Classics and the Western Canon discussion

I Introductory
The subject of Mill's work is:

Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual.

And the objective:

. . .is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

Tyranny of the Majority is also to be guarded against; Mill writes:

Society. . .practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling;

Since Mill asserts the sole end for which liberty may be limited, he explicitly excludes interference:

for his own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant’>

This entails several categories often thought to justify interference that should not.
1. Harm to self, or legal paternalism - seatbelts and motorcycle helmet requirements would be an over-reach in Mill's view.
2. Moral paternalism for acts viewed as immoral but do not cause harm to others.
3. Offensive acts or materials that are offensive to some but do no harm.

For these categories Mill writes:

His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

This makes a lot of sense, however all too often it too easy to claim collateral harm to others in some form that justifies legal or social controls. I hope Mill can provide more guidelines on these cases. Drugs and alcohol, pornography, death with dignity initiatives, assisted suicide, even video games, are some of the issues involved here.

The Utilitarian criterion of promoting the general happiness of mankind seems to have gone out the window. Now we have a Libertarian criterion of leaving everyone alone.

II Liberty of Thought and Discussion

Mill sums up his position when he writes:

But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.

Mill reminds us that we are ever fallible when he writes:

Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.

It seems we may be better off without any opinion at all?

Utility plays a role in judging an opinion and Mill appears to shoot down pragmatism before it even got started:

And it will not do to say that the heretic may be allowed to maintain the utility or harmlessness of his opinion, though forbidden to maintain its truth. The truth of an opinion is part of its utility. . .no belief which is contrary to truth can be really useful

Roger wrote: "The Utilitarian criterion of promoting the general happiness of mankind seems to have gone out the window. Now we have a Libertarian criterion of leaving everyone alone."

What Libertarian criterion of leaving everyone alone?

David wrote: "I Introductory
This makes a lot of sense, however all too often it too easy to claim collateral harm to others in some form that justifies legal or social controls.
..."

In the Mill's time, this principle usually leads to the 'state as night watchman' like ideas. But as time goes, people in full accordance with it become able to justify medical provision and compulsory education, who would deny that our diseases has great collateral damage for people around, and our poor education harmed society as a whole. And I am speaking only of benign ways of using this argument to justify further interventions, malign are far more common.

David wrote: "Roger wrote: "The Utilitarian criterion of promoting the general happiness of mankind seems to have gone out the window. Now we have a Libertarian criterion of leaving everyone alone."

What Libert..."

". . . the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."

Alexey wrote: "And I am speaking only of benign ways of using this argument to justify further interventions, malign are far more common."

Can you give an example?

Roger wrote: "The Utilitarian criterion of promoting the general happiness of mankind seems to have gone out the window. . ." the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.""

How is that at odds with Mills' utilitarian principles? I see this as perfectly in line with utility. Mill writes:

I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorize the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those actions of each, which concern the interest of other people. If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a primâ facie case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation. There are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform; such as, to give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection

David wrote: "Alexey wrote: "And I am speaking only of benign ways of using this argument to justify further interventions, malign are far more common."

Can you give an example?"

Internet censorship was introduced here in Russia by a pretext of protecting the children from harm coming with the dangerous information; anti-LGBT laws have the same justification; the right of public assembly was annihilated under the flag of protecting teenagers, etc. Not that the gov has any interest in liberal principles, but very this argument is used every time the rights are curbing.

David wrote: "Roger wrote: "The Utilitarian criterion of promoting the general happiness of mankind seems to have gone out the window. . ." the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any m..."

I see a problem in that he stated that utilitarian excluded need for any positive ethical principle like Kantian, and now he introduced such a principle that limited the use of utilitarian criterion in the actions. Of course, we may suggest that politics and ethics are different domain, governed by different principle, but 'libertarian' principle is still having ethical nature not merely political.

From "Utilitarianism," Ch. 2: "The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." But here in "On Liberty" we have a new principle, that of leaving people be, unless it is strictly necessary to protect others. The principles aren't necessarily opposed, maybe, but they are different.

So in "On Liberty," Ch. 1, Mill says, "I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being." So is utility based on happiness, or is it based on interest, i.e. what is good for someone? Those can be different things! Indeed, it's remarkable that happiness hasn't even been mentioned so far in this work.

I guess I am confused by what is being asserted; Is the question. . .

That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

. . .Is at odds with the utilitarian end of the greatest happiness for the greatest number?

Or is the sole end of interfering with liberty. . .

That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.

. . .being confused with the sole end of human actions?

happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct; from whence it necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since a part is included in the whole.
Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism

If so, I don't see a problem here either way. I think it is safe to classify interference of liberty as a human action, therefore political/legal actions are in fact moral ones. Its all morality.

As I recalling Mills writing on rights and justice in Utilitarianism. I think Mill takes liberty as not only a right, something for which some form of penalty or response is deserved when unjustly violated, because rightful liberty* is essential for our happiness and we are harmed without it.

I think Mill also expressed it in The Subjection of Women when he said government should not interfere in the issue by making mischievous, i.e., prone to abuse, laws either way on the matter and the laws currently on the books were all restrictive to women's freedom, i.e., liberty, and should be annulled or repealed.

*(view spoiler)[Jefferson underscores the normative function of liberty in a letter to fellow republican Isaac Tiffany (April 4, 1819), in which he distinguishes between liberty and rightful liberty: “Of liberty then I would say, that, in the whole plenitude of its extent, it is unobstructed action according to our will, but rightful liberty is unobstructed action according to our will within limits drawn around us by the equal rights of others. I do not add ‘within the limits of the law,’ because law is often the tyrant’s will, and is always so when it violates the right of an individual.” The sentiment of those definitions is responsible free activity—that is, the freedom to do what one wants so long as one does not contravene the rights of others to do what they want to do.

Holowchak, M. Andrew; Holowchak, M. Andrew. Thomas Jefferson (p. 80). Prometheus. Kindle Edition. (hide spoiler)]

David wrote: "I guess I am confused by what is being asserted; Is the question. . .
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will,..."

My problem is with Mill's claims that the principle of utilitarianism is enough for moral behaviour, and we do not need additional moral imperatives to guard our behaviour. And now he suggests exactly the moral imperative:

'That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.'

It is not that this imperative or utilitarian approach is bad, but that utilitarian approach still demand some principles to govern its use.

Alexey wrote: "It is not that this imperative or utilitarian approach is bad, but that utilitarian approach still demand some principles to govern its use."

I think I agree. I was confused for a bit because I was treating liberty as an end, but it is not, our happines and freedom from pain is. Liberty is an essential ingredient to our happiness and the rules and principles circumscribing our liberty are corollaries to the utilitarian theory.

Like the all the astronomy behind the ready made charts for navigation On Liberty is the utilitarian "astronomy" behind the corollaries pertaining to the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual.

Consider Mills response to the criticism that utilitarianism is impractical because there is not time, previous to action, for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the general happiness. (Utilitarianism II). The answer of course is:

. . .the whole past duration of the human species. . .mankind have been learning by experience the tendencies of actions; on which experience all the prudence as well as all the morality of life, is dependent. . .mankind must by this time have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects of some actions on their happiness; and the beliefs which have thus come down are the rules of morality for the multitude, and for the philosopher until he has succeeded in finding better. (Utiliitarianism II)

Mill then mentions corollaries from the principle of utility and says:

It is a strange notion that the acknowledgement of a first principle is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones. (Utilitarianism II)

It suggests that Mill's principles of liberty are corollaries, or secondary ones, derived from utility. Once boiled down, which takes Mill the entirety of On Liberty to do, the whole notion becomes a shortcut of sorts for deciding and taking action on the subject. Mill gives the example:

Nobody argues that the art of navigation is not founded on astronomy, because sailors cannot wait to calculate the Nautical Almanack. Being rational creatures, they go to sea with it ready calculated; and all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with their minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong, as well as on many of the far more difficult questions of wise and foolish. And this, as long as foresight is a human quality, it is to be presumed they will continue to do.(Utilitarianism II)

Now, instead of rereading On Liberty every time a question of liberty comes up, we just have to remember That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. as the rest of book explains what the corollary entails and why.

The two principles are not the same, the question is: do they contradict?

For example: a law that everyone must wear a seat belt. This law is conducive to the overall benefit of society, therefore it is in agreement with the principle of utilitarianism. However, it forces someone else to do something which is not a harm to others, therefore it is not in agreement with the principle of liberty. Can the two be reconciled?

In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel argues that liberty does not mean liberty to obey what he calls one's whims. In his view, liberty is liberty to do one's duty, which would be what is best for society as a whole. Any other liberty is a delusion. This is hardly the libertarian view expressed by Jefferson in his letter and some have seen in it a justification for authoritarianism. I think this is what Alexey had in mind when he mentioned 'malign uses.'

Let us suppose an argument can be made that a law requiring everyone to wear a seat belt is NOT utilitarian for reason that include that by its very nature violates the principle of liberty and the autonomy it protects.

One way out of it in favor of a little paternalism is to review the conditions that warrant such liberty, namely maturity of the state of society. Mill writes:

It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage.. . .

. . .Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others.>

Are we willing to admit that society has lost the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion [and] of being improved by free and equal discussion in order to justify suffering from a little legal paternalism? It seems a slippery slope.

Indeed, it is a slippery one. Authoritarians use this argument so often to justified paternalism, that I am very surprised Mill did not notice the danger of this concession. In any case, he should understand that it could not be the strict criteria to separate the society which is ready for liberty from one that is not mature enough.

Alexey wrote: "I In any case, he should understand that it could not be the strict criteria to separate the society which is ready for liberty from one that is not mature enough."

I guess my questions got lost in my long answer. Is mankind, as a collection of societies at various stages of development, really mature enough for liberty? Or do societies still require benevolent rulers or majorities to hold our hand?

Social Security, national healthcare, car insurance, seat belt laws, helmet laws, anti-smoking laws, vaccines, masks; all these things were and are met with such resistance in the name of liberty with willful ignorance, misinformation, and plain contrarian stubborness.

In these turbulent times it is difficult not to conclude that societies do not have the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion.

On the other hand, it may be easier just to admit that utilitarianism may justify some limits on individual liberty. However, since it also deems liberty crucial to happiness and well-being, and therefore to overall utility, one should try to maximize overall happiness while also protecting individual liberties to the greatest extent possible.

I suppose one should also admit that reducing the human action down to only one sole end and reducing the justification for interfering with liberty down to only one principle will not make the hard questions go away.

As it seems from my point of view (geographical), societies governed by themselves are more stable and secure, than those seeking for a benevolent ruler. Of course, limits of individual freedom and of societal intervention in private life are very contentious. Even Mill's clear suggestion of these limits turned to be very vague in practice. However, the laws and rules, you've mentioned, tend to be more effective when they are product of self-government of the people than of the 'benevolent' ruler, though this difference may be only in perception.

Mill seems to be something of an absolutist when it comes to freedom of expression. What would Mill think of the modern idea that speech causes harm, that speech can be violence? I've heard it said that speech should be suppressed (deplatformed, shouted down) if it expresses hate or phobia, even in temperate and unemotional language.

Roger wrote: "Mill seems to be something of an absolutist when it comes to freedom of expression. What would Mill think of the modern idea that speech causes harm, that speech can be violence? I've heard it said..."

He does put limits on opinion and causing harm is one of them.

even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act.(Chapter III)

If I understand Mill correctly, racist theory uttered in academic conversation will be ok, but the same in the face of a crowd will be a crime. At least, it is quite straightforward and doesn't depend much on interpretation, not as much as in an alternative approach which Roger has cited.

Thank you Susanna, couldn't agree more with your words.

Alexey wrote: "If I understand Mill correctly, racist theory uttered in academic conversation will be ok, but the same in the face of a crowd will be a crime. At least, it is quite straightforward and doesn't dep..."

So to sum up Mill's opinion, the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

In the case of an opinion supporting a racist theory, Mill would argue that individuals have the right to express their opinions, even if those opinions are offensive or unpopular. However, if that speech incites violence or causes harm to others, then it may be justifiable to limit or regulate that speech.

The U.S. defines incitement as "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action" AND is "likely to incite or produce such action." This means that speech may be protected by the First Amendment unless it poses an immediate threat of harm and is likely to result in imminent lawless action imminent lawless action (Brandenburg v. Ohio 1969)
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremeco...

In other countries, incitement to violence may be defined more broadly to include speech that promotes hatred or discrimination against a particular group, even if it does not directly call for violence.

Qs: Which definition of incitement more closely fits Mill's justification for limiting the opinion? Is the broader definition better or worse than the U.S. definition?

Mill suggests that the great evil of suppressing opinions is that each instance represents the opportunity for a "teachable moment". Theoretically I must agree. However, practically speaking these teaching moments usually seem to fail and have the contrary result of both sides becoming more entrenched in their own opinion by way of claiming victory in the debate; even to the point of becoming the main reason to debate at all. Formal public debates summaries always sound something like this, After the debate, opinions varied as to who presented the more convincing arguments, with supporters of both sides claiming victory.

But even if the freedom to express opinions only leads to an inefficiently small number of corrected opinions, it is still better than having opinions dictated by others. Unfortunately this results in two outcomes of the utilitarian principle.

On one hand, individuals who are uncritically close-minded and thus more likely to hold foolish opinions are made happy with the liberty to stubbornly do so. On the other hand, individuals who are critically open-minded and more likely to hold well-considered opinions, provisionally, are made to be content tolerating and suffering foolish opinions.

This seems to underscore a need to accept the idea that "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.

It all remind me about George Soros's lecture, in which he asked—why in political discussion can not Popper's methodology be used? —and answered—it lacks the major prerequisite: pursuit of truth as a goal.

I think it is a bit simplistic, but the general idea is correct.

Alexey wrote: "It all remind me about George Soros's lecture, in which he asked—why in political discussion can not Popper's methodology be used? —and answered—it lacks the major prerequisite: pursuit of truth as..."

I am uncertain which of Popper's methodologies is being referred to, but if it is his falsification principle, then my understanding is that it is a method for distinguishing between scientific knowledge from and non-scientific claims. The falsification principle thus helps guide us towards discovering actionable knowledge.

I think Mill promotes the idea that the pursuit of truth and knowledge is essential for individuals and society to achieve happiness and well-being and suggest that liberty of thought and opinion is a critical part of that pursuit when he writes:

There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action

He ment hypothesising and testing hypotheses on falsification.

I agree about Mill's promotion of pursuit of truth and that he saw it as essential for progress off society, and so I believe Popper and Soros. Indeed, very this similarity in position made me recall Soros. But crux is that pursuit of truth is a rare thing in political discussions, and this makes them quite ineffective, though still far from the damage of their absence.

This echoes John Milton in Areopagitica: "I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat," etc.

I also am a little dubious about Mill's faith in free public debate as the source of truth. But I'm hard put to come up with anything better.

Roger wrote: "I also am a little dubious about Mill's faith in free public debate as the source of truth. But I'm hard put to come up with anything better."

Tongue in cheek: Is it "truth" that "matters"? Humane human action? Oh, whatever might that be?