this thread as a spring board into conversation of Being and Nothingness or Sartre in general for those interested.

I have a pack of notes I wrote in the margins of my copy. Percipere I've rendered as "knowing." Percipi I've read as "the known," as in the appearance. Percipiens I rendered as "the knower."

Where Sartre's English translation says (the) "being known," I've substituted (the attitude of) "knowing" because it makes more sense. However, other posters may be able to express the concepts more accurately than I can. To pick up on what Iri said, I think much of the technical language is particular to Sartre's existentialism, so it's hard to refer to the terms the way Hegel or Berkeley used them.

Part of the difficulty is the English translation. I think it must be much clearer in French grammar which direction the action of the verb is going in, so we English speakers have to read each statement much closer.

I'm guessing that you're reading The Pursuit of Being at the beginning?

Thanks, too, for the book suggestion. I didn't even know there was a commentary, and Being and Nothingness is worth it. Here's the link:

http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/30...

Iri wrote: "also see Joseph S. Catalano's commentary on Being and Nothing..."
Thanks for this also. I have long found Being and Nothingness useful, but I have a notion I must revisit it.

Tyler wrote: "I have a pack of notes I wrote in the margins of my copy. Percipere I've rendered as "knowing." Percipi I've read as "the known," as in the appearance. Percipiens I rendered as "the knower."

..."

Yes, these questions stem from the intro, Pursuit of Being. Your notes correlate to what I jotted down in the margin, so I feel better about how I'm understanding the section. I did, however, think of percipi as perceivable, or knowable rather than the known.

I'm going to take this book slow. I've reread the intro, Pursuit of Being already just to ensure my progress. Today it had me thinking about certain things from The Critique of Pure Reason so I spent the day at the park rereading sections of that book. I am somewhat unsure if I should have started on this and not read Being and Time. I listened to some audio lectures on Heidegger but haven't read him. I was very awestruck by Sartre so I went immidiately for Being and Nothingness.

I know a lifetime can be spent on one thinkers philosophy but I am a stick and move reader, gleaning all I can from what motivates and intrigues me. I'm hoping my diverse understanding of philosophy will equip me for such a book.

One of the difficulties with Being and Nothingness is that Sartre didn't rewrite things to make them clearer. I can recall my professor castigating the seminar one day when I suppose we were delivering rather lackluster participation. He began with, "This is nothing new! He's just coming at the same issue again from a slightly different angle."
I began to see the book clearly after that.
Indeed, I think the secret to not only reading but understanding this tome is to accept that which he is saying rather than trying to see the big picture immediately. In fact I recall that it was well into half the book before it began to gel and become much easier.
There is a tendency, of course, to resist and examine closely that which is new and strange. I think it best, especially with this, to allow it to make sense on its own, allowing the book to come to you, as it were. Sartre was clearly not a good editor and even once or twice maintained that he never rewrote anything in this book but merely wrote more. Whether this was a mere boast or not, this idea helped me to understand him much better and especially the breaking of new ground for which he was primarily responsible.
Of course Latin grammar often aids one in this study,
but I think that percipiens is best understood as the one who is perceiving rather than an abstract act. The concept of perception is very delicate here and the reader should understand the subtleties between, say, this and cognoscere, intelligere and even sentire or videre.
It is also worthwhile to view what he says here as a stage for Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception a few years later.

I think it best, especially with this, to allow it to make sense on its own, allowing the book to come to you, as it were. before it began to gel and become much easier.

That works for me. I think it was in the chapter Bad Faith that I began realizing just how extraordinary the book really is. I wouldn't have seen that only from the preceding chapter.

I've wondered about the way Sartre put this book together. It reminds me a little of Kant. When people remarked about The Critique of Pure Reason, he said that if anyone could find an easier way to say it, then let them.

With Sartre, what's interesting is that he wrote the book in the middle of a major war. He must have been thinking just how much time he might have to get this idea organized into something systematic. Some time I'd like to find out more about exactly how he wrote it.

Interestingly, I've found that every paragraph ultimately makes sense if you read it closely enough, and each idea expressed seems necessary. But doing this takes time and motivation.

I can't think of many philosophy books I've read that have a spirit, but this is one. Because of that I, too, agree it's far more important to let the spirit of the book take hold the first time than to try to upend every sentence in it.

The actual difficulty seems to be the technical terms. Not only is the dictionary in back nearly useless, but even where Sartre borrows terms from other philosophers, he doesn't use them the same way. The best ad hoc solution (if you haven't read the commentary, that is!) is to work out the meanings contextually.

It is also worthwhile to view what he says here as a stage for Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception a few years later.

That's an interesting point. I haven't read Merleau-Ponty yet, and now I have a good incentive.

The concept of perception is very delicate here and the reader should understand the subtleties

Fortunately, Sartre goes at this from every angle, and includes many examples. Once he starts breaking down the in-itself-for-itself, the role of perception becomes clearer, even if his terminology does not.

i've not finish Being and Nothingness, but so far it does make sense. I think i need to re-read it for me to give a certain insight about the text. I regret that i don't know French, it might be better really to read the exact text

Ok, so I put this book down and read a few backround materials. I came back much more prepared and started from the translators intro (which I skipped the first time around). I'm glad to have spent closer attention to the transl's intro and Sartre's intro because it was very helpful.

Now, this book is beginning to POP for me. I'm around page 150, amidst the 2nd section of the book. I still have difficulty with the idea of negation to an extent, the idea of freedom in anguish, and some of the twisted terms. in particular there are some Greek terms which I can even begin to find answers to?!?!

Anyone know what this is, E with a squiggle on top of it, the symbol for pi, O, X, n with an accent mark above it and a longer leg on right side?

The repetition gets crazy but is extremely helpful in understanding the point he is making with being-for-itself and being-in-itself, consciousness (of) being is consciousness (of) being. I get a kick out of reading tens of pages, getting the idea, then reading a sentence to my wife which standing alone makes absolutely no sense at all, but to me it makes profound sense! Not as a way of making fun of her but as a way of realizing that I took certain words and ideas for granted, and how they can mean so much more when described in great detail. Describing the obvious is harder then it sounds!

Hi Brian --

The word you're reading is "epoche" in English, and it's in the dictionary at back, referring to the "bracketing" of consciousness. Another term that will later appear in Greek is "hexis," which refers to (the ancient Greek concept of) virtue.

Does you book include the chapter on Bad Faith?

Personally, I think the freedom in anguish part is a bit overdone by Sartre -- I for one, am not all that "anguished," at least after my first awareness of it. But as a rule, I suppose people spend their lives trying to escape freedom. Yet as Sartre says, you're not free not to be free.

Of course, you know that negation (nihilation) is the basis of abstraction (hence, consciousness) in a world that would otherwise be rock-solid being. Okay, referring again to margin notes, I wrote:

"Negation -- Often understood as a quality of propositional judgments,is actually a relation of being, and transphenomenal." I noted several of Sartre's descriptions of it: "An original and irreducible event; a break in continuity; an act; a detachment; a bond of being between object and for-itself; a priori; facticity, unreflective." The important point Sartre makes is that negation is an aspect of being itself (transphenomenal), and does not stand over and opposite to being (as one might naively suppose). I hope this puts a little more light on it.

I also notated "external negation" as roughly equivalent to a deterministic act, and "internal negation" as the pure for-itself.

My own favorite read-aloud sentence here is: "[The for-itself:] is the being that, in its being, is not what it is and is what it's not." It makes perfect sense -- as long as you've read Sartre!

Tyler wrote: "Does you book include the chapter on Bad Faith?"

Yes it is chapter two of part one. I read it already and found it troubling. it was troubling because it has a truth to it that seems to run into a vicious circle for me.

What I mean is, to use the waiter example, the waiter recognizes he is not what he is and so becomes what he is not. he plays the part of the waiter rather than being the water. What troubles me is that being the waiter and reflecting on what it means to be the waiter are the same thing because in order to be the waiter the waiter must partake in the being-for-itself of waiterness. When he reflects on the fact that he is being a waiter he is just confirming what he has come to know as being a waiter even before he reflected on being a waiter.

Is bad faith confirmation of being? If so that seems a tautology by Sartre, because the being-in-itself of waitering has the same outward appearence as being for the waiter and only consciousness of it separates the two. Ultimately the consciousness of waitering is just a facet of being a waiter and contributes nothing to the being of the waiter. I say this because the waiter could be conscious of the food getting cold and knowing it needs to get to the table quickly, so he quickens his step, "a little too quick" as Sartre would call it. If the waiter takes a moment to reflect on being a waiter for-itself, it really makes no difference because being a waiter in-itself was when he was conscious of the cooling plate. this consciousness is still the same as the one that reminds him to be conscious of being a waiter because being a waiter carries the duties of "assure the food does not cool".

The consciousnes of being for the waiter is all about fulfilling waiter duties, one of which is reflecting on waiterness. Calling it bad faith seems like Sartre has some privileged access to how the waiter is operating and interacting with the world and is able to categorize these actions in a system where the definition carries the baggage word of "bad". I just don't see consciousness as a steady stream but rather a flickering flourescent bulb. the bulb actually flickers on and off but at such a speed that it appears everything is continuously illuminated. If being itself of waiter is getting the food before it cools amounts to light off, reflecting on being a waiter is light on. I don't think we can continuously reflect on being in a steady stream. It seems that being requires consciousness and confirmation of consciousness in such quick succession that it appears a stream. I don't know if he addresses this idea. the next chapter is called temporality. The circular nature which i mentioned is the fact that these two conscious states are not the same conciousness intention, but why should that matter? Consciousness is consciousness of something whether it is the cooling food or reflecting on waiterness.

I feel like I understood the message conveyed in this section. I also feel I need to complete the book to gain a totality of bad faith understanding. As of now i'm looking at bad faith as positional intentionality, as in the direction which consciousness places itself either on the need of the action (getting the cooling food out to custy) and how the physical form is handling the operation (the too quick walk). Walking too quick gets tips after all right!

Thanks for the definition. Epoche was in glossary but no footnote indicated the Greek syntax was Epoche. Hexis came out early in the book and was defined. I don't know what the deal was with epoche?

Hi all,

As once Descartes said "Cogito Ergo Sum." The humans have this realization deep-welded into their bones. So, even if they actually face the most real thing that can be an abundant or in the scarcest form of existence. They will start thinking about it and will try to decipher or try to peel it off.

The truth most of the time is reality is simple (the simplest form it can get). The problem is our mind. We philosophers can never be a being, but can only think to be or not to be a being.

Most of the time, when I am thiking, I have wondered whether the term or the coinage of the term "metaphysical" just signifies an analysis of the other truth or whether it is the observation in silence that matters.

When one states "I think, therefore I am" it means he is a thought. But if the statement is altogether altered and is stated as "I be, therefore I is" it gives an altogether different understanding of the term metaphysical. Of lately, I came to believe in a concept that is neither new nor is old. It is never the thought that is important but being itself.

I think what Sartre is doing is separating the being of the role of waiter from the being of the for-itself, then arguing that a consiousness is not reducible to its social roles. Intrestingly, I'm currently reading a Marxist-leaning book that disputes this point, but I like Sartre's analysis better. The role, then is an in-itself, not a for-itself, and this is why the two are incommensurable, and why we can only "play at" our functions in society.


Is bad faith confirmation of being?

Bad Faith is evasion or self-deception. In existentialism, it is the closest one gets to committing a moral wrong, but it is almost impossible to avoid. The danger of bad faith is that it will become a lifestyle of thought. The example of the waiter is to show that in truth, one can't say, "I am a waiter." One can properly say only, "I play at being a waiter." But that, of course, is a very narrow point.

The reflectivity or positional intentionality discussion is clearer if we look at the example of the coquette who leaves her hand on the table. The fact is, she does, on some level of consciousness (I forgot if it's reflective or pre-reflective) understand what the touch implies, but she employs bad faith to ignore it -- a kiss is only a kiss, right? Likewise the friend who urges his companion to confess his sexual deviancy so as to grant him a kind of expiation: The friend is in bad faith because he (knows he) cannot really do it; he can only play at the role of friend/confessor. His companion with the problem is ultimately on his own, alienated.

You're right: Bad faith will pop up later in the book, especially in connection with a discussion of Freud's psychoanalysis.

Hi Zealot --

... stated as "I be, therefore I is" it gives an altogether different understanding of the term metaphysical...

I've wondered if "I think, therefore I am" might be better stated "I am, therefore I think"

Wasn't that Socrates that coined that phrase. I think therefore I am?

It was Rene Descartes, Robin.

okay, got my philosophers mixed up.

I read " The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre edited and introduced by Robert Denoon Cumming (1965) this year which had about 250 pages of Being and Nothingness in a text of about 500 pages. I won't join your discussion as I have enough on my plate but will read and learn. If you want more Sartre, I think you would enjoy Sartre's Roads of Freedom Series . The first two volumes were written in 1945. The last volume which was never completed was published in 1949 in French but is now available in English with a section on the difficulty of translation and other academic notes (2009) ( From the back cover: In these pages , the roads of freedom take an interesting turn, unveiling Sartre's own trajectory with regards to the concepts of freedom and commitment." The book was translated by Craig Vasey.

After reading the above comments I found it interesting that the translator in his introduction quoted Sartre in his first paragraph.

" I have been hoping to clear up the misunderstandings that those who read badly spread among those who don't read." I think your forum her is excellent. Hope to learn a lot.

One thing I'd like to warn readers about is to avoid this edition of B&N:

Being And Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology

The reason is that the second chapter has been left out. This is the chapter on bad faith, one of the most important ideas in Sartre's existentialism. I mentioned this in Glen's review of Sartre's novels, but it bears repeating here. A proper edition of Being and Nothingness can run 725 pages or more.