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T.J. Petrowski
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Michael Parenti, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, B. G
Michael Parenti, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, B. George Hewitt, Tim Buck, Seymour Melman, David Ray Griffin, Philip S. Foner, Dan Kovalik, Karl Marx, Victor Perlo, Arne Haugen, Pierre Jalee, Josué de Castro, Kwame Nkrumah
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T. J. Petrowski is an independent political scientist and researcher specializing in Marxism, imperialism, international law, and ethnic and secessionist conflicts, focusing on the former USSR, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and the Caucasus. His work has been cited or published in various newspapers, magazines, and NGOs, including People’s Voice, Rebel Youth, CounterPunch, the Centre for Research on Globalization, Dissident Voice, Tesfa News, and Press TV. He is the author of the book Nagorno-Karabakh: A Reassessment of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict. He lives in Winnipeg, MB, Treaty 1 territory, with his wife, their Ball Python named Penny, and their library of over 1,500 nonfiction books.
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Nagorno-Karabakh: A Reassessment of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict
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In “Self-Determination in Disputed Colonial Territories,” Jamie Trinidad presents a brilliant and succinct analysis of colonial self-determination in territories subject to a territorial dispute or that deviate from the normative framework of colonia
In “Self-Determination in Disputed Colonial Territories,” Jamie Trinidad presents a brilliant and succinct analysis of colonial self-determination in territories subject to a territorial dispute or that deviate from the normative framework of colonial self-determination. The book begins with a thorough analysis of Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UN General Assembly Resolution 1514). According to Paragraph 6, “Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” This is the ‘order-based’ counterpoint to the emancipatory aspect of colonial self-determination contained in Paragraph 2: “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” The conventional interpretation of Paragraph 6 is that it protects the territorial integrity of the colonial territory, based on the principle of uti possidetis. According to this principle, a newly independent state inherits the borders of the administrative divisions of its former colonial territories, thereby ensuring the stability of the interstate system. This limits the right to colonial self-determination to the entire administrative unit rather than its subdivisions, with the intent of restricting the dismemberment of a Non-Self-Governing Territory by the former colonial power. Unrelated to this book, it is worth mentioning that there is a serious flaw with the uti possidetis principle. Although intended to minimize interstate conflict, uti possidetis inflamed ethnic and secessionist conflicts in post-colonial states. By granting statehood to the dominant ethno-nationalist group in a multiethnic territory, secessionist wars and anti-secessionist repression became pervasive features of the post-colonial world order as the UN state system struggled to coexist with the nationalism it had engendered through decolonization. However, this conventional understanding of Paragraph 6 has been repeatedly challenged since the Declaration was drafted. During the drafting of the Declaration, Guatemala proposed adding a new paragraph 7, which read: “The principle of the self-determination of peoples may in no case impair the right of territorial integrity of any State or its right to the recovery of territory.” Guatemala was undoubtedly concerned that the wording of the Declaration would compromise its claim to British Honduras (present-day Belize). The Guatemalan amendment received little support in the UN General Assembly, and it was ultimately withdrawn. However, this ‘irredentist’ interpretation of Paragraph 6 would again resurface with Indonesia’s claim to East Timor and Mauritania’s and Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara. Indonesia, Mauritania, and Morocco, although unsupportive of the Guatemalan amendment, would justify the annexation of East Timor and Western Sahara, respectively, based on pre-colonial sovereignty and an irredentist interpretation of Paragraph 6. Does Paragraph 6 protect the current territorial integrity of Non-Self-Governing Territories through the principle of uti possidetis? Or does Paragraph 6, as Guatemala, Indonesia, Mauritania, and Morocco would subsequently argue, protect the territorial integrity of pre-colonial states? Based on a thorough analysis of the travaux préparatoires of the drafting of Paragraph 6, as well as the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara (1975), Trinidad argues that the drafters of Paragraph 6 had in mind the secessionist crises in West Irian and Katanga, and preventing the dismemberment of colonial territories by the former European colonial powers, not in righting colonial wrongs or restoring pre-colonial boundaries. This is consistent with the intertemporal scope of the principle of territorial integrity. If Paragraph 6 justified the reversion to some pre-colonial status quo ante, this would mean, as the Australian representative argued concerning Resolution 2353, “that nearly every European country, such being Europe’s history, could lay claim to some part of another European country on the basis of some earlier conquest or some earlier transfer of land,” thereby undermining the UN interstate system established after WWII. The book then proceeds to examine exceptional cases of colonial self-determination, such as those involving third-party territorial disputes or that departed from the normative framework of colonial self-determination in Non-Self-Governing Territories. Part 1 examines departures from the principle of uti possidetis, such as the Chagos Islands (separated from Mauritius by Britain), Mayotte (separated from the Comoros by France), and the Scattered Islands (separated from Madagascar by France). In each of these cases, the UN General Assembly condemned these violations of the uti possidetis principle and upheld the territorial integrity of the Comoros, Mauritius, and Madagascar. This contrasts with the seemingly non-contentious fragmentation of the British Cameroons, Ruanda-Urundi, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Cocos (Keeling) Islands and Christmas Island, and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. According to Trinidad, a legal doctrine of exception isn’t required to explain these exceptions to the general prohibition on the fragmentation of Non-Self-Governing Territories and the violation of uti possidetis. These exceptions were based on the consent of the affected colonial populations (e.g., Ruanda-Urundi) and/or justified by concerns regarding international order and stability (e.g., fearing a unilateral declaration of independence by the Ellice Islands if forced to merge with the Gilbert Islands). Consequently, the conventional interpretation of Paragraph 6 of the Colonial Declaration is correct. Part 2 examines irredentist claims over Non-Self-Governing Territories based on legal ties of territorial sovereignty, as evidenced by treaties. This includes the Panama Canal Zone, Hong Kong, Macau, and Gibraltar. If a State can prove it has retained territorial sovereignty over a territory, such as by leasing a territory without relinquishing sovereignty, that State’s territorial integrity supersedes colonial self-determination. Once more, this is consistent with a conventional interpretation of Paragraph 6 of the Colonial Declaration. Part 3 examines the dispute over the Falkland Islands. Trinidad argues that the Anglo-Argentine dispute centers on present-day sovereignty under customary international law rather than the relevance of pre-colonial ties. On the one hand, if Argentina can prove the Falkland Islands were an integral part of Argentina upon independence in 1816, then the Falkland Islands would no longer be entitled to colonial self-determination. On the other hand, if Britain holds valid territorial sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, then the Falkland Islands are a prima facie Non-Self-Governing Territory entitled to colonial self-determination. Therefore, the case can be understood according to a conventional interpretation of Paragraph 6 of the Colonial Declaration. The reason Trinidad singles out the Falklands Islands from the other territories in Part 2 is due to the contemporary emphasis on the ethnographic characteristics of the population, which have no relevance to the principle of self-determination, as self-determination is territorially, not ethnographically, defined. Finally, the book examines the colonial enclaves doctrine, according to which colonial enclaves (defined as Non-Self-Governing Territories surrounded on at least three sides by another state) are not entitled to colonial self-determination. Focusing on a small number of anomalous cases, such as the French territorial possessions in India, Walvis Bay, the Portuguese Dependencies in India, and São João Baptista de Ajudá, Trinidad argues that there exists no consistent legal doctrine of exemption. Instead, the denial of self-determination in these Non-Self-Governing Territories is the result of political decisions, often driven by realpolitik. For example, some scholars have proposed that colonial enclaves are not entitled to self-determination due to various reasons, including the territory’s small size and limited resources, threats from the contiguous state, and social and military considerations. While some of these characteristics might be true, many Non-Self-Governing Territories with these same limitations have exercised their right to self-determination and achieved independence. Compare East Timor, Kiribati, and Goa, all of which are examined in the book. Kiribati gained independence based on colonial self-determination in 1979. It has a total area of 811 square kilometers, a current population of 121,000, and a GDP of approximately $297 million. Likewise, East Timor gained independence in 2002 based on colonial self-determination. It has a total area of 14,950 square kilometers, a current population of 1.3 million, and a GDP of $5 billion. In contrast, Goa, which was forcibly annexed by India in 1961 in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, had a population of over 600,000 in 1961 and was substantially more economically developed than East Timor and Kiribati (its current GDP is $11 billion, more than double that of East Timor’s) and, at 4,000 square kilometers, was more than four times the size of Kiribati. Goa is larger and more populated than Kiribati and more economically developed than both East Timor and Kiribati but was denied the right to self-determination. No legal doctrine of exception can adequately account for this based on the demographic or territorial characteristics of these territories. Only realpolitik can account for the differing outcomes. As Milena Sterio argues in her book (aptly titled “Selfistans”), Great Power politics ultimately determine if a secessionist seeking movement succeeds or fails. This explains the world’s acquiescence to the denial of self-determination to Goa. When India annexed Goa, Portugal was diplomatically isolated due to its unpopular colonial wars in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau, while world sympathy was with colonial peoples and their leaders, such as India’s Nehru. Portugal refused to recognize Goa’s right to self-determination, for which it was condemned in the UN General Assembly. Thus, many socialist and former colonial states viewed India’s annexation of Portuguese Goa as a blow to colonialism and a continuation of the anti-colonial movement in the subcontinent. As Tom Ruys argues in his article on Goa in “The Use of Force in International Law” edited by Tom Ruys, Oliver Corten, and Alexandra Hofer, although the world might have disagreed with India’s method (forcible annexation), it supported the outcome (the expulsion of the Portuguese and Goa’s integration with India). I was incredibly impressed with this book. I would highly recommend it to anyone interested in self-determination. ...more |
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As an unrepentant working class, self-taught Marxist-Leninist, and a staunch follower of the anti-revisionist line of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, I find myself in profound disagreement with Trotsky’s ‘theories’ and his contemporary adherents. Despite h
As an unrepentant working class, self-taught Marxist-Leninist, and a staunch follower of the anti-revisionist line of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, I find myself in profound disagreement with Trotsky’s ‘theories’ and his contemporary adherents. Despite having previously delved into M. J. Olgin’s 1935 book, ‘Trotskyism: Counter-Revolution in Disguise, I felt compelled to revisit it, seeking a deeper understanding of the counter-revolutionary essence of Trotsky and his theories, particularly the so-called theory of ‘Permanent Revolution.’ The dispute between Trotsky’s so-called theory of “Permanent Revolution” vs. Stalin’s (in actuality, Lenin’s) theory of “Socialism in One Country” began shortly after the Great October Socialist Revolution in 1917. After the revolution, particularly after the defeat of the foreign intervention and the White Guards in the Russian Civil War, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) faced a significant political and theoretical dilemma. Most Russian Marxists, including Lenin, had anticipated that a revolution in Russia would spark a revolutionary wave in Europe’s more economically developed countries. As the Political Report of the Central Committee (March 6-8) reported: …it is the absolute truth that without a German revolution we are doomed—perhaps not in Petrograd, not in Moscow, but in Vladivostok, in more remote places to which perhaps we shall have to retreat, and the distance to which is perhaps greater than the distance from Petrograd to Moscow. At all events, under all conceivable circumstances, if the German revolution does not come, we are doomed (source). However, the defeat of Germany’s 1918-1919 revolution and the short-lived Hungarian revolution of 1919 dashed such hopes. Western Europe no longer looked ripe for a proletarian revolution, but the Russian working class, in alliance with the peasantry, had already taken power in Russia. This left the CPSU, as the proletariat’s vanguard, with a complex theoretical question: what was the best course of action? Stalin argued in favour of continuing to build socialism in Russia, even if Russia was blockaded and isolated and there were no immediate parallel proletarian revolutions in Western Europe, i.e., “Socialism in One Country.” As Stalin wrote in The Foundations of Leninism, the CPSU must continue to build socialism in Russia, albeit acknowledging that a socialist revolution in a single country was insufficient for the final victory of socialism: …the proletariat of the victorious country can and must build a socialist society. But does this mean that it will thereby achieve the complete and final victory of socialism, i.e., does it mean that with the forces of only one country it can finally consolidate socialism and fully guarantee that country against intervention and, consequently, also against restoration? No, it does not. For this the victory of the revolution in at least several countries is needed. Therefore, the development and support of the revolution in other countries is an essential task of the victorious revolution. Therefore, the revolution which has been victorious in one country must regard itself not as a self-sufficient entity, but as an aid, as a means for hastening the victory of the proletariat in other countries (source). The theory of “Socialism in One Country” logically builds upon Lenin’s theory of imperialism and socialist revolution. According to Lenin, the three main characteristics of imperialism are: The domination of finance capital, the export of capital to the colonies and dependent territories, and the existence of an omnipotent financial oligarchy. The growth in “spheres of influence,” the emergence of a world system of financial bondage, and the colonial oppression of the majority of humanity by a handful of advanced countries. The inevitability of imperialist wars and bitter struggles between those advanced countries for a re-division of the world. These three enumerated characteristics of imperialism will inevitably lead to: An intensification of the revolutionary crisis in advanced capitalist countries. As the proletariat of the “mother countries” is increasingly exploited by the financial oligarchy, the class struggle intensifies, and the proletariat’s class consciousness increases, creating an internal crisis and strengthening the proletarian front. An intensification of the revolutionary crisis in the dependent and colonial countries, i.e., the national liberation movement. Wars between the imperialist states, which leads to their general weakening, and a coalition of the proletariat of the advanced imperialist states with the national liberation movement of the dependent and colonial countries, thus forming a united world front of the revolution against the world front of imperialism. From these essential characteristics of imperialism, it follows that an imperialist system of the world economy exists, which is an integral unit continuously ripped asunder by its inherent contradictions, where the proletarian revolution has ripened everywhere, even in the comparatively backward countries, and may break imperialism as its weakest link. Thus, a proletarian revolution can occur in a single country, not necessarily in multiple countries simultaneously, and not necessarily in a more advanced country. Lenin recognized this fact in his opposition to the slogans “United States of Europe” and “United States of the World”: As a separate slogan, however the slogan United States of the World would hardly be a correct one, first because it merges with Socialism, second, because it may wrongly be interpreted to mean that the victory of Socialism in a single country is impossible; it may also create misconceptions as to the relations of such a country to others (source). Trotsky opposed the theory of “Socialism in One Country.” Why? What was his basis for this opposition? The basis for Trotsky’s opposition was his rejection of the law of the uneven development of capitalism. He denied Lenin’s theory of imperialism as an integrated whole that must inevitably be broken by the proletarian revolution at its weakest spot. As Trotsky wrote during the 1905-06 revolution: Without direct State support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia cannot maintain itself in power and transform its temporary rule into a durable Socialist dictatorship. This we cannot doubt for an instant. (Leon Trotsky, Our Revolution, Russian Edition, 1906, p. 278.) Trotsky clung to the outdated Menshevik view that the proletarian revolution must occur in the economically advanced countries of Europe, disregarding the law of the uneven development of capitalism and, thus, the possibility of building socialism in a single, backward country like Russia. If the proletariat of a country happened to find itself in control of State power, according to Trotsky, they would be unable to maintain it without the State support of the European proletariat. Without such support, a socialist revolution in Russia was impossible. As Trotsky wrote in his 1917 pamphlet Program of Peace: The only more or less concrete historical consideration put forward against the slogan of the United States of Europe was formulated in the Swiss Social-Democrat in the sentence which follows: ‘Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism.’ From this the Social-Democrat drew the conclusion that the victory of Socialism was possible in a single country, and that, therefore, there was no point in making the creation of a United States of Europe the condition for the dictatorship of the proletariat in each separate country. That capitalist development in different countries is uneven is an absolutely incontrovertible fact. But this very unevenness is itself extremely uneven. The capitalist level of England, Austria, Germany or France is not identical. But in comparison with Africa or Asia all these countries represent capitalist ‘Europe’, which has grown ripe for the social revolution. That no single country should ‘wait’ for others in its own struggle is an elementary idea which it is useful and necessary to repeat, in order to avoid the substitution of the idea of expectant international inaction for the idea of simultaneous international action. Without waiting for others, we begin and continue our struggle on our national soil quite sure that our initiative will give an impetus to the struggle in other countries; but if that should not happen, then it would be hopeless, in the light of the experience of history and in the light of theoretical considerations, to think, for example, that a revolutionary Russia could hold its own in the face of conservative Europe or that a Socialist Germany could remain isolated in the capitalist world. (Leon Trotsky, Collected Works, Russian Edition, Vol. III, Part I, pp. 89-90.) Trotsky rejected Lenin’s theory of imperialism, as described above, and the law of the uneven development of capitalism. He failed to see that while England, Austria, Germany, and France were all advanced imperialist states, there were contradictions within them, between their proletariat and the ruling class, as well as between them, as demonstrated during the imperialist First World War, and between the advanced countries and the colonies and dependent territories (ex. India and Britain, German South West Africa/Namibia and Germany, Indochina and France). To Trotsky, the revolution wouldn’t come as a result of these contradictions but would come simultaneously or nearly simultaneously in the most advanced countries or none at all. Since revolutions don’t happen like this, this is an essentially defeatist, counter-revolutionary theory, which only serves to weaken the proletariat and strengthen the bourgeoisie. Lenin criticized this all-or-nothing thinking in January 1918: I know that there are, of course, sages who think they are very clever and even call themselves Socialists, who assert that power should not have been seized until the revolution had broken out in all countries. They do not suspect that by speaking in this way they are deserting the revolution and going over to the side of the bourgeoisie. To wait until the toiling classes bring about a revolution on an international scale means that everybody should stand stock-still in expectation. That is nonsense (source). In addition to rejecting the law of the uneven development of capitalism, Trotsky, in typical Menshevik fashion, rejected the alliance of the working class with the mass peasantry, furthering his opposition to the development of socialism in Russia. Contrary to Trotsky’s quasi-Marxist theory of “Permanent Revolution,” Marx and Engels envisaged a ‘Permanent Revolution’ as the proletariat leading the masses of oppressed peoples and petty-bourgeois democrats, first, against the old system, and secondly, against the petty-bourgeois democrats, together with the village poor, when the former entrench themselves and become the ruling power in the State. As Marx and Engels wrote: While the democratic bourgeois wish to terminate the revolution as quickly as possible with the view to confine themselves at best to the realization of only these demands [the demands of the petty bourgeoisie], our interests and our tasks consist in making the revolution permanent until all more or less property-owning classes have been removed from power, until the proletariat has conquered State power, until the union of the proletarians not only in one country, but in all leading countries of the world, has developed to such an extent, that competition between the proletarians of those countries has ceased and at least the decisive productive forces are concentrated in the hands of the proletarians. What we are concerned with is not a change in private property, but the abolition of private property, not softening class contradictions, but abolishing classes, not improving existing society, but founding a new society (source). Marx and Engels conceived of the ‘Permanent Revolution’ as the proletariat not terminating at the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution but making a permanent revolution, that is, advancing from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to a final socialist revolution, from a revolution to improve existing society to a revolution that founds a new society. Just as Marx and Engels envisaged the proletariat leading all the oppressed classes, so did Lenin. As early as 1894, Lenin wrote: When its [the proletariat’s] advanced representatives will have assimilated the ideas of scientific socialism, the idea of the historic role of the Russian worker, when these ideas will have become widespread, and there will be created among the workers stable organizations which transform the now sporadic economic warfare of the workers into a conscious class struggle,—then the Russian worker, rising at the head of all the democratic elements, will throw down absolutism and lead the Russian proletariat (hand in hand with the proletariat of all countries) on the straight road of open political struggle to a victorious Communist revolution (source). This is a complete outline of the real Marxist ‘Permanent Revolution’: the proletariat leading other elements of the exploited classes towards a bourgeois-democratic revolution, overthrowing absolutism and establishing bourgeois democracy, and then continuing to fight until it overthrows the capitalist system and establishes Communism. Why would the inherently petty-bourgeois peasantry support the proletariat? As Lenin understood, the peasantry is not an undifferentiated mass: rich peasants (kulaks), middle peasants, and poor peasants exist. In the struggle against absolutism and for the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the proletariat will ally with the peasantry as a whole. However, as soon as the bourgeois-democratic revolution is completed, class divisions will emerge among the peasantry, and the proletariat will ally with the semi-proletarian elements within the peasantry to eliminate the opposition of the kulaks and carry through the abolition of capitalism, overcoming the resistance of both the bourgeoisie and the kulaks. This is essentially what happened in Russia with the October Revolution in 1917 and, later, with the forced collectivization of the countryside and de-kulakization, in 1929. True to his Menshevik roots, Trotsky rejected the alliance with the peasantry, seeing an undifferentiated mass of petty-bourgeois in it. The Russian proletariat, finding itself in possession of power—even if this were only a consequence of a temporary combination of forces in our bourgeois revolution—will meet with organized hostility on the part of world reaction, and with readiness for organized support on the part of the world proletariat. Left to its own forces, the working class of Russia will inevitably be crushed by the counter-revolution the moment the peasantry will turn away from it. Nothing will remain for it but to link up the fate of its political domination, and consequently the fate of the entire Russian revolution, with the fate of a socialist revolution in Europe. That colossal State political power which it gets from the temporary combination of forces in the Russian bourgeois revolution, the working class will thrust upon the scales of the class struggle of the entire capitalist world. With State power in its hands, with the counter-revolution behind its back, with the European reaction in front of it, it will issue to its brothers the world over the old battle-cry, which this time will be the battle-cry of the last attack, ‘Workers of the world, unite! (source). Although dramatic in style, the message is defeatist. If the working class of Russia is alone and has no allies, then it cannot achieve State power, and even if it does through some miracle, with world reaction in front of it and nine-tenths of the population against it from behind, it is doomed. In 1930, Stalin brilliantly explained the essence of Trotskyism: The essence of Trotskyism consists, first of all, in the denial of the possibility of building Socialism in the U.S.S.R., with the forces of the working class and the peasantry of our country. What does this mean? It means that if, in the near future, help does not come in the form of a victorious world revolution, we shall have to capitulate to the bourgeoisie and clear the road for a bourgeois-democratic republic. Consequently, we have here the bourgeois repudiation of the possibility of building Socialism in our country masked by ‘revolutionary’ phrasemongering about the victory of the world revolution. The essence of Trotskyism consists, secondly, in denying the possibility of drawing the basic masses of the peasantry into Socialist construction in the countryside. What does this mean? It means that the working class is not strong enough to lead the peasantry after it in the task of shunting the individual peasant farms on to collective rails and that, if in the near future the victory of the world revolution does not come to the aid of the working class, the peasantry will restore the old bourgeois system. Consequently, we have here the bourgeois denial of the strength and opportunities of the proletarian dictatorship for leading the peasantry to Socialism, covered with the mask of ‘revolutionary’ phrases about the victory of the world revolution. The essence of Trotskyism consists, lastly, in the denial of the necessity of iron discipline in the Party, in the recognition of the freedom of factional groupings in the Party, in the recognition of the necessity of constituting a Trotskyist party. For Trotskyism, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union must be not a united and single militant Party, but a collection of groups and factions, each with its own central organization, press and so forth. And what does this mean? It means that following the freedom of political groupings in the Party must come the freedom of political parties in the country, i.e., bourgeois democracy. Consequently, we have here the recognition of the freedom of factional groupings in the Party, leading directly to the toleration of political parties in the country of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and all covered up with phrases about ‘internal Party democracy’ and ‘improving the regime’ within the Party” (source). Olgin similarly and concisely summarizes the essence of Trotsky’s opposition to the building of socialism in the Soviet Union based on Trotsky’s rejection of the possibility of “Socialism in One Country” and alliance with the peasantry: What follows from a wrong premise is a number of counter-revolutionary conclusions which make up the main features of Trotskyism: 1. The basis is ...more |
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