Harry Rothmann's Blog - Posts Tagged "vietnam-war"

This past Sunday marked the 50th Anniversary of the commitment of US ground forces to the Vietnam War. Our book, "None Will Surpass" tells the story of the members of the West Point Class of 1967 and their role in that War. http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00JV829QA

I have published two books on the Vietnam War. To sell them, or more importantly to get them into Vietnam War Veterans hands, I have joined Facebook and other social media sites. What I have found there is startling and troubling to me. This is why.

First, I had taught a course on Vietnam to military officers at a senior war college. There senior officers were enraged at how poorly the high ranking military officers and their civilian heads had gone about to wage the war in Vietnam. This was from its inception, where they did not properly formulate a national strategy to wage the war; and then as they conducted military operations where they ignored their enemy, failed to provide the means to fight it, and handcuffed the military commanders in their operations. In short, they were interested in how they could improve in the future civil-military strategic formulation that was sorely needed.

But, what I found on the internet and in social media was that very few Vietnam Veterans were interested in how the wrongs and failures of the conduct of that war could be remedied so that they would not be repeated again for future veterans. Rather, they wanted to blame someone for the failure or not admit that the war was lost -- not correct what went wrong for any future war. They were enraged and wanted to have someone or something to blame for their sacrifice. In so doing, moreover, many rallied around the argument that they - the military - had won all the battles and the politicians lost the war for them. It was the classic "Stab in the Back" argument that Adolph Hitler so effectively used to gain power in Germany in the early thirties. And when I attempted to tell them it was not that simple, many, because I too was a veteran, called me a traitor to their cause because I had said we lost the war.

Now why is this a topic anyone on Goodreads should care about. Well, the view that the Veterans embraced was that of the Revisionist historians who have been arguing for over a decade now and is expounded upon in many of the more recent history books that are available to read. While those historians are not much worse than the orthodox historians who argue that the war should never been fought and was unwinnable two wrongs don't make a right - as the saying goes.

So for those who are interested in the histories of the Vietnam War, as you read one of the books on that war beware.....blaming someone who had been involved in some particular onerous outcome is not the real value of history. Rather finding what caused the decisions that were made and why they chose to make them is a much better approach and of more value in trying to understand the outcome of that history. And don't forget that, especially in the case of the Vietnam War, US decisions were not the only ones that resulted in the outcome. Rather, as the saying goes, 'the enemy matters and gets a vote' in the outcome. Harry Rothmann

It has always been my primary goal to publish WARRIORS AND FOOLS, my book on the Vietnam War, primarily to get it in the hands of Vietnam Veterans and Educators who want to teach about the war. While for a self-published book sales have been moderate at 1000 copies and have already reached scores of veterans, it still has not received wide acceptance in academic circles and institutions. I am very pleased and honored that several noted historians, such as Professor Larry Berman and Dr. Andrew Bacevich; and the US Army’s Heritage Center, under Mike Perry, has promoted it through inviting me to talk about it. But thus far, only one teacher, Professor Eric Mann, has decided to use it in a course. In addition, except for the iBook version, which has not gotten much attention, other versions do not have what I think is very useful in assisting in the teaching of the war; i.e., maps, diagrams, tables, pictures and copies of actual documents.

Thus, I have decided to publish a textbook version of my book. It will consist of two volumes and include pictures, maps, diagrams, tables, and other materials from my research. This textbook version will initially be available on Amazon as a two volume paperback and found on my author page at https://www.amazon.com/Harry-Rothmann.... I anticipate that this will be available at the beginning of September 2020. I will also attempt a new effort that will inform as many people as I can about the textbook - concentrating of course on an audience including those who may be interested in teaching a course on Vietnam.

So if any who are reading this post know of any potential courses or events about the Vietnam War or know of teachers who may be interested, please pass this post on to them or let me know how to contact them. I will, as I have offered before, send a courtesy version of the textbook after making contact with them and receiving a course proposal, lesson plan, or syllabus that demonstrates their seriousness in teaching a course on the Vietnam War.

In a subsequent post I will show what the textbook version looks like and how it will be organized. I thank those of you who have read my book and especially those of you who have supported it through writing reviews, and passing knowledge of its existence on to others.

In his introduction to Determined to Persist: General Earle Wheeler; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Military’s Foiled Pursuit of Victory in Vietnam Colonel (Retired) Mark Viney writes that his book is one that General Wheeler never wanted written. The reason, he explains, is that Wheeler, who was the Chairman of the JCS for Presidents Johnson and Nixon at the height of that controversial war, was so disgusted with the war’s outcome that he destroyed the memoirs he had been working on for two years during his retirement and then shortly died from a heart attack afterwards.

Colonel Viney, whose grandfather and father served during and fought in Vietnam, explains why he took on a book whose subject person never wanted it written. First, he points out that many historians of the war have either neglected or misrepresented the role that Wheeler played in the Vietnam War. Much of this neglect and misrepresentation, he argues, is due either to the lack of Wheeler’s detailed personal explanation of the events and the military advice he and the Military Chiefs gave to their civilian leaders; or to a very narrow understanding of Wheeler’s attempts to influence his civilian superiors to pursue a different military strategy to force rather than just persuade North Vietnam to cease its aggression against the South.

Second, Colonel Viney further explains that what gives him the wherewithal to write this book are his access to the here before unavailable Private Papers of General Wheeler, and his very thorough research and more sympathetic understanding of recently available secret documents in the National Archives. Using these he argues that “portrayals of Wheeler and the Chiefs as parochial, unimaginative yes-men, complicit with, and unable to effectively articulate recommendations and consequences to the unreceptive Johnson Administration” are inaccurate. Rather, “his book demonstrates conclusively that Wheeler and the Chiefs were not derelict, passive accomplices to civilian mismanagement of the war in 1964-65. On the contrary, during that period and the subsequent and preponderant five years of Wheeler’s tenure as Chairman, he and the Chiefs ‘determined to persist’ in aggressively and proactively providing consistent, doctrinally grounded strategic recommendations and potential consequences to the Johnson Administration and then to the more receptive but politically constrained Nixon Administration.”

While Colonel Viney’s emphasis on and evidence presented do portray a more positive light on the efforts of General Wheeler and the other Chiefs to change their civilian superiors minds about adopting a more aggressive and militarily sound strategy, he fails to focus on their own failures to do so. For example, at important times in the war- especially during the 1968 TET Offensive, they neglected to clearly explain why their more aggressive military advice would change the course of the war, end it favorably for the U. S. , and yet avoid a confrontation with China and the Soviet Union.

Despite this shortcoming in his book, Colonel Viney’s new view of General Wheeler and the Chiefs role and attempts to persuade their civilian leaders to wage a more effective war is an important contribution to the understanding of the Vietnam War. Thus, Historians, Students, War Veterans, and those who are interested in enlightening themselves on the war need to read Determined to Persist. In doing so, in the opinion of this Vietnam War Veteran and history teacher, you will understand better the difficulties and reasons for the Vietnam War’s outcomes, as well as the interactions between the military and civil leaders and advisors. The book, moreover, is well-written and organized, making for an easy read and understanding.

Determined to Persist: General Earle Wheeler, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Military’s Foiled Pursuit of Victory in Vietnam