Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Once again, we see philosophical questions that are still debated today arising (perhaps even originating) in Plato. Many incredible ideas.

It is hard to overemphasize how radical the idea of the equality of men and women was in his day. Yet Socreates tossed it off almost casually in Book 4, and we only hear more about it because Adeimantus (again, recall, Plato's brother) presses him for more detail.

And the idea of communal family care comes 2,000 years before Communism and the hippie communes.

Isn't the idea of abolishing the private family just another example of Plato's central principle of placing the interests of the city as a whole ahead of individual liberties?

And here we finally get to the philosopher-king, and idea that seems to outrage Glaucon. Why? (Perhaps because he makes his living persuading people that he can turn almost any person into a rhetorician and from there into a philosopher?) Isn't the question of who is best qualified to lead a city or country still a matter of fierce debate to this very day?

Finally, we get to the theory of Forms. Universals vs. particulars. Absolutism vs. relativism. Another concept fiercely debated to this very day.

What a group of ideas!


BTW, in case you've been wondering where I've been the past week or two, I've been spending a lot more time over on the mainland than I really want to. But I see that things are humming along without me -- thanks to all for the great discussion. I do hope to get back into it actively soon!

Everyman wrote: "It is hard to overemphasize how radical the idea of the equality of men and women was in his day. Yet Socreates tossed it off almost casually in Book 4, and we only hear more about it because Adeimantus (again, recall, Plato's brother) presses him for more detail. .."

There is something almost comical about the way Book 5 starts, with Polmarchus grabbing Adeimantus and asking, "Well, are we going to ask him about it?" Clearly they know what "it" is, and they've been worried about it for some time.

Socrates is very reluctant to talk about "it", but his friends cast proverbial votes to "arrest" him and make him defend and explain the community of women and children in the city. The language is that of the court -- Socrates must present arguments before a jury after being arrested and summoned to defend his case, but Glaucon laughs at this and tells him not to worry. "...if we are affected in some discordant way by the argument, we'll release you like a man who is guiltless of murder." (451b)

Just as Socrates was detained at the start of the dialogue, here it happens again. It's almost as if Glaucon and the gang know he doesn't want to discuss "it" and they force him into it for their own amusement. Why is Socrates so reluctant to discuss the community of women and children? Is the problem perhaps that it throws serious doubt on the possibility that such a city could exist?

Thomas wrote: "Why is Socrates so reluctant to discuss the community of women and children? Is the problem perhaps that it throws serious doubt on the possibility that such a city could exist? ..."

Objection, Your Honor, speculation and leading the witness.

If we abide by the rules of evidence this is going to take a very very long time... ;)

Thomas wrote: " Why is Socrates so reluctant to discuss the community of women and children?..."

Nevertheless Socrates’ proposal is the first for emancipation of women. He says plainly that both sexes are equally capable of competing for any job. This demands equal education, co-ed gymnasia, and competition. Sex is mainly for reproduction but recreational sex is allowed for the guardians past their prime, as well as erotic rewards for bravery in battle. Most troubling parts are some kind of euthanasia that is advocated for unwanted children and educating children in warfare by taking them on horseback to witness military conflicts.

Galicius wrote: "Thomas wrote: " Why is Socrates so reluctant to discuss the community of women and children?..."

Nevertheless Socrates’ proposal is the first for emancipation of women. He says plainly that both ..."

No, not REALLY emancipation for women. Socrates isn't emancipating them, it seems, so much as assigning them different sorts of work. And denying their womanhood.

The women, I thought, were very much sexist objects. WHY is it so important for them to exercise in the nude? WHY do the men, as a reward for extra prowess in battle get to "have" extra sessions with the women? WHY do the men "possess" them women?

Looks like a sucky deal to me. Frankly, in the republic, I'd rather be living in the lower ranks, where I could have a family, and actually have my own children.

And yet....you ARE right about the women in the Guardian class being educated the same as the men in that class...and the women in that class WOULD be making judgments for the city the same as the men in tbst class would.

It does seem to me that S does this by taking away from them the most evident aspect they are...from Nature....

Yes, he does educate them...but he uses them as educated brood mares...there is no gain, it seems to me for women as women....no opportunity.... it just seems to be one or two more ways to USE women.

It seems that instead of being used by one man (a husband...let's say she hadn't wanted him for a husband but had no choice)....the women in the republic get sexually by a whole bunch of men (and not by choice because remember the partners are chosen...make that "chosen"...by lot....AND when the honored warrior wants someone, that someone can't even refuse.

Yes, SOME equality. But do you think it is an equality many women would want???

But, if I'm reading right, the sex isn't to promote reproduction... Or am I mistaken? (I did read too fast.). The sex, I thought, was scheduled on special occasion days and those days only so that reproduction could be low...the city isn 't supposed to grow...and there are only a small number of Guardians...

Adelle wrote: "It does seem to me that S does this by taking away from them the most evident aspect they are...from Nature....
..."

If I understand you correctly, you are making the same objection that Glaucon does at 453c:

How then can you deny that you are mistaken and in contradiction with yourselves when you turn around and affirm that the men and the women ought to do the same thing, though their natures are so far apart? (Shorey translation)

To which Socrates responds, "Ah jeez, that's why I didn't want to talk about this in the first place," and then says there may be a way out of this contradiction by "applying the proper divisions and distinctions to the subject under consideration." Which turns out to mean that the nature of men and women are similar in some respects, and different in others. After some discussion about similarities and differences between the sexes, they conclude that there is no difference with respect to their ability to manage the affairs of the city.

@ 9 Thomas wrote: "Adelle wrote: "It does seem to me that S does this by taking away from them the most evident aspect they are...from Nature....
..."

If I understand you correctly, you are making the same objection..."

Mmm....yes, very probably I am making that objection.

1) Socrates never soundly counters this objection. He brings up bald men and long-haired men...which has no bearing on what one by nature is fitted or un-fitted to do. whereas bearing children naturally induces maternal instincts. It's not that a woman can't perform the same work that men can AND also put time and emotion into raising their child. The problem is that in Socrates' "only one job/Focus!" city, two jobs is one job too many. S seems to hold that it is easier to expect women to repress their natural instincts that for them to have a child and a job.



2) S brought up somewhere... I can't seem to find the location... tht the female dogs hunted with the male dogs. So S is putting dogs before us as proper models of behavior.

2A) the offspring of dogs take only a few weeks of maternal care. During that period the mother dogs nurse and care for their own young. So from the model that S uses, we see that there is a strong natural tendency to care for one's young. 2B) S said earlier in the book that one takes better care of what one cares about... that when city-interest coincides with self-interest, that is when one will obtain the best results.

Children raised in institutional settings without an opportunity for emotional bonding (raised by many; loved one-on-one by none; what did Aristotle say? That which is commonly owned by all is taken care of by none.) (studies, I think bear this out ), don't tend to become optimal adults. Yet Socrates' Guardians need to be optimal adults.

3) but it doesn't seem to me that Socrates really wants women pGuardians. The city requires the BEST. Socrtes himself says at 455a "Then is there any human activity at hich men aren't far better in all these respects then women?". And S nd G have a good laugh together. And G, after that enjoyable bonding exchange says, "Damn straight! Men are better than women at everything!"

3A) in which case it would seem,since S believes most men to be better, that ALL the Guardians...since only the best are chosen, would be males.

Btw, I was a mother AND I had an ouside the home job. So to be clear, my position is NOT that women cannot do the same sorts of jobs as men can do...I think they can.

My position is that Socrates was mistaken, I think, in suppositioning that that women birthed children with no natural attachment....that they were as ok with sending the babies off to the state creche as one would be in putting up signs to give away puppies.... To go back to Socrates self-selected example of female dogs, those dogs are not going to easily relinguish their puppies...because such behavior would NOT be natural. So, yes, i think Socrates is disregarding nature.

3B) which leads me to think that S is only putting females into his Guardian group because his plan requires the most suitable females to be included strictly for breeding purposes. If there were some way that man could breed with man, I think that Socrates would have all the Guardians be males.

Thomas wrote: "Everyman wrote: "It is hard to overemphasize how radical the idea of the equality of men and women was in his day. Yet Socreates tossed it off almost casually in Book 4, and we only hear more about..."

Socrates shows reluctance because he is aware of having ideas which appear impossible, or, if practicable, anything but good and he’s keen to point out that he’s proceeding by trial and error, because there is no certainty of the things mentioned. [450c ff]
But then, encouraged by Glaucon, he decides to express his thoughts. Until the fourth book, Socrates spoke of citizens using the masculine terms and pronouns: for example, has consistently used the word andres (human male) when the Greek language would allow him to use anthropoi (humans in general).

Certainly, the ideas of Socrates, to us seembut sexist and misogynistic, but for men of his time just the idea of ​​educating women was absolutely unthinkable, let alone to have them to govern the polis, but it's obvious that his solution isn't adequate.
(In Italy this is a very sensitive issue...we have a Prime Minister who thinks of women as "the warrior's rest" and has chosen his party's women candidates based on their physical appearance).

Adelle wrote: "@ 9 Thomas wrote: "Adelle wrote: "It does seem to me that S does this by taking away from them the most evident aspect they are...from Nature....
..."

If I understand you correctly, you are making..."

Excellent response, Adelle! A couple things I want to comment on, though I'm not sure if Socrates is going to get out of this one unscathed.

1) Socrates never soundly counters this objection. He brings up bald men and long-haired men...which has no bearing on what one by nature is fitted or un-fitted to do. whereas bearing children naturally induces maternal instincts.

I guess the question is this: what part of human nature makes one fit to be a guardian? It obviously isn’t hair. Is it any physical characteristic? Socrates says a “man and a woman whose souls are skilled in the doctor’s art have the same nature” with respect to the art of medicine. He concludes the same thing about the art of governing the city – some women will be good at it, and some will not, just like some men will be suited for it and some men won’t.

2B) S said earlier in the book that one takes better care of what one cares about... that when city-interest coincides with self-interest, that is when one will obtain the best results.

But this was an unhealthy tendency which had to be corrected through education. Left alone, the care one feels for one’s own children and family leads to faction, which is Socrates’ definition of injustice. (If this the case though, how is anyone supposed to feel love or patriotism for one's city?)

3) but it doesn't seem to me that Socrates really wants women pGuardians. The city requires the BEST. Socrtes himself says at 455a "Then is there any human activity at hich men aren't far better in all these respects then women?". And S nd G have a good laugh together. And G, after that enjoyable bonding exchange says, "Damn straight! Men are better than women at everything!"

Glaucon suggests that some women are better at some things than some men, and Socrates does not disagree. Indeed they would have to be – a woman of the gold guardian class must be better in every respect than a man of the bronze working class.

There will be women suited for the “gold” class of society, and this is based on the quality of their souls. The physical differences between male and female guardians are totally irrelevant to how they function as guardians, and the city does everything it can to minimize the bothersome necessity of reproduction and child rearing.

To me what this suggests is that for Socrates the body is completely subordinated to the soul. This may not play out in reality.

To go back to Socrates self-selected example of female dogs, those dogs are not going to easily relinguish their puppies...because such behavior would NOT be natural. So, yes, i think Socrates is disregarding nature.

I think this is quite true.

Patrice wrote: "I particularly love 450 a. "what a thing you've done in arresting me," I said. "How much discussion you've set in motion..."

Plato is pointing out that in trying to shut Socrates up by killing him, they have instead set into motion a 2500 year dialog...."

very nice point. very.

"Adelle had written: "2B) S said earlier in the book that one takes better care of what one cares about... that when city-interest coincides with self-interest, that is when one will obtain the best results.

Thomas wrote: But this was an unhealthy tendency which had to be corrected through education. Left alone, the care one feels for one’s own children and family leads to faction, which is Socrates’ definition of injustice. (If this the case though, how is anyone supposed to feel love or patriotism for one's city?)

.."

Yeah, I do see where Socrates is coming from...but at the same time, it seems to me that raising the children the way that Socrates advocates that the children won't grow into optimal adults. Tricksy.

Polemarchus. I saw that Polemarchus re-entered the conversation towards the beginning of Book 5. It reminded me that I had just read that Polemarchus was executed during the reign of the Thirty.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polemarchus

449-450. Thomas, early, noted that, as in Book 1, there is a physical reaching out, a symbolic physical restraint, to make Socrates stay. There is something...there's some meaning there...but it keeps evading me.

Be that as it may, it paints a situation which seems to undermine the point of view of Thrasymachus (that might makes right). The group tells Socrates that they aren't going to let him go. There's a good deal of joking in this, but yes, physically, they could have restrained him.

This section rather suggests, I think, that one can through might restrain a person from doing something one doesn't want done (like the group was able to restrain Socrates from leaving).

Adeimantus: "When I asked what it was they weren't going to let go,' he answered, 'You.'"

But that method (physical power) is not usually effective in getting someone to do what one wants to other person to do.

The group wants Socrates to talk further about the women in common. Even Thrasymachus wants to know more about the women in common. And Thrasymachus isn't in a position of power to get want he wants. Thrasymachus suddenly seems to shift from "might makes right" to "majority rules." Implying that as Socrates is part of the group, he should follow the rules of the group...which has voted to have Socrates talk. Thrasymachus...conceding that rules, not power plays, are more powerful ---at least sometimes.

"In fact, Socrates," said Thrasymachus, "you can take it we're unanimous"(450a).

I actually thouht this clever on the part of Glaucon and Thrasymachus. Prior to the lines where G and T brought up "voting," the group was more or less bullying Socrates. Trying to get him (through overpowering him vocally) to to something he didn't want to do.

But when the voting aspect entered the conversation, it had the effect of reminding Socrates that he was voluntarily a member of the group. And that in voluntarily remaining with the group, he was, in effect, agreeing to abide by the rules of the group. (the vote).

Didn't Socrates pretty concede as much in "The Crito"?

"The Laws would further say, Socrates says, that he entered into a contract with them by remaining within the city," (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Crito)

Patrice wrote: "I'll have to go back and look at this but my impression of "majority rules" is just another way of saying that might makes right. I thought that the whole thing was meant to remind us of the injus..."

Hi, Patrice! I can understand your interpretation.

And yet...(I'll try to be more concise)...

My interpretation is that "might makes right" (the original position of Thrasymachus, is the power is the motivating factor/the bottom line. And that for the people who aren't in power...they have no choice in the matter...they do what they are forced to do.

But that a democracy is a step closer to justice. Yes, you are right on one level that "majority rules" = "might makes right."

Democracy, I think, is more nuanced than a pure power play. The citizens are supposedly citizens voluntarily. They could leave if they wanted to. And that as decisions do have to be made....and the citizens have collectively agreed to democracy, to voting, to the concept that if the vote goes against them, well, then, they will reluctantly go along with the vote...because they have agreed to be part of the system...and they have agreed beforehand that that is the way the system will work.

A majority vote, you are right, does not GUARANTEE justice. But it does seem to me a step closer to justise than "Do what I say or I will kill you." or, "beat you, or simply take what I want."

Because it is an agreed upon process.

Socrates, in this setting, COULD have left. He could have left Athens, too. But in agreeing to stay, whether agreeing to stay in Athens...and follow the rules of Athens and drink the hemlock...or in agreeing to stay in the house of Cephalus and continue the discussion, to me, the key point was that he voluntarily agreed to stay...and to voluntarily abide by the rules of the group.

:) But that's just my take.

Patrice wrote: "Physically grabbing someone and forcing them to stay and saying "there are more of us" isn't that a gang mentality?..."

Yes. That's why I thought it clever that they moved the incentive to stay from physical power (the gang mentality) to co-operative voting.

450e. "But when one is doing what I am doing now, and trying to discuss things about which one is far from certain..."

I know that Socrates downplayed what he knew...or seemed to.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_know_t...

This statement sounds on the level. That Socrates wouldn't want to steer them wrong... "For, I believe, it's better in fact to be guilty of manslaughter than of fraud about what is fair and good and just" (451a).

Socrates would like to discuss his ideas...but he's not sure of them.

Women. 451c. LOL. Revealing passage concerning where Socrates thinks women should be: behind men.

"Well, then," I began, we must go back and pick the subject up again. We ought perhaps to have discussed it in its proper place, but maybe it's a good plan to let (!) the women come on stage now, after the men have played their part..."

451d-452c----Women as Guardians.

I thought Socrates steered the discussion here quite well.

"Let us, then, proceed to arrange for their [women's] birth and upbringing accordingly. We can then see if it suits our purpose."

They have just discussed how women should follow after men. And they are now discussing how to arrange things so that women fit the purposes of the men. Therefore...the men in the group are going to be somewhat more relaxed about this conversation...because they have been assured that they [the men] are still in charge.

But one of the men still wants a little further assurance, and voices "we should treat the females as the weaker, the males as the stronger" ... and no one objects...so right there there is a litte more assurance...the men are still in the favored position.

Socrates makes a number of statements with which is difficult to rationally disagree with...ALSO...for his foundational question he doesn't refer to women...he refers to animals...

And the men answer Socrates with a number of absolute agreements....

but then... when it gets down to brass tacks, and Socrates says, "We shall have to train the women also, then, in both kinds of skill, and train them for war as well, and treat them in the same way as the men"... why, suddenly the men aren't quite agreeing with him.


"It seems to follow from what you said."

And Socrates immediately changes tactics. He stops presenting his agrument as an argument based on reason. He does two things. He brings in prurient interest. The men will be exercising with the naked women. He brings in humor. "Why, we'll all be laughing and laughing at those naked old
women...wrinkled and ugly to look at"

Ridicule is not a reasoned argument. But it's often effective.

@ 25 Patrice wrote: "Whenever I read Plato I see him everywhere! At the moment, on book TV, Steven Pressfield is discussing his book "The Warrior Ethos". He started the talk with a description of Sparta.

The point..." Etc.

The relishes! I LOVE it! I hadn't heard or read that remark before ("I didn't ask about my sons. I asked about the battle.") The line I remember about Spartans was the mothers saying to their sons, "Come home with your shield, or come home on it."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_...

TOTAL ASIDE: So I go the wikepedia link, and about the 3rd quote down is one from Aristotle: ""Libya always bears something evil." Been problems in Libya for a long, long time.

Sparta.

Patrice wrote: "Adelle wrote: "Patrice wrote: "I'll have to go back and look at this but my impression of "majority rules" is just another way of saying that might makes right. I thought that the whole thing was ..."

Whew! Well, it was you who told me to go ahead and try...and if I was wrong that that was part of the process.

@15 Patrice wrote: "...it reminds me of that wonderful phrase "it takes a village". I've always countered that with, it takes parents. When a village cares for your child, no one does. ..."

I haven't read the book whose title may grate, but how many parents can raise a child without a community supportive at least to some extent?

While I can't buy Plato/Socrates's proposition of severing children from parents for communal rearing, it seems to me that there have usually, if not always, been aspects of communal child raising even in the most monogamous of societies.

Adelle wrote: "451d-452c----Women as Guardians.

And Socrates immediately changes tactics. He stops presenting his agrument as an argument based on reason. He does two things. He brings in prurient interest. The men will be exercising with the naked women. He brings in humor. "Why, we'll all be laughing and laughing at those naked old
women...wrinkled and ugly to look at"

Ridicule is not a reasoned argument. But it's often effective. "

This is a fair assessment of the reaction of Socrates' audience at the start, but I disagree with your characterization of Socrates. He recognizes that his interlocutors -- all upper class men -- will find the idea of female guardians difficult to take seriously. He tries to avoid the discussion altogether. But then he proceeds to counter their ridicule and presents a sober argument to convince them otherwise, and he does. He says those who would make jokes about women exercising with men -- comedians, in other words -- need to "not mind their own business" and be serious about it.

He then goes on to show that with respect to skills, including the skill of statesmanship, women are just as capable as men -- though weaker. Not ALL women are fit to be guardians, but neither are all men. In the scheme of the Republic, female guardians are by their nature certainly "better" and stronger than male shopkeepers or farmers, are they not?

After he has shown that women have skills that entitle them to guardian status, he goes back to the thing that his interlocutors thought so funny -- women stripping and exercising with men. They aren't laughing anymore.

And the man who laughs at naked women practicing gymnastic for the sake of the best, 'plucks from his wisdom an unripe fruit for ridicule' and doesn't know-- as it seems -- at what he laugts or what he does.

Thomas wrote: "Adelle wrote: "451d-452c----Women as Guardians.

And Socrates immediately changes tactics. He stops presenting his agrument as an argument based on reason. He does two things. He brings in prurient..."

Plato's Socrates challenges the factual determination of physis ( as established once and for all, as a crystallization of the social image of people, and he radically calls into question the gender structure of his society, while living in a world viciously misogynistic and discriminatory (and he also isn't immune to the ideas of his time).
A political community,that take seriously both the Platonic principle of justice as a division of labor according to the physis, and the physis as the idea that you know just testing it, could apply this principle only after allowing for all men - and all women - the opportunity to prove themselves.

Plato, with John Stuart Mill, is one of the few great male philosophers of the Western tradition to critically discuss the problem of women, without limiting himself to confirm things already said, and without taking them for granted with the simple expedient of ignoring the family and the gender.

Cassandra wrote: "Plato's Socrates challenges the factual determination of physis ( as established once and for all, as a crystallization of the social image of people, and he radically calls into question the gender structure of his society, while living in a world viciously misogynistic and discriminatory (and he also isn't immune to the ideas of his time). "

What Socrates does in his analysis of gender is socially radical, but it seems to be a natural consequence of his belief that the soul is separate and distinct from the body. There is a relationship between the soul and the body, but the soul is clearly dominant and responsible for the person as a whole. Socrates seems to be saying that gender difference is merely physical. I'm not sure if this is true, but it seems to follow from the way he separates soul and body.

Thomas wrote: "Socrates seems to be saying that gender difference is merely physical. I'm not sure if this is true, but it seems to follow from the way he separates soul and body...."

So what are you (or other philosophers) suggesting are the other possibilities? Does the separation of soul and body matter to the discussion?

Lily wrote: "So what are you (or other philosophers) suggesting are the other possibilities? Does the separation of soul and body matter to the discussion? "

I guess the question for me, limited to the example Plato gives us here, is whether the physical experience of gender gives us a different understanding of the world and ourselves. This is just one aspect of physicality; one could just as well ask if a blind person understands the world in the same way as a sighted person. Socrates says there are things we know -- the Ideas -- that have no relation to physical experience of them. A blind person knows what virtue is just as well as a sighted person because sight is not necessary to understand this. One understands virtue by "seeing" the Idea of virtue. No physical experience is necessary. The question then becomes this: how do we know things that we have not learned from experience?

It's a difficult question, but we'll see more of this in detail as we proceed. The next few books of the Republic will go into the world of Ideas in depth. It will probably be easier to discuss this question then, and save me from mangling Plato's philosophy, which I'm probably doing right now. :( But it's a great question.

Thomas -- thank you for the lovely (thoughtful) response. I had thought perhaps you were getting at the sort of thing that Lawrence Summers alluded to in the explosive discussions about men and women as scholars/contributors across various areas demanding mental prowess of specific types. (E.g., it is my understanding that if one looks at the testing for certain traits associated with mathematical genius at the highest levels, the results indicate a greater presence of those traits in men than in women for large populations ostensibly controlled for relevant factors. I have not probed the veracity of those claims nor the existence of other possible analogous traits that might favor one or another gender. However, I don't disagree with the possibility such findings could, even perhaps should, influence educational policy, even though the results may apply to only a small percentage of those already categorized as extremely capable.)

I found the passage at 474a/b rather funny. And, perhaps, a commentary on human nature.

Glaucon says to Socrates, "I won't desert you, and will give you what help I can, though it won't amount to more than goodwill and encouragement"

So Glaucon is, in effect, saying, "Don't expect any help from me."

And Socrates replies, I thought with a little amusement, "You're such a powerful ally that I must make the attempt."

Patrice wrote: ".The point being that we must always leave our minds open and questioning. In the Meno, there is something called "Meno's Paradox". If I remember correctly it's that when we think we know, we stop looking for answers. Thinking you know when you don't is the ultimate dead end. We just stop searching."

OK, two hands. On the one hand, yes, knowledge is probably never "absolute." (Isn't that addressed in an upcoming book?) And hence there is a strong case to be made for keeping an open mind and looking for answers.

On the other hand, in actual life, it seems to me that at some point a decision has to be made. We don't have the time to continually tweek the architectural plans...even though it is evident that we could improve the plans. At some point, the building must be built...and at that point, unless there is an overwhelmingly persuasive argument for changes, suggestions for changes must be rejected. It's too late to keep an open mind.

I have enjoyed the discussion. A thank you to all.

I'm driving back to North Dakota in the morning. I'm going to try to keep up with the reading. And if I have a little spare time (lol, and an internet connection), I'll try to log in and read your comments.

http://www.google.com/imgres?q=indian...

Adelle wrote: "I found the passage at 474a/b rather funny. And, perhaps, a commentary on human nature.

Glaucon says to Socrates, "I won't desert you, and will give you what help I can, though it won't amount to more than goodwill and encouragement"


And right after that, he says "...and maybe I'd give you replies in a more harmonious spirit than someone else would."

I thought Patrice would like that. Glaucon knows he's a "yes man".

:)

Adelle wrote: " On the one hand, yes, knowledge is probably never "absolute." (Isn't that addressed in an upcoming book?) And hence there is a strong case to be made for keeping an open mind and looking for answers. .."

I've been thinking about the possibility or impossibility of the city, and wondering if there is a connection between the city and the "absolute." Socrates says it was "for the sake of a pattern" that the city in speech was created, and that things described in speech (in logos, in theory) don't come into being exactly the same way in all respects. He says we should be satisfied if a city could be founded that is close to the pattern. (The word for pattern here is paradeigma, which is cognate with the English word paradigm, and means a pattern, a model, or an example.) I'm not sure if a pattern or an example is the same thing as an absolute though. I usually think of absolutes as abstract concepts, but I'm not sure if that's right either.

Thomas wrote: "Adelle wrote: Thomas wrote: I've been thinking about the possibility or impossibility of the city, and wondering if there is a connection between the city and the "absolute." Socrates says it was "for the sake of a pattern" that the city in speech was created, and that things described in speech (in logos, in theory) don't come into being exactly the same way in all respects. He says we should be satisfied if a city could be founded that is close to the pattern. (The word for pattern here is paradeigma, which is cognate with the English word paradigm, and means a pattern, a model, or an example.) I'm not sure if a pattern or an example is the same thing as an absolute though. I usually think of absolutes as abstract concepts, but I'm not sure if that's right either."

You may be headed down the right path.

I may have posted this previously:

From Plato in 90 Minutes Paul Strathern

"It was Pythagoras who most deeply influenced Plato, and to him we must go for the source of many of Plato’s idea" (11).

Plato was to be deeply influenced by Pythagoras’s famous saying, ‘All is number.’ Pythagoras believed that beyond the jumbled world of appearances there lies an abstract harmonious world of number. In fact, his conception of number was closer to what we would call ‘form.’ …. The ideal world of number (or forms) was filled with harmony and was more real than the so-called real world… (11).

Now, there's a good deal of time separating me from my calculus classes. A very long time. But isn't the theory that there is no "2" or "3" etc. That "2" or "3" etc is merely a symbol.

And then, when one looks at real numbers, like pi, it seems even more like Plato. No one, no computer even, has ever determined the value of pi. We edge ever closer, but we can never really determine its value. So most of us just accept "3.145".


Or, like 1/3. It never can truly be translated into a truly exact numerical form. 0.3333333 and the 3s go on forever.

Is that what you are getting at? That if we equate Plato's ideal city to real numbers, and consider the symbolism of numbers, that maybe then we are thinking along the same lines as Plato?

Or am I reading you wrong?

Adelle wrote: "Pythagoras believed that beyond the jumbled world of appearances there lies an abstract harmonious world of number. In fact, his conception of number was closer to what we would call ‘form.’ …. The ideal world of number (or forms) was filled with harmony and was more real than the so-called real world… (11). "

That sounds like it's in the same ballpark. The mathematical example that is easiest for me to deal with is from geometry: take the "idea" or "form" of a circle. I can imagine a perfect circle, flawlessly round, every radius from the center exactly the same length. And I can identify circles based on this "form." A bicycle tire, a tree stump viewed from above, the moon. But no concrete example of a circle matches up with with the perfect circle in my mind. Viewed closely enough, no circle in everyday experience is perfect -- the tire has nicks and imperfections, the stump is slightly elliptical, the moon has mountains. And even though I have that idea in my mind, I could never actually draw a perfect circle, even with the assistance of a computer, at a microscopic level there will imperfections. But still there is that idea. Is the idea real, even though I can't demonstrate it in a concrete way? Even though I have never actually experienced it in an empirical way?

*Perfect explanation.

*well, as perfect as one gets in this world.

:) but really, I appreciated how you explained the concept,

Adelle wrote: "I have enjoyed the discussion. A thank you to all.

I'm driving back to North Dakota in the morning. I'm going to try to keep up with the reading. And if I have a little spare time (lol, and ..."

Have a safe trip! I spent many summers in North Dakota as a child, working on my grandparents' farm and wondering about the guys in the Minuteman missile silo a few miles away. So I know they have some sort of technical abilities in ND... wifi is easier to do than ballistic missiles, you would think, so hopefully you'll get back to us ASAP!

Adelle wrote: "The ideal world of number (or forms) was filled with harmony and was more real than the so-called real world..."

It is hard for me to grasp the meaning of "harmony" in this context. You sent me fumbling for definitions -- real numbers, integers, rational numbers, irrational numbers, constants like pi (ratio of circumference to diameter)... Some interesting stuff out there on the edges of mathematics... -- much of which I probably won't even try to understand at this point in my life (at least not very hard).

A couple of simple definitions, however, "an irrational number is any real number which cannot be expressed as a fraction a/b, where a and b are integers, with b non-zero, and is therefore not a rational number. Informally, this means that an irrational number cannot be represented as a simple fraction. Irrational numbers are precisely those real numbers that cannot be represented as terminating or repeating decimals...Perhaps the best-known irrational numbers are π, e and √2...."

"...a rational number is any number that can be expressed as the quotient or fraction a/b of two integers, with the denominator b not equal to zero. Since b may be equal to 1, every integer is a rational number.... The decimal expansion of a rational number always either terminates after finitely many digits or begins to repeat the same finite sequence of digits over and over. Moreover, any repeating or terminating decimal represents a rational number. These statements hold true not just for base 10, but also binary, hexadecimal, or any other integer base."

"Real numbers" -- well, go looking if interested.

Lily wrote: "It is hard for me to grasp the meaning of "harmony" in this context...."

The harmony in the city comes from the three classes playing their roles, right? And the harmony in the soul comes from the three parts of the soul harmonizing with each other. Plato has an interest in multiplicities and unities (which he goes into in depth in an extremely difficult dialogue called Parmenides) but I haven't seen the mathematical issues that are brought up there as an issue in the Republic. But we're only half-way through the book, so maybe we have this difficulty to look forward to! As if we need any more. :)

Thomas wrote: "The harmony in the city comes from the three classes playing their roles, right?..."

Not inherently obvious to me. Seems to me, for such to be true, to presume roles can both be defined and carried out in ways such that minimum "friction" exists. But so long as making shoes depends on the ability to procure leather at a reasonable price, it seems to me that the potential for "disharmony" exists.

Lily wrote: "Thomas wrote: "The harmony in the city comes from the three classes playing their roles, right?..."

Not inherently obvious to me. Seems to me, for such to be true, to presume roles can both be de..."

I agree. Socrates tries to iron out these wrinkles by saying that the "city in speech" is only a model, or an example. The "real" city can't possibly live up to the ideal one. Is that a satisfactory defense, or does it indicate something fundamentally wrong with the "city in speech"?

Thomas wrote: "...The 'real' city can't possibly live up to the ideal one. Is that a satisfactory defense, or does it indicate something fundamentally wrong with the 'city in speech'? "

Have been reading Plato's Republic: A Biography by Simon Blackburn this morning. He says some interesting things about valid argumentation via analogies, referring to "the positive part of the analogy, the negative part, and the open ground in the middle, the part that may or may not make the analogy fruitful." (p. 48) Unfortunately, he uses billiard balls/gases to demonstrate, rather than an analogy from Plato! But, he does go on to say:

"...If Republic is read as presenting a thought-experiment, it may not matter if there are unrealistic elements in it. They may be irrelevant to the point being made, and there is ample evidence Plato does not care if his ideal community cannot exist. This does not automatically imply that he incurs the charge of irrelevant dreaming...." (Blackburn goes on to describe a useful thought-experiment of Galileo towards Aristotelian theory about falling bodies.)

Blackburn is a professor of philosophy at Cambridge and has some interesting things to say about Plato in English political debates during the 1930's and '40's. I'll try to pull more on those later.

The book is part of series entitled "Books that Changed the World" under the imprint of Atlantic Monthly Press -- a bit pretentious, perhaps, but for the collection and the authors, see here:

http://www.atlanticmonthlypress.com/d... (Search for "books that changed the world" to get a list of the titles in the series. However, there are only seven in the list I got there, whereas the book I have lists ten???)

Although I need a bit more time to start responding substantively to the excellent comments on Books 4 and 5, I did want to note that Plato's "noble lie" of the earth as our parents, which I believe is a metaphor for invoking the principle that all of us in the city are of one parenthood and therefore are all a family of brothers and sisters, is implicitly being invoked right now by our current administration as it talks not of our government but of our "federal family." I'm not sure it will "fly" today any better than it would have for Socrates, but at least they seem to be adopting his basic thought. (Whether we are a functional or a dysfunctional family I guess depends on your political viewpoint, which gets closer to partisan politics than we should get here; the point is just that the principle underlying that noble lie seems to be alive and well today.)

Everyman wrote: "...Plato's "noble lie" of the earth as our parents, which I believe is a metaphor for invoking the principle that all of us in the city are of one parenthood and therefore are all a family of brothers and sisters, is implicitly being invoked right now by our current administration as it talks not of our government but of our "federal family."..."

I find that an amusing and clever positioning!

"A lie" -- okay, shall we agree? Or shall we not? Rather like the questions in which responding is accepting the proposition of the question? Is there a difference between a lie and an analogy? Is either operative in these contexts?

Then, of course, we have all the political talk about "family values" ---

Lily wrote: "
"A lie" -- okay, shall we agree? Or shall we not? Rather like the questions in which responding is accepting the proposition of the question? Is there a difference between a lie and an analogy?"

Or a lie and a myth? Is Santa Claus a lie? Is the tooth fairy? Or are these simply stories representing values for children? Are Plato's noble lies any different from these?

Everyman wrote: "Or a lie and a myth? Is Santa Claus a lie? Is the tooth fairy? Or are these simply stories representing values for children? Are Plato's noble lies any different from these? ..."

I can take the conversation that direction -- sort of the life is stories and what are the meanings we ascribe to those stories direction.