The One-State Solution

The situation between Israel and the Palestinians has gone from bad to worse yet again, and people despair of ever establishing a permanent peace. Yet there is a solution. No, not the two-state solution, and certainly not the Greater Israel sought by the extremist Zionist settlers and their backers. Nor is it Hamas’s goal of an Islamic state replacing the Jewish one. The two-state solution is dead for one main reason: it won’t work. It would simply perpetuate the status quo of two people fighting reflexively over everything: security, water, harbors and airports, jobs, everything. The two-state solution gives Israel no improvement in border security, so Israel would have to maintain control over all borders—its own and the Palestinian state’s. As such, there is no way an independent Palestine would ever be free of Israel’s effective hegemony. The two ethnically cleansed versions—Zionist and Islamic—are obviously no good (even though Hamas says an Islamic state would safeguard adherents of all three Abrahamic religions, replacing pervasive Judaism with pervasive Islam would likely just as bad or worse). In all these scenarios, there would be no resolution of the underlying conflicts. Violence would continue. Religious extremists would have undue influence on politics, and the two minority religions would be marginalized, as is the case now. Hate would fester and erupt violently from time to time. More innocents would be killed, and no peace would be achieved.
There is only one choice left: the secular one-state solution. It is the only even potentially viable option of the four. The one-state solution gives everyone what they want, in fact (land, security, religious freedom)—but they will have to share.
Instead of looking backward to the crimes and mythology of the past, the population would have to be encouraged to look forward. Most want this already. This would be the creation of a new, inclusive nation of Israel (the name is OK—according to the Bible, in ancient times it was a pagan state, reviled in the Bible for its worship of foreign gods). Reconciliation could become a common national effort to compensate for the errors of the past on both sides—rebuild destroyed villages, bond through their mutual history in ancient times, create a sense of common rootedness in the land.
The territory would consist of Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank—one state from Jordan to the sea. There would be free movement of people, and everyone would be equal under the law. Palestinian refugees would be allowed to return. This would take place over several years because there would have to be a system of reparations for land taken in 1948 within the present boundaries of Israel. The post-1967 West Bank settlements are all illegal under international law, and so would have to be condemned. But there could be a system where the settlers could purchase (at—as a matter of justice—current fair market value, as improved land) their buildings from whoever was the owner or legitimate occupier of the land when it was taken (or their heirs). Older settlements might be given an actual right to purchase, but more recent settlements would have to negotiate. Palestinians basically would have the choice to get the land back or receive adequate payment.
Given the mistrust that has infected both peoples, the form of government must contain enough checks and balances to prevent government abuses against ethnic and religious minorities. So, a written constitution must come first, with universal guarantees of equality under the law and free exercise of religion—and no single established religion. Leave religion as a matter of individual conscience. (Please note that the U.S. from whose constitution these phrases are taken, has a very strong, even vibrant religious population.) Given that Jewish population and the Muslim population (with a few Christian Arabs thrown in) would be roughly equal, this has at least a promising starting-off point. But the present system of government in Israel simply will not do as a template. It uses a structure of proportional representation (only Italy, not a paragon of good government, has the same structure), which has historically meant that small minority (and extremist) parties become kingmakers. And a general parliamentary system is unlikely to guarantee necessary insulation from majoritarian abuse. But there is a paradigm to work from. Two hundred-odd years ago a bunch of rebels were confronted with a similar quandary (well, similar enough). So they came up with the “Connecticut Compromise,” a structure with two houses of government and a directly elected President. By having two chambers, one based on political divisions and one based on population, we in the U.S. created a state where it was very difficult for one party to steamroller the other. It isn’t perfect, the ride hasn’t been smooth, but this structure provides balance and security from a good many types of political abuse (not all, as the Tea Party has shown, alas).
The walls between Israel and Gaza and Israel and the West Bank would come down in stages, to allow people to get used to the new structures, but the government would be constituted immediately through direct elections, and civil law would be immediately extended to all parts of the country.
Extremists would not like any of this, but they would be a diluted minority. The police force and military would have their job cut out for them, of course, but the current stimulants for extremism would be absent. There would be protests, which should be allowed—but violence would be punished. Crimes, no matter what their excuses, would be treated as crimes—everything from murder to cutting down orchards to any sort of hate crime. Religion would no longer be a shield for racism.
Israel would begin to be not just a normal state, but an example for the region—a democracy where freedom exists and everyone has the same rights.
Lastly, and not inconsequentially, what of the “Jewish State”? This has been the raison d’etre of Israel and must be addressed. The problem is that the “Jewish State” has never been defined. It is still being debated after sixty-six years. And for good reason. The question of “who is a Jew?” has been the property of the Rabbinate, who do not represent Judaism as a while. Recently, dissatisfaction with the Rabbinate and its discrimination against non-Ashkenzi Orthodox Jews has led to calls for its abolition. Which still leaves the question unanswered. All that one can say is that Israel is a Jewish state because the majority of its inhabitants are Jews. Descriptive, not normative. Some want to guarantee a Jewish majority in Israel forever. But legislating ethic majorities is functionally impossible, as well as morally repugnant. Where does one draw the line? Fifty-one percent? More? And how do you tell the mother of a newborn infant that she must leave the country because her child exceeds permission limits for the minority population?
And what is a Jew anyway—Orthodox Jews only? This disenfranchises a great many sincerely practicing Jews. And this is why “Jewish State” has never been defined. It can’t really be done. And creating a “Jewish State” isn’t the issue anyway. The issue is to create country where Jews, and all other people—of all religions—are safe from discrimination and abuse. And that would be a more “Jewish” state than Israel is now, perhaps, because it would be more consistent with Jewish moral teachings. The mythology of God giving this land to one tribe of “chosen people” is a myth and should be treated as such. Our moral inheritance is far more important.
The new state would provide freedom and certainly as much protection for Jews as Israel does today, probably more. And for everyone else as well. And isn’t that the point?