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Katherine Eban

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Katherine Eban

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Born
New York , The United States
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March 2019


Katherine Eban, a New York Times bestselling author and investigative journalist, is a Fortune magazine contributor and Andrew Carnegie fellow. Her narrative, deeply reported articles on pharmaceutical counterfeiting, gun trafficking, and coercive interrogations by the CIA, have won international attention and numerous awards. She lectures frequently on the topic of pharmaceutical integrity. Press and speaking event contacts can be found here: https://www.katherineeban.com/contact ...more

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Katherine Eban Dear Rohit, Thank you for your question. As I understand it, you are asking whether American MNCs behave in the U.S., and misbehave in India? There is…moreDear Rohit, Thank you for your question. As I understand it, you are asking whether American MNCs behave in the U.S., and misbehave in India? There is some evidence to support what you are saying. The reason for this, I believe, is that as soon as companies operate in an environment with poor or minimal regulation, they resort to form -- and start cutting corners. But if they are operating in a regulated market, where they fear unannounced inspections, they are more likely to play by the rules. Sad but true. -- Katherine(less)
Katherine Eban Your generic drug refill costs $4 at Walmart. And you have no idea where the drugs were made.
Average rating: 4.41 · 7,533 ratings · 1,181 reviews · 3 distinct worksSimilar authors
Bottle of Lies: The Inside ...

4.42 avg rating — 7,391 ratings — published 2019 — 18 editions
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Dangerous Doses: How Counte...

3.94 avg rating — 136 ratings — published 2005 — 16 editions
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Addiction: Why Can't They J...

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4.15 avg rating — 86 ratings — published 2007 — 4 editions
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Bluebird, Bluebird
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“That sentiment seemed absent, and shockingly so. In a conference call with a dozen company executives, Spreen expressed her fears about the quality of the AIDS medicine that Ranbaxy was supplying for Africa. One of the company’s top medical executives responded, “Who cares? It’s just blacks dying.”
Katherine Eban, Bottle of Lies: The Inside Story of the Generic Drug Boom

“the mystery was far from solved. Nobody understood why heparin—which is made from the mucosal lining of pig intestines, most of which come from China—was suddenly making patients sick. In February 2008, the FDA discovered the likely source of the contamination: a Chinese plant supplying crude heparin to Baxter. In a clerical blunder, the FDA had completely overlooked and failed to inspect the facility, Changzhou SPL, located about 150 miles west of Shanghai. Instead, it inspected and approved a plant with a similar-sounding name. Predictably, once FDA officials finally traveled to Changzhou in February 2008 to make an on-the-ground inspection, they found serious problems. The facility had dirty manufacturing tanks and no reliable method of removing impurities from heparin, and it acquired the crude heparin from workshops that had not been inspected. Chinese regulators were no help at all. A loophole in Chinese regulations allowed certain pharmaceutical plants to register as chemical plants, which made them subject to far less oversight. For U.S. congressional investigator David Nelson, whose committee was now immersed in the heparin crisis as well, the situation laid bare the “classically good reason to be suspect of production coming from any country that doesn’t have competent regulatory authority.” The FDA issued an import alert in March 2008, meaning that Changzhou SPL’s shipments would be stopped at the U.S. border. Though”
Katherine Eban, Bottle of Lies: The Inside Story of the Generic Drug Boom

“As Graedon scrutinized the FDA’s standards for bioequivalence and the data that companies had to submit, he found that generics were much less equivalent than commonly assumed. The FDA’s statistical formula that defined bioequivalence as a range—a generic drug’s concentration in the blood could not fall below 80 percent or rise above 125 percent of the brand name’s concentration, using a 90 percent confidence interval—still allowed for a potential outside range of 45 percent among generics labeled as being the same. Patients getting switched from one generic to another might be on the low end one day, the high end the next. The FDA allowed drug companies to use different additional ingredients, known as excipients, that could be of lower quality. Those differences could affect a drug’s bioavailability, the amount of drug potentially absorbed into the bloodstream. But there was another problem that really drew Graedon’s attention. Generic drug companies submitted the results of patients’ blood tests in the form of bioequivalence curves. The graphs consisted of a vertical axis called Cmax, which mapped the maximum concentration of drug in the blood, and a horizontal axis called Tmax, the time to maximum concentration. The resulting curve looked like an upside-down U. The FDA was using the highest point on that curve, peak drug concentration, to assess the rate of absorption into the blood. But peak drug concentration, the point at which the blood had absorbed the largest amount of drug, was a single number at one point in time. The FDA was using that point as a stand-in for “rate of absorption.” So long as the generic hit a similar peak of drug concentration in the blood as the brand name, it could be deemed bioequivalent, even if the two curves reflecting the time to that peak looked totally different. Two different curves indicated two entirely different experiences in the body, Graedon realized. The measurement of time to maximum concentration, the horizontal axis, was crucial for time-release drugs, which had not been widely available when the FDA first created its bioequivalence standard in 1992. That standard had not been meaningfully updated since then. “The time to Tmax can vary all over the place and they don’t give a damn,” Graedon emailed a reporter. That “seems pretty bizarre to us.” Though the FDA asserted that it wouldn’t approve generics with “clinically significant” differences in release rates, the agency didn’t disclose data filed by the companies, so it was impossible to know how dramatic the differences were.”
Katherine Eban, Bottle of Lies: The Inside Story of the Generic Drug Boom

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