Marc Goergen's Blog

This paper examines one of the most consequential decisions in family firms: CEO succession. In founder-led firms, succession choices are particularly critical, as they determine whether the firm remains under family control and, if so, in what form. 
We outline three main options for founder CEOs upon retirement: selling the firm, appointing a family successor, or retaining ownership while appointing a professional (non-family) CEO. While prior research has largely focused on the outcomes of these succession choices, this paper turns attention to their determinants. 
 Read the full paper: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=29035

This paper provides a comprehensive introduction to how social networks shape outcomes in corporate finance. It highlights that relationships between individuals and organisations, such as directors serving together, sharing educational backgrounds, or belonging to the same professional or social circles, form networks that meaningfully influence firm behaviour and governance. 
The paper also distinguishes between one-mode networks (e.g., director–director links) and two-mode networks (e.g., directors and the firms they serve), showing how different analytical tools, such as centrality measures and Q-analysis, reveal patterns of influence, prominence, and information flow across corporate systems. 
Read the full paper: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5824084

Many firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange are family firms. A significant number of them have more than one CEO. But how do these co-CEO structures impact ESG performance?

In our latest study, my co-authors Yuliya Ponomareva, Francesco Paolone, and Domenico R. Cambrea and I find that co-CEO structures generally reduce ESG performance due to family-induced cognitive diversity. However, when one of the co-CEOs also chairs the board, this negative effect is mitigated and can even turn positive.

Our research is now published online in the Journal of Business Ethics and is available free of charge from here.

Here is the link to a brief podcast summarising the study.

A CEO’s political beliefs can significantly influence corporate decisions, dividend policies, and workforce management. The personal political beliefs of CEOs can significantly influence corporate decisions, including dividend policies and workforce management. Research indicates that conservative CEOs, who are generally more risk-averse and prudent, tend to favor stable dividend payouts. In contrast, liberal CEOs, who are more open to change and innovation, may prefer to reinvest earnings into the company rather than distribute them as dividends.

Please see my latest article for IE Insights for further details.

My latest study with Luc Renneboog and Yang Zhao looks at insider trades by directors who sit on multiple boards. When these directors face a trading ban in one of their firms due to an impending earnings announcement, we find they often trade in one of their other firms, using their private information, and they make a profit by doing so.

These trades aren't illegal, but are they ethical?

You can hear more about our findings in this podcast.

The study itself can be downloaded from the website of the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI).

Ever wondered how a CEO's political ideology influences their company's payout policy?

In my latest study with Ali Bayat, we find that conservative CEOs are not only more likely to pay dividends, but they also pay higher dividends and often combine them with share repurchases. Interestingly, these payouts are typically funded by drawing on cash reserves and cutting back on capital and R&D spending.

Our full study will be published soon in the Journal of Banking and Finance. You can read it here.

A podcast summarising the study is available from here.

How did CEOs of S&P500 firms react to the COVID-19 pandemic? Did they prioritize shareholders by meeting dividend expectations or did they secure jobs? In a study, I conducted with Ali Bayat, Panagiotis Koutroumpis and Xingjie Wei, we find that the answer to this question depends on the CEOs' political orientation. The study is forthcoming in the Journal of Corporate Finance .

A brief podcast summarising the study is available below.

Marc Goergen · Podcast - Covid paper

Please follow this link for a recent article in the Lex column of the Financial Times covering my research on CEO duality. The study in question is discussed in more detail in one of my earlier blog posts.

The ownership and control of listed UK firms is often thought to be much simpler than the ownership and control of listed firms from most of the rest of the world, including Continental Europe. However, a study I coauthored with Svetlana Mira shows that this is not always the case.For example, the distinction between beneficial and non-beneficial holdings can introduce duplication in the holdings of insiders, which may be difficult to resolve. In a study forthcoming in The British Accounting Review, we highlight a number of challenges that researchers face when determining the ownership and control of listed UK firms. We propose ways of tackling these challenges.We expect these challenges to become more pronounced over the next years due to the recent changes to the UK listing rules following the Hill review.The study is available free of charge from here.

I have just received my copy of "The European Corporation: Ownership and Control after 25 Years of Corporate Governance Reforms". The book studies changes in corporate ownership and control from the 1990s to 2018/19.The book, which is edited by Evgeni Peev and Klaus Gugler and published by Cambridge University Press & Assessment, covers a number of countries. These include Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the UK. The book benefits from contributions by Johan Eklund, Rondi Laura, and Alexander Wagner among others. I am the author of the chapter on the UK.Ultimately, the book attempts to answer the important question as to whether national corporate governance systems have converged or not since the 1990s. More information about the book can be found here.