I have moved it here in its own topic of discussion, Moral Agency for consistency, clarity, and so others may follow along, contribute and comment. If you need any guidance on how to post a topic, please refer to: How do I add a discussion thread to a folder in a group?
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Loving the conversation, guys. <3 <3 <3
I think everyone loves (or at least ‘likes’) their echo chambers and ‘preaching it to the choir’ (due to cognitive biases), but I must say that conversations which I find myself disagreeing are better for my betterment. I am bound to enjoy them more and they (hopefully) allow me to grow. I cannot learn anything from someone who thinks just like I do.
I’ll start with Jamie’s text, which BTW I enjoyed quite a lot. Here, I will assume that both of us accept that there are objective moral values and that there is just a thing as objective justice. (That is, I will not dwell upon moral ontology, epistemology nor linguistics.) Though I have may inquires, I still am puzzled by some of the aspects of his utilitarianism, their consequences and implications. I’ll focus on two points to keep it short. (Also, because at least some of the answers to those questions might be in other parts of the sentience webpage. XD)
i) Individual Sentients over Groups and Identities: Though, I agree to a point, people who would concur seem to be mostly from an Anglo-Saxon cultural background (you know places where Locke’s libertarianism impacted). For places where Locke’s thesis didn’t ruffle feathers, then it’d be hard to point out why that would be case… or at least, the rationality behind it. Certainly some moral implications of extreme positions, such as moral egoists (i.e. “I am bound to only care about my own interests”), minarchists (i.e. “I only have an obligation of NOT doing harm”) and nihilists (i.e. “it all ends up in nothing, so who cares?”) are disagreeable. I see a child drowning. I think the moral thing to do is to either jump and swim out with him or throw him a rope. Crossing my arms and watching seems… morally appalling. If I were a moral egoist, minarchist or nihilist (which a priori ARE NOT IN CONTRADICTION with sentiocentrism), I could just cross my arms and do nothing and it’d be legitimate action from me.
Now, I believe the main point of that issue was to make a case that some crimes are presented as worse when certain groups are affected. Focusing in the individual itself and the harm of the crime would avoid subjectivity. De facto, I object to this, but for argument's sake I'll assume it is true. I am in cave with five more people. Sadly, the one who was climbing first got stuck just right at the exit and can’t liberate herself. If the five of us don’t blow her up with dynamite, we all die of asphyxiation and eventually she’ll die of hunger. Is it good to murder? No. Is it permissible to blow this person up to save the other five? Well....
(To be fair, I do believe one of the greatest pickles is precisely how to balance individual rights v. community rights. Michael Sandel’s Justice class beautifully represents these issues. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iOotE... )
ii) Free Will and Moral Agency Neutral: “A sentientist justice that is primarily concerned with future suffering and flourishing of sentients doesn’t depend on concepts of agency or free will. What matters is whether an entity caused harm and is likely to cause harms in the future. Their degree of agency or the freedom of their will is irrelevant.” = Really? Honestly I don’t even know how could you possible reconcile those two. Would you say tree having a branch falling over someone’s head has committed a (moral) crime? Maybe you could answer: “oh, well, but a tree is not an entity”. I could accept that answer for argument’s sake (very reluctantly, BTW… I mean, is it really not an entity?) and further question you on what type of ‘thing’ constitutes an entity for this type of argument. I have the impression you will say that animals could be considered entities. If that’s the case, then you’ll have the same problem that I describe in (viii) that I mentioned Tui she had as well. Wouldn’t that mean that lions are murderers and should be stopped and educated? Isn’t means rea a necessary condition to judge a crime (albeit a moral one)? Of course, you’ve said consequences count for more v. intentions, but if free will doesn’t exist then intentions wouldn’t matter at all. Running over a person out of a second of imprudence would be as bad as stabbing some with a knife 200 times and murdering them. And even worse, IF the victim of the 200 stabbings somehow manages to survive, then the imprudent driver would be a worse criminal than 200-stabbings wanna-be-murderer, since consequences count for more and the second case there is no dead person. I most certainly disagree with that conclusion.
Honestly, this point struck me as, well… completely inconsistent. To be entirely honest, it seems to me that you don’t know how to reconcile your determinism with a sound moral foundation... and you kind of see yourself forced to bite the bullet. The result being flushing free will down the toilet. Now, unlike you I’m a compatibilist, but I must admit that my position is far from being sound. (I do notice tension at some points for which I don't know if there are solutions.) XD Maybe here’s where we all hold hands and read a book together??? XD lol In your text you recommend Dennett’s book. He certainly has interesting opinions on free will and I do think he’s a fine writer.
in another thread: How you define and measure sentientism among and across species.
I have moved it here in its own topic of discussion, Moral Agency for consistency, clarity, and so others may follow along, contribute and comment. If you need any guidance on how to post a topic, please refer to: How do I add a discussion thread to a folder in a group?
___________________________________________
Loving the conversation, guys. <3 <3 <3
I think everyone loves (or at least ‘likes’) their echo chambers and ‘preaching it to the choir’ (due to cognitive biases), but I must say that conversations which I find myself disagreeing are better for my betterment. I am bound to enjoy them more and they (hopefully) allow me to grow. I cannot learn anything from someone who thinks just like I do.
I’ll start with Jamie’s text, which BTW I enjoyed quite a lot. Here, I will assume that both of us accept that there are objective moral values and that there is just a thing as objective justice. (That is, I will not dwell upon moral ontology, epistemology nor linguistics.)
Though I have may inquires, I still am puzzled by some of the aspects of his utilitarianism, their consequences and implications.
I’ll focus on two points to keep it short. (Also, because at least some of the answers to those questions might be in other parts of the sentience webpage. XD)
i) Individual Sentients over Groups and Identities:
Though, I agree to a point, people who would concur seem to be mostly from an Anglo-Saxon cultural background (you know places where Locke’s libertarianism impacted).
For places where Locke’s thesis didn’t ruffle feathers, then it’d be hard to point out why that would be case… or at least, the rationality behind it.
Certainly some moral implications of extreme positions, such as moral egoists (i.e. “I am bound to only care about my own interests”), minarchists (i.e. “I only have an obligation of NOT doing harm”) and nihilists (i.e. “it all ends up in nothing, so who cares?”) are disagreeable.
I see a child drowning. I think the moral thing to do is to either jump and swim out with him or throw him a rope. Crossing my arms and watching seems… morally appalling. If I were a moral egoist, minarchist or nihilist (which a priori ARE NOT IN CONTRADICTION with sentiocentrism), I could just cross my arms and do nothing and it’d be legitimate action from me.
Now, I believe the main point of that issue was to make a case that some crimes are presented as worse when certain groups are affected. Focusing in the individual itself and the harm of the crime would avoid subjectivity. De facto, I object to this, but for argument's sake I'll assume it is true.
I am in cave with five more people. Sadly, the one who was climbing first got stuck just right at the exit and can’t liberate herself. If the five of us don’t blow her up with dynamite, we all die of asphyxiation and eventually she’ll die of hunger. Is it good to murder? No. Is it permissible to blow this person up to save the other five? Well....
(To be fair, I do believe one of the greatest pickles is precisely how to balance individual rights v. community rights. Michael Sandel’s Justice class beautifully represents these issues.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iOotE... )
ii) Free Will and Moral Agency Neutral:
“A sentientist justice that is primarily concerned with future suffering and flourishing of sentients doesn’t depend on concepts of agency or free will. What matters is whether an entity caused harm and is likely to cause harms in the future. Their degree of agency or the freedom of their will is irrelevant.” = Really? Honestly I don’t even know how could you possible reconcile those two.
Would you say tree having a branch falling over someone’s head has committed a (moral) crime? Maybe you could answer: “oh, well, but a tree is not an entity”. I could accept that answer for argument’s sake (very reluctantly, BTW… I mean, is it really not an entity?) and further question you on what type of ‘thing’ constitutes an entity for this type of argument. I have the impression you will say that animals could be considered entities. If that’s the case, then you’ll have the same problem that I describe in (viii) that I mentioned Tui she had as well. Wouldn’t that mean that lions are murderers and should be stopped and educated?
Isn’t means rea a necessary condition to judge a crime (albeit a moral one)? Of course, you’ve said consequences count for more v. intentions, but if free will doesn’t exist then intentions wouldn’t matter at all. Running over a person out of a second of imprudence would be as bad as stabbing some with a knife 200 times and murdering them. And even worse, IF the victim of the 200 stabbings somehow manages to survive, then the imprudent driver would be a worse criminal than 200-stabbings wanna-be-murderer, since consequences count for more and the second case there is no dead person.
I most certainly disagree with that conclusion.
Honestly, this point struck me as, well… completely inconsistent.
To be entirely honest, it seems to me that you don’t know how to reconcile your determinism with a sound moral foundation... and you kind of see yourself forced to bite the bullet. The result being flushing free will down the toilet.
Now, unlike you I’m a compatibilist, but I must admit that my position is far from being sound. (I do notice tension at some points for which I don't know if there are solutions.) XD
Maybe here’s where we all hold hands and read a book together??? XD lol In your text you recommend Dennett’s book. He certainly has interesting opinions on free will and I do think he’s a fine writer.