Larry Hancock's Blog

One of the ‘loose ends’ David and I had to leave in The Oswald Puzzle was the question of what was going on with and around Lee Harvey Oswald during his last weeks in New Orleans – after he had made himself and his support for both the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and the Castro regime so visible via his street protests and media appearances. After getting the book out we have continued to tackle that area, a real challenge given the obfuscation and outright likes from so many sources that might have clarified matters.

Presently we are working though finalizing a paper that will assess what what we think was happening around Oswald during the three/four months prior to the assassination of the President. We plan to present at least part of that at the upcoming JFK Lancer Conference in Dallas and follow it up with a relatively extensive White Paper.

This particular study is challenging due to the fact that so many parties did lie, withhold information and actually ‘scrub’ documents which should have contained information about Oswald, specifically information being compartmentalized within the Special Affairs Staff of the CIA – both at its headquarters staff and at its operations base in Miami. On the other hand, the ‘negative template’ (what should be in the files based on standard practice vs. what is in the files) has become relatively clear and provides some real clues as to what was going on about Oswald within the Agency.

The more challenging part is what was going on with Oswald as the conspiracy against the President became set and began to evolve. That requires a lot of ‘connecting’ the dots and is far more speculative. David and I think what we are finding makes sense and presents a strong argement for a particular scenario in that regard, of course readers will make their own decisions (and there are lots of document links in the paper that will help in doing that).

So, yes I’m still here and at work, and David is still doing a heroic job of document location and retrieval. You will certainly hear more from us as the paper goes though some editing and our standard peer review process.

Anyone following the JFK assassination dialogs will be aware that due to the actions of Representative Luna’s government oversight committee (after decades of abortive FOIA requests and legal challenges) we can finally see the contents of the Joannides Administrative file.

Of course, if you are seriously into this subject, you also know that does not equate to seeing the Special Affairs Staff/Miami Operating Base files related to his actual work activities nor the contents of the many months of his communications with the Cuban Student Directorate (DRE/AMSPELL) which he had been brought into SAS to take control of and manage. Those key files are reportedly missing in their entirety, as are Joannides reports on his ongoing work with the Student Directorate.

So, what have we learned from the administrative file itself. First, we have official confirmation that he used the alias ‘Howard’, – an alias which was not officially registered in CIA files but which was ‘backstopped’ with a false drivers license and possibly other items of identification sometimes referred to as ‘pocket litter.’  The fact alone verifies of what DRE Cuban leaders had been telling Jeff Morley for years – that their CIA contact was ‘Howard’.

Beyond that it confirms their remarks that they had been routinely reporting on their contacts with Oswald in the summer of 1963, as well as on a public propaganda campaign which they had launched against him. That raises a real issue in that none of that information shows up as being entered into the master DRE file at CIA headquarters, nor in Oswald 201 personality file. The fact that CIA Special Affairs Staff were compartmentalizing current Oswald information also showed up following his appearance at the Cuban and Soviet consulates/embassies in Mexico City.  When the CIA Mexico City station requested information on Oswald, they were advised the last file information was that he was in the Soviet Union but was reportedly being allowed to return to the United Staes – at the time that information was over a year old.

The level of internal CIA compartmentalization of Oswald’s contemporary 1963 activities – especially given his time in the Soviet Union, his marriage to a Soviet citizen and his highly public media appearances in New Orleans, advocating against American policy on Cuba and for the Castro regime – is striking.  We have extensive CIA files, widely shared, on individuals engaged in Cuba related activities who would have been of far less interest than Lee Harvey Oswald. The records anomaly is so obvious that CIA officers such as Jane Roman were forced to acknowledge that it suggests some sort of operational interest in Oswald was in play in the fall of 1963, apparently from within the Special Affairs Staff (Cuba Project group) headed by Desmond Fitzgerald. The anomalies in CIA information related to Lee Harvey Oswald in 1963 are striking, ignoring them would be a form of denial.

Interestingly another item in Joannides administrative file also raises its own questions. In the late spring of 1963, he went through an additional security check for something beyond his routine duties as the DRE case officer. We do know of certain highly secret new projects initiated under being initiated within SAS at that time, projects dealing with a new Special Operations Group, reporting directly to Fitzgerald. Could that new assignment have brought Oswald into play as the subject of operational interest beyond the DRE propaganda activities?

Interesting, but the reality is that without the actual, missing, DRE report file, without Joannides own operational files, and without knowing the detail of the new project he was cleared to join, we will be left primarily with speculation. That is especially true if the interest in Oswald was ‘notional’ (hypothetical), a matter of following him and evaluating different possibilities for leveraging his activities.

Using Oswald for propaganda was easy enough, DRE had already started to do that by the end of summer. But his contacts with Cubans and Soviets in Mexico City may have offered something much more significant in terms of his potential. The Joannides file release resolved one critical question, confirming that the CIA was routinely receiving information on Oswald’s pro-Castro activities in the summer of 1963.  In doing so it confirmed that the gaps in CIA internal communications on information provided by the DRE was highly anomalous, suggestive of operational interest. Confirmation yes, clues yes, how far those clues might lead us is yet to be determined.

I had an extended discussion of this subject, along with some speculation of where the clues might lead us (including to David Phillips) in a recent show, which you will find here https://ochelli.com/

For those interested, the Assassinations Archives and and Research Center (AARC) has been good enough to accumulate a summary of my works for the past thirty plus years. That includes not only book lists but links to monographs, interviews and key blog posts.

This archive covers all the areas of my work so regardless of your interests you might find something of interest at this link https://aarclibrary.org/larry-hancock-archive/

Certainly what is happening does not involve me posting recently, wish I had more to share. We were pleased that The Oswald Puzzle did make it out in Audible format since a good number had requested that – even better there is a promotion on it that makes it available free with an Audible trial from Amazon.

Beyond that I’ve put out an editorial piece on how the MLK file release might be done with concern given to the King families’ issue with the personal material – some of it highly questionable – that Hoover had placed in the files.

David and I are also working on a detailed Oswald timeline for the period from New Orleans to Dallas and its fascinating how many tangents there are in when one looks at it closely. We are not sure its going to reveal anything strikingly new, but its the type of slogging that needs to be done. We anticipate presenting it at the Lancer conference this fall.

As for myself, most of my research time is spent on the subject of UFO’s and UAP’s – after five years and 4 published papers (over 200 pages worth) our team has completed our initial assessment of ‘intentions’ in both the military and public domain. I’ve been speaking on that, one recent link is below and this evening we do a two hour live show with Reed Summers on Emergent.

Presently the team is moving on to study and assess UAP Origins scenarios – obviously walking where angels fear to tread…

You will find a recent show on UAP intentions with Mica Hanks on The Debrief at this link https://podcasts.apple.com/ao/podcast/uap-indications-analysis-and-intentions-of-the-operators/id442136254?i=1000714577378

Well I haven’t posted much since the publication of The Oswald Puzzle, once again I shifted my attention back to our long term UFO study project. And our team has just released the fourth paper in our series of studies of post WWII UFO activities, behavioral patterns, intentions and changes in focus.

These studies constitute an immense body of work and together comprise a couple of hundred pages of analysis, there are associated papers on methodology and database collections available as contextual support for the work.

And it all grew out of a book I published as far back as 2017 – seems amazing to me now that it this, certainly not something I anticipated at the time (I didn’t even know the people who now form a team that meets weekly and communicates almost daily – with members in Illinois, Virginia and New Zealand).

In any event, if its a subject that interests you, you can find the press release on our newest study (it contains the link to the study itself, as well as our data) here https://www.explorescu.org/post/groundbreaking-scu-study-identifies-the-evolving-patterns-of-activity-by-unidentified-anomalous-phen

The book that started it all can be found here: https://www.amazon.com/Unidentified-National-Intelligence-Problem-UFOs/dp/069289229X

The RFK file ‘release’ has not drawn the media attention the earlier JFK releases did, nor have there been extended remarks from RFK Jr. on the release. Of course what we are now seeing going online are relatively routine FBI RFK Name files, basically correspondence directed the FBI – much of it calling for an investigation of Sirhan in terms of communist or radical Arab or Palestinian influence. There are also requests from LAPD for routine background checks on individuals and copies of LAPD investigative materials and evidence (including autopsy photos) – as well as newspaper coverage of the trial.

This is the sort of thing we would expect given that the FBI was simply supporting LAPD in a criminal investigation, not itself ‘working’ the crime. As to the evidence itself, and the extensive LAPD investigative files, much of it has been available at the California Archives, Dartmouth and other institutions (including the Mary Ferrell Foundation) for many years. https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/RFK_Assassination_Documents.html

Its not that the RFK releases don’t give us further insight into the context of the crime, but primarily they simply broaden our historical view. We are not seeing brand new investigative files with the RFK materials, we are seeing history – history from bulk files (many simply copies from LAPD or elsewhere) not withheld or secret, simply from FBI records setting in the National Archives.

But is that really all there is?

Anyone reviewing the press coverage of Sirhan, or the witness statements made at his trial would have found ample indications of his Palestinian advocacy, of his hatred of Israel, and his negative view of his experience in America. He had made no effort to conceal those feelings. There were also LAPD reports of Sirhan in the company of others – young people of apparent Arab descent – both before the assassination and at the Ambassador Hotel the evening of the crime. And the FBI and the CIA were well aware of activist Arab, pro-Palestinian student groups in the U.S. – including groups Sirhan might have encountered during his two years at Pasadena City College.

The FBI and CIA were also aware that foreign nation’s intelligence services were actively working in the United States – working to counter opposition from expatriates and students studying in American colleges. Perhaps the most active of those was Iranian intelligence, known as SAVAK. Inititially established with CIA assistance to support the newly installed Shaw of Iran. SAVAK was particularly active in its overseas missions. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81M00980R000600050015-5.pdf

Click to access Meisels-Eitan_SNR-Thesis_web.pdf

In that regard we know that a series of reports given to both the FBI and LAPD identified the Khan family of Iran as being associated with Sirhan immediately before the assassination (the family being ex-patriots with their own problems with the Shaw and SAVAK).

All of this raises the question of whether any element of the American Intelligence community – CIA, FBI, NSA – held files which might have been relevant to foreign involvement in the RFK assassination. Files which would have pointed towards potential influence, contact or even influence over Sirhan – provoking or otherwise taking advantage of his own publicly stated political views (which testimony showed he was never hesitant to express to friends and acquaintances).

LAPD certainly collected numerous leads and reports which would have had at least suggested the possibility of foreign involvement in the crime. While they, and the LA District Attorney, ultimately chose not to pursue the question of influence and conspiracy at trial, did the American intelligence community choose to ignore it as well? Or are did relevant files exist which might truly expand our view of the murder of an American Senator and Presidential candidate?

If so, bringing something new to the RFK assassination is going to take more than simply scanning bulk files at NARA. Someone with major authority would have to order an actual search for such files – files the CIA in particular would have not been anxious to share back in the 1970’s – or even now.

I first researched and wrote about Garett Underhill in Someone Would Have Talked, some twenty years ago.  At that point I covered him as a loose end, given that he had expressed his fears that a ‘clique within the CIA’ had been involved in killing President Kennedy, that they had been involved in illegal smuggling activities, they were opposing JFK’s policies, and that they posed a threat to the President.

Underhill’s background and connections were impressive, directly related to his long-time work in monitoring and consulting on foreign military matters related to weapons, in particular international sales and shipments of arms.  He had served as an advisor on weapons to LIFE magazine during WWII, and afterwards served as an analyst for several publications including Collier’s magazine, Fortune, Esquire and The Washinton Post.

His expertise also led him into consulting work for the Army during the 1950’s and, most importantly, becoming a business associate of Samuel Cummins and INTERARMCO, the world’s largest military and weapons trading company. Details on that relationship are covered  in my book Shadow Warfare which explores Cummins his CIA connections –  with a history reaching through years of its covert operations and ‘deniable ‘weapons shipments around the world.

In 1963, Underhill was working for Fortune magazine, with a particular interest in Cuba. Immediately following the President’s assassination, he privately expressed fears that his research had exposed him to a clique of CIA officers, formerly working in SE Asia and involved in illicit weapons shipments which had also involved drugs. He feared that this clique viewed JFK as a threat and had been involved in killing him. Beyond that Underhill was panicked by the thought that they knew who he was, and that he was aware of their activities.

Over time and with further research, Underhill’s remarks began to be much less of a loose end, especially as I researched and wrote about arms shipments into Thailand, Laos, and related activities in the Golden Triangle area – where arms going in were entangled with drugs coming back in the same channels. An area where CIA officer Henry Hecksher had worked (after his time as Chief of Station in Laos).

Most importantly in Shadow Warfare I also explored a new and highly deniable CIA project which involved shipments of weapons and equipment going into the Caribbean in the fall of 1963 – a project headed by Henry Hecksher designated as AMWORLD.  With his interest in Cuba, it seems more than likely Underhill would have become aware of weapons shipments going to a project that was covertly sanctioned, but overtly presented as something totally against JFK’s public position of no further American military action against Cuba. It would have appeared to be a direct violation of JFK’s orders to turn off American support for Cuban exile missions against Cuba.

While Underhill likely did not know any details of the sanctioned project, he certainly could have heard from Cummins that the people involved were old SE Asia hands, individuals we now know to be Hecksher and Carl Jenkins (newly assigned to the project and coming back from duties in Laos and Vietnam).

With what we have learned over time we can speculate that Underhill might well have reached the conclusion that CIA officers out of SE Asia had gone rogue, using their established connections to get weapons to support people working in direct opposition to JFK’s announced policies – for that matter it must be noted that AMWORLD itself would later be shut down over media reports of drug smuggling associated with its operations.

Underhill might also have feared that his inquiries via Cummins had been shared with the AMWORLD officers – something would have been of interest to them given their security concerns. While the CIA officers in charge of AMWORLD maintained a distance from its field operations, they were very much concerned about its security and visibility.

What Underhill could not have known was that a what appeared to be a very illegal and rogue operation against JFK’s policies – a project buried so deeply in deniability that recruits were told the Kennedy’s had abandoned them – was actually an operation known to him and strongly supported by Robert Kennedy. Sadly, his fears may have been meaningless, ironically his immediate thoughts about a ‘clique within the CIA’ being a threat to the president may have been much more accurate.

Hopefully many of you were able to catch the two hours that David and I spent with Jeff Morley and his listeners last week, if not you can visit it here (it was definitely a deep dive) https://jfkfacts.substack.com/p/the-jfk-facts-podcast-102-the-oswald?utm_source=podcast-email&publication_id=315632&post_id=158856216&utm_campaign=email-play-on-substack&utm_content=watch_now_button&r=1mvxaw&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

Any conversation with Jeff is an important one and a couple of things emerged from this one that really got our attention and which are now is leading us to a new focus in our research. You will find the discussion in the show, in regards to Oswald’s contact with the DRE ,but most specifically in the corroboration that DRE members were well aware of Oswald’s travels to Mexico and on to Dallas. That is especially interesting considering that the DRE claimed to have had no contact with him after he left New Orleans in the summer of 1963.

During our conversation Jeff pointed out that following the assassination key DRE figures were actually sent outside the country, with arrangements made by CIA officers. That seems to have received far less attention than it should.

And it also becomes especially striking due to the fact that certain key DRE military figures as well as persons of special interest in the assassination also ended up outside the country, black exfiltrated as part of AMWORLD.

In considering both points, David and I have decided (or somehow the two of us have drawn each other back into it..sigh) to conduct a new round of research on the period between Oswald’s departure from New Orleans to and beyond the assassination. We feel that if we treat that period objectively, taking a fresh view (and likely another contrarian one) we may just come up with a closer view as to how Oswald came to be a patsy in Dallas – but more specifically who knew that he was being set up in that role and just possibly how a conspiracy became hidden in a sanctioned CIA deniable operation.

Certainly not my usual type of post but my current level of frustration and embarrassment for my nation requires me to go on record, even if in an obviously limited venue. This week Chuck Ochelli gave me the opportunity to offer my historical studies of the Russia/Ukraine conflict as well as my more personal takes on the situation. The former are based on the extensive work on the conflict which I put into print in Creating Chaos, which I feel is factual and balanced – it presents the deep historical context for the conflict that is being totally ignored in both contemporary media and American policy making.

The second is very personal – no need to disguise that, you will hear it if you choose to listen to the show https://www.spreaker.com/episode/the-ochelli-effect-3-5-2025-mike-swanson-larry-hancock–64738669

To go along with it I offer two other links to illustrate that my frustration, the first being American foreign policy as conducted under President Kennedy https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/berlin-w-germany-rudolph-wilde-platz-19630626

The second being American foreign policy as being conducted now – and the extent to which we are not just abandoning Ukraine but actively acting against them, even extending to Administration control over private companies https://mil.in.ua/en/news/maxar-cuts-off-ukraine-s-access-to-satellite-imagery/

If that looks and feels like blackmail, it probably is….

In The Oswald Puzzle we discuss several key issues with the Warren Commission’s work, with a good bit of that discussion cited to Pat Speer and his study of the Commission. Many of the issues of the Commissions’ problems with Oswald as the shooter (and as ‘marksman’) come from a memorandum counsel staff member Wesley Liebeler wrote critiquing elements of the Commissions’ draft report on that area (most of which were simply ignored). Of course we could only sample that in the book. Fortunately Pat has has recently posted a point by point excerpt of Liebeler’s issues, and I think this would be a good place to offer it as an extension of what we were able to point out in on our book. The following is excerpted from Chapter 3 of Pat’s work:

From chapter 3:

Leave It to Liebeler

Elsewhere on 9-4-64, after rapidly devouring a copy of chapter 4 of the report, Warren Commission Counsel Wesley J. Liebeler nearly has a heart attack. Sensing that critics would see this chapter, which lays out the Commission’s reasons for believing Oswald was the assassin, as, in his own words, “a brief for the prosecution,” he fires off a 26 page long memorandum to Warren Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin on 9-6. His comments on the Oswald’s Rifle Capability section of chapter 4 follow… 

OSWALD’S RIFLE CAPABILITY

1. The purpose of this section is to determine Oswald’s ability to fire a rifle. The third word at the top of page 50 of the galleys, which is apparently meant to describe Oswald, is “marksman.” A marksman is one skilled at shooting at mark; one who shoots well. Not only do we beg the question a little, but the sentence is inexact in that the shot, which it describes, would be the same for a marksman as it would for one who was not a marksman. How about: the assassin’s shots from the easternmost window of the south side of the Texas School Book Depository were at a slow-moving target proceeding on a downgrade virtually straight away from the assassin, at a range of 177 to 266 feet.”

2. The last sentence in the first paragraph on galley page 50 should indicate that the slope of Elm Street is downward.

3. The section on the nature of the shots deals basically with the range and the effect of a telescopic sight. Several experts conclude that the shots were easy. There is, however, no consideration given here to the time allowed for the shots. I do not see how someone can conclude that a shot is easy or hard unless he knows something about how long the firer has to shoot, that is, how much time is allotted for the shots.

4. On nature of the shots–Frazier testified that one would have no difficulty in hitting a target with a telescopic sight, since all you have to do is put the crosshairs on the target. On page 51 of the galleys, however, he testified that shots fired by FBI agents with the assassination weapon were “a few inches high and to the right of the target * * * because of a defect in the scope.” Apparently no one knows when that defect appeared, or if it was in the scope at the time of the assassination. If it was, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary one may assume that it was, putting the crosshairs on the target would clearly have resulted in a miss, or it very likely would, in any event. I have raised this question before. There is a great deal of testimony in the record that a telescopic sight is a sensitive proposition. You can’t leave a rifle and scope laying around in a garage underfoot for almost 3 months, just having brought it back from New Orleans in the back of a station wagon, and expect to hit anything with it, unless you take the trouble to fire it and sight the scope in. This would have been a problem that should have been dealt with in any event, and now that it turns out that there actually was a defect in the scope, it is perfectly clear that the question must be considered. The present draft leaves the Commission open to severe criticism. Furthermore, to the extent that it leaves testimony suggesting that the shots might not have been so easy out of the discussion, thereby giving only a part of the story, it is simply dishonest.

5. Why do we have a statement concerning the fact that Oswald’s Marine records show that he was familiar with the Browning automatic rifle, .45-caliber pistol and 12-gage riot gun? That is completely irrelevant to the question of his ability to fire a rifle, unless there is evidence that the same skills are involved. It is, furthermore, prejudicial to some extent.

6. Under the heading “Oswald’s Rifle Practice Outside the Marines” we have a statement concerning his hunting activities in Russia. It says that he joined a hunting club, obtained a license and went hunting about six times. It does not say what kind of a weapon he used. While I am not completely familiar with the record on this point, I do know for a fact that there is some indication that he used a shotgun. Under what theory do we include activities concerning a shotgun under a heading relating to rifle practice, and then presume not to advise the reader of the fact?

7. The statements concerning Oswald’s practice with the assassination weapon are misleading. They tend to give the impression that he did more practicing than the record suggests that he did. My recollection is that there is only one specific time when he might have practiced. We should be more precise in this area, because the Commission is going to have its work in this area examined very closely.

8. On the top of galley page 51 we have that statement about Oswald sighting the telescopic sight at night on the porch in New Orleans. I think the support for that proposition is thin indeed. Marina Oswald first testified that she did not know what he was doing out there and then she was clearly led into the only answer that gives any support to this proposition.

9. I think the level of reaching that is going on in this whole discussion of rifle capability is merely shown by the fact that under the heading of rifle practice outside the Marine Corps appears the damning statement that “Oswald showed an interest in rifles by discussing that subject with others (in fact only one person as I remember it) and reading gun magazines.”

10. I do not think the record will support the statement that Oswald did not leave his Beckley Avenue rooming house on one of the weekends that he was supposedly seen at the Sports Drome Rifle Range.

11. There is a misstatement in the third paragraph under rapid fire tests when it says “Four of the firers missed the second shot.” The preceding paragraph states that there were only three firers.

12. There are no footnotes whatsoever in the fifth paragraph under rapid fire tests and some rather important statements are made which require some support from someplace.

13. A minor point as to the next paragraph–bullets are better said to strike rather than land.

14. As I read through the section on rifle capability it appears that 15 different sets of three shots were fired by supposedly expert riflemen of the FBI and other places. According to my calculations those 15 sets of shots took a total of 93.8 seconds to be fired. The average of all 15 is a little over 6.2 seconds. Assuming that time is calculated commencing with the firing of the first shot, that means the average time it took to fire the two remaining shots was about 6.2 seconds. That comes to about 3.1 seconds for each shot, not counting the time consumed by the actual firing, which would not be very much. I recall that chapter 3 said that the minimum time that had to elapse between shots was 2.25 seconds, which is pretty close to the one set of fast shots fired by Frazier of the FBI. The conclusion indicates that Oswald had the capability to fire three shots with two hits in from 4.8 to 5.6 seconds. Of the 15 sets of 3 shots described above, only 3 were fired within 4.8 seconds. A total of five sets, including the three just mentioned were fired within a total of 5.6 seconds. The conclusion at its most extreme states that Oswald could fire faster than the Commission experts fired in 12 of their 15 tries and that in any event he could fire faster than the experts did in 10 of their 15 tries. If we are going to set forth material such as this, I think we should set forth some information on how much training and how much shooting the experts had and did as a whole. The readers could then have something on which to base their judgments concerning the relative abilities of the apparently slow firing experts used by the Commission and the ability of Lee Harvey Oswald.

15. The problems raised by the above analyses should be met at some point in the text of the report. The figure of 2.25 as a minimum firing time for each shot used throughout chapter 3. The present discussion of rifle capability shows that expert riflemen could not fire the assassination weapon that fast. Only one of the experts managed to do so, and his shots, like those of the other FBI experts, were high and to the right of the target. The fact is that most of the experts were much more proficient with a rifle than Oswald could ever be expected to be, and the record indicates that fact, according to my recollection of the response of one of the experts to a question by Mr. McCloy asking for a comparison of an NRA master marksman to a Marine Corps sharpshooter.

16. The present section on rifle capability fails to set forth material in the record tending to indicate that Oswald was not a good shot and that he was not interested in his rifle while in the Marine Corps. It does not set forth material indicating that a telescopic sight must be tested and sighted in after a period of non-use before it can be expected to be accurate. That problem is emphasized by the fact that the FBI actually found that there was a defect in the scope which caused the rifle to fire high and to the right. In spite of the above the present section takes only part of the material in the record to show that Oswald was a good shot and that he was interested in rifles. I submit that the testimony of Delgado that Oswald was not interested in his rifle while in the Marines is at least as probative as Alba’s testimony that Oswald came into his garage to read rifle–and hunting–magazines. To put it bluntly that sort of selection from the record could seriously affect the integrity and credibility of the entire report.

17. It seems to me that the most honest and the most sensible thing to do given the present state of the record on Oswald’s rifle capability would be to write a very short section indicating that there is testimony on both sides of several issues. The Commission could then conclude that the best evidence that Oswald could fire his rifle as fast as he did and hit the target is the fact that he did so. It may have been pure luck. It probably was to a very great extent. But it happened. He would have had to have been lucky to hit as he did if he had only 4.8 seconds to fire the shots. Why don’t we admit instead of reaching and using only part of the record to support the propositions presently set forth in the galleys. Those conclusions will never be accepted by critical persons anyway.