Classics and the Western Canon discussion

We now get to what I feel safe in saying is the most widely studied and commented on passage in all of philosophy -- Plato's allegory of the cave. It's an allegory worth some thinking and talking about, richer I think than it might appear on the surface.

We also have an extensive discussion of Plato's views on education. How does his view of education compare with modern views of education? Does he have ideas that could be incorporated into education today to improve our educational system?

Patrice wrote: "I love the allegory of the cave and how it reminds us that whenever someone "sees the light" those who don't will attack him. Whether it is Socrates or Galileo or just a free thinking person who d..."

There are also those who claim to have seen the light and are correctly labeled as crackpots. The trouble is telling the difference between those people and the Philosopher Kings. How do we do that?

Or maybe we don't need to recognize the difference, because a benevolent tyrant would simply seize power and administer justice by the light of the Good.

The first time I read the Republic I thought that the reason the philosopher had to go down again with the prisoners in the cave was because he was going to educate them, release them and show them the way to the light. I was wrong about that. He goes down to "harmonize the citizens by persuasion and compulsion" for the sake of the city.(519e) The prisoners stay prisoners. There's something about that I don't like.

Thanks, P & T. Don't know that I can add anything to the conundrums you describe -- at least tonight.

Patrice wrote: "Yes, everything hinges on "knowing" the difference.I keep thinking of different examples of the process. Scientific discovery is one example. Whenever a new discovery is made, even the scientific community clings to the old "knowledge". It's amazingly conservative in it's thinking and it takes an awful lot of evidence to overcome old ideas."

I think the scientific community clings to old ideas until the news ones are sufficiently proven. Thomas Kuhn wrote a famous book about how this happens --
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. You're right that new ideas aren't immediately taken seriously. I think that's human nature. Whether it's science or religion or politics, we cling to our customs and traditional concepts. Your devout friend sounds like a religious conservative, and Joyce was a complete rebel in that regard. (Maybe the Irish showed their contempt for Joyce by putting him on the old ten pound note. I'm sure Joyce would have found that amusing, and typically Irish.)

But I wonder how you would classify the philosopher king -- someone who has "seen the light" has no opinion, only pure "intellection" of the ideas. Is that a conservative way of thinking, or is it completely revolutionary?

Patrice wrote: "...It is the most abstract, the most mathematical and the most solidly true of the the sciences. ..."

And you say that even as the exploration of the galaxies keeps raising new questions and challenging old assumptions!

The book by Kuhn that Thomas names is truly a classic. I haven't read it now since the early '80's, but it was a major source for a graduate school paper I did. I don't own the book, but have been thinking for some time that I'd like to re-read at least parts again.

My quotation this morning will come from Einstein rather than Plato (as reported by
Harvey Cox in The Future of Faith) in a chapter called "Einstein's Snuffed-Out Candles":

"The most beautiful emotion we can experience is the mysterious. It is the fundamental emotion that stands at the cradle of all true art and science. He to whom this emotion is a stranger, who can no longer wonder and stand rapt in awe, is as good as dead, a snuffed out candle. To sense that behind anything that can be experienced there is something that our minds cannot grasp, whose beauty and sublimity reaches us only indirectly: this is religiousness. In this sense, and in this sense only, I am a devoutly religious man."

The bold is added -- the phrase sounds suspiciously akin to Plato's concept of "form"?

There are some decent summary remarks on Kuhn here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Kuhn

Patrice wrote: "...Do you disagree about physics?..."

Not certain the question is particularly relevant. Certainly physics and mathematics together have set some of the most stringent criteria for what we as humans have come to regard as "truth." I am rather interested on what we as evolved sentient beings are able to 'learn' as we come up against the barriers imposed by our own evolution on the planet earth -- I think that is what the Fermi Lab scientists and writers like Steve Hawking are coming to grips with and now are part of what they are trying to communicate to the broader populace. Fascinating stuff!

Patrice wrote: "So we're really talking about religion? ..."

Good question. Sounds like it within that quotation. I'll take a look at the context later today or tomorrow. Need to get some other things done.

Thinking of the intelligible realm as religious in nature makes a certain amount of sense to me. It's the world of the eternal. Science, on the other hand, examines how things move and change and are affected by other things. We do science by observing, experimenting, and sensing. I think Socrates would classify that as the world of becoming, though I think he would give the mathematical part of science, the part that doesn't depend on the senses, a place in the world of "being."

For Socrates it seems that we are unable to truly "know" anything in motion; we can have opinions about material things, we can think (dianoia) about them, but we can't have intelligence (voein) about them because they are in motion, constantly changing. Science (and math) is on the bottom part of the upper division of the divided line; it uses images and analogies. The very top of the divided line is reserved for pure Ideas -- but what the Ideas really are, I'm not sure. They seem to be inexpressible. Things get really mystical for me at that point.

Patrice wrote: "LOL! I am SO glad that you aren't sure what the Ideas are either!"

Well I'M not! I'll never get to be a philosopher king at this rate. :(

The puzzling thing is that the philosopher king has perfect knowledge of the good, but it results in a regime like the Republic. I think Socrates sees the complications that arise when the Idea of justice is applied to the real world -- it goes against human nature, so human nature must be re-drawn, and as Socrates says, "That's hardly easy." (501a) I'm still not convinced that Socrates really believes the city is possible, but we have another three books to go.

I think the genius of American government is that it is based on compromise and the premise that, in Platonic terms, there is no "knowledge," only opinion. It admits the participation of all kinds of opinions, and sets them against each other in a way that forces agreements based on compromise. (A very serious problem arises when the parties refuse to compromise, as we have seen quite recently, but in the end they must compromise or the government fails to function.)

Jefferson's loathing for the Republic is not so surprising -- it goes against everything he believed in and fought for. But I also think Jefferson completely missed the irony of the Republic.

Thomas wrote: "...But I also think Jefferson completely missed the irony of the Republic."

I think you have some already, but do continue to point out the evidence Plato knows he is being ironic. I find it too easy to read it "straight" -- and get irritated in the process! (lol at self)

Lily wrote: "Thomas wrote: "...But I also think Jefferson completely missed the irony of the Republic."

I think you have some already, but do continue to point out the evidence Plato knows he is being ironic. ..."

The first thing that comes to mind is the passage that you led us to earlier about playing. Socrates gets all worked up when he thinks about "the current mistake in philosophy," which is that "bastards," men who aren't genuine, have taken it up. After he has exorcised his disgust he says,

I seem to have been somewhat ridiculously affected just now... I forgot that we were playing and spoke rather intensely. For, as I was talking I looked at Philosophy and, seeing her undeservingly spattered with mud, I seem to have been vexed and said what I had to say too seriously as though my spiritedness were aroused against those who are responsible. 536c

What is this "playing" anyway? Is he not being serious here? Does this playing apply to the dialogue as a whole? Does it apply to the city? How much of this is meant to be taken seriously?

I do think quite a lot of it is to be taken seriously, but I think Plato's method is to set up a structure in order to show its flaws. So I end up arguing that the argument is at least to some extent ironic. But in order to see the irony I think it's necessary to first take Socrates seriously and get irritated. That, I believe, is the Socratic method.

Patrice wrote: "Hate to have to leave the discussion but I'm off for a week in New York. I'll definitely be checking on my husband's ipod whenever i can find wi-fi but I'm not sure how easy it will be to find a ..."

Phooey! Hurry back -- because Lily and I are going to have all this figured out in the next week and you'll miss all the fun. ;)

Have a safe trip!

Thomas wrote: "But in order to see the irony I think it's necessary to first take Socrates seriously and get irritated. ..."

RFLOL! You just brightened my afternoon with hearty laughter!

(Of course, part of what irritates is the way Plato sets up the dialogue: "Yes, Socrates" until down some outrageous path, when ten steps ago, "No" or "Yes, but..." would have been more appropriate.)

(This is one place I do see another kind of irony -- plays are bashed, but the whole discussion is written almost like a stage script.)

Glaucon: So tell what the character of the power of the dialectic is, and, then, into exactly what forms it is divided; and finally what are its ways. For these, as it seems, would lead at last toward that place which is for the one who reaches it a haven from the road, as it were, and an end of his journey.

Socrates: You will no longer be able to follow, my dear Glaucon, although there wouldn't be any lack of eagerness on my part. But you would no longer be seeing an image of what we are saying, but rather the truth itself, at least as it looks to me. Whether it is really so or not can no longer be properly insisted on. But that there is some such thing to see must be insisted on. Isn't is it so? 532d-533a

An enigmatic passage. The end of dialectic is a haven from the road, but it's one that Glaucon cannot follow. There are no images there, only truth. But Socrates cannot say if it is really is the truth. He can only say that some such truth must be.

Maybe this is what it's like to emerge from the cave and see the sun for the first time. The power of the sun is blinding and there is no doubt it is there, but it can't be described because it is, of course, blinding. But if the sun is by analogy the truth, which we cannot see in all of its brilliance, how can we possibly live in accordance with it?

Thomas wrote: "if the sun is by analogy the truth, which we cannot see in all of its brilliance, how can we possibly live in accordance with it? ..."

I have the same question too. The whole book doesn't really say what the truth is. Truth, "being" the truth, is the truth, and things which are constantly changing, and "becoming", are in reality, what we have to constantly prepare for and respond to. If we can see it and hear it with our bodily senses, it is not the truth yet. Quite a big challenge for educators.

Thomas wrote: "Thinking of the intelligible realm as religious in nature makes a certain amount of sense to me. It's the world of the eternal. Science, on the other hand, examines how things move and change and are affected by other things. We do science by observing, experimenting, and sensing. I think Socrates would classify that as the world of becoming, though I think he would give the mathematical part of science, the part that doesn't depend on the senses, a place in the world of "being."

For Socrates it seems that we are unable to truly "know" anything in motion; we can have opinions about material things, we can think (dianoia) about them, but we can't have intelligence (voein) about them because they are in motion, constantly changing. Science (and math) is on the bottom part of the upper division of the divided line; it uses images and analogies. The very top of the divided line is reserved for pure Ideas -- but what the Ideas really are, I'm not sure. They seem to be inexpressible. Things get really mystical for me at that point. "

I quoted that post in full because I think it gets at a major issue for my understanding of Plato: that he was not really scientist in our modern understanding of the term. For scientists, there is never absolute truth. Science is a process of discovery, but each significant new scientific discovery we make opens up whole realms of new areas we don't understand. When, for example, we thought of the earth's form as fixed and unchanging, there were only a limited number of questions to ask about it. But once we developed plate tectonics, that opened up a whole new realm of previously unimagined areas to explore. How to the plates move? What causes their movement? Will Gaia ever re-form? And on and on.

Scientific inquiry, then, is a never ending process, and it's tree-like -- as we get out near the end of a limb, we usually discover a whole new set of branches where we thought we were reaching at least one end point.

For Plato, I think, philosophical inquiry is not this. There ARE absolute end points. There ARE truths which are ultimate and absolute and discoverable. There ARE forms which are eternal and unchanging. This is the very opposite of science, isn't it?

Selina wrote: "The whole book doesn't really say what the truth is. Truth, "being" the truth, is the truth, and things which are constantly changing, and "becoming", are in reality, what we have to constantly prepare for and respond to. If we can see it and hear it with our bodily senses, it is not the truth yet. Quite a big challenge for educators. "

Exactly! It seems as if "the good itself" is something that must be experienced directly by the soul -- it can't be transmitted from one person to another. Every philosopher must experience the blinding brilliance of the Good first hand.

But how to use that experience of the good in the "real" world? At the end of Book 7 Socrates says,

Once they see the good itself, they must be compelled, each in his turn, to use it as a pattern for ordering city, private men, and themselves for the rest of their lives.

Socrates uses the word "pattern" (paradeigma) to save the model of the city in Book 5 (472e), and I think there is a similar dynamic here. Just as he is about to admit that the city is impossible, he says there that it may be "a way most closely approximating what has been said." Maybe that is how it is with the Good as well -- the pure being of the Good is translated to the real world of becoming in an "approximate" way.

A big challenge indeed!

Patrice wrote: "I've been thinking about philosopher kings. We don't like the sound of "kings" and the idea of a philosophy professor running the country does not appeal. But then, I started to think about what ..."

I didn't find in my translations anywhere that Plato used the term "philosopher-king." That's a shortcut we use for what I think is a more complex idea, but the very idea of a king is antithetical to what I understand Plato to be saying: kings are universally concerned with personal aggrandizement and the cult of personality, whereas philosopher rulers would be exactly the opposite.

One key phrase caught my attention last night. It's at 520d: "the truth is that the city in which those who are to rule are least eager to hold office must needs be best administered and most free from dissension, and the state that gets the contrary type of ruler will be the opposite of this.”

Perhaps I enjoyed that because it fits perfectly with my belief that those who seek the office of President and are willing to go through what must be gone through to win it are the least qualified to actually hold it. (When we get to Plato on democracy we should discuss whether the US made a huge mistake in taking the election of the President out of the hands of the legislatures and put it into the hands of the general public.)

I think the genius of Plato, and also the reasons his idea would never work, is that the rulers would be people who don't really want to rule but are dedicated enough citizens to accept the responsibility if they are shown to be the best persons to lead the state. I dream of a selection process where everybody is trying their hardest NOT to get chosen, and the view is that the best man loses.

Thomas wrote: "I think the genius of American government is that it is based on compromise and the premise that, in Platonic terms, there is no "knowledge," only opinion. It admits the participation of all kinds of opinions, and sets them against each other in a way that forces agreements based on compromise."

But if we follow this thought, doesn't it suggest that the problem is that it is based on the opinions of people who are still chained in the cave, and is therefore always based on error and not on truth?

Those who have been out of the cave know the truth, but when they come back to share it, they get killed, as Socrates did.

516e to 517a: “And consider this also,” said I, “if such a one should go down again and take his old place would he not get his eyes full of darkness, thus suddenly coming out of the sunlight?” “He would indeed.” “Now if he should be required to contend with these perpetual prisoners in 'evaluating' these shadows while his vision was still dim and before his eyes were accustomed to the dark—and this time required for habituation would not be1 and would it not be said of him that he had returned from his journey aloft with his eyes ruined and that it was not worth while even to attempt the ascent? And if it were possible to lay hands on and to kill the man who tried to release them and lead them up, would they not kill him?” “They certainly would,” he said.

So any candidate for office who really knew would be scorned by the populace and even killed.

And since everybody who has opinions bases them on shadows and untruth, then even if the opinions are, as you say, "[set] against each other in a way that forces agreements based on compromise," are you suggesting that a compromise between different perceptions of falsehood can conceivably provide a good result?

Thomas wrote: "Maybe this is what it's like to emerge from the cave and see the sun for the first time. The power of the sun is blinding and there is no doubt it is there, but it can't be described because it is, of course, blinding. But if the sun is by analogy the truth, which we cannot see in all of its brilliance, how can we possibly live in accordance with it?
"

Isn't it that over time we get used to the sun, and learn to look at it? Isn't it that wisdom and truth come slowly, at first they blind us and we turn away, but if we persist then over time as we get used to looking at them and recognizing the difference between our earlier life of shadow in the cave and our new life of truth and wisdom in the sunlight we eventually see wisdom and truth in all their power?

This, at least, is how I take the passage starting at 515e:

“And if,” said I, “someone should drag him thence by force up the ascent which is rough and steep, and not let him go before he had drawn him out into the light of the sun, do you not think that he would find it painful to be so haled along, and would chafe at it, and when he came out into the light, that his eyes would be filled with its beams so that he would not be able to see even one of the things that we call real?” “Why, no, not immediately,” he said. “Then there would be need of habituation, I take it, to enable him to see the things higher up. And at first he would most easily discern the shadows and, after that, the likenesses or reflections in water of men and other things, and later, the things themselves, and from these he would go on to contemplate the appearances in the heavens and heaven itself, more easily by night, looking at the light of the stars and the moon, than by day the sun and the sun's light.” “Of course.” “And so, finally, I suppose, he would be able to look upon the sun itself and see its true nature, not by reflections in water or phantasms of it in an alien setting, but in and by itself in its own place.” “Necessarily,” he said.

Everyman wrote: "For Plato, I think, philosophical inquiry is not this. There ARE absolute end points. There ARE truths which are ultimate and absolute and discoverable. There ARE forms which are eternal and unchanging. This is the very opposite of science, isn't it? "

Yes, it is the opposite of science; I think I agree with Patrice's suggestion that it is much closer to religion than science. The difficulty is that we live and breathe in the world of science, while the world of absolutes is a different plane of existence altogether. How and where the world of science and the world of absolutes meet is very difficult to describe.

Everyman wrote: "And since everybody who has opinions bases them on shadows and untruth, then even if the opinions are, as you say, "[set] against each other in a way that forces agreements based on compromise," are you suggesting that a compromise between different perceptions of falsehood can conceivably provide a good result?
"

My contention is that the philosopher is simply unable to communicate the good to those who cannot experience it first hand. He must "persuade and compel" because "the many" are incapable of making the ascent to the good. The prisoners are prisoners by nature, as the philosopher is a philosopher by nature.

Democracy is the rule of the prisoners and, in this context, a cynical form of government. I don't see how "the many," if they have any power at all, are to be reasonably expected to cede that power to an individual based on an understanding which they cannot have. It would be a faith-based government. I think I prefer democracy, warts and all.

Thomas wrote: "Yes, it is the opposite of science; I think I agree with Patrice's suggestion that it is much closer to religion than science."

But it is quite different from religion in that religion rests entirely on belief which may not be questioned, and usually on sacred writings which must be accepted. Reason and logic are present only in a very limited sense, in being used to interpret these absolutes, such as for example does the Bible necessarily require a trinitarian belief, are certain passages to be taken literally or allegorically, how can we reconcile apparently conflicting passages.

Platonic philosophy, however, is based on reasoning and logic developed through dialectic with no presuppositions or sacred texts.

I think it's really a third leg of human understanding; religion or belief, science, and philosophy.

Thomas wrote: "My contention is that the philosopher is simply unable to communicate the good to those who cannot experience it first hand. He must "persuade and compel" because "the many" are incapable of making the ascent to the good. The prisoners are prisoners by nature, as the philosopher is a philosopher by nature. "

Well put. I agree.

But isn't it better, at least in principle, for the many to be persuaded to follow the philosopher even though they can't understand him than for the many to go off on their own and make decisions based on ignorance and falsehood?

Or course, then we get false philosophers, which we have seen frequently throughout history, and in modern times in a number of cults which ended disastrously. The question, it seems to me, then, is whether, and if so how, it is possible for the many correctly to assess whether a given claimed philosopher is in fact a true philosopher. I'm not sure whether Plato every addresses this specific question, which seems to me to be at the heart of the philosopher-ruler approach to government.

Everyman wrote: "But it is quite different from religion in that religion rests entirely on belief which may not be questioned, and usually on sacred writings which must be accepted. "

It is different from religion, I agree, but I think it is closer to religion than it is to science. Perhaps mystical is a better term than religious.

The Good is compared to the sun for good reason; just as the sun provides the light by which things on earth are seen, so does the Good provide the truth by which ideas are known. Socrates goes even further and says that the Good provides the "existence and being" of things, just as the sun provides living things with nourishment and growth. But going even further yet, Socrates says the Good is beyond being itself. This seems reasonable, since the Good serves as the condition for being. To all of this Glaucon responds, "By Apollo, that's a stupendous stretcher." (Sachs translation, which is better than Bloom's "demonic excess".)(508d-509c) How are we to understand this? It's not irrational. On the contrary, it makes perfect sense logically. Something has to serve as the ultimate condition of existence -- we can call it the Good, or we can call it God. But whatever it is, we cannot truly comprehend it. What springs to mind is a passage from the Upanishads:

Not that which the eye can see, but that whereby the eye can see: know that to be Brahman the eternal, and not what people here adore;

... Not that which the mind can think, but that whereby the mind can think: know that to be Brahman the eternal, and not what people here adore. Kena Upanishad

That's probably enough mysticism for the moment, but I have one more thing about Socrates and the sun. In the Symposium, Alcibiades describes Socrates on campaign with the army. One night Socrates is lost in thought about something, standing outside in the cold. He stands there all night, thinking. Some of the soldiers take their bedding outside and stand guard by him though the night. They're freezing, it's winter, and Socrates is barefoot and wearing only his himation. Finally, as the sun begins to rise, Socrates walks away, offering a prayer to the sun.

I'll stop now, but I find all of this extraordinary.

Everyman wrote: "Or course, then we get false philosophers, which we have seen frequently throughout history, and in modern times in a number of cults which ended disastrously. The question, it seems to me, then, is whether, and if so how, it is possible for the many correctly to assess whether a given claimed philosopher is in fact a true philosopher."

This is precisely my concern. What if the only true philosopher is the one who admits that he doesn't know? If he also doesn't want to rule, well, he's our perfect candidate. (It sounds like Thoreau's ideal government in the making.)

Thomas wrote: "It is different from religion, I agree, but I think it is closer to religion than it is to science. Perhaps mystical is a better term than religious. "

I think I get what you're saying -- that both Platonic philosophy and mysticism/religion rely on the existence of absolute truth.

But OTOH, Platonic philosophy and science are closer to each other than religion in that they both rely on the process of shared inquiry based on reason, and it is just that science deals with the physical world and PP deals with the world of ideas.

That's why I think it's really a third thing. But perhaps it's more a matter of semantics than anything else.

Thomas wrote: "This is precisely my concern. What if the only true philosopher is the one who admits that he doesn't know? If he also doesn't want to rule, well, he's our perfect candidate. "

Which is why the Republic is a conceptual work, not a blueprint for a possible actual society!

Everyman wrote: "Thomas wrote: "This is precisely my concern. What if the only true philosopher is the one who admits that he doesn't know? If he also doesn't want to rule, well, he's our perfect candidate. "

Whic..."

To which I should add, let's not forget that the purpose for creating the Republic in the first place is simply to understand what justice for the individual is by seeing it writ large in the state.

Everyman wrote: "To which I should add, let's not forget that the purpose for creating the Republic in the first place is simply to understand what justice for the individual is by seeing it writ large in the state. "

A good point, and one that is easy to lose sight of in all of the details of the city. But the Idea of the good must find a practical application somehow, as messy and imperfect as it may be.

Thomas wrote: "But the Idea of the good must find a practical application somehow, as messy and imperfect as it may be. "

True, or else what good is it to have found it?

I am thinking back to Boethius and wondering really whether Plato (though I recognize that we haven't finished the Republic yet) or Boethius (or neither!) provided the better usable model on how to live one's life to, sorry for this but it works here, be the best one can be?

Everyman wrote: "...be the best one can be? "

However one determines that and succeeds in carrying it out (the how).

Does this pertain?:

"Bertrand Russell is famous for distinguishing 'knowledge by description' (a form of knowledge that) and 'knowledge by acquaintance' in Problems of Philosophy. Gilbert Ryle is often credited with emphasizing the distinction between knowing how and knowing that in The Concept of Mind. In Personal Knowledge, Michael Polanyi argues for the epistemological relevance of knowledge how and knowledge that; using the example of the act of balance involved in riding a bicycle, he suggests that the theoretical knowledge of the physics involved in maintaining a state of balance cannot substitute for the practical knowledge of how to ride, and that it is important to understand how both are established and grounded. This position is essentially Ryle's, who argued that a failure to acknowledge the distinction between knowledge that and knowledge how leads to vicious regresses."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gnoseology

Everyman wrote: "I am thinking back to Boethius and wondering really whether Plato (though I recognize that we haven't finished the Republic yet) or Boethius (or neither!) provided the better usable model on how to live one's life to, sorry for this but it works here, be the best one can be? "

Boethius takes Platonic idealism to heart, and this serves as his consolation. Only what is truly good can be said to truly exist. I'm not sure if this is a model exactly, but it helps Boethius to minimize the evil he endures, since evil in effect does not exist. Physical existence is transitory, the shadowy experience of the cave dweller. Losing this sort of existence is far less painful than would be losing sight of the Good. The Good sustains him even as evil men take his life.

I re-read the Apology and Crito the other day and was struck, in the light of the Republic, that Socrates' reason for not escaping from prison is that he made a contract with the state to obey its customs and its courts. I don't recall Boethius mentioning this line of reasoning at all.

We haven't yet talked about the education of the guardians.

I find it a fascinating program of education. Military training, then ten years of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, but NOT dialectic.

Mathematics, of course, deals with subjects which it is possible to understand and agree on absolutely. We may disagree on what is the best form of government, we may disagree on the definition of justice, but we cannot (unless we are either mad or intentionally perverse or a student of the most esoteric branches of number theory totally unknown to Plato and for good reason) disagree that two plus two equals four. Thus, the guardians are educated in learning about things that can be proved, where the course of mutual study will necessarily lead to agreement as to whether a proposition is or is not true. No argument, no disagreement, no messy topics. Just thought which always leads to an agreement on what is true and what is false.

Dialectic is reserved until after public service; only then will the guardians be prepared to study it. I find this fascinating. Of course, it is totally contrary to the whole concept of St. John's college and many other colleges based on developing the ability of the still young to discuss seriously philosophy and other topics which do not have answers that can be agreed to by everybody who is capable of following the logical proof.

Only when one is fifty, has had a lengthy term of study of mathematics and another lengthy term of public service, is the mind ready to learn the process of discussing matters of philosophy and the good. The young cannot handle this power, and will distort and abuse it.

Should all college philosophy departments (along with literature and other topics where the study of the topics will not necessarily achieve universal agreement) be scrapped, or only admit students of the age of 50 and up, and normal age college students limited to the study of mathematics, the basics of chemistry, physics, biology, and such where there are absolute "right" answers that are beyond debate? (The definition of iron can be known and agreed to by all, unlike the definition of virtue.)

Does Plato have something potentially wise going on here, or is he just out in left field?

Everyman wrote: "

Only when one is fifty, has had a lengthy term of study of mathematics and another lengthy term of public service, is the mind ready to learn the process of discussing matters of philosophy and the good. The young cannot handle this power, and will distort and abuse it."


Is this what Socrates means when he tells Glaucon that he won't be able to follow the path to dialectic? (533a)

Socrates is delivering this argument to a group of relatively young people. If they are taking him seriously, they might bristle at the suggestion that the young are incapable of making the ascent to dialectic. But it looks like Glaucon wants to make that ascent. The education of the young (military strategy, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy) is merely the "prelude to the song," and Glaucon wants to hear the song itself, dialectic. I wonder if Socrates isn't playing with Glaucon a bit here by telling him, "Sorry kid, you're not ready yet."

I'm starting to wonder if some of the more outlandish aspects of the city aren't designed more for dramatic effect than to demonstrate philosophical truth. As much as Socrates denigrates poetry and drama, he uses it to great effect. (Though perhaps that credit should go to Plato and not Socrates.)

Thomas wrote: "As much as Socrates denigrates poetry and drama, he uses it to great effect. (Though perhaps that credit should go to Plato and not Socrates.)..."

Whether Tolstoy or Plato, is it the ironies and the inconsistencies in their writing partly what ultimately make them palatable? (I'm simply musing, after listening to Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilych this morning -- I have just read it as well.)

Thomas wrote: "I'm starting to wonder if some of the more outlandish aspects of the city aren't designed more for dramatic effect than to demonstrate philosophical truth. As much as Socrates denigrates poetry and drama, he uses it to great effect."

Personally, I've been there for awhile. In fact, I'm starting to think that he is intentionally using a reductio ad absurdum argument to show how bad a government based purely on political theory would be. But I should wait for Book 8 or later to make this full argument, since Book 8 is really where it comes to the fore for me.

Thomas wrote: "Socrates is delivering this argument to a group of relatively young people. If they are taking him seriously, they might bristle at the suggestion that the young are incapable of making the ascent to dialectic. But it looks like Glaucon wants to make that ascent. The education of the young (military strategy, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy) is merely the "prelude to the song," and Glaucon wants to hear the song itself, dialectic. I wonder if Socrates isn't playing with Glaucon a bit here by telling him, "Sorry kid, you're not ready yet." "

It does seem that Socrates is spending quite a bit of time grooming Glaucon for a potential life as a philosopher. Glaucon seems the only one of the interlocutors who has the right mindset, but I get the sense that Plato is still feeling him out to see whether he has the true gold soul.

Lily wrote: "Whether Tolstoy or Plato, is it the ironies and the inconsistencies in their writing partly what ultimately make them palatable? "

The technique seems similar to the fiction writer's dictum, "show, don't tell." Socrates doesn't lecture, or teach as the teachers of his day did. He asks leading questions instead, and builds arguments that he knows will not stand because he wants his students to see both the chinks in the argument and the truth of ideas which can't quite be articulated. He is accused of dishonesty and manipulation by many modern readers for doing this, which is ironic because he accuses the poets of the same thing. He is a masterful poet in his own right, and as such he is able to show us something that is deeper than the words he uses to show it.

A total sidebar, but it is almost Halloween month and it is clearly the shadows of the cave that created the link for me, so, in reading, for totally different reasons than this discussion, of the little ghost town of Avilla in Missouri on the old Route 66, a town that remained Union loyal, even though the rebel flag flew less than ten miles away in Carthage, I encountered this article on Shadow Folk (under Legends and Folklore) and bring it now to your attention:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avilla,_...

Thomas wrote: "...because he wants his students to see both the chinks in the argument and the truth of ideas which can't quite be articulated...."

You give Plato/Socrates a lot more credit than I have, but you also make reading them more plausible and less likely to just raise the frustration level.

Patrice wrote: "Yes, everything hinges on "knowing" the difference..."


I appreciate your use of quotation marks as Plato kept reinterating that there was "knowing" and there was "opinion" and "belief" is nothing but more intense "opinion."

Thomas wrote: "The puzzling thing is that the philosopher king has perfect knowledge of the good, but it results in a regime like the Republic. I think Socrates sees the complications that arise when the Idea of ..."

Like Patrice, I think, "But Socrates wouldn't even be accepted in such a "republic." Why would Plato design the perfect-city in such a way? DID the years of war and plague and tyranny contribute to Plato's wanting a city that could function in relative peace?

Aside: I wonder though, whether Socrates saw himself (or whether Plato saw Socrates) as a philosopher who actually had perfect knowledge of the good. I suspect not. By their own definition, it seems, neither could have been a philosopher-king as neither had had the proper education.

Patrice wrote: at post 21..."

On the long drive, I was listening to the Great Courses on Socrates/Plato/Aristotle. The lecturer said that theorically the farming classes, etc., could never be allowed to participate in governing as they would have no virtue...because they would never have the leisure time to study and develop virtue. They might be virtuous, but they wouldn't qualify to engage in civic activities.

The founding fathers, it seems, looked towards government from a somewhat different perspective than Plato. Though Socrates was supposedly looking for what type of life brought a man happiness (and a man would be an individual), Plato seemed to be searching for what was "best" for the society. Madison, etc., where looking for individual rights, no?

Everyman wrote: @45 ".Does Plato have something potentially wise going on here, or is he just out in left field?.."

Personally, I think he's on to something. Socrates/Plato is using dialectic (an intellectual exchange of ideas, the tension or opposition between two interacting forces or elements) properly...ie, to expose false beliefs and elict truth.

The older philosophers that Plato would consider for rulers have had years of training in having as a goal to find "the right answer." (There generally is a right answer in the mathematics.)

If my cadre of younger Facebook "friends" is any indication, the goal of back and forth discussions is very frequently not to find right result or a correct answer or even any answer, but rather to score points for clever or witty retorts.

Of course we live in a sound-bite world these days...so perhaps that is seen as an admirable model. Yet wasn't one of the complaints against the speakers in Athens that those involved weren't looking sincerely for answers, but rather were more engaged with the sound of their own words?

Just somewhat random thoughts so that I can get back into the swing of things:

"Imagine an underground chamber like a cave..." 514a.

This turns my thoughts towards pschology. That much of the really important/influential aspects of our selves is subconscious or unconscious (underground).

"In this chamber are men who have been prisoners there since they were children" (again, our personalities were formed---forged--- when we were children). The beliefs we formed as children are frequently unexamined. How can we break free?

Unassisted, we couldn't. Could we? I don't think so. It seems that the same two requirements that Plato needs in order to develp a Guardian are precisely the same two requirements that a human being would require in order to "turn his head" from the core beliefs he formed as a child:

[Edit added: at 538c Socrates seems to address this, writing, "There are certain opinions about what is right and honorable in which we are brought up from childhood, and whose authority we respect like that of our parents."]

One---proper education...to develop the analytical skills...to strengthen rational thinking...to provide the power/the illumination/the light so that irrational and emotional based beliefs can be examined....because if we can understand WHY we behave and believe as we do, then we have the potential to change should we decide that we desire to change.

Two--- even more important, I think, than the education is "proper nature." Only SOME people can fully benefit from an intense university education. Tests are given in an attempt to determine WHICH individuals.

Plato, too, first looked at the nature of the young in The City. Only those with promising natures were then provided with the proper philosopher-education plan.

There must be the right nature/or a promising nature/somethig inate... prior to education.

Thomas wrote 23: "The first time I read the Republic I thought that the reason the philosopher had to go down again with the prisoners in the cave was because he was going to educate them, release them and show them the way to the light. I was wrong about that. He goes down to "harmonize the citizens by persuasion and compulsion" for the sake of the city.(519e) The prisoners stay prisoners. There's something about that I don't like.

."

It seems to me that the fact that no one actually loosed the chains of the philosopher is important. It was something in that particular philosopher's own self, it would seem, that unlocked the chains.

And that, I think, is important. No one can free you to find the way to the light except you. The psychoanalist (sp?) can not "free" one of one's neurosis (sp?)... He can only ask the questions that might lead the patient to do the work to free himself. or yeah, herself.

In the Wizard of Oz, no one could get Dorothy our of Oz but herself.

(How about that? Dorothy and Plato.)

When reading the Book of Job, I thought that there might have been a factor that contributed to his trials and tribulations: the fact that he offered sacrifices FOR/or on behalf of his children. His grown children, I thought, really should have been making their own sacrifices. The important things in life......can't be done by someone else.

Socrates couldn't do the hard thinking for the citizens of Athens. He couldn't unlock their chains. He could only ask them the questions--perhaps rather aggressively--- that might get them thinking...so that they could find what they needed within themselves should they desire to change their lives.

Or something along those lines.

[Edit added. 536e.

Granted, the chained prisoners aren't free. Perhaps they don't even wish to be free. At 535b Socrates says, "the mind shirks mental hardship more than physical."

Still, it occurs to me that Socrates might be addressing "the why" the philosopher doesn't try to unchain the prisoners. At 536e he says, "Because a free man ought not to learn anything under duress. Compulsory physical learning never sticks in the mind."

The prisoners wouldn't want to see the light. The philosopher would have had to compel them.]

Thomas wrote @18: "I think the genius of American government is that it is based on compromise and the premise that, in Platonic terms, there is no "knowledge," only opinion. It admits the participation of all kinds of opinions, and sets them against each other in a way that forces agreements based on compromise. (A very serious problem arises when the parties refuse to compromise, as we have seen quite recently, but in the end they must compromise or the government fails to function.)
..."

Interesting.

I rather think that the founders accepted compromise as a necessary evil that they would live with because it was better than the alternative.

The alternative being one person, or group of people, deciding how things were going to be. And because one person alone, or one group with similar beliefs or desires, so very easily might try to direct the powers of government to simply benefit themselves---or maybe just not make "the right" decisions; for that reason, I think, the founders set up the three branches to keep any one branch in check.

They didn't, I think, like compromise. Who would? If you have strong-held ideals surely you would want the path of those ideals followed and not the ideals which you strongly disagree with. But what's the alternative? A bit like Plato's Place maybe? No philosopher WANTS to serve....but not serving would result in an inferior society. I can't imagine that those in Washington want compromise....but they're in the system (more or less) that the founders decided on in attempt to avoid an inferior society.

I did vote for Democracy in America. lol.

Everyman wrote: " To which I should add, let's not forget that the purpose for creating the Republic in the first place is simply to understand what justice for the individual is by seeing it writ large in the state.

..."

I repeatedly forget that.

I wondered if Socrates contradicted himself.

In an earlier book he had been quite firm that he wanted persons to concentrate ONLY on the job or task they had been assigned. Away with plurality.

Yet here, 525e, Socrates seems to say that we need plurality, that even more pointedly we need contradictions, in order to develop better thinking.

"But if is always conbined with the perception of its opposite, and seems to involve plurality as much as unity, then it calls for the exercise of judgement and forces the mind into a quandry in which it must stir itself to think...."

Or am I misreading him?