Vanda Kadas

“Animal rights theory seeks to move at least some nonhumans from the “thing” side of the “person / thing” dualism over to the “person” side. There are at least two reasons to offer in favor of this move. First, there is no characteristic or set of characteristics that is possessed by all humans (whom we regard as persons) that is not possessed by at least some animals. To put the matter a different way, those who support animal exploitation argue that animals are qualitatively different from humans so animals can be kept on the “thing” side of the “person / thing” dualism; animal rights advocates argue that there is no such difference because at least some nonhumans will possess the supposedly “exclusive” characteristic while some humans will not possess the characteristic. Nor is it enough to argue that species difference is itself morally relevant; after all, to rely on species alone as morally relevant is to assume what needs to be proved by those who hold such a view, and is morally indistinguishable from using race, sex, sexual orientation, or ability to determine membership in the moral community of persons. In other words, there is no reason to exclude animals from the progressive concept of personhood that has been developed.”
― Francione, Gary L., Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation

“As I discuss in Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?, we may, in the lifeboat or burning-house situation, decide to favor the human over the nonhuman not because death is a lesser harm to the nonhuman, but because we do not know what death means to the nonhuman and we have a better idea what it means to the human. We might, therefore, rely on this—a matter of epistemological limitation on our part and not any empirical claim that death is a lesser harm to humans—as the tie-breaker. We might also flip a coin. We might also decide to choose the nonhuman for some other reason, such as that the human in question is very old and the nonhuman in question is very young. In no case, however, would I think it appropriate to invoke any notion that humans are “higher” animals.”
― Gary L. Francione, Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation by Gary L. Francione

“As discussed earlier, humans who lack the reflective self-awareness of normal adults, such as those with particular forms of amnesia or very young children or those with certain mental disabilities, still are self-aware and still have an interest in continuing to live. There may, of course, be a difference between the self-awareness of normal adult humans and that of other animals. But even if that is the case, it does not mean that the latter have no interest in continuing to live, and it does not justify treating the latter as commodities.”
― Gary L. Francione

“In sum, reliance on cognitive characteristics beyond sentience to justify the use of nonhumans in experiments requires either that we assume that these characteristics are morally relevant or that we ignore the fact that we do not regard the lack of such characteristics as morally relevant where humans are concerned. We are left with one and only one reason to explain our differential treatment of animals: We are human and they are not, and species difference alone justifies differential treatment. But this criterion is entirely arbitrary and no different from maintaining that, although there is no special characteristic possessed only by whites, or no defect possessed by blacks that is not also possessed by whites, we may treat blacks as inferior to whites merely on the basis of race. It is also no different from saying that, although there is no special characteristic possessed only by men or no defect possessed only by women, we may treat women as inferior to men based merely on sex.”
― Francione, Gary L., Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation