William S. Lind > Quotes

“But first the student must learn to think creatively, to innovate, and to do the things that will most quickly seek out the enemy’s weak spots and undo him. Learning to think in that fashion is fundamental. That is what this course is about: the fundamentals. Once these fundamentals are learned, that is, once the student has begun to think clearly about how best to undo his adversary, once he has been rewarded in the classroom or the field for creative thought, the careful weighing of alternatives and risks followed by boldness in decision-making, he will then be ready to study definitions, control measures and formats. He will grasp their meaning more rapidly, for he will have a context in which to place them. They will be more than mere words and symbols.”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“Remember, if you don't get the question right, your answer doesn't matter.”
― William S Lind, On War

“Education and training should work together to build common approaches to problems, not common solutions. Both should prepare you to know how to think in combat.”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“Wars have an unpleasant habit of evolving in ways that none of the participants anticipated. When, in the summer of 1914, Europe resounded with cries of “A Berlin!” or “Nach Paris!”, no one imagined the Somme, or Verdun, or the starvation blockade of Germany that killed 750,000 civilians.”
― William S Lind, On War

“The concept of surfaces and gaps is one of several concepts that bear on tactics. It is of the same level of importance as mission tactics and the main effort, which will be the subjects of the two tactics lessons following this one. All of the concepts should be constantly at work during the execution of battle.”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“War always changes. Our enemies learn and adapt, and we must do the same or lose. But today, war is changing faster and on a larger scale than at any time in the last 350 years. Not only are we facing rapid change in how war is fought, we are facing radical changes in who fights and what they are fighting for. All over the world, state militaries find themselves fighting non-state opponents. This kind of war, which we call Fourth Generation war, or 4GW, is a very difficult challenge.”
― William S. Lind, 4th Generation Warfare Handbook

“The second precondition is developing a viable strategy before entering a Fourth Generation conflict. We have already noted that our strategic goals must be realistic; we cannot remake other societies and cultures in our own image. Here, we offer another warning, one related directly to fighting Fourth Generation war: our strategy must not be so misconceived that it provides a primary reason for others to fight us.”
― William S. Lind, 4th Generation Warfare Handbook

“Basil Liddell Hart, the British author, called it the expanding torrent system tactic. He drew an analogy between an attacking army and a torrent of water: If we watch a torrent bearing down on each successive bank of earth and dam in its path, we see that it first beats against the obstacle feeling it and testing it at all points. Eventually, it finds a small crack at some point. Through this crack pour the first driplets of water and rush straight on. The pent up water on each side is drawn towards the breach. It swirls through and around the flanks of the breach, wearing away the earth on each side and so widening the gap. Simultaneously the water behind pours straight through the breach between the side eddies which are wearing away the flanks. Directly it is passed through it expands to widen once more the onreach of the torrent. Thus as the water pours through in ever-increasing volume the onreach of the torrent swells to its original proportions, leaving in turn each crumbling obstacle behind it.”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“Today, the term “education” has become almost meaningless. People speak of a “high school education.” They assume any college will automatically “provide an education.” Virtually any sort of instruction is assumed to have “educational value.” But education is more than the learning of skills or the acquisition of facts. It includes acquiring a broad understanding of one’s culture, its development and the principles upon which it is founded. Education develops the ability to put immediate situations into a larger context built of history, philosophy, and an understanding of the nature of man. Inherent in education is the ability to think logically, to approach problem solving methodically, but without a predetermined set of solutions.”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“In June of 1944, when Field Marshal von Rundstedt, the German commander in France, was told that the Allies were landing in Normandy, he knew exactly what to do. He went out into the garden and pruned his roses. Von Rundstedt knew that in war, early reports, regardless of whether the news is good or bad, are usually misleading. Reacting to them with instant analysis merely makes the problem worse.”
― William S Lind, On War

“Requiring cats to hunt like dogs will benefit only the mice.”
― William S. Lind, 4th Generation Warfare Handbook

“Terminology, control measures and formats must all be learned. We must speak a common language if we are to continue to be the cohesive Corps that we are. The Basic School and subsequent schools must continue to stress a common language that is understood by all Marines so that we fight as a single team. Teamwork has long been our trademark. It is indispensable. But first the student must learn to think creatively, to innovate, and to do the things that will most quickly seek out the enemy’s weak spots and undo him. Learning to think in that fashion is fundamental. That is what this course is about: the fundamentals. Once these fundamentals are learned, that is, once the student has begun to think clearly about how best to undo his adversary, once he has been rewarded in the classroom or the field for creative thought, the careful weighing of alternatives and risks followed by boldness in decision-making, he will then be ready to study definitions, control measures and formats. He will grasp their meaning more rapidly, for he will have a context in which to place them. They will be more than mere words and symbols.”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“Doesn’t the superior lose control if his subordinates have a great deal of freedom to make their own decisions? The historical record quickly shows this is not the case. Generals George Patton and Bruce Clark both used mission-type orders in World War II. The German army has used mission-type orders for over a century, yet it has not been an army that was “out of control.” What changes is the way control is achieved. Instead of controlling by telling the subordinate what to do and then demanding constant reports to show he is doing it, control comes through the intent and the mission. Indeed, control is really replaced with guidance, while the intent and the mission “glue” the force together. There are”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“In planning a war, the most important task is to understand what can be planned and what cannot.”
― William S Lind, On War

“A basic rule of history is that the inevitable eventually happens.”
― William S Lind, On War

“When we teach tactics in the opposite order, that is, the mechanics ahead of the thinking, too often we produce, instead of soldiers, structured mechanics who find it difficult to think without rules. The art of war has no traffic with rules. Yet I have often seen students reject their best tactical ideas because they could not fit them into the format.”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“You have probably noted a lack of “how to” instructions to this point. While some technical and tactical suggestions will be offered in the next chapter, the essence of maneuver warfare is its approach to tactics and operations. Rather than concentrating on formulas and checklists - with their inherent predictability - maneuver warfare emphasizes a thought process. It is a process of seeing your options, creating new options, and shifting rapidly among those options as the situation changes. Ultimately tactics in maneuver warfare require that you “out-Boyd Cycle” the enemy.”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“Conflict can be seen as time-competitive observation-orientation-decision-action cycles. Each party to a conflict begins by observing. He observes himself, his physical surroundings and his enemy. On the basis of his observation, he orients, that is to say, he makes a mental image or “snapshot” of his situation. On the basis of this orientation, he makes a decision. He puts the decision into effect, i.e., he acts. Then, because he assumes his action has changed the situation, he observes again, and starts the process anew. His actions follow this cycle, sometimes called the “Boyd Cycle” or “00DA Loop.” If one side in a conflict can consistently go through the Boyd Cycle faster than the other, it gains a tremendous advantage. By the time the slower side acts, the faster side is doing something different from what he observed, and his action is inappropriate. With each cycle, the slower party’s action is inappropriate by a larger time margin. Even though he desperately strives to do something that will work, each action is less useful than its predecessor; he falls farther and farther behind. Ultimately, he ceases to be effective.”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“Education without excellence in techniques means action will not be timely or effective. But techniques without education means tactics will be formulistic, rigid, and predictable to the enemy.”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“Teaching leaders at all levels to live with friction. Friction is the inherent condition of war. It is caused by the enemy, by terrain and weather, and by the foul-ups that occur in your own force. The only way to learn how to deal with it is to train with it. Again, this means conducting aggressed, free-play exercises. And it means taking the whole unit to the field. CPXs have great value, but whenever troops are not involved, the level of friction is unrealistically low. Units must get plenty of time in the field as units if they are to learn how to accomplish their missions despite friction.”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“Under such a system, how do you avoid mistakes? You don’t entirely. Mission-type orders and a “zero-defects mentality” are contradictory. Several years ago, a member of Congress told a German Army colonel that he wanted to organize his Congressional office on the basis of mission-type orders. The colonel replied, “That is very good, but I hope you realize it means allowing your staff to make mistakes.” A maneuver warfare military believes it is better to have high levels of initiative among subordinate officers, with a resultant rapid Boyd Cycle, even if the price is some mistakes.”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“Employment of this concept of surfaces and gaps, then, gives us many advantages over what could be called slower moving forms of combat, where strength is thrown against strength. Attacking through gaps, avoiding surfaces, gives us an advantage of economy of force. If we are pitting strength against strength, assaulting enemy strong points, we are consuming our manpower as well as ammunition and supplies as we go along. If we go through the gaps, we are practicing economy of force. We are reaching our objective without using up our men. We are leaving the enemy behind. Because we are moving faster, we have the advantage of rapid exploitation.”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“Learn how to critique. The value of exercises is very much a product of the quality of the critique, because it is in the critique that lessons can be drawn for all to see. Today, many critiques are poor quality. Often, they are not a critique at all, but just a narrative of who shot whom. At other times, the critique is stifled by an etiquette that demands no one be criticized and nothing negative be said. Too often, critiques can be summarized as “The comm was fouled up but we all did great.” There are a number of things you can do locally to improve the quality of critiques: First, the commanding officer can set a ground rule that demands frankness in critiquing. A good way to encourage this is for the CO to give a trenchant self-critique of his own actions and encourage others to do the same. Beginning a critique with the most junior officers and ending up with the most senior can also help encourage frankness. Second, a critique should be defined as something that looks beyond what happened to why it happened as it did. It may be helpful to look for instances where key decisions were made and ask the man who made them such questions as, “What options did you have here? What other options did you have that you failed to see? How quickly were you able to see, decide and act? If you were too slow, why? Why did you do what you did? Was your reasoning process sound, and if not, why not?” Third, the unit commander can attempt to identify individuals who are good critiquers and have them lead the critique. Not everyone can do it well; it takes a certain natural ability. Finally, the unit can hold a class on critiquing and from it develop some critique SOPs. These can help exercise participants look for key points during the exercise, points that can later serve to frame the critique. These actions are not substitutes for an overall reform of Marine Corps training. But they are concrete ways you can improve your own training. And just as individual self-education will be important after the schools are reformed, so these actions will help you train even after overall training is improved.”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“Maneuver warfare tactics are trust tactics. That is their single most important characteristic. And that’s the biggest difference from what we do now.” It is certainly the biggest change from the current command and control system. Trust and a shared way of thinking, leadership and monitoring, not fancy new C2 equipment, are what you need to be able to fight using maneuver warfare.”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“The concept of surfaces and gaps demands leadership from the front as opposed to leadership from the rear. The commander must be where he can make swift decisions. He must be where the situation is developing. Obviously, leadership from the front had become a scarcity by World War I. J. F. C. Fuller, in his book, Generalship, wrote: In the World War, nothing was more dreadful to witness than a chain of men, starting with a battalion commander and ending with an army commander, sitting in telephone boxes, improvised or actual, talking, talking, talking, in place of leading, leading, leading. The result was unresponsive leadership and slow reactions.”
― William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

“In reality, a higher level of war always trumps a lower.”
― William S Lind, On War

“Another change is that all three levels may show up in a small local theater of operations. A troop unit may have a beat, much as police do—an area where they are responsible for maintaining order and perhaps delivering other vital public services.”
― William S. Lind, 4th Generation Warfare Handbook

“Physical fitness. Being a light infantryman is physically demanding. Troops must maintain the ability to move long distances quickly, with or without loads. At the same time, the “soldier’s load” should not exceed 45 pounds, beyond which march performance is degraded regardless of physical conditioning. Light infantry also requires a different approach to physical fitness from that currently taken by many state militaries. Light infantry requires endurance far more than physical strength. Soldiers must be able to march long distances; they must be prepared to move all night carrying their combat load in difficult terrain. Physical fitness standards for light infantrymen should reflect this emphasis on endurance.”
― William S. Lind, 4th Generation Warfare Handbook

“include: Patience. The need for patience is, perhaps, the greatest difference between light infantry and line infantry. Light infantry operations proceed much more slowly, primarily due to the requirement for light infantry to operate stealthily. It takes time to discover targets, reconnoiter suitable ambush sites, and move covertly. Training must reflect this. The”
― William S. Lind, 4th Generation Warfare Handbook

“These changes point to another of the dilemmas that typify Fourth Generation war: what succeeds on the tactical level can easily be counter-productive at the operational and strategic levels. For example, by using their overwhelming firepower at the tactical level, state forces may in some cases intimidate the local population into fearing them and leaving them alone. But fear and hate are closely related, and if the local population ends up hating the state forces, that works toward their strategic defeat.”
― William S. Lind, 4th Generation Warfare Handbook