Walt Shiel's Blog: Writing from the Woods

I’m going to give away up to 10 copies of the audiobook of ROUGH WAR via a Rafflecopter giveaway. If there are 10 or fewer total entries, everyone will get one. If there are more than 10, Rafflecopter’s system chooses the winners at random. I’ll contact the winners within 48 hours of the contest closing and send each an Audible code redeemable for the Rough War audiobook.

There are four different ways to enter: Tweeting a message, following me on Twitter, liking my Facebook page, or signing up for my newsletter. You can increase your odds of winning by using as many of those entry options as you want or by sending the tweet more than once.

Rough War audiobook giveaway

There is no contest requirement to post a review of the audiobook on Audible, but I would certainly appreciate it if you did!

The audiobook production of ROUGH WAR is well underway…about 50% complete as of yesterday.

I am blessed with an outstanding professional narrator — Emil Gallina of Booth Champion Productions. If you’ve watched very many documentaries on TV, you will probably recognize his voice. Also, he produced the An Officer and a Movie series on the Military Channel (now the American Heroes channel).

You can listen to the 5-minute sample right here.

If you have trouble with that player, you can download the sample.

The audioboook edition of ONCE A KNIGHT is now live on:

You can listen to the free sample on any of the above sites. The complete audiobook runs 7 hours, 30 minutes and is unabridged. Current retail price is $17.95-19.95 depending on where and how you purchase it.

If you want to agree to listen to the entire audiobook and post a review on Audible.com, I have a few discount codes for a free copy. Just email me and give me an approximate date for when you think you can get a review posted (I promise not to harass you about it, I’d just like to know).

Narrator Adam Mendelevitz did a great job on this book. I will be posting an interview with him right here soon.

Yesterday, I completed the final review of the final files for the audiobook edition of my World War I aviation novel Once A Knight.

ONCE A KNIGHT by Walt Shiel audiobook cover

Thanks to ACX.com for making this possible and a special thanks to Adam Mendelevitz for his excellent job of bringing this story to audible life!

ACX says it could take 10-14 days for their internal quality check, and then they will distribute it through Amazon, iTunes, and Audible.com.

In the meantime, you can use the audio controls below to listen to the audio sample:

NOTE: If you don’t see the play button, just click on the left end of the black bar. If you have trouble playing this recording, you can try downloading it to listen.

We’re finally closing in on the release of the audiobook version of my World War I historical novel Once A Knight. To give you an idea, here’s the first 15 minutes of the audiobook.

Note: If you can’t see the Play/Pause button on the audio playback bar, just click on the black at the left edge next to the current time display.

Hope you enjoyed Adam Mendelevitz’s narration! The full audiobook edition should be available by mid-December.

I’ve mentioned previously that I participated in an aggressor program up in Alaska, pitting our Lockheed T-33s against the Alaskan Air Command F-4Es. The goal was to break bad habits that fighter pilots can inadvertently pick up if they always train by dogfighting with identical aircraft.

As part of this Dissimilar Air Combat Tactics (DACT) training program, several of us T-Bird pilots were qualified for the DACT missions and, eventually, developed a training program to qualify other T-Bird pilots for DACT.

However, before engaging with the Double Ugly (aka F-4), we had to learn the basics of dogfighting each other (T-33 vs. T-33). Basic fighter maneuvers (BFM) is the generic term for the set of maneuvers that are employed during within visual range (WVT) combat to allow an attacker to maneuver into lethal parameters against a bandit. Defensive BFM allows the defender to save his know-know-what and, he hopes, become the attacker.

One of the first BFM tactics learned is the Yo-Yo, wherein an attacker reduces both the distance and the angles between his aircraft and the bandit’s aircraft so he can spit some lead at him or launch a heat-seeking missile. There are two basic variations: High Yo-Yo and Low Yo-Yo. The choice depends on the relative airspeed and distance between the two aircraft and the dynamics of the fight. During initial BFM training, the defender maintains a constant airspeed in level flight with a constant G load.

Here’s the standard Low Yo-Yo diagram (the shaded aircraft is the attacker and the numbers are time references):

At the start, both aircraft are at positions labeled 1. This puts the attacker too far back and in a lag pursuit position (i.e., his nose is pointing behind the defender’s aircraft). The attacker must tighten his turn (pull more Gs) and descend to gain airspeed. This allows the attacker to cut across the defender’s circle for an intercept. However, this maneuver results in a high angle-off position for the attacker, in addition to being well out of the defender’s maneuvering plane. Therefore, the attacker must choose the correct moment to convert that excess airspeed into a higher altitude (back in the defender’s maneuvering plane) by starting a pull-up. If he does nothing else, he would arrive in the defender’s plane with an even higher angle-off, resulting in an overshoot (vertically and/or horizontally). To solve that problem, the attacker must time a slight vertical overshoot so that he can roll back down on the defender, letting God’s G help him. He then times his pull-down to arrive back in the defender’s plane with a turn matching that of the defender (actually a bit tighter to give him a lead pursuit solution from which to fire).

There is another standard variation of the Yo-Yo: the High Yo-Yo:

This time, the attacker pulls up and rolls over into a tight descending turn, again allowing God’s G to help him pull to the inside of the defender’s maneuvering plane. With higher airspeed at position 4, he can pull a tighter turn to “saddle up” on the defender in a shooting solution (lead pursuit).

Of course, in the real world the defender is unlikely to play “duck” and hold such a nice, steady, and level turn, unless you’ve managed to sneak up on him. You may find it necessary to transition from a High Yo-Yo to a Low Yo-Yo, or vice versa…or employ one of the other maneuvers in the BFM bag of tricks. But everyone has to learn the basics one step at a time before allowing the fight to progress to a free-play environment.

When we fought the F-4E with a T-33, we often used the Low Yo-Yo and turned really hard to meet the F-4 on the opposite side of the fighting circle with as much airspeed as the old Lockheed Racer would give us (up to its maximum of 505 KIAS or 0.8 Mach or “aileron buzz,” whichever came first. Our big advantages were the fact that we could out-turn the F-4 at any speed in our envelope and could maneuver well at airspeeds below 200 KIAS. The Phantom’s biggest disadvantages were that it lost airspeed quickly in a hard turn and maneuvered like a bloated pig at anything much below 250 KIAS.

All of which meant that our goal was always to force them into a hard turn at the outset. How we did that falls into the realm of Dissimilar Air Combat Tactics 9DACT). But, trust me, we did it regularly.

I’m still working my way through the updated and revised second edition of Cessna Warbirds, As I noted earlier, Chapter 5 is one of the longest chapters and details the long and storied history of the L-19 Bird Dog, which served admirable in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

If you missed the earlier excepts, be sure to catch up on them:

The Cessna Dynasty

The First Military Cessnas

The T-50 Bobcat

The LC-126

The L-19/0-1 Bird Dog

Since the Bird Dog chapter is so long, I decided to post a two-part except. Even so, this will represent less than 10% of the total chapter, which is about the length of typical novella with dozens of photos.

So, here we go…a bit more from Chapter 5:

By the end of 1961 President Kennedy had authorized additional aircraft for the VNAF—three more squadrons including a third liaison squadron of L‑19s. USAF Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay established the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (code named “Jungle Jim”) at Eglin AFB, Florida, to train air commandos. A Jungle Jim detachment deployed to South Vietnam to set up the “Farm Gate” program at Bien Hoa with 151 personnel and a variety of obsolete aircraft.

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara authorized three more US units to deploy to South Vietnam in March 1962—a C‑123 squadron, a squadron of USAF U‑1A liaison aircraft, and an Army O‑1A company—with authorization to remain for no more than one year, at which time the aircraft were to be turned over to the VNAF. However, in July 1963, a second Army O‑1A company deployed to South Vietnam with its aircraft dispersed among various Army corps advisors. In September, the USAF activated the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS) at Bien Hoa, flying O‑1s. USAF also established a FAC training detachment at Tan Son Nhut Air Base—instructors developed an extensive list of comparable English and Vietnamese words needed for voice communications in the air. By October, VNAF students had entered training in the US at Hurlburt Field, Florida, after first attending a new eight‑week English language school at the base.

In 1963, the VNAF renumbered its squadrons. Three Liaison Squadrons were established, with the 110th and 114th (under the 41st Air Wing) based at Da Nang and the 112th (under the 23rd Tactical Wing) at Tan Son Nhut. All flew O‑1s, and the 114th also flew Cessna U‑17s (see Chapter 9). The VNAF Bird Dogs sported light gray on the upper wing surfaces to help the VNAF fighter‑bombers spot the slow‑moving FAC aircraft from above against the jungle foliage.

Later in the year, the US began the build‑up of advisors to South Vietnam in earnest. As part of that build‑up (which included the “Dirty Thirty,” a deployment of 30 USAF pilots to serve as copilots on VNAF C‑47s, freeing VNAF pilots for strike fighter assignments), USAF deployed a detachment to Nha Trang to establish a training center for O‑1E Bird Dog pilots and maintenance personnel. As part of the Rules of Engagement, the American advisors were only allowed to participate in combat sorties with a South Vietnamese on board. After the coup that overthrew the government of South Vietnamese President Diem in November 1963, the air war heated up, particularly along the border with Cambodia, and the US began deploying more of its own aircraft to South Vietnam as direct combatants. Between May and August of 1963, a total of 534 preplanned air strike requests from III Corps commanders went unfilled—167 due to insufficient aircraft and 244 due to a lack of VNAF FACs. As a result, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) commanders began calling on the readily available US Army helicopter gunships for close air support.

On March 19, 1964, an O‑1E from the 19th TASS, flown by a USAF pilot accompanied by a Vietnamese observer, allegedly strayed over the border where it was shot down by Cambodian Royal Khmer Aviation (RKA) T‑28s, killing both the pilot and observer.

In 1964, the VNAF activated another O-1E unit, the 116th Liaison Squadron based at Nha Trang. When the incident off the coast of North Vietnam led Congress to approve the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, American forces in Vietnam no longer had to negotiate the intricate labyrinth of rules caused by non‑combatant advisors flying occasional combat missions. The US provided more aircraft to the VNAF squadrons to increase their strength and to replace losses, including sufficient Bird Dogs to allow the VNAF to assign a FAC to each ARVN division.

It was about this time that the USAF asked the Army for 50 more O‑1s for the buildup in South Vietnam. Jerry Robinson, a Fort Rucker student pilot at the time, remembers that they “raided the Fort Rucker fleet for every old piece of junk airplane we could find (including a museum display airplane that had had the fuselage shortened by six inches) for ‘hulls’ to be reconditioned at the factory and sent to the Air Force for FAC use in Vietnam.”

USAF O-1E over South Vietname (US Army Aviation Museum photo)

March 1965 proved a turning point for US involvement in the war in Vietnam. Congress authorized General William Westmoreland to use US aircraft any time the VNAF could not respond in a timely manner with appropriate support and withdrew the requirement for a VNAF crewmember to fly aboard any US aircraft committed to combat. That same year, President Johnson authorized additional US military advisors and authorized direct air strikes against North Vietnam. By the end of the year, the USAF had 500 aircraft in Southeast Asia and 21,000 personnel stationed at eight major bases throughout South Vietnam.

NOTE: This presents only a very small portion of the Bird Dog story, an aircraft produced by Cessna until 1963 with more than 3,000 delivered to the US Army and Air Force and armed forces around the world..

Copyright ©2013 Walter P. Shiel. All Rights Reserved.

In a previous post I mentioned that I participated in an aggressor program up in Alaska, a program that pitted our Lockheed T-33s against the Alaskan Air Command F-4Es. The goal was to break bad habits that fighter pilots can inadvertently pick up if they always train by dogfighting with identical aircraft.

As part of this Dissimilar Air Combat Tactics (DACT) training program, several of us T-Bird pilots were qualified for the DACT missions and, eventually, developed a training program to qualify other T-Bird pilots for DACT.

One of the first things we covered was the effect of gravity (colloquially referred to as “God’s G”) on aircraft performance when engaged in a vertical fight.

Here’s the graphic we used to help explain the concept (typically call the Egg):

Total G is the number displayed on the G-meter in the pilot’s cockpit. Radial G is the actual turning G available after taking into account the 1G always acting on the aircraft (due to the Earth’s gravitation pull). That 1G is the force you feel when standing or sitting on the ground, or when flying along straight and level in unaccelerated flight. That’s God’s G.

If the two fighters in the diagram are exactly opposite each other, each pulling 4 Gs on the cockpit meter, and without vectored thrust of any kind, they will have the same radius of turn when one is at the 3 o’clock position and the other is at the 9 o’clock position. God’s G is neither adding to nor subtracting from their total 4G.

However, if one is at 12 o’clock (the top of the Egg) and the other at 6 o’clock (the bottom of the Egg), then the pilot of the 12 o’clock position will turn tighter despite both aircraft G-meters reading 4 Gs. God’s G is adding another G to his ability to turn, i.e., pulling down and tightening his turn. The guy at the bottom is still reading 4 Gs in the cockpit, but God’s G is subtracting 1 G from his ability to turn, i.e., pulling down and widening his turn.

If they arrive at those two positions (12 and 6 on the diagram) at the same time, the pilot at 12 was the advantage and can maneuver into a position for a quick, high-deflection shot with his guns (a “snapshot”), because for a brief period he will be able to out-turn the guy at the bottom.

Of course, “vertical” fights are often less than purely vertical since many other factors come into play. Despite that, God’s G will still effect both aircraft in varying degrees depending on how close to vertical they are fighting at any given moment…and how far about on the circle they are at that moment.

So, here’s a more realistic diagram of a “vertical” fight tilted off the vertical.

In a real close-in dogfight, of course, many other factors determine the relative effects of God’s G on the dynamics of the fight. The two aircraft are probably not identical and can sustain different levels of G at different airspeeds. One might have vectored thrust capability and can point his nose irrespective of the G-load available to him. One pilot might be better at coaxing the most out of his aircraft.

In any case, God’s G will still effect both aircraft and an understanding of how to turn it to advantage just might be critical in determining who wins.

As I continue working my way through the updated and revised second edition of Cessna Warbirds, I’ll keep posting some excerpts. Chapter 5 is one of the longest chapters and details the long and storied history of the L-19 Bird Dog, which served admirable in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

If you missed the earlier excepts, be sure to catch up on them:

The Cessna Dynasty

The First Military Cessnas

The T-50 Bobcat

The LC-126

Since the Bird Dog chapter is so long, I’ll post a two-part except. Even so, this will represent less than 10% of the total chapter, which is about the length of typical novella with dozens of photos.

So, here we go…Chapter 5:

In August 1949, the US Army and the US Air Force announced a competitive procurement for an Army Observation Aircraft—an all‑metal, two‑place, high‑wing observation aircraft to replace the fabric‑covered Piper L‑4s and Stinson L‑5s that had served admirably during and after World War II. The new aircraft—intended to operate on wheels, skis, and floats—would serve as a platform for ground observation, aerial search and rescue, visual and photographic reconnaissance, forward air control (FAC), cargo and personnel transport, control and adjustment of artillery fire, and pilot training. In addition, the Army wanted a rugged aircraft easy to maintain in the field and able to operate from unimproved forward airstrips. The official specification, released on November 15, 1949, included a requirement for landing over a 50‑foot obstacle in a total distance of less than 600 feet. The Army scheduled a fly‑off between competing contractors (Piper, Taylorcraft, Temco, and Cessna) for March 1950.

With several civilian projects underway and an engineering staff of only 18, Cessna decided to capitalize on their existing designs to meet the planned fly‑off date. They chose the basic wing design of the Model 170 and the tail assembly of the Model 195 (which the military had already purchased as the LC‑126), and focused the majority of their design efforts on a new fuselage, new landing gear, and new powerplant installation. The landing‑distance‑over‑an‑obstacle requirement necessitated high‑drag, high‑lift flaps (unlike the plain or split flaps on other Cessnas of the day), manually operated to save weight. Cessna engineers decided to modify the 170’s 45° slotted flap design to allow for 60° of extension by using an external hinge bracket with a pivot point below the wing (a configuration later seen on civilian Cessnas).

They chose the six‑cylinder, 190‑horsepower Continental O‑470‑11, with a 213‑horsepower takeoff power rating, which Continental modified to meet the Army design and performance requirements. They coupled this to a 90‑inch McCauley two‑blade, fixed‑pitch, metal propeller with a very low pitch. This allowed high RPM for short takeoffs and landings but reduced available power at cruise to avoid exceeding the rated RPM. The carburetor delivered more pressurized fuel than the engine required so they installed a fuel return line. A unique fuel valve design ensured adequate flow while returning excess fuel to the currently selected tank (another design subsequently used on other Cessnas).

The engineers laid out the fuselage design on full‑scale Mylar sheets stretched out on six bolted‑together drafting tables. The Cessna Experimental Department built the first fuselage from laminated aluminum templates created from the original full‑scale Mylar prints. Prototype construction began on September 8, 1949. The first Model 305 rolled out of its Wichita womb a mere 90 days later.

The 1,400‑pound aircraft (200 pounds over the specification weight) sported a semi‑monocoque aluminum fuselage with bulkheads and stringers made of aluminum alloys. The semi‑cantilever wings, like those of the C‑170 from which they had been borrowed, had dual spars, stressed aluminum skin, and single struts. The cockpit provided tandem seating for a pilot and observer in a fishbowl of Plexiglas—windows all around plus six panels in the cabin roof. The pilot and observer each had a full set of flight controls, although the observer could remove and stow the control stick when it was not needed.

Model 305 engineering prototype (N41694). Kansas Aviation Museum/Robert J. Pickett Collection photo

The new airplane first flew on December 14, 1949. After further factory test flights to determine the optimum takeoff and landing procedures to meet the short‑field requirements, Cessna’s Chief Test Pilot, Hank Waring, ferried the prototype (registration number N41694) to Wright Field in Dayton, Ohio. During the fly‑off evaluation, conducted between April 6 and April 14, the prototype Model 305 logged just under four hours. When the 305 proved it could meet or exceed all performance requirements, including the rigorous 600‑foot landing over a 50‑foot obstacle, its slight weight problem ceased to be an issue. The Army notified Cessna on May 29, 1950, that they had won the competition and would be issued a contract for 418 aircraft, designated the L‑19A.

The Army requested delivery of the first production aircraft by September 1950, but that was delayed until December while Cessna acquired an approved type certificate from the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA—forerunner of today’s Federal Aviation Administration), as the Army had mandated adherence to Civil Aeronautics Regulations rather than military standards. The CAA pilots put the new aircraft through its paces between August 2 and October 26, 1950.

NOTE: This presents only a very small portion of the Bird Dog story, an aircraft produced by Cessna until 1963 with more than 3,000 delivered to the US Army and Air Force and armed forces around the world..

Copyright ©2013 Walter P. Shiel. All Rights Reserved.

I’m not sure of the original source for the following rules, but they were posted for a time on a bulletin board in the 43rd Tactical Fighter Squadron at Elmendorf AFB, Anchorage, Alaska, around 1980.

Have a pretty good fighter. Put weapons on it that work. Have enough fuel to fight.

Know your enemy…his aircraft, his tactics and capabilities!

See him first! Cheat! Use surprise! Attack out of the sun! Sneak up on him!

Use superior numbers with mutually supporting tactics!

Fight your fight, not his.

Be a better fighter pilot than he is!

Copyright ©1981 Walter P. Shiel. All Rights Reserved.

Discussion of the “rule” about using superior numbers inevitably led to the quality vs. quantity debate–was it preferable to fight flying the best damn fighter or a good fighter attacking in larger numbers? This usually led to somebody observing that quantity has its own quality, meaning a flight of excellent fighters can be overwhelmed by, and lose to, a much larger contingent of less capable fighters using well-thought-out tactics, particularly if the pilots on both sides possess comparable skills.

Which naturally leads into that last item on the list : Be a better fighter pilot than he is!

While I was flying T-33s in the Alaskan Air Command (1979-82), several of us “Lockheed Racer” pilots were qualified to conduct Dissimilar Air Combat Tactics training as aggressors against the command’s F-4E Phantoms. But that’s a story for another blog post…