Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Socrates has successfully squelched Thrasymachus (do we agree that he has?), and thinks he is done with the subject. But squelching Sophists is not doing real philosophy. Glaucon and Adeimantus, being brothers of Plato, are (or at least are presented by their brother to be) true lovers of wisdom for its sake, not merely for a paycheck, and they want to explore the issue of virtue more in depth with Socrates.

What struck me about Book 2 is how much Socrates focuses on his guardians--really to the exclusion of anyone else in his state. I haven't finished the whole work yet, but he continues to focus on them for quite a while. This strikes me as odd, and I'm wondering what other people make of it.

Also, it seems odd to me that he makes Thrasymachus out to be such a mercenary. Presumably, people pay to go to his Academy, so why would he attack his own profession?

Audrey wrote: "Also, it seems odd to me that he makes Thrasymachus out to be such a mercenary. Presumably, people pay to go to his Academy, so why would he attack his own profession? "

I think this is where Plato differs from Socrates. Socrates had no official school and appears to be flat broke. He doesn't appear to have much interest in money, and he has no teaching of his own. He just refutes the teachings of others. Plato, on the other hand, came from a fairly prosperous and powerful family, established the Academy, and might have some sympathy for Thrasymachus as a fellow businessman. Maybe that's why Thrasymachus' argument is rehabilitated in Book 2. Glaucon sees merit in Thrasymachus' argument and wants Socrates to refute it "truly" rather than simply seeming to do so. I think it's interesting that Thrasymachus is portrayed in such a negative light, but his argument is treated so seriously.

Thomas wrote: "...I think it's interesting that Thrasymachus is portrayed in such a negative light, but his argument is treated so seriously. ..."

Was he the "competition" perhaps?

I don't think I understand the significance of being a Sophist in those days. I made a couple entries on the background resources, but they don't seem to have given an adequate sense of their role and acceptance in Athens at that time period.

Let's see, I believe somewhere I read that The Republic is set earlier than 395BC -- that Plato has Socrates refer in 1.336a to Ismenias's taking gold from the Persians in 395 to help foment war between the Thebans and Spartans in a probably deliberate (reverse) anachronism.

Socrates: c. 469 BC – 399 BC
Plato: 424/423 BC – 348/347 BC
(according to Wikipedia)

So Plato is about 25 when Socrates died.

At the end of Book 1, Socrates is disappointed that he hasn't been able to say what justice is. He is satisfied with his argument that justice is wise and virtuous, and that it is more profitable than injustice, but he hasn't said yet what justice is.

Book 2 starts with Glaucon's attempt to determine what kind of good justice is. He delineates three types of good:

1. That which is immediately good, like pleasure. I am thinking he means sensual pleasures here.
2. That which is good in itself, and also has pleasing consequences, like thinking and being healthy.
3. That which is good but isn't necessarily pleasant, obligations that are good and beneficial in themselves, but which we do not enjoy because they require personal sacrifice. A just act may be good in itself, but it isn't necessarily good for me. In fact, I may suffer for it.

Socrates says justice falls into the second category, while Glaucon says it falls into the third.

What do you all think?

Thomas wrote: "...What do you all think?..."

Are these a "good" set of categories? Are there others equally useful?

Lily wrote: "Thomas wrote: "...What do you all think?..."

Are these a "good" set of categories? Are there others equally useful?"


It does seem to be an incomplete set, but maybe chosen that way for a reason. Glaucon seems concerned with consequences more than anything else, so he gives us categories that consider justice as

1. a good thing with no consequences, just good in itself.
2. a good thing in itself which also produces good consequences.
3. a good thing in itself which produces consequences that are not good, but which we put up with for the sake of the good involved. We put up with the drudgery of work so we can receive wages, and the discomfort of medical treatment for improved health. Eventually Glaucon says that justice is something that we put up with so that we don't suffer injustice from others.

The underlying question is what is "the good", but I can't help but think Glaucon means what is pleasurable, the sorts of "goods" that Gyges pursues when there are no consequences -- sex, power, wealth.

(To be fair to Glaucon, he is proposing this argument as what "the many" believe, and he fully expects Socrates to shoot it down.)

Audrey wrote: "What struck me about Book 2 is how much Socrates focuses on his guardians--really to the exclusion of anyone else in his state. I haven't finished the whole work yet, but he continues to focus on ..."

It looks as though there is a further section on education...so educators probably get a good deal of coverage.

Still...I can see that guardians are going to be of importance. IF there is going to be justice in the ideal city, then someone/some group is going to have to determine what it's going to be, someone is going to have to persuade or convince the citizens to live there lives according to this definition, and if the citizens can't be convinced, someone is going to have to compel them to live according to the definition....

Did Socrates set down what the guardians are to do? I feel as though I must have missed it. I will re-scan book 2 tomorrow. (Apologies for having dropped out for a few days. Time constraints.)

Adelle wrote: "(Apologies for having dropped out for a few days. Time constraints.)"

Not a problem. I'm having, for various reasons, to drift in and out myself. Have had to go off island several times recently, and several more to come. But we have a great group, including yourself, carrying on when I'm not able to be fully active.

Things will get better soon, I keep telling myself.

Thomas wrote: " I think it's interesting that Thrasymachus is portrayed in such a negative light, but his argument is treated so seriously.

..."

That is interesting, isn't it? Because, yes, Thrasymachus is written in such a way that the reader almost naturally wants to lean away from T and towards Socrates.

I saw you post here a couple days ago...and have been mulling it over.

It occurred to me that perhaps Plato wrote it this way to "warn" us away from a cult of personality. Correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't that famous Athenian speaker Pericles living about this time? Such a great speaker. So persuasive. And yet...there were many who believed that he was almost something of a dicator? That he influenced Athens towards policies that weren't actually good for Athens?

So I started to think that perhaps Plato presented Thrasymachus in a negative light...and yet presented Thrasymachus's ideas as being difficult for Socrates to truly refute...so that we readers would realize that it's not always the likeable, word-skilled man who has the best or soundest or most defendable ideas.

Sometimes, as in the case of Thrasymachus, a seemingly unpleasant man, a man who can't always smoothly manipulate an argument....well, sometimes THAT man might actually have the soundest idea.

And even if such a man can't smoothly defend his idea, well, that doesn't prove that the IDEA itself is unsound.

Such seemed to be the case here in the Republic. Socrates, as Everyman said, "squelched" Thrasymachus...Socrates managed to get Thrasyachus to verbally agree with various statements.

Glaucon and A(brother) know, however, that agreement isn't proof. And they realize that Socrates hasn't disproven the assertions of Thrasymachus.

Thomas wrote: "so he deliniates three types of good

1. That which is immediately good, like pleasure. I am thinking he means sensual pleasures here.

;) ... The two sensual pleasures that come first to mind for me are (1) ice cream....which is an immediate "good," ... but which I have to pay for the next day through excess poundage or extra exercise---neither of which I particularly find "good" or pleasurable. But that's just me.

EDIT...OK, I was off track here...I found the passage and I see Glaucon qualified the statement with "as long as it brings no harm and it's only result is the enjoyment it brings." 357B.

(2)...sex...and this category is complicated by the question of whether the parties involved mutually agree...and in a time prior to birth control...were the consequences always as pleasurable and good as the intial encounter?

2. That which is good in itself, and also has pleasing consequences, like thinking and being healthy.


3. That which is good but isn't necessarily pleasant, obligations that are good and beneficial in themselves, but which we do not enjoy because they require personal sacrifice. A just act may be good in itself, but it isn't necessarily good for me. In fact, I may suffer for it

And there is a further complication...in that the very act of doing "good" for one friend, might result in "bad" for a second friend.

It seems more and more that in order to determine "good," or "justice" or "excellence," we are going to have to, as more than one poster suggested, have to look at the end purpose desired.

Even in the case of the pruning shears....their excellence would not be the same for shearing all shrubs. What kind of shrubs are we shearing? Are we shearing them back severely? Or are we wanting to shear shapes...with delicacy? Given our limited resources, how much are we prepared to pay for said shears? At some point, their "excellence" is no longer cost effective. A real concern in the real world.

Audrey wrote: " Also, it seems odd to me that he makes Thrasymachus out to be such a mercenary. Presumably, people pay to go to his Academy, so why would he attack his own profession?

..."

I went googling for information on Plato/free will/determinism (see post #13) and ran across the statement: "His [Plato's] instruction, needless to say, was given without remuneration."

I have no idea how solid the source is...but I remembered you had posed the question...so I post it here for what it's worth.

http://www.blavatsky.net/magazine/the...

So I started re-reading. And 357b kept pulling me back.

Glaucon asks, "Do you want our conviction that right action is in all circumstances better than wrong to er genuine or merely apparent?"

In my translation [Penquin Classics; Desmond Lee], Sophocles replies, "If I were given the choice, I should want it to e genuine."

I found it couldn't get past this page. I kept going back to that sentence. Since the translation uses "were" [the past subjective], that implies that the situation is not true, ie, that Socrates does NOT have the choice. (You know, "If I were you" but I'm not... If it were still yesterday..but it's not... Etc.)

So I wondered what Plato's position was on free will, choice, determinism. Went googling.

from the web address I cited in post 12:

"Plato's philosophy is ethical above all else, based upon the idea of man's free will and power of choice. He claims that it is this power of choice which determines a man's parentage, his hereditary tendencies, his physical constitution and his early education, since all of these things are merely the effects of choices made in former lives.

These choices also determine the man's stage of evolution, show the position he should occupy in the well-ordered state, and indicate the particular virtue necessary for his immediate development. The whole problem of evolution, according to Plato, is one of ethics.

As the ultimate aim of every man is to free himself from the tyranny of his lower nature, and as this can be accomplished only through the efforts of the individual, each man must start where he is, and develop that virtue which is most necessary for him.

But then he repeats, again, "The natural inequalities among men, due to their past choices..."

Which then made me wonder anew if he believed in free choice...since where one is in this life was determined by choices of a past life...determined? by an even more past life?

Or do other translations not bring up the question of choice?

Adelle wrote: "Correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't that famous Athenian speaker Pericles living about this time? Such a great speaker. So persuasive. And yet...there were many who believed that he was almost something of a dicator? That he influenced Athens towards policies that weren't actually good for Athens? .."

Demogogue might be a better term for Pericles than dictator. He was a champion of democracy, a brilliant politician and an aggressive leader. He relied on his rhetorical skills to maintain power, so in that way he could be compared with Thrasymachus, but I'm not sure that he shared the same idea of justice.

It will be good to think about Pericles when we get to Socrates' examination of democracy, so keep him in mind.

Adelle wrote: "In my translation [Penquin Classics; Desmond Lee], Sophocles replies, "If I were given the choice, I should want it to e genuine."

I found it couldn't get past this page. I kept going back to that sentence. Since the translation uses "were" [the past subjective], that implies that the situation is not true, ie, that Socrates does NOT have the choice. (You know, "If I were you" but I'm not... If it were still yesterday..but it's not... Etc.)

."

This is a good example of Socratic irony, I think. Frequently Socrates is described as "eironikos" which is translated as "ironic" but that doesn't really convey the right meaning. The definition is actually "feigned innocence." The most common example of Socratic irony is his claim that he knows nothing -- he is feigning this for a specific purpose, maybe to provoke his interlocutors into further discussion, maybe to let himself off the hook. Here we have him pretending that he is just little old Socrates and has no choice in the matter. It's a little disingenuous, isn't it? And a little funny maybe.

Thomas wrote: "...It's a little disingenuous, isn't it? And a little funny maybe. ..."

And, depending upon one's own equanimity and sense of humor, perhaps sometimes irritating?

Lily wrote: "Thomas wrote: "...It's a little disingenuous, isn't it? And a little funny maybe. ..."

And, depending upon one's own equanimity and sense of humor, perhaps sometimes irritating?"

Absolutely. Especially to those in power.

Thomas wrote: "Absolutely. Especially to those in power. ..."

And to those not in power, who chaff at excessive excessive displays of ego in those who are, even if they claim not to be.

Lily wrote: "Thomas wrote: "Absolutely. Especially to those in power. ..."

And to those not in power, who chaff at excessive excessive displays of ego in those who are, even if they claim not to be."

I don't find Socrates to be egotistical. He specializes in bursting bubbles, which can certainly be irritating if you are the one with the bubble, but I don't see that as egotistical exactly. Maybe it is, but it doesn't have to be.

I'm reminded of Laches where Nicias talks about what it means to converse with Socrates:

Anyone who "enters into conversation with him is liable to be drawn into an argument; and whatever subject he may start, he will be continually carried round and round by him, until at last he finds that he has to give an account both of his present and past life; and when he is once entangled, Socrates will not let him go until he has completely and thoroughly sifted him." (187e,188a)

Adelle wrote: "So I wondered what Plato's position was on free will, choice, determinism. ..."

Very good question. This is what I understand to be Plato's position, and I'm interested in others' thoughts on it as well:

Since nobody commits injustice voluntarily, but only through ignorance, our free choice is predetermined by our knowledge of the good. We choose only what we believe to be good, although our beliefs are often wrong, and we end up with evil, but we never choose evil voluntarily. Some people make better choices than others because they have a better knowledge.

Knowledge of the good is like any scientific knowledge, and not all people have the same level of understanding. Our capacity for understanding is determined by our nature. For instance, a human being would have a higher level of knowledge than a monkey, and a philosopher (i.e., lover of wisdom) has a higher knowledge of the good than other people.

Nemo wrote: "Since nobody commits injustice voluntarily, but only through ignorance, our free choice is predetermined by our knowledge of the good. We choose only what we believe to be good, although our beliefs are often wrong, and we end up with evil, but we never choose evil voluntarily. Some people make better choices than others because they have a better knowledge."

The mistaken belief about the good is borne out in Thrasymachus' argument -- he argues that injustice is better than justice because it makes the one who does injustice most happy. The tale of Gyges is very similar -- Gyges chooses injustice because it is what he most desires. On the level of pure appetite, injustice is good.

But Thrasymachus' argument starts to really fall apart once Socrates asks whether the unjust person is intelligent or not. This makes Thrasymachus admit that intelligence is required for a person to be a really competent villain. But Socrates shows that intelligence leads to knowledge of virtue (which is entwined with the good), and virtue will not allow injustice because injustice is fundamentally dysfunctional. There is no such thing as a truly competent villain. To be competent one must be virtuous (in the sense of well functioning), which assumes knowledge of the good, what it means to function well. And even a villain wants to function well and be competent so he can be as unjust as possible -- but this is shown to be impossible. One simply cannot be a truly good bad person. One can only be a bad person by mistaking the bad for good.

I think that's how it goes. /:

Audrey wrote: "What struck me about Book 2 is how much Socrates focuses on his guardians--really to the exclusion of anyone else in his state. I haven't finished the whole work yet, but he continues to focus on ..."

Regarding the guardians, to jump a couple thousand years, this here in Plato is the origin of what some in modern times call the “Noble Lie”. The government has the bully pulpit supported by many of the neoconservative persuasion that the elite rulers are superior to the masses and must decide for the inferior masses. They create external threats to unite people. Religion, lies and wars are the tools of the ruling elite who will always deny they believe in these principles. Whoever disagrees with their schemes is unpatriotic, nonhumanitarian, and against the troops. I don’t think this is what Plato intended but the distortion of his thinking originates with him.

Galicius wrote: "..."

How odd. I had always just assumed (yes) that the term neoconservative referred to some sort of conservative, ie, Republican. So I googled. I learned that newconservatives were originally Democrats or had orginally been positioned on the left. Well, I learned something. Today won't be a total loss.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neoconse...


And then, I do have to say, those last few sentence strike me unsupported opinion stated as fact. ..and it looks, to me at least, as though you are commenting on today's political situation. ("against the troops" is such a modern media phrase.)

Are you saying Plato specifically advocates for such policies? Is that Plato's position? she wondered rhetorically.

Now you have me all curious. What are these next few books going to have to say???

Galicius wrote: "...I don’t think this is what Plato intended but the distortion of his thinking originates with him."

Surely the distortion, if it is indeed a distortion, comes from the distortionist, not the original thinker? A counterfeit bears resemblance to the genuine item, but the former doesn't originate with the latter, it originates with the counterfeiter.

Mmmm, this just occurred to me:

Supposedly Socrates brings the city into the discussion because the city is the individual writ large, right? The group is discussing justice in the life of an individual. But Socrates says, "Big letters are easier to see/Justice in the city would be easier to see." The implication being that they will then take what they learn from looking at the city and apply it to the life of the individual.

So if Plato is indeed introducing "the Noble Lie" for city, are we then suppose to take that idea and apply it to our own lives? Since supposedly it is the individual, not the city, that we are really discussing. Is Plato advocating we base our lives on a Noble Lie? I have that difficult to believe!

But if the city is nothing more than an example so we can better understand individuals...wouldn't that be the result?

Thomas wrote: "There is no such thing as a truly competent villain. To be competent one must be virtuous (in the sense of well functioning), which assumes knowledge of the good,"

There was a story/joke about a bank robber who used the booty to buy a diamond necklace for his girlfriend. He later found out that the diamond was a fake and became angry at the injustice of the counterfeiter. So yes, even a villain needs knowledge of the good. Many can judge the quality of a diamond, or the health of the body, but few can discern the quality of his own soul, his most valuable possession.

Obviously I am now hung up on this Noble Lie...which doesn't even come up for discussion for another couple of weeks...

But at 357d, Socrates is putting justice and right "into the highest category" of good, welcome "both for its own sake and for its consequences."

And I think, even if one could make a case for the Noble Lie "for its consequences," one cannot make an agrument for the Noble Lie "for its own sake."

Those first two questions... I'm with you ... and my reasoning ... both of those questions have to do with military operations... the very goal of military operations is to not lose the main war ...if the public knows, that information will always be known to "the enemy."

(There is a difference, too, between "not telling" and "telling a lie."

There is also, dis-information to be considered. In the two cases above, the American people were well aware --- and mostly in agreement --- of the objective: fight in Europe; get Osama. So, the public would back the objective...and as the public is not fighting the actual war or actually going after Osama themselves, there is no NEED for the public to know the actual details...and public knowledge of the details would undermine the odds of succussfully obtaining the objective...So such details being made known to the public at large would be against the interests of the public at large---and therefore the public would be in agreement with such details not being made public.



But your 3rd question, "Might a leader, in the best interests of the people, tell a noble lie?" Way too general.

And I haven't read the Rebulic. But it seems like it's going to go to "Is is just and right" to FOUND the city on a lie? (ha. maybe I'm mistaken. maybe the book isn't going to take us there.)

You pose interesting questions.

Patrice wrote: "OK, take it to the next step, Can a leader say that Osama is not in Pakistan so that he can insure the success of the operation? ..."

I thought I addressed that point

[EDIT. In any case, I can't go further because I haven't read yet the position of The Republic...and even if current events work their way into the discussion, I only want to deal with them here on Western Canon to the degree that they relate to The Republic.)

Adelle wrote: "Now you have me all curious. What are these next few books going to have to say??? "

The heart of the Noble Lie will be discussed in the next book, so we might want to wait a couple days to discuss that one -- and we should all remember that it isn't a partisan tool. We tend to look at the current state of politics because it's right in front of us, but the Noble Lie really isn't exclusive to the left or right. Or to politicians even. In this book the primary use is to educate children. Is it okay to lie to children? (With only the best of intentions, of course...)

Patrice wrote: "I did not mean to discuss current events but to give examples in which actually telling a lie (not just lies of omission) might be the just and right thing for a leader to do. Our natural inclina..."

Patrice, thank you for being accommodating. I'm aware that others here have read The Republic before, but I haven't.

lol. For me, if I'm veering off to discuss my own take on how the world should work, then I'm not focusing on Plato, in fact, if I don't hear what he has to say before I start speaking, then I'm a bit like those guys at the beginning of the book. "You can't persuade people who won't listen" 327a. (That's probably just me...but I know (some) of my weaknesses.)

Adelle wrote: "Mmmm, this just occurred to me:

Supposedly Socrates brings the city into the discussion because the city is the individual writ large, right? The group is discussing justice in the life of an ..."

This brings up what I think is a crucial question, since it forms the basis for most of The Republic -- is this a true analogy? Is the the justice of the city really the same thing as the justice of the soul, the only difference being the size? Socrates doesn't say that it is -- he says it perhaps it is. (369a) But he assumes it anyway.

His analogy relies on an assumption that there is one form of justice, an "idea" of justice that is universal in nature. But isn't the idea of a "just" individual person sort of odd? How is one just outside of one's relationship to others? Can I be "just" within myself, in isolation from others?

Patrice wrote: "How many times have i beaten up on myself, unjustly? Maybe compassion for others is tied to compassion for ourselves? And in a way it makes sense that to have a really good and solid city, one must have really good and solid citizens who understand what "good" is. ..."

Interesting! Glaucon and Adeimantus have some questions for you (and anyone else who wants to join in.)

They are assuming you have done something unjust.

1. Glaucon's question: Would you still beat up on yourself if you were invisible and no one knew what you had done? You've done the unjust thing and gotten away with it. No one will ever find out. Nobody can blame you for anything.

2. Adeimantus' question: Would you still beat up on yourself if everyone knew what you had done, but nobody disapproved of it? You appear to be completely in the right. All of your family and friends agree you did the right thing. But you still know know it was unjust.

For myself, I think I would still beat myself up over it. My mother beats herself up for having done things that none of the rest of us can see the harm in. And we tell her so. But it doesn't make any difference to the way she feels about it inside herself. I think this is the reason for rationalization. We need to believe that he haven't acted unjustly, and so we convince ourselves that we did the right thing. This is fairly universal. I lean towards thinking that we wouldn't need that defense mechanism if we cared about being THOUGHT unjust, rather than BEING unjust.

Patrice--I like your explanation of the state as an allegory for the individual. This makes a lot of Socrates' edicts for the state much more palatable to me. Taken literally as a way to run a state, there are a lot of them that I can't stand. But as metaphors, I think they have a lot of wisdom. I don't think it works for everything, but it's given me a different perspective.

The way I see the comparison of a state to an individual [not quite in the context of the Republic, but just saying how it could work] is this:

The Rulers [Guardians and Auxiliaries, I believe?] would equate with the head and nervous system. They deal with ideas and with actions.

In our society, the Heart would be those who are not in power that care about the state of things. People who vote, people who keep up with the news &c.

And then for those few who really don't care, who have 'better things to do', you've got the background actions, such as digestion. In the case of discussing justice &c, we'd be about as concerned with them as they would be concerned with this conversation.

The Heart can be given to vast, swaying opinions, such as in the Athenian Democracy. To let it rule would mean to act rashly and without consideration, and would also not allow the digestive and background processes to go about their merry way because the head and nervous system would be subjugated to what the heart desires, to the exclusion of all else, usually.

However, to let the Head rule, as I believe is the case that Plato makes, would be to give thoughtful consideration to things, taking into account the desires of the heart, the needs of the background processes, and the concepts of "good" in order to take action.

I know this was in response to something, but I can't for the life of me remember what : /

Adelle wrote: "Galicius wrote: "..."

Are you saying Plato specifically advocates for such policies? Is that Plato's position? she wondered rhetorically..."

Nothing that Plato advocates. His idea got seriously distorted. I apologize...I surely muddled my last sentence.

Nemo wrote: "Galicius wrote: "...I don’t think this is what Plato intended but the distortion of his thinking originates with him."

Surely the distortion, if it is indeed a distortion, comes from the distortio..."

You are absolutely right. Plato's idea got seriously distorted. I messed up my last sentence.

Post 24, Post 44 Galicius wrote: "Adelle wrote: "Galicius wrote: "..."

..."

I apologize, too. I, too, should have worded my response differently. Sigh. As Vriston pointed out, a good many of us follow the news. And this past month, more than usual it seems, this past week, more than usual it seems, there has been an awful lot of insinuations and name calling and opinions stated as fact...not a discussion of actual events and of what might have prompted one congressman or another to vote as they did.

Might could be that I had come to view Western Canon as a refuge from arguing the pros and cons of current events.

I surely could have written my response better, too.

Thomas wrote: "His analogy relies on an assumption that there is one form of justice, an "idea" of justice that is universal in nature. ..."

The universal idea of "justice" is not so much an assumption, as an abstraction. Socrates gives a working definition of justice in book IV, and by that definition, justice exists in both the individual and the state.

I find it helpful to consider the concept in terms of genus vs. species. Justice in the state and in the individual are specific instances of the universal idea of Justice. They share common attributes despite apparent differences.

But isn't the idea of a "just" individual person sort of odd? How is one just outside of one's relationship to others?

It's not odd if we acknowledge that there're three principles in man: reason, passion and desire. The relationships among these three would determine whether there is "justice" in the individual.

Patrice wrote: "Maybe the lower class would be analogous to the body? the body acts and carries out the functions required to live. The guardians would be the soul/reason?
"

The first city, the "city of pigs" as Glaucon sees it, is one developed for the lower class of things -- bodily functions, our basic needs like food (nutritious but simple) and shelter (furnishings not included.) It's a simple, Spartan-like existence which seems incomplete and unrealistic. It's hard to see justice in this city because there are no luxuries to desire. There are only the necessities.

But in Glaucon's city, the city of dogs, there are luxuries. And where there are luxuries there is desire, which means that citizens will have to protect themselves from the consequences of desire. Gorging on food will result in a need for doctors. Unlimited acquisition of land means an army will be necessary for protection and for conquering other lands. And a army needs soldiers, i.e., guardians who will act on Polemarchus' principle of protecting friends and defeating enemies. And as dogs are trained to protect friends from enemies, so guardians will be trained to protect the city.

Patrice: Going back to the devlopment of morality in childhood (Kohlberg) my soul is not at peace if I judge myself as wrong. Whether or not others know or agree that I am wrong, I judge myself, like Audrey's mom.

At first I thought Glaucon's Gyges story was a little harsh. I would like to think that human nature is not that brazenly bad, but after reading the end of Book 2 again it appears Socrates is taking the same approach you are: childhood development. Even if human nature in its raw state is selfish and only concerned with satisfying its own desires, it can be educated and made better. I think conscience is to a large extent something we learn as children, though at this point I'm not sure how or if conscience fits into the city.

Nemo wrote: "This is what I understand to be Plato's position, and I'm interested in others' thoughts on it as well:

Since nobody commits injustice voluntarily, but only through ignorance, our free choice is predetermined by our knowledge of the good. We choose only what we believe to be good, although our beliefs are often wrong, and we end up with evil, but we never choose evil voluntarily."

Once again, I'm drawn back to Boethius. Isn't this just what Boethius says? That people seek power, or glory, or wealth, believing that they are good, but the people are wrong, and through ignorance we choose what turns out to be contrary to the true good. I'm not sure either one has totally convinced me, but it seems that they are thinking very much alike here, even though one was pagan and one, at least ostensibly, Christian.

Adelle wrote: "Obviously I am now hung up on this Noble Lie...which doesn't even come up for discussion for another couple of weeks..."

Perhaps we should wait to get into that until Plato does? Still lots of Book II to talk about!

Audrey wrote: "Patrice--I like your explanation of the state as an allegory for the individual. This makes a lot of Socrates' edicts for the state much more palatable to me. "

Perhaps we should also keep in mind the Greek approach to citizenship. These days we think of citizenship in terms of nations, very large institutions which feel fairly distant from most citizens. But there were no nations in Socrates's day, just cities -- that was the largest political unit, and citizens had a great deal of influence on the polity. According to Vandiver, every citizen was expected to be fully qualified to manage the city's affairs; this is why in many cases there were not elections for public office, but officials were chosen by lot from the citizens. (Can you imagine no elections for President and Congress, but just drawing names from a hat? Okay, no more current politics -- too many people might say we couldn't do any worse!) With this concept of the citizen and the city in mind, drawing a parallel between the citizen and the city in terms of justice may make more sense, since any individual citizen may have to be the person deciding what is just for the city to do.

I want to think a bit more about the myth of Gyges and whether a person would commit injustice if a) he though to his benefit, and b) he would never suffer any consequences of it -- that is, he would never get caught, nor would his neighbors every think of him as an unjust person.

I suspect that many people in fact do think very much that way in practical parts of their life. Let me give an example, assuming that breaking the law is assumed to be unjust conduct.

Most of us probably live in states which have a sales tax. (If you don't, assume that you do.) Virtually all such states require that people who purchase items from out of state, when they don't pay sales tax as part of the purchase, are required to fill out a "use tax" form and pay the equivalent of the sales tax to the state. However, it's clear that very, very few people do this. I believe the reasons are pretty clear: a), it is advantageous not to pay the tax; b) there is virtually no enforcement of these laws, and so no realistic chance of getting caught and punished for breaking the law (e.g. acting unjustly); and c) nobody expects people to pay this tax, so there is no public disapproval, or sense that one is an unjust person because they break this law. It is the "perfect storm" of being able to benefit from being unjust while not suffering either punishment or public disapproval for being unjust.

@39Thomas wrote: "Adeimantus' question: Would you still beat up on yourself if everyone knew what you had done, but nobody disapproved of it? You appear to be completely in the right. All of your family and friends agree you did the right thing. But you still know know it was unjust.
.."

Mmmm, I wonders if such a situation could exist.

Let's assume justice or right action is something that naturally resonates with us. That we have an inate sense of justice. And an action that is unjust we can instinctively reconize as unjust ("That's not right."), even if we can't explain WHY or HOW we know it's unjust. If such is the case, then surely I wouldn't be the only one to believe that my action was unjust.

And if we assume that justice is something that can be reasoned to, then again, surely I wouldn't be be the only one to believe that my action was unjust.

But if we are going down the path that cultural mores are equivelent to justice or right action, and if everyone, neighbors, family, friends, etc., saw my actions are "right," ...

in that case I'm suspecting that eventually I would come to think, too, that my action was NOT unjust.

I say that because one can see how over the past, oh, 70 or 80 years, through exposure to different cultural mores in the movies and on television, and then tolorance or acceptance of those new mores amongst many in the community, people's cultural mores have changed. And if I didn't have even friends and family to make me question my action, if even they thought I was acting rightly, well, I suspect that I would eventually think that way as well.

Again, I think Plato was highlighting the imporatance of social relationships, the influence of peer pressure in our decisions, when early in book I, GLAUCON wants to stay, and says so, and Socrates goes along with it.

Polymarchus: "I believe you are starting off on your way back to town."

Socrates: "You are quite right."

And Glaucon wants to stay and Adeimantus brings up reasons why they should stay.

Polymarchus: "So please do stay."

To which Glaucon replied, "It looks as if we shall have to."

{Again....I come back to wondering about how much choice Plato thinks we have... "we shall HAVE to")

Socrates: "Well, if you think so, stay we MUST."

So I'm thinking maybe this is a foreshadowing of the influence of peer pressure, of social mores, when it comes to the question of justice.

Book II does go touch a little on the importance of education --- of education CORRECTLY ---

Perhaps??? so that the correctly educated children will grow up with the correct views and put social pressure on one another to act correctly... which perhaps Plato equastes with justice???

Everyman wrote: "Adelle wrote: "Obviously I am now hung up on this Noble Lie...which doesn't even come up for discussion for another couple of weeks..."

Perhaps we should wait to get into that until Plato does? S..."

Oh, we've left that subject. Someone referenced it, and we wandered (and wondered) down that side path a little while, but we have all returned by now to the well-marked Book II.

(And my Book II is literally "well-marked.")

@42 Vrixton wrote: "The Rulers [Guardians and Auxiliaries, I believe?] would equate with the head and nervous system. They deal with ideas

."

How neat! I love how you managed to make meaningful the allegory of the body/the State.

And then last night, I ran across this, and apparently Plato, too, (in a different work), has the Head reasoning. And he wrote a lovely allegory. I so liked the image of the charioteer and the horses!

Anyway, I really enjoyed the allegory, so I post it here.

Charioteer Allegory


"Plato's charioteer myth (Phaedrus 245c-257b) certainly also deserves mention. The ascent of the mind to celestial and trans-celestial realms is likened to a charioteer and a chariot drawn by two winged horses, one dark and one white.

Figuratively represented is the famous Platonic tripartite model of the soul: the charioteer represents reason, or intellect, the dark horse appetitive passions, and the white horse irascible nature.

Only by taming and controlling the two horses can the charioteer ascend to the heavens and enjoy a banquet of divine knowledge. Key epistemological features of the charioteer myth are (1) an emphasis, as with the cave allegory, upon true knowledge as ascent, (2) and the need to tame one's passionate nature to obtain true knowledge."



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Platonic...

372d "So they will lead a peaceful and healthy life, and probably die at a ripe old age, bequeathing a similiar way of life to their children." Socrates calls it "our healthy state." [373a]

This reads as though Socrates is endorsing tradition.

But Glaucon (speaking for himself? speaking for the many?) wants the kind of civilization that has extras, the kind where the people can fulfil some of their desires for "more," ... the kind of civilization that necessarily leads to war.

How disparaging Glaucon is of that first society. "A community of pigs," he calls it.

Is Glaucon saying, in effect, that the healthy, simple life is fit only for animals? That even though Glaucon KNOWS that the kind of city that he wants to live in will eventually be engaged in wars,
[373e: "That will lead to war, Glaucon, will it not?"
"It will."]

yet Glaucon still desires that kind of city....because ??? it is only in such a city in which people's desires have allowed for the accumlation of wealth....and it is only the accumlation of wealth and discretionary time and education which allows young men (like Glaucon) to get beyond a mere task-oriented life???? Because only in such a city can man go beyond the animal life and become human??? Because man's true excellence can't exist in the simple "community of pigs"???

And then, Glaucon, too, endorses tradition, or at least he endorses the concept that What-we-already-have-is-what-is-right (so isn't this implying that what we think of as "right" is merely "convention"/or "accepted cultural norms"?):

372e: How would you found a city? Socrates asked Glaucon.

"Give them the ordinary comforts. Let them recline in comfort on couches and eat off tables, and have the sort of food we have today."

Is Plato/Glaucon just being realistic? That it is human nature to want and desire more than one has?? That everyone wants more than his fair share?

Polymarchus thouht justice was giving everyone hie due. But if everyone wants and tries to acquire more than his due... How then will there be any justice?