The History Book Club discussion

**Spoiler Alert**

Each president of the United States seems to have their own view on the importance of intelligence.

The CIA site examines some of these reflections; but it may be worthwhile to discuss each president and how they used intelligence briefings and when the CIA was established how did its directors get along with each president "for better or for worse."

The CIA site has some interesting tidbits on our founding fathers and George Washington, our first president, who they claim really is the first American Intelligence Chief for his role in the American Revolution.

They named three rooms after George Washington, John Jay and Benjamin Franklin (all who they claim) were very much involved in our country's earliest attempts to obtain intelligence to protect our country. The CIA did write-ups on all three to show how they were involved with intelligence gathering activities.

Here is the write-up that they have on George Washington and why they make this claim. George Washington stated: "There is nothing more necessary than good intelligence to frustrate a designing enemy, & nothing requires greater pains to obtain."

Some of the intelligence that he gathered early in his career was actually for the British before we broke off with England and sought independence.

Washington established a unit known as Knowlton's Rangers, under the command of Lt. Col. Thomas Knowlton, to carry out reconnaissance and raids against British facilities. This unit was the first American military intelligence organization; the US Army has characterized it as a historical parent of the modern-day Army Rangers, Special Forces, and Delta Force. The ill-fated American spy Nathan Hale was recruited from this early Ranger force.

But it was Washington's adroitness as a manager of agents and his skillful use of their reporting that best commend him as the Founding Father of American collection of foreign intelligence. In addition to managing countless spies around British forces' locations, he ran numerous agent networks inside British-controlled New York City and Philadelphia. His operatives provided daily reporting on British troop movements and often were able to report on the plans and intentions of enemy commanders.

After the British seized control of New York City in autumn 1776, Washington directed the activities of numerous spies there. Of particular note was the Culper spy ring, which comprised about 20 people. This network, established in the summer of 1778, was managed by Major Benjamin Tallmadge of the 2nd Connecticut Light Dragoons, who operated from an outpost on the Hudson River above the city. The Culper ring was the most professional of Washington's agent networks. It used code names, secret writing, enciphered communications, couriers, dead drops, signal sites, and specific collection requirements.

Complete article with sources:

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-fo...

Truman, no doubt, in the beginning of the book did not trust the CIA as a operative force. It seems he feared their powers in a democratic society, which makes some sense, since all this is new territory as a organization.

I think that is true about Truman. Maybe because of the war which we had just gone through at the time; this fear was exacerbated by what had gone on in Germany and elsewhere and secrecy seemed an anathema to democracy.

I think the CIA site has a lot of interesting articles in it. I never realized how subterfuge and spying played such a big role in the American Revolution. Paine played a role in publishing some of these activities (the American Revolution version of wikileaks). Adams, Franklin, John Jay, Washington and others like the Continental Congress themselves were sworn to secrecy about many of the techniques and methods used.

Intelligence Techniques
Secrecy and Protection
The Committee of Secret Correspondence insisted that matters pertaining to the funding and instruction of intelligence agents be held within the Committee. In calling for the Committee members to "lay their proceedings before Congress," the Congress, by resolution, authorized "withholding the names of the persons they have employed, or with whom they have corresponded." On May 20, 1776, when the Committee's proceedings-with the sensitive names removed-were finally read in the Congress, it was "under the injunction of secrecy." The Continental Congress, recognizing the need for secrecy in regard to foreign intelligence, foreign alliances and military matters, maintained "Secret Journals," apart from its public journals, to record its decisions in such matters.

On November 9, 1775. the Continental Congress adopted its own oath of secrecy, one more stringent than the oaths of secrecy it would require of others in sensitive employment:

"RESOLVED, That every member of this Congress considers himself under the ties of virtue, honour and love of his country, not to divulge, directly or indirectly, any matter or thing agitated or debated in Congress, before the same shaft have been determined, without the leave of the Congress: nor any matter or thing determined in Congress, which a majority of the Congress shall order to be kept secret, And that if any member shall violate this agreement, he shall be expelled this Congress, and deemed an enemy to the liberties of America, and liable to be treated as such, and that every member signify his consent to this agreement by signing the same."


On June 12, 1776, the Continental Congress adopted the first secrecy agreement for employees of the new government. The required oath read:

"I do solemnly swear, that I will not directly or indirectly divulge any manner or thing which shall come to my knowledge as (clerk, secretary) of the board of War and Ordnance for the United Colonies. . . So help me God."

The Continental Congress, sensitive to the vulnerability of its covert allies, respected their desire for strict secrecy. Even after France's declaration of war against England, the fact of French involvement prior to that time remained a state secret. When Tom Paine, in a series of letters to the press in 1777, divulged details of the secret aid from the files of the Committee of Foreign Affairs (formerly, the Committee of Secret Correspondence), France's Minister to the United States, Conrad Alexandre Gerard, protested to the president of the Congress that Paine's indiscreet assertions "bring into question the dignity and reputation of the King, my master, and that of the United States." Congress dismissed Paine, and by public resolution denied having received such aid, resolving that "His Most Christian Majesty, the great and generous ally of the United States, did not preface his alliance with any supplies whatever sent to America."

In 1779 George Washington and John Jay, the president of the Continental Congress and a close associate of the Commander in Chief's on intelligence matters, disagreed about the effect disclosure of some intelligence would have on sources and methods. Washington wanted to publicize certain encouraging information that he judged would give "a certain spring to our affairs" and bolster public morale. Jay replied that the intelligence "is unfortunately of such a Nature, or rather so circumstanced, as to render Secrecy necessary." Jay prevailed.

Cover

Robert Townsend, an important American agent in British-occupied New York, used the guise of being a merchant, as did Silas Deane when he was sent to France by the Committee of Secret Correspondence. Townsend was usually referred to by his cover name of "Culper, Junior." When Major (later Colonel) Benjamin Tallmadge, who directed Townsend's espionage work, insisted that he disengage himself from his cover business to devote more time to intelligence gathering, General Washington overruled him: "it is not my opinion that Culper Junior should be advised to give up his present employment. I would imagine that with a little industry he will be able to carry on his intelligence with greater security to himself and greater advantages to us, under the cover of his usual business. . .. it prevents also those suspicions which would become natural should he throw himself out of the line of his present employment." Townsend also was the silent partner of a coffee house frequented by British officers, an ideal place for hearing loose talk that was of value to the American cause.

Major John Clark's agents in and around British-controlled Philadelphia used several covers (farmer, peddler, and smuggler, among others) so effectively that only one or two operatives may have been detained. The agents traveled freely in and out of Philadelphia and passed intelligence to Washington about British troops, fortifications, and supplies, and of a planned surprise attack.

Enoch Crosby, a counterintelligence officer, posed as an itinerant shoemaker (his civilian trade) to travel through southern New York while infiltrating Loyalist cells. After the Tories started to suspect him when he kept "escaping" from the Americans, Crosby's superiors moved him to Albany, where he resumed his undercover espionage.

John Honeyman, an Irish weaver who had offered to spy for the Americans, used several covers (butcher, Tory, British agent) to collect intelligence on British military activities in New Jersey. He participated in a deception operation that left the Hessians in Trenton unprepared for Washington's attack across the Delaware River on December 26, 1776.

Disguise

In January 1778, Nancy Morgan Hart, who naturally was tall, muscular, and cross-eyed, disguised herself as a "touched" or crazy man and entered Augusta, Georgia, to obtain intelligence on British defenses. Her mission was a success. Later, when a group of Tories attacked her home to gain revenge, she captured them all, and was witness to their execution.

In June 1778, General Washington instructed "Light-Horse Harry" Lee to send an agent into the British fort at Stony Point to gather intelligence on the exact size of the garrison and the progress it was making in building defenses. Captain Allan McLane took the assignment. Dressing himself as a country bumpkin, and utilizing the cover of escorting a Mrs. Smith into the fort to see her sons, McLane spent two weeks collecting intelligence within the British fort and returned safely.

Secret Writing

While serving in Paris as an agent of the Committee of Secret Correspondence, Silas Deane is known to have used a heat-developing invisible ink, compounded of cobalt chloride, glycerine and water, for some of his intelligence reports back to America. Even more useful to him later was a "sympathetic stain" created for secret communications by James Jay, a physician and the brother of John Jay. Dr. Jay, who had been knighted by George III, used the "stain" for reporting military information from London to America. Later he supplied quantities of the stain to George Washington at home and to Silas Deane in Paris.

The stain required one chemical for writing the message and a second to develop it, affording greater security than the ink used by Deane earlier. Once, in a letter to John Jay, Robert Morris spoke of an innocuous letter from "Timothy Jones" (Deane) and the "concealed beauties therein," noting "the cursory examinations of a sea captain would never discover them, but transferred from his hand to the penetrating eye of a Jay, the diamonds stand confessed at once."

Washington instructed his agents in the use of the "sympathetic stain," noting in connection with "Culper Junior" that the ink "will not only render his communications less exposed to detection, but relieve the fears of such persons as may be entrusted in its conveyance." Washington suggested that reports could be written in the invisible ink "on the blank leaves of a pamphlet. . . a common pocket book, or on the blank leaves at each end of registers, almanacks, or any publication or book of small value."

Washington especially recommended that agents conceal their reports by using the ink in correspondence: "A much better way is to write a letter in the Tory stile with some mixture of family matters and between the lines and on the remaining part of the sheet communicate with the Stain the intended intelligence."

Even though the Patriots took great care to write sensitive messages in invisible ink, or in code or cipher, it is estimated that the British intercepted and decrypted over half of America's secret correspondence during the war.

Codes and Ciphers

American Revolutionary leaders used various methods of cryptography to conceal diplomatic, military, and personal messages.

John Jay and Arthur Lee devised dictionary codes in which numbers referred to the page and line in an agreed-upon dictionary edition where the plaintext (unencrypted message) could be found.

In 1775 Charles Dumas designed the first diplomatic cipher that the Continental Congress and Benjamin Franklin used to communicate with agents and ministers in Europe. Dumas's system substituted numbers for letters in the order in which they appeared in a preselected paragraph of French prose containing 682 symbols. This method was more secure than the standard alphanumeric substitution system, in which a through z are replaced with 1 through 26, because each letter in the plain text could be replaced with more than one number.

The Culper spy ring used a numerical substitution code developed by Major Benjamin Tallmadge, the network's leader. The Ring began using the code after the British captured some papers indicating that some Americans around New York were using "sympathetic stain." Tallmadge took several hundred words from a dictionary and several dozen names of people or places and assigned each a number from 1 to 763. For example, 38 meant attack, 192 stood for fort, George Washington was identified as 711, and New York was replaced by 727. An American agent posing as a deliveryman transmitted the messages to other members of the ring. One of them, Anna Strong, signalled the messages' location with a code involving laundry hung out to dry. A black petticoat indicated that a message was ready to be picked up, and the number of handkerchiefs identified the cove on Long Island Sound where the agents would meet. By the end of the war, several prominent Americans-among them Robert Morris, John Jay, Robert Livingston, and John Adams-were using other versions of numerical substitution codes.

The Patriots had two notable successes in breaking British ciphers. In 1775 Elbridge Gerry and the team of Elisha Porter and the Rev. Samuel West, working separately at Washington's direction, decrypted a letter that implicated Dr. Benjamin Church, the Continental Army's chief surgeon, in espionage for the British.

In 1781 James Lovell, who designed cipher systems used by several prominent Americans, determined the encryption method that British commanders used to communicate with each other. When a dispatch from Lord Cornwallis in Yorktown to General Henry Clinton in New York was intercepted, Lovell's cryptanalysis enabled Washington to gauge how desperate Cornwallis's situation was and to time his attack on the British lines. Soon after, another decrypt by Lovell provided warning to the French fleet off Yorktown that

The remainder of the article from the CIA site:

Intercepting Communications

The Continental Congress regularly received quantities of intercepted British and Tory mail. On November 20, 1775, it received some intercepted letters from Cork, Ireland, and appointed a committee made up of John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Johnson, Robert Livingston, Edward Rutledge, James Wilson and George Wythe "to select such parts of them as may be proper to publish." The Congress later ordered a thousand copies of the portions selected by the Committee to be printed and distributed. A month later, when another batch of intercepted mail was received, a second committee was appointed to examine it. Based on its report, the Congress resolved that "the contents of the intercepted letters this day read, and the steps which Congress may take in consequence of said intelligence thereby given, be kept secret until further orders." By early 1776, abuses were noted in the practice, and Congress resolved that only the councils or committees of safety of each colony, and their designees, could henceforth open the mail or detain any letters from the post.

When Moses Harris reported that the British had recruited him as a courier for their Secret Service, General Washington proposed that General Schuyler "contrive a means of opening them without breaking the seals, take copies of the contents, and then let them go on. By these means we should become masters of the whole plot." From that point on, Washington was privy to British intelligence pouches between New York and Canada.

Technology

Dr. James Jay used the advanced technology of his time to prepare the invaluable "sympathetic stain" used for secret communications. Perhaps the American patriots' most advanced-if not successful-application of technology was in David Bushnell's "turtle," a one-man submarine created for affixing watchwork-timed explosive charges to the bottom of enemy ships.

The "turtle," now credited with being the first use of the submarine in warfare, was an oaken chamber about five-and-a-half feet wide and seven feet high. it was propelled by oars at a speed of about three miles an hour, had a barometer to read depth, a pump and second set of oars to raise or lower the submarine through the water, and provision for both lead and water ballast.

When Bushnell learned that the candle used to illuminate instruments inside the "turtle" consumed the oxygen in its air supply, he turned to Benjamin Franklin for help. The solution: the phosphorescent weed, foxfire. Heavy tides thwarted the first sabotage operation. A copper-clad hull which could not be penetrated by the submarine's auger foiled the second. (The "turtle" did blow up a nearby schooner, however.) The secret weapon would almost certainly have achieved success against a warship if it had not gone to the bottom of the Hudson River when the mother ship to which it was moored was sunk by the British in October of 1776.

An early device developed for concealing intelligence reports when traveling by water was a simple, weighted bottle that could be dropped overboard if there was a threat of capture. This was replaced by a wafer-thin leaden container in which a message was sealed. Not only would it sink in water, but it would melt and destroy its contents if thrown into a fire, and could be used by agents on land or water. It had one drawback-lead poisoning if it was swallowed! It was replaced by a silver, bullet-shaped container that could be unscrewed to hold a message and which would not poison a courier who might be forced to swallow it.

Intelligence Analysis and Estimates

On May 29, 1776, the Continental Congress received the first of many intelligence estimates prepared in response to questions it posed to military commanders. The report estimated the size of the enemy force to be encountered in an attack on New York, the number of Continental troops needed to meet it, and the kind of force needed to defend the other New England colonies.

An example of George Washington's interest in intelligence analysis and estimates can be found in instructions he wrote to General Putnam in August of 1777:

"Deserters and people of that class always speak of number. . . indeed, scarce any person can form a judgement unless he sees the troops paraded and can count the divisions. But, if you can by any means obtain a list of the regiments left upon the island, we can compute the number of men within a few hundreds, over or under." On another occasion, in thanking James Lovell for a piece of intelligence, Washington wrote: "it is by comparing a variety of information, we are frequently enabled to investigate facts, which were so intricate or hidden, that no single clue could have led to the knowledge of them. . . intelligence becomes interesting which but from its connection and collateral circumstances, would not be important."

Washington's intelligence chief for a short period in 1778, Colonel David Henley, received these instructions when he wrote to Washington for guidance: "Besides communicating your information as it arises. . . you might make out a table or something in the way of columns, under which you might range, their magazines of forage, grain and the like, the different corps and regiments, the Works, where thrown up, their connexion, kind and extent, the officers commanding, with the numbers of guns &ca. &ca. This table should comprehend in one view all that can be learned from deserters, spies and persons who may come out from the enemy's boundaries." (It was common practice to interrogate travelers from such British strongholds as New York, Boston and Philadelphia.)

So already at the beginning of our country's history - intelligence gathering and "secrecy" played a role and we have our founding fathers engaging in it - and two of our first presidents at the very least. (Washington, Adams) and founding fathers Benjamin Franklin and John Jay. With Paine being the WikiLeaks Julian Assange of the Revolutionary period!!!

This was a letter from George Washington regarding intelligence gathering and the importance to the cause of gaining accurate numbers, etc. I remember when we were discussing the Civil War (another American conflict) and reading Killer Angels (a novel but very historically accurate); spies were used by both sides to judge troop size, strength and location, and many other bits of information.


Letter from G. Washington


8 Miles East of Morris Town July 26: 1777.

Sir

By a Letter received this morning from Lord Stirling of the 22d Inst, I find he intends to pursue his Rout from Peeks Kill, thro Keckyate & Pyramus to the Great Falls -- From thence thro Watsessing -- Springfield & Brunswick or Bound Brook.

The reason of my being thus particular in describing Lord Stirling's Rout, is, Because I wish you to take every possible pains in your power, by sending trusty persons to Staten Island in whom you can confide, to obtain Intelligence of the Enemy's situation & numbers -- what kind of Troops they are, and what Guards they have -- their strength & where posted. -- My view in this, is, that his Lordship, when he arrives, may make an attempt upon the Enemy there with his division, If it should appear from a full consideration of all circumstances and the information you obtain, that it can be done with a strong prospect of Success. -- You will also make some enquiry How many Boats are & may be certainly [used?] to transport the Troops, in case the Enterprize [should?] appear adviseable. You will, after having assured yourself upon these [several?] matters, send a good & faithful Officer to meet Lord Stirling with a distinct and accurate Account of every thing -- As well respecting the numbers & strength of the Enemy -- their situation &c -- As about the Boats, that he may have a General view of the whole, and possessing all the circumstances, may know how to regulate his conduct in the Affair.

The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged -- All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in Most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned & promising a favourable issue.



I am Sir
Yr Most Obed Sert
G. Washington

Historical Document
Posted: Mar 15, 2007 04:13 PM
Last Updated: Jul 07, 2008 12:47 PM
Last Reviewed: Mar 15, 2007 04:13 PM

Source: CIA site

by Michael Shaara

It seems for many years espionage was not an organizational apparatus, but conducted by individuals and groups. I wonder if WWI developed a government/military organization...

Probably behind the scenes intelligence gathering was going on; that seems to be the impression given by the CIA site - since they documented that intelligence gathering was going on during the American Revolution and Civil War.

Maybe one of our group members may be able to add to this.

I find it interesting that the Founding Fathers were better at intelligence then the CIA was in it's infancy. I wonder what happened to that network? Things that I've read elsewhere (sorry, can't think of specific titles...maybe grade school history books?) make me think that it stayed at least partially active into the 1800s, but what happened later?

Do we know when America became so dependent on British intelligence? Obviously, they were during both world wars, but when did it come to that?

I know I'm asking more questions than really discussing, but the stuff you've posted, Bentley, has really made me wonder what happened.

Maekala, I am not sure but hopefully we will discover this while reading the book and/or maybe some other group members might be able to join in. Before the CIA, we had something called The Pond.

I think what made earlier intelligence gathering different is that at the time Washington and others were simply doing that...gathering intelligence. When it became dirty tricks operations or covert activities to become involved in regime changes is another thing which I think has damaged the US reputation and probably has a lot to do with the undercurrent in the Middle East and we are not alone in causing that undercurrent..I guess we could say that the British had their hand in that region as well. We are relatively the kids on the block when it comes to covert operations and intelligence and spying organizations worldwide.

Your question is an interesting one and deserves follow up as we discover more.

US government spying in WWI -
http://tinyurl.com/23vr9ad (the CIA site Bentey mentioned)

The most significant advance for US intelligence during the war was the establishment of a permanent communications intelligence agency in the Army, what would become the forerunner of the National Security Agency. Meanwhile, the Secret Service, the New York Police Department, and military counterintelligence aggressively thwarted numerous German covert actions inside the United States, including psychological warfare, political and economic operations, and dozens of sabotage attempts against British-owned firms and factories supplying munitions to Britain and Russia.

The Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation (what would later become the FBI) began a counterintelligence role in 1916, and Congress passed the first federal espionage law in 1917.

****
And then came the Palmer Raids (on US citizens):
http://chnm.gmu.edu/exploring/20thcen...

The climate of repression continued after the war ended: this time, government interest focused not on Germans but on communists, Bolsheviks and "reds" generally. The climactic phase of this anti communist crusade occurred during the "Palmer Raids" of 1918-1921. A. Mitchell Palmer, Wilson's Attorney General, believed communism was "eating its way into the homes of the American workman." In his essay "The Case Against the Reds," Palmer charged that "tongues of revolutionary heat were licking the alters of the churches, leaping into the belfry of the school bell, crawling into the sacred corners of American homes, seeking to replace marriage vows with libertine laws, burning up the foundations of society." With a broad base of popular support, in 1919 Palmer intensified the attacks on political dissent that had begun during the war.
**


Bryan wrote: "It seems for many years espionage was not an organizational apparatus, but conducted by individuals and groups. I wonder if WWI developed a government/military organization..."

I was most impressed with the way Jimmy Carter tried to use the CIA but by that time it was a bit late to change the internal culture of the agency. These were many of the same guys who had worked for JFK!

Thank you Becky; great find on that site in the area for students.

Thank you but I forgot to include the URL for the Palmer Raids paragraph. I edited my post and it's there now - different site.

Good thank you for your add and edit. Yes, it is hard to believe everything going on in the background even during the JFK years and before.

One of my students is assisting a class examining history of espionage in U.S. foreign policy. The prof was a former CIA historian. They are reading:

Christopher Andrew

He mentions they will be reading parts of our book.
Tim Weiner

Thank you for the add. Bryan I did not know you taught.

Bentley wrote: "Thank you for the add. Bryan I did not know you taught."

I don't teach, but I have graduate students (who are teaching assistants) working for me in writing briefing books for our interviewees and interviewers.

Oh understand now.

Getting To Know the President: Intelligence Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952-2004

by John L. Helgerson (no photo)

Synopsis:

This second edition of Getting To Know the President by John Helgerson makes a singular contribution to the literature of intelligence by describing this important process of information sharing between the Intelligence Community (IC) and the Chief Executive, the President of the United States, starting as a presidential candidate. Since 1952, the CIA, and now the Intelligence Community as a whole, has provided presidential candidates and presidents-elect with intelligence briefings during their campaigns and transitions. These briefings have helped presidents be as well informed as possible on international developments from the day they take office.

First published in 1996 and now revised and updated to include accounts of intelligence support to candidates and presidents-elect in the three elections between then and 2004, Helgerson’s study provides unique insights into the mechanics and content of the briefings, the interaction of the participants, and the briefings’ effect on the relationships presidents have had with their intelligence services. His observations on how and what to brief during the campaign and transition periods are essential reading for members of the community charged with that responsibility in the future and seeking to learn from the best practices of their predecessors.

Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror



Synopsis:

An unprecedented high-level master narrative of America's intelligence wars, from the only person ever to helm both CIA and NSA, at a time of heinous new threats and wrenching change

For General Michael Hayden, playing to the edge means playing so close to the line that you get chalk dust on your cleats. Otherwise, by playing back, you may protect yourself, but you will be less successful in protecting America. "Play to the edge" was Hayden's guiding principle when he ran the National Security Agency, and it remained so when he ran CIA. In his view, many shortsighted and uninformed people are quick to criticize, and this book will give them much to chew on but little easy comfort; it is an unapologetic insider's look told from the perspective of the people who faced awesome responsibilities head on, in the moment.

How did American intelligence respond to terrorism, a major war and the most sweeping technological revolution in the last 500 years? What was NSA before 9/11 and how did it change in its aftermath? Why did NSA begin the controversial terrorist surveillance program that included the acquisition of domestic phone records? What else was set in motion during this period that formed the backdrop for the infamous Snowden revelations in 2013?

As Director of CIA in the last three years of the Bush administration, Hayden had to deal with the rendition, detention and interrogation program as bequeathed to him by his predecessors. He also had to ramp up the agency to support its role in the targeted killing program that began to dramatically increase in July 2008. This was a time of great crisis at CIA, and some agency veterans have credited Hayden with actually saving the agency. He himself won't go that far, but he freely acknowledges that CIA helped turn the American security establishment into the most effective killing machine in the history of armed conflict.

For 10 years, then, General Michael Hayden was a participant in some of the most telling events in the annals of American national security. General Hayden's goals are in writing this book are simple and unwavering: No apologies. No excuses. Just what happened. And why. As he writes, "There is a story here that deserves to be told, without varnish and without spin. My view is my view, and others will certainly have different perspectives, but this view deserves to be told to create as complete a history as possible of these turbulent times. I bear no grudges, or at least not many, but I do want this to be a straightforward and readable history for that slice of the American population who depend on and appreciate intelligence, but who do not have the time to master its many obscure characteristics."