Classics and the Western Canon discussion
Discussion - Plato, The Republic
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The Republic - The Book as a whole
Had to drive into town today and had the chance to do some musing. And see what emerged!You've met a bookish friend for coffee (or tea or whatever other tipple is your preference), and of course you have your copy of Plato with you which has been your constant companion for the past eight weeks.
Friend: Have you really been reading Plato?
You: Yes, we just finished The Republic for a book discussion group.
Friend: I was supposed to read that in college, but I have to admit I funked it. Isn't it about justice or such?
You: Yes, that and a whole lot more, but justice is a main theme of the book.
Friend: So, now that you've read it, what is justice?
You:
Justice is a social arrangement whereby each person has a job that allows him to be the best that he can be, and he does his job without interfering with his neighbor, who is doing what she is best at as well. When everyone is doing his or her job to the best of their abilities, the community is stable, happy, and justice prevails. And because every citizen is doing their best with the ultimate good always in sight, the people are virtuous and happy. So what's with the service in this establishment? What does it take to get a double espresso in this place? Who's minding the store? Garçon!
Thomas wrote: "Justice is a social arrangement whereby each person has a job that allows him to be the best that he can be, and he does his job without interfering with his neighbor, who is doing what she is best..."Hmmm. Haven't you simply changed the term at issue from justice to best? What is the best that Hitler could have been? Yes, you added the without interfering, but is it really possible not to interfere with a neighbor being her best? Churchill's best interfered mightily with Hitler's best! And if my best is robbing banks, then the best policemen are going to interfere with it if they can.
I know that you are using best in a different way from that, but again, doesn't that just mean that your definition only works if we agree on what best is, and if we can agree on that isn't it likely that we can agree on what justice is, and so won't have to ask that question in the first place?
I wonder whether Plato believed that he had answered the question. Frankly, I don't think he did, and I'm not sure he ever intended to. That goes back to my belief that for Plato, philosophy wasn't an answer but a process. I believe that his goal in writing The Republic wasn't to give us an answer, but to give us a range of questions and a variety of approaches for considering them. Of course, the way my mind isn't working, I could easily be totally off course.
But if I'm right, did in fact Plato succeed in changing (in a good way) your approach to the questions of what is justice, and beyond that how we can create a more just society?
Everyman wrote: "I know that you are using best in a different way from that, but again, doesn't that just mean that your definition only works if we agree on what best is, and if we can agree on that isn't it likely that we can agree on what justice is, and so won't have to ask that question in the first place? "I guess that this is the reason for the philosophical digression in the middle of the book about the good. Justice is a function of the good; without the good there can be no justice. We may not be able to define the good, but we can ascend to it via dialectic. We may not entirely agree on an absolute definition of the good or of justice, but as we get closer to the Idea, we get closer in agreement, and we become better and more just souls. It is a process, surely. But for Plato it doesn't seem to be an endless process; there is a metaphysical endpoint -- the Idea.
Thomas wrote: "I guess that this is the reason for the philosophical digression in the middle of the book about the good. Justice is a function of the good; without the good there can be no justice. "The more I think about this, the more I realize that it an endless self-referring process. To define justice we need to know the good. But how do we define the good? And if we define it in terms of what is right, or fair, or such, what is the definition of those terms? And if we define, as I think Plato suggests, justice as the balance of wisdom, courage, and moderation, what is the definition of wisdom?
At some point we have to have at least just agree on a definition, or at least an agreed understanding, of at least one key term (whether it be wisdom, the good, the best, justice, or whichever we choose) without being able to prove the definition. After all, if you run across Thrasymachus in the agora and ask him what defines the best life, won't he say something like "well, I usually charge my students a thousand drachma for that information, but I like you, so I'll tell you for free: it's getting all the money, power, influence, and glory you can for yourself without getting killed in the process."
I agree with you that for Plato there is the Idea of good, of justice, of wisdom. And I like to think that we, who are the wise and intelligent and caring members of society, can agree in general terms on what the Idea is, or at least that we can recognize it when we see it and, more important, can recognize it's absence or its opposite when we see it, but proof is an entirely different matter, isn't it? That's why I think for Plato it's always a process, not a result, even though there is a Result up there in the sunlight if we can ever climb out of the cave to see it. But who ever really gets to climb out of the cave?
Patrice wrote: "Isn't justice the end result of knowledge? Seeking the truth, won't that result in what is just? 612 b "What kind of knowledge? Machiavelli had lots of knowledge, but did he have justice?
Patrice wrote: "It struck me that Plato thought that money was evil. I think money is a tool that can do so much good. Without it what power is there to help relieve human suffering?"
Back in the days when I was doing fundraising for good (at least in my view, but then, what is the good? ) causes, I coined a little expression I used to share with reluctant donors: Money may be the root of all evil, but it is also the fertilizer of all good.
Everyman wrote: "The more I think about this, the more I realize that it an endless self-referring process. To define justice we need to know the good. But how do we define the good? And if we define it in terms of what is right, or fair, or such, what is the definition of those terms?"I think this is what is referred to in some contexts as the "hermeneutical circle." The basic problem is that the parts are defined (or understood) in terms of the whole, but at the same time the whole is understood as the aggregate of the parts. Plato gets around this by saying that the Good is what provides the truth of things. It is the cause of knowledge and of being itself. The Good is like the sun -- as the sun allows us to see, the Good allows us to know. And if we are seeing in perfect light, we have perfect sight; in the light of perfect Good, we have perfect knowledge. (This is that very difficult passage in Book 6, around 508-509.) He gets around the hermeneutical circle by saying that the Good is beyond everything, even beyond being itself -- it is the source of all being, and knowledge, and all things that truly are, i.e. the Ideas.
To which Glaucon responds, roughly, "Man, that's crazy!"
And it doesn't really offer an escape from the circle. He simply places the Good beyond knowing -- like the cave dwellers stumbling into the light of day, we cannot look into the sun. I think it's a powerful and effective analogy, but it doesn't really solve the problem. It just says the solution is beyond reach.
Thomas wrote: "I think it's a powerful and effective analogy, but it doesn't really solve the problem. It just says the solution is beyond reach. "And yet we find that so totally unsatisfactory, and insist on trying to find the Good.
What I find interesting is that almost every society has committed much of its intellectual capital to trying to answer the question how one should live a good life. And yet, are we any closer to an answer than Plato was? (Or Beowulf, going even further back?)
Have any of the footnotes to Plato actually moved us beyond his insights?
Everyman wrote: "...Have any of the footnotes to Plato actually moved us beyond his insights? ..."Well, perhaps they have caused us to ask some different questions or to posit or even implement some other approximations of justice.
For some interesting insights on "justice," try Steve Inskeep's new book: Instant City: Life and Death in Karachi. Among the basics of dealing with immigration and governing, consider the differences between the intent of Jinnah and actual results. Looking at the group rivalries, ask, as Patrice does, where does compassion fit in the concept AND implementation of justice? Or property (land) rights and laws and building codes. But even education in a population where 5 men and 1 woman per 100 were literate at the time of Partition. (I wonder what the figures were in Classical Greece -- to what extent is education part and parcel or independent of "justice".)
Everyman wrote: "And yet we find that so totally unsatisfactory, and insist on trying to find the Good. "I think we insist on finding the Good because we are insecure with relativity. We want a final answer. We want solid ground to stand on so we can say this is right and this is wrong, and this -- the Absolute Good -- is why.
What Plato shows us, I think, is that there is a fundamental divide between human existence and divine existence, and while we have a notion of the divine, it can never be realized in physical human life. The absolute is only realized in the afterlife, when the soul leaves the world of becoming. As long as we're breathing on the planet Earth, we are like Tantalus, forever reaching for what is always out of reach.
So can you be good without knowing what the good is? Maybe you can be good if you know that some things are better than others. Good enough, maybe?
Thomas wrote: "...Good enough, maybe? ..."Maybe not? But at least able to have a sense of striving towards good -- perhaps more as an adjective, than as a noun?
Thomas wrote: "So can you be good without knowing what the good is? Maybe you can be good if you know that some things are better than others. Good enough, maybe? "That's a great question. What if we were to find that The Good really is something totally different from what we think it is -- that, say, The Good is found only by living the Amish life? Or, probably worse for all of us, that The Good requires that all conflicts all be settled not by courts or mediation or discussion but only by dueling to the death?
Until we know what The Good is, can we be sure that these aren't actually it?
Everyman wrote: "What if we were to find that The Good really is something totally different from what we think it is -- that, say, The Good is found only by living the Amish life? Or, probably worse for all of us, that The Good requires that all conflicts all be settled not by courts or mediation or discussion but only by dueling to the death? "I don't see how one could come to either conclusion except in relative terms. The Amish life is better than some, worse than others, and even those statements are relative to the circumstances. If someone believes that trial by combat is good, it's probably because he has seen a worse method of determining guilt and innocence.
I think that's why Plato never tries to define the Good. He sees it as a guiding principle rather than something to be defined. The Greek word "idea" means the "look" of a thing. We can't see the look of a thing without light, and the Good is that light.
So what does justice "look" like? Does it look the same to everyone, or does education give one person more light and greater clarity than another less educated person? Or do the philosopher and the soldier and the sales clerk all see the same thing? Can we identify the ones who have the greatest clarity and charge them with leading the city? Or is this impossible, because only those with that clarity can identify those who have the greatest clarity... where is our Philosopher King??
Patrice wrote: "But doesn't the Good have to benefit people? "That's our conception of it. But are we understanding it clearly? Or is that a mirage of the good -- something that looks plain from afar (down in the bottom of the cave) but looks the very opposite when you get to examine it closely (at the mouth of the cave).
I don't happen to believe that, but how can I prove it's not the case beyond just saying that I don't believe it?
Patrice wrote: "But I think that would require "belief" and not reason, wouldn't it? ..."
I can't remember if Socrates talks about his daimon in the Republic, but I find it fascinating that he has this divine entity that tells him when he is about to do something he shouldn't. Socrates can argue in a rational way for hours and hours about the nature of justice, but at the end of the day, he has a daimon who tells him if he's about to do injustice. (Apology 40a-c)
Ultimately I think we have to have belief, or faith, in something. Otherwise it's turtles all the way down. We can't reason our way to first principles.
I thought, in a way, Plato in Book X, has come full circle. In Book One, Socrates had been in P(town, sorry, book is upstairs) to take a look at a new religion. In Book X, Socrates is there with the new religious myth. In Book One, Cephalus (spelling?) engages in the discussion until he runs out of solid, rational answers; and returns to his religion. Socrates has engaged in the discussion, sometimes he hasn't been solidily rational, and now Socrates, too, in the end, is looking towards a non-rational support.
I may not be being clear. I think we all have a fairly good idea of what the Good is, though I'm sure we disagree on some aspects of it. I think in general we are right about what is indeed good and what is not. I think if we were each asked to name five historic figures who most exemplified The Good, our lists would be remarkably similar.That's not the issue I'm trying to get at. My question is, can we demonstrate it, can we through philosophical inquiry arrive at a definition of the good which we can prove to be right, or do we have to just accept that the consensus of serious shared inquiry is the best we can hope for? Is there a way to recognize those who have indeed reached the mouth of the cave and differentiate them from madmen (or madwomen) or charlatans?
Thinking back over the Republic, I realize that Plato places a lot of reliance on views that we instinctively share without proof. This seems to be his method, to move from fairly specific positions that people can't really say no to (e.g. the purpose of the pilot is to get the ship safely to port, so that we can define the good pilot as one who is successful in getting us safely to port) to more generalized positions that, if they had been suggested originally, would have brooked argument, but because he has worked us as frogs in the water of argument he heats gradually, are unable to realize that we are being taken to a place we wouldn't have willing gone initially.
Thomas wrote: "Ultimately I think we have to have belief, or faith, in something. Otherwise it's turtles all the way down. We can't reason our way to first principles."
Well put.
Even in mathematics we need to start somewhere with shared agreement that must be accepted, not proved.
Everyman wrote: "Thinking back over the Republic, I realize that Plato places a lot of reliance on views that we instinctively share without proof. This seems to be his method, to move from fairly specific positions that people can't really say no to (e.g. the purpose of the pilot is to get the ship safely to port, so that we can define the good pilot as one who is successful in getting us safely to port) to more generalized positions that, if they had been suggested originally, would have brooked argument, but because he has worked us as frogs in the water of argument he heats gradually, are unable to realize that we are being taken to a place we wouldn't have willing gone initially...."Very much, I agree, Eman. Again and again, in reading The Republic, I say (out loud, even) "but why are you agreeing now?" Perhaps it is the aspect of Plato/Socrates that is a good politician or a good leader, in the sense of being one that can motivate others to follow.
Thomas has led me to appreciate Plato in ways I never have been able to do so before, by emphasizing the process aspects. But as you so aptly imply, the process itself can be dangerous -- or exciting.
I promised weeks ago to quote a passage from Simon Blackburn's Plato's Republic on an argument in England back in the 1930's - '40's on whether Plato provides an argument for totalitarianism, but it ended up running six pages, so I decided I probably would be pushing copyright considerations, and I haven't found myself able to cogently summarize its dialectic. (Thomas has reviewed Blackburn and knows he is no particular fan of The Republic.)Blackburn in essence does defend Plato in analyzing the criticism, but for me those pages exemplified the multiplicity of uses to which another canon of our culture can be bent, or should I try to be more neutral, and say "applied".
Everyman wrote: "Even in mathematics we need to start somewhere with shared agreement that must be accepted, not proved...."But when that mathematics no longer predicts/matches a world that we can measure and observe, we revisit those shared agreements, as occurred in the introduction of non-Euclidean mathematics.
Comment on the definition of "good" -- in Pakistan, building codes and building practices allow the risers on steps to vary in height, a practice widely discontinued elsewhere due to observations and studies that humans are less likely to stumble and fall on stairs with even risers. What is the point? Perhaps that "good" can be specific and learned and new in time as well as a timeless, universal concept?
Patrice wrote: "Actually, I'm not sure that we can agree on what is "good". For instance, obedience. Obedience is a prized virtue to some and not to others. "That's a good point. I think Plato would say that we are imperfectly seeing The Good.
But I think we can all agree on the basic principle that moderation in obedience is good. That absolute, total obedience is not good (a soldier told to shoot a prisoner who has surrendered), and that absolute, total rejection of obedience is not good (fire in the house and the parent telling the child to get out of the house). Thus, I think we can get agreement that obedience in moderation is Good. The question, of course, is where we draw the line of moderation, and in that, humans being imperfect, we are necessarily imperfect.
Patrice wrote: "Greeks accepted homosexuality as a good. When I was young I found this amazing. Now we've come around as a society to seeing it the Greek way."Although their acceptance and our acceptance are quite different.
Lily wrote: Comment on the definition of "good" -- in Pakistan, building codes and building practices allow the risers on steps to vary in height, a practice widely discontinued elsewhere due to observations and studies that humans are less likely to stumble and fall on stairs with even risers. What is the point? Perhaps that "good" can be specific and learned and new in time as well as a timeless, universal concept? "Interesting. I wonder why they do this. Did they not have the mathematical skill centuries ago to exactly measure how high each rise in a set of stairs covering a given height with a given number of stairs should be? Or did they feel that they were emulating nature? Or did they generally eschew evenness?
It seems, at least for the sake of discussion, that we are agreed that when it comes to the understanding of philosophical concepts, we have to start somewhere with unprovable agreement. Thinking about that, I wonder why Plato chose to search for a definition of justice and apparently consider the Good the term we accept with out definition, rather than assuming justice to be itself the term we accept without definition. Is it because the Good is the broadest philosophical concept, encompassing all of justice within it, whereas justice is narrower and cannot encompass all of the good within it?
Everyman wrote: "Interesting. I wonder why they do this. Did they not have the mathematical skill centuries ago to exactly measure how high each rise in a set of stairs covering a given height with a given number of stairs should be? Or did they feel that they were emulating nature? Or did they generally eschew evenness?..."As best as I could tell from the example given, the practice occurs where stairs must be fit into very narrow spaces, possibly particularly spiral stairs in poor homes. I don't know that it is universal throughout the culture. But Inskeep did call it out and it struck me here as an interesting case of implementing "good."
Might the justice/good simply indicate the orientation here was political/government more than morality/ethics? What does Wittgenstein say about these definitional quandaries? He always seems to make sense to me (a lot more than Plato's cave with its shadows) until I get totally, totally lost, which doesn't take very long.
"He argues that philosophical problems are bewitchments that arise from philosophers' misguided attempts to consider the meaning of words independently of their context, usage, and grammar, what he called 'language gone on holiday.'"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wittgens...
Lily wrote: "What does Wittgenstein say about these definitional quandaries?"I hope somebody can address that question. I can't, since I didn't understand him even when I read him forty plus years ago, and I remember virtually nothing of him.
Anybody else?
Lily wrote: ""He argues that philosophical problems are bewitchments that arise from philosophers' misguided attempts to consider the meaning of words independently of their context, usage, and grammar, what he called 'language gone on holiday.'"."I think Wittgenstein's basic contention is that language is not adequate to the task. Socrates agrees, which is why he has such problems with the poets and sophists -- people who use words to deceive others rather than to elucidate ideas. For Socrates the truth could be most closely approached through dialectic, a back-and-forth process of discussion and examination. Even then, the absolutes aren't quite obtainable. Approachable, but not capable of proof. People can approach the ideas in dialectic, but books that purport to "tell the truth" will always fall short of the mark. This is why Socrates did not write. I think he was a cynic about language, as was Wittgenstein.
Plato, on the other hand, held out hope for the written word. He must have, or else we wouldn't have the Republic or any of the dialogues. And I think he was right. It is indeed possible to lead readers to the ideas, or to at least spark discussions that do this, through poetry (or drama, or dialogue.) Fortunately for us, Plato had immense literary talent.
Thomas wrote: "I think Wittgenstein's basic contention is that language is not adequate to the task...."First, thanks for your comments, Thomas. But to what "task" do you refer? Establishing absolutes? Defining truth?
Lily wrote: "But to what "task" do you refer? Establishing absolutes? Defining truth? "Yes and yes. It is a thing of wonder that people can communicate in a meaningful and coherent way when we rarely agree on the definitions of the words we use. And when pressed to define common words (like justice, the good, love, etc.) we end up sounding a little lost. And yet we do know these things and we can talk about them without sounding crazy. Well, sometimes.
Does anyone have the new iPhone? Ask it the big question: "Siri, what is justice?"
Thomas wrote: "And yet we do know these things and we can talk about them without sounding crazy. Well, sometimes. ..."I smile as I read this!
Thomas wrote: "Does anyone have the new iPhone? Ask it the big question: "Siri, what is justice?" "I don't have one. (I don't have any sort of smart phone; just an ancient phone I use only off island on an old pay-by-the-minute-with-no-monthly-fee plan.)
But I hope somebody does, and asks it that!
Everyman wrote: "But I hope somebody does, and asks it that! ..."I wasn't impressed with the non sequitur answers I read in some posting today (or was it yesterday already)? (Like basically, don't know, to where is Steve Jobs.)
This may be lots of non sequiturs, too, but it did amuse me to stumble onto this site this afternoon, given our discussion here. Another place where "what is good" is being discussed?
http://www.good.is/category/cities/ (There are lots of categories besides "cities.")
As usual, this discussion will stay open indefinitely, and I do hope people will continue to think and post about the Republic, but I'm going to go ahead and post our next two-week Interim Read, and then starting November 9th we will start our discussion of Swann's Way.
Patrice wrote: "I was left dumbfounded. I think she's right. If you truly believe, can you truly question? Isn't God the answer to this question? Doesn't the question require a certain level of disbelief? And how can you ask God such a question if you meet him? Is it a contradiction?Any thoughts? "
Great story, Patrice! And great questions. It seems to be a delicate balancing act -- to really "know the good" requires a certain level of faith, but that faith is not sustainable unless it can withstand questioning. Faith can be supported by reason, and I think that's where we end up at the conclusion of the Republic. There is no ultimate answer to the question, "what is justice," but we can see that there is a right path to understanding. Walking that path means we must continue to ask the questions, while we hold the "myth" (of Er, or of the Absolute Good) as a beacon in the distance.
"Faith," said Anselem, "is the assent of the intellect to that which is believed." Interesting to me that he distinguished so clearly between faith and belief.
Everyman wrote: ""Faith," said Anselem, "is the assent of the intellect to that which is believed." Interesting to me that he distinguished so clearly between faith and belief."
You mean by clarity ["distinguished so clearly"] that faith involves intellect, perhaps implying that "belief" need not [involve intellect]?
Lily wrote: "Everyman wrote: ""Faith," said Anselem, "is the assent of the intellect to that which is believed." Interesting to me that he distinguished so clearly between faith and belief."
You mean by clarity ["distinguished so clearly"] that faith involves intellect, perhaps implying that "belief" need not [involve intellect]? "
Correct. Not that I'm saying that one necessarily has to agree with Anselm's definitions, but that he makes a clear distinction between faith and belief. I'm no religious scholar, but I haven't seen the difference between faith and belief (if one thinks there is one) as clearly laid out anywhere else.
Perhaps. Sounds to me as if Anselm's distinction has greater clarity for you than to me! (I am having trouble identifying beliefs totally devoid of the assent of the intellect, albeit that the intellect may be mistaken about the truth of the belief.)
Patrice wrote: "Faith can be supported by reason", yes. But can reason be supported by faith? I don't think so.Well, is reason possible without faith?
Patrice wrote: "Why not? Not sure I understand."Well, start with faith in the ability of reason to discern truth. Or, with faith in the ability of human senses or extensions thereof to observe accurately (or at least within the limitations of our best theories).
But, maybe we have been assigning different "meanings" to "faith." I am using it here along the lines of "confidence", i.e., firm trust or confidence in the value, power, or efficacy of something [in this case, of reason].
Patrice wrote: "Yes, I think we're assigning different meanings to the word faith."I've been thinking about this, and am not sure I have an answer -- correct that, I'm very sure I don't have an answer -- but one way of looking at is that faith involves a degree of submission which belief doesn't. I think you can believe in something without having to go any further, as I can believe in ghosts but leave it at mere belief. But if you have faith, I think you have to take some further step to evidence the belief. In the case of ghosts, you either go looking for them, or try to get in touch with them, or do something beyond just saying "okay, I believe in ghosts, now let's go to the movies."
Not sure that makes sense to anybody but me.
Patrice wrote: "Makes sense to me. Belief can just be a matter of opinion. To "take a leap of faith" is to commit a belief."Which brings us back to Anselem, because some agreement of the intelligence is required to take that leap of faith, isn't it? Don't you have to make a mental decision to act on your belief?
Remember Anselem: faith is the assent of the intellect to that which is believed. Have we at least suggested that there may be some validity to that? Or have we failed to persuade some of the previously unpersuaded?
I think faith is reserved for ground conditions which cannot be logically derived. We can argue reasonably from first principles, but reason cannot prove the truth of those first principles. We have to accept first principles on faith. Everyman wrote: "one way of looking at is that faith involves a degree of submission which belief doesn't"
I'm not sure what the difference is between belief and faith, but I like very much the notion that faith involves submission. Plato went to Sicily to transform Dionysius into the Philosopher King, but Dionysius would not submit to the Good. After barely escaping with his life, Plato decided to write the Laws instead. Laws are enforceable. Faith in first principles, in the Good, requires a submission which is purely voluntary, and as it turns out, quite difficult for many people to do.
Thomas wrote: "I think faith is reserved for ground conditions which cannot be logically derived. We can argue reasonably from first principles, but reason cannot prove the truth of those first principles. We hav..."I like what you write, Thomas, but perhaps another viewpoint is not so much "faith" in first principles because some of the real breakthroughs in understanding the universe have come from challenging what were considered "first principles", e.g., parallel lines never meet versus non-Euclidean geometry where they do. But, it seems to me that there is still a level of faith that, assuming those unprovable first principles, logic and reason and observation can "determine" (lead to recognition of?) truth.
Did any of you see Brian Greene et al on the PBS special on "Time" last night?
Patrice wrote: "yes lily, I saw it. It made me think of Proust! Time as a frozen river rather than a flowing river. Past, present and future all of a piece. Fascinating but hard to understand, at least for me."Obviously, we are not alone (in finding the concepts of time not easy to understand)! LOL! What fun those working in those areas must have translating at least some of those concepts for the rest of us! It fascinates me to see the efforts and the progress, even across my lifetime.
Lily wrote: "but perhaps another viewpoint is not so much "faith" in first principles because some of the real breakthroughs in understanding the universe have come from challenging what were considered "first principles", e.g., parallel lines never meet versus non-Euclidean geometry where they do. .."Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry is a good example of the problem because it shows how fundamentally important definitions are. First principles or definitions, whatever it is that we start out with, even provisionally, shape our understanding of what is "true." Using the same reasoning but different principles gets us different sets of "truths."
Pure mathematics consists entirely of assertions to the effect that, if such and such a proposition is true of anything, then such and such another proposition is true of that thing. It is essential not to discuss whether the first proposition is really true, and not to mention what the anything is, of which it is supposed to be true ... If our hypothesis is about anything, and not about some one or more particular things, then our deductions constitute mathematics. Thus mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true.
--Bertrand Russell
Glad to see Bill back after too long away!
Time to discuss the work as a whole. Going back to the very beginning of the dialogue and seeing how Plato sets it all up.
I end this course of medication later this week, and hope then at last I'll really be able to get back with things. Meanwhile, again, my enormous gratitude to all who have kept the discussion up at such a high level all this time.