Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Books 6 and 7 are sometimes called the philosophical books of the Republic. That’s perhaps simplistic; in my reading I’m finding Plato not traveling in a straight line, but wandering about, going on tangents, circling back. (As Socrates says, “our argument after winding a long and weary way.” 484a) This, of course, is how conversations, as opposed to most books and lectures, work. Philosophy is scattered throughout the work. But critics tend to focus on these two books as more philosophical in nature. You may of course agree or disagree.

We start by talking about philosophers as those who can see the unchanging, whereas most people can only see the changing. Which naturally assumes that there is an unchanging, there there are absolutes in ideas an not just situationals. Which of course is assumed and not proved!

And then we get into the ship of state imagery, which we will I hope have a lot of interest in discussing, because I think there’s a lot there that’s not obvious on the surface.

One perhaps minor point, does anybody want to try to reconcile for us the passage from 485b-c:

“Consider, then, next whether the men who are to meet our requirements must not have this further quality in their natures.” “What quality?” “The spirit of truthfulness, reluctance to admit falsehood in any form, the hatred of it and the love of truth.”

With the requirement that the rulers be able to tell, convincingly, the noble lies. My head is spinning trying to reconcile these two ideas.

Lots more to talk about here!

Everyman wrote: "“Consider, then, next whether the men who are to meet our requirements must not have this further quality in their natures.” “What quality?” “The spirit of truthfulness, reluctance to admit falsehood in any form, the hatred of it and the love of truth.” "

This bothers me as well, but I think it's because I can't accept the social hierarchy that Socrates contends is natural. The philosopher is an exceedingly rare creature, highly intelligent, supremely moderate, extraordinarily brave, and of course, just. The ordinary guardian does not qualify, let alone the lower class people. Only the philosopher can intuit the ideal truth. The rest must be led to believe the noble lies that benefit the city, and by association benefit the people themselves.

There does seem to be a disjunct between the ideal truth and the noble lie, but it seems that Socrates believes that the best of men are capable of understanding the truth, but "the many" aren't -- in fact the many end up persecuting the philosopher instead.

Thomas wrote: "There does seem to be a disjunct between the ideal truth and the noble lie, but it seems that Socrates believes that the best of men are capable of understanding the truth, but "the many" aren't -- in fact the many end up persecuting the philosopher instead. "

I was thinking about this last night, and one possible way to accept both the truthfulness of the philosopher-ruler and the noble lie is that the philosopher-ruler understands that the noble lie is a lie, so he is truthful in understanding that, but he tells the noble lie in the service of the greater good. I'm not sure that really fits with the text, which says (Shorey) “The spirit of truthfulness, reluctance to admit falsehood in any form, the hatred of it and the love of truth,” but perhaps the reluctance and hatred of falsehood can be overcome by the greater good as long as the philosopher isn't self-deluded about it. I'm not fully satisfied, but I can't find a better answer yet.

BTW, I am becoming less enamored of Bloom. He may be the most neutral translation (the one least inserting his own opinions into the text), but I am finding, surprisingly to me, the classic Jowett translation to be the one that makes the most sense to me, the only problem being that I can't find an on-line text with page numbering, and even my Great Books Jowett copy only has the page numbers, not the letter sections. I also have Sachs in hard copy, and Shorey both in hard copy (the edition I used in college) and on line, and go to those also when a passage isn't clear to me, but I'm finding that Jowett is the easiest for me to read.

At this point, half-way through, what translations are others using and what is your experience with them. (I know Thomas is using several translations also; what are you preferring?)

Is anyone reading the R.E. Allen translation? I haven't read it myself, but I've really come to like his Symposium. He's quite faithful to the Greek but his English is more fluid than Bloom or Sachs, imo.

Thomas wrote: "Is anyone reading the R.E. Allen translation? I haven't read it myself, but I've really come to like his Symposium."

Never heard of it. But it's had excellent reviews.

Everyman wrote: "....At this point, half-way through, what translations are others using and what is your experience with them."

My copy has a subtitle(if that's how you call it) that says "The Comprehensive Student Edition". The title page says "Edited by Andrea Tschemplik with a complete revision of the classic translation by John Llewelyn Davies and David James Vaughan". I'm not sure what is meant by "classic translation", and if a revision of a classic translation is still a classic translation.

I am not reading any other translation. I am quite happy with the book because the language is easy to understand, but not the concepts and ideas. I don't have many choices of different edition and translation of this book from my library.

Selina wrote: "My copy has a subtitle(if that's how you call it) that says "The C..."

Interesting -- I've never heard of that translation.

Everyman wrote: "Selina wrote: "My copy has a subtitle(if that's how you call it) that says "The C..."

Interesting -- I've never heard of that translation."
Perhaps this edition?
http://www.amazon.com/Republic-Plato/...

Here is the obituary of the translator John Llewelyn Davies, which mentions his work and his associate D. J. Vaughan:

http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Tim...

An audio copy is available online, but I haven't spotted a text copy.

Lily,

That is the edition I am reading now. Thank you for the link to the translator's obituary. I'm glad to read a little about his life.

Selina

Patrice wrote: "Philosophers have to observe human nature and deal with the reality. Or have I mis-read? I don't think there is a line that doesn't deserve to be read and re-read but I'll never get through if I do that! "

But philosophers aren't supposed to look at "reality". That would be looking down, observing the ephemeral world that has no real being because it is always in flux, always one thing and then another. Philosophers should look to the heavens! To the eternal truths of things!

Doubtless, Adeimantus, there's no leisure for anyone who has his thinking truly directed toward the things that are to gaze down at the concerns of human beings and get filled up with resentment and malice over battling with them; instead, by gazing on and contemplating things in a regular arrangement and always in the same condition, that neither do nor suffer injustice among themselves, all disposed in order in accord with reason, they imitate these things and take on their likeness as much as possible. Or do you imagine there's any way for anyone not to imitate whatever he dwells with and admires? 500c

So quit admiring those kids, Patrice, and get out your drawing paper. ;)

LOL!

"The Other Socrates" source I just added to "Resources" includes this quotation:

"...In many of these dialogues, as Plato recreates them, Socrates does not even have a lesson to teach. His goal was simply to make his interlocutors recognize that their own common-sense ideas, on subjects like virtue and piety and beauty and politics, were hopelessly confused...."

Lily wrote: ""The Other Socrates" source I just added to "Resources" includes this quotation:

"...His goal was simply to make his interlocutors recognize that their own common-sense ideas, on subjects like virtue and piety and beauty and politics, were hopelessly confused...."
"

And I often think that he offers common-sense ideas of his own in an ironic way. I think we're meant to see how crazy some of this stuff is. Patrice's example above (16) is just one of them. The question is how do we get such crazy results from principles that sound so reasonable?

Thomas wrote: "The question is how do we get such crazy results from principles that sound so reasonable?..."

Have you ever read In Our Defense: The Bill of Rights in Action by Ellen Alderman and Caroline Kennedy? It has been awhile since I have, but I recall having some of those same reactions -- were these really the results desired or intended?

Lily wrote: "Thomas wrote: "The question is how do we get such crazy results from principles that sound so reasonable?..."

Have you ever read In Our Defense: The Bill of Rights in Action by Ellen..."

I haven't read that one, but I'm in the middle of A Necessary Evil: A History of American Distrust of Government by Garry Wills, which I think touches on similar points. The Constitution embodies principles that most Americans believe are worthy of enacting, but history shows us that we can't all agree on how they are to be enacted. I think we see the Ideas that are good in the Constitution, but building a state based on those Ideas is very complicated, and the result is far from perfect.

Thomas wrote: "...I think we see the Ideas that are good in the Constitution, but building a state based on those Ideas is very complicated, and the result is far from perfect."

Sounds like much the same theme. (I may keep my eye out for Wills, but, oh, dear, my TBR.) The real-life implementations insist upon including sticking points.

At the end of Book 6 we come to two extraordinary analogies -- the analogy between the sun and the good, and the divided line. This may be one analogy seen in two ways, or two analogies that are closely related. Either way, they are fascinating.

The gist of the analogy is that just as the sun is what illuminates the visible world, the good illuminates the intelligible world. The idea of the good provides truth to things; and just like the sun makes it possible to see, the good makes it possible to know.

Assuming that my interpretation is correct, what does this say about evil? Is it possible to know evil? Does evil exist at all? Or is it only a lesser form of good?

Patrice wrote: "My take on it is that evil does not exist for Socrates. Only error.
Ignorance. If all people want some good, what we call "evil" is just a mistaken attempt at what is good. Either people don't ..."

I think you're right about Socrates, but I'm not sure that Socrates is right either. He does have a cogent argument, without a doubt, and I am persuaded to an extent. He would say that Thrasymachus is merely mistaken about justice being the advantage of the stronger. In other words, Thrasymachus is mistaken about the good. I think that's true. But what Socrates assumes is that all people choose the good, even if they are mistaken about what it is. I'm not sure if that is true, for the same reasons you have in mind. 9/11, and other atrocities that seem to be intentionally destructive.

On the other hand, maybe acts of intentional destruction are "understandable" insofar as they are unintelligible. Using the sun/good analogy, acts of intentional destruction are so far in the dark and devoid of good that they are unintelligible. But it still seems to me that some people are capable of willing the the dark existence.

Thomas, Patrice -- are either of you readers of Derrida?

http://www.iep.utm.edu/derrida/

It is our discussion of the difficulties of good and evil that brought him to mind here -- the limitations of dealing in binaries that he articulates. (I turn to him most often on discussions on the nature of forgiveness.)

Lily wrote: "Thomas, Patrice -- are either of you readers of Derrida?

http://www.iep.utm.edu/derrida/

It is our discussion of the difficulties of good and evil that brought him to mind here -- the limitations..."



I tried to read Derrida years ago and couldn't make heads or tails of him. I might be able to do more with him now, but at the moment I'm having enough trouble with Plato!

Patrice wrote: "When a parent beats a child "for their own good", is that just the conscious explanation while the truth is a loss of control? In a way Freud and Socrates believe in the same thing. That uncovering the truth will lead to goodness."

That's a really interesting comparison. Can punishment lead to enlightenment? Judging by the effectiveness of our penal system, I'd say no. The cave analogy is more helpful here than the divided line, so I think I'll wait a couple days for Book 6 to comment further.

Thomas, I always think of James Joyce because of your icon. Has anyone here read "Portrait of the Artist"?
I thought of it when reading about the divided line and the cave.

I can't say I've ever made that connection! Please say more!

Joyce used everything in his writing, so I think you're right to see Plato there. (Samuel Beckett once said, "Joyce tries to put everything in. I try to take everything out.")

You're right about the Church as well. His problems with the Church and Ireland go hand in hand, and he makes it clear that escaping them both was required in order to become an artist. Aesthetics were extremely important to Joyce, for obvious reasons. I would like to believe that Socrates would forgive Joyce for living in the sensual world, but he would surely shake his head and expel him from the city anyway.