Alicia

“With control of Germany, Russia could hope to rival all the island powers combined. Without Germany, the USSR might hold its own. But with a restored Germany in the camp of the island powers, the USSR was eternally overmatched.”
― T.R. Fehrenbach

“The great-power veto, which paralyzed the security arrangements of the Council, had not been unrealistic. It was merely a sublimation of the veto power actually held by powerful countries in the field of action, in the same way that ballots are not sacred, but only a sublimation of clubs or bullets, in the domestic arena.”
― T.R. Fehrenbach, This kind of peace

“Marching into Germany, Americans had no intention of remaining; they had counted on keeping occupation armies on German soil no more than two years. But once involved in Central Europe, and understanding Soviet motives and ambitions, the U.S. government did not dare depart. Gradually, American officialdom began to accept the fact that some problems, like that of Germany, defied any quick solution, and that the price of continued security or success had to be eternal vigilance.”
― T.R. Fehrenbach, This kind of peace

“Russians by history were chess players. The surface game as in chess, was important, but not vital. The real game, for power, control - all the marbles - was the thing. Americans, as a people, did not care for chess. They preferred a ball game, and this was what the USSR would not play. With no greater game in mind, Western policy always fell into the trap of watching the current score, the needs of the day, and the passing scene, never the future. It put more store in ephemeral diplomatic gains than real, if hidden, shifts of power.”
― T.R. Fehrenbach, This kind of peace