Mark E. Stille > Quotes

“At the end of the campaign, Japanese air and naval forces had suffered heavy attrition which was clearly beyond their ability to withstand.”
― Mark Stille, Guadalcanal 1942–43: Japan's bid to knock out Henderson Field and the Cactus Air Force

“sheer size, it has no rival. Of the two American fleets involved in the battle, one was comprised of 738 ships and carried an invasion force of approximately 165,000 men in addition to the 50,000 sailors aboard the ships.1 The other American fleet was the most powerful in the world, with a total of 16 aircraft carriers and six of the world’s most powerful battleships. In total, the two fleets brought 235 surface combatants and 1,500 aircraft to the battle. Opposed to this collection of naval might was the Imperial Japanese Navy. Once the most powerful navy in the Pacific, the Imperial Fleet was forced into a desperate fight with all its remaining strength. In total, the Japanese committed 69 ships and some 375 aircraft, most of which were land based.2 Both sides committed so much because the stakes were so high. The Americans planned to invade Leyte Island in the Philippines as a potential first step to occupying the entire archipelago. The Leyte invasion force was larger than the initial American contribution to the assault force at Normandy. If the Philippines could be occupied, Japanese sea lines of communications between the Home Islands and the resource areas in Southeast Asia would be severed, fatally compromising Japan’s ability to continue the war. This demanded that the Japanese respond to the invasion with all of their remaining strength. The ensuing battle was the most complex naval battle of the entire Second World War. Its complexity makes it compelling. Instead of being a single battle as the name implies, it was actually comprised of four major engagements and several lesser actions fought over the span of three days. The characteristics of the battle continue to astound – it contained the largest air-sea battle in history; it included the last carrier and battleship clashes in history; it was the only time that a surface force engaged a carrier force while under air attack; and it featured the first pre-planned use of suicide attacks during the Pacific War. Adding to the drama of this momentous event was the role personalities played in the battle. On the American side were the flamboyant General Douglas MacArthur, the steady Admiral Chester Nimitz, and the impulsive Admiral William Halsey. Overlooked but still key commanders included Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid and the brilliant Clifton Sprague, commander of the escort carrier group known as Taffy 3. For the Japanese, the taciturn Vice Admiral Kurita Takeo was placed in command of their most important force. He was charged to execute a plan devised by Admiral Toyoda Soemu, who cared more about presenting the Imperial Navy’s Combined Fleet with an opportunity to die fighting than to produce a plan in the best interests of the nation.”
― Mark E. Stille, Leyte Gulf: A New History of the World's Largest Sea Battle

“By mid-1943, Japanese fighter pilots were going into combat with a minimum of flight training.”
― Mark Stille, Guadalcanal 1942–43: Japan's bid to knock out Henderson Field and the Cactus Air Force

“It needs to be underlined how critical it was for Fletcher and Spruance to use the minimal information they received on Japanese movements and turn it into decisive action.”
― Mark E. Stille, Midway: The Pacific War’s Most Famous Battle

“On December 77”
― Mark E. Stille, Pearl Harbor: Japan's Greatest Disaster

“Such a narrative is much more palatable than to point out that American unpreparedness allowed a flawed plan”
― Mark E. Stille, Pearl Harbor: Japan's Greatest Disaster

“This delay was inconsequential against a force that could not strike back, but against a force that could was simply too long.”
― Mark E. Stille, Midway: The Pacific War’s Most Famous Battle

“the author believes that once all the plans, personalities, doctrines, ships, and weapons of the two sides are examined, a Japanese defeat was the more likely outcome.”
― Mark E. Stille, Midway: The Pacific War’s Most Famous Battle

“At Guadalcanal”
― Mark E. Stille, Pearl Harbor: Japan's Greatest Disaster

“The nation that was capable of fighting a two-ocean war and supplying the Allied powers with weapons was able to address a relatively minor level of damage at a single naval base.”
― Mark E. Stille, Pearl Harbor: Japan's Greatest Disaster

“MacArthur”
― Mark E. Stille, Leyte Gulf: A New History of the World's Largest Sea Battle

“It is almost as if the events of the morning proved the adage that it is better to be lucky than good.”
― Mark E. Stille, Midway: The Pacific War’s Most Famous Battle

“Given these factors, the only thing that saved Somerville’s fleet from destruction was Japanese incompetence.”
― Mark E. Stille, Midway: The Pacific War’s Most Famous Battle

“When the author was on the staff of the Naval War College, he witnessed the same inability of Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force officers to improvise when their plans were derailed in wargames.”
― Mark E. Stille, Midway: The Pacific War’s Most Famous Battle

“in the final analysis”
― Mark E. Stille, Pearl Harbor: Japan's Greatest Disaster

“The militarists in Japan”
― Mark E. Stille, Pearl Harbor: Japan's Greatest Disaster

“It was more about providing the IJN with a glorious opportunity to go down fighting”
― Mark E. Stille, Leyte Gulf: A New History of the World's Largest Sea Battle

“Ultimately”
― Mark E. Stille, Pearl Harbor: Japan's Greatest Disaster

“as imperfect as Nimitz’s battle plan was, it looked brilliant compared with Yamamoto’s.”
― Mark E. Stille, Midway: The Pacific War’s Most Famous Battle

“the commonsense proposition that the two senior commanders on the island were responsible for the fighting condition and fate of the forces under their charge.”
― Mark E. Stille, Pearl Harbor: Japan's Greatest Disaster