Provender

“Conventionalism is not just rejected by contemporary philosophers, it is vehemently rejected. It is despised and reviled, to the point where anything that hints at conventionalism is immediately and thoughtlessly rejected. Theorists whose views come close to conventionalism often take great pains to distance themselves, lest they too be dubbed heretics. The rejection of conventionalism is now one of the central dogmas of contemporary philosophy.

What explains this state of affairs? Early in the book... I listed a few of the philosophical reasons for the historical failure of conventionalism. ... I don’t think this can be the entire story. The situation is odd. For example, the master argument [went] almost unchallenged in the literature until very recently. That is extremely rare in philosophy, for any argument.
... But philosophical arguments only go so far when it comes to influencing public opinion, no matter their power. There is also a major sociological reason that conventionalism has been widely rejected, one that goes beyond the lingering influence of Quine....

That reason is that conventionalism seems to make things too easy. I mentioned this in the coda to chapter 3 when I compared unrestricted inferentialism’s ability to slice through philosophical tangles to Alexander’s hack through the Gordian knot. Conventionalism not only solves or dissolves many classical problems, it does so easily. Too easily, perhaps. I suspect that many philosophers harbor worries about this. Perhaps because they don’t really want philosophical problems to be solved. I don’t know. I am not sure how widespread this feeling is, but a number of philosophers have personally expressed to me, either directly or indirectly, a desire for philosophical problems to remain open and difficult, and for theories to be as technical and complicated as possible.

I don’t share this desire. I am interested in finding out the truth and resolving the issues that have puzzled me for years. For me, this is not a game. It is deeply personal. The nature of logic and mathematics have long troubled me, but they trouble me no longer. The theory presented in this book has cured me, at least of these particular troubles. But this is confession, not argument.”
― Jared Warren, Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism