Modern Egypt Quotes

“As Fawaz Gerges has astutely argued, Egyptian nationalism developed in response to British colonization of Egypt, hence a concept of ‘sameness’ in opposition to the ‘other’ became prevalent.
Chapter 1: Genesis, page 31”
― Maged Mandour

“The concept of fourth-generation wars simply refers to the use of disinformation, funding subversive N.G.O.s, and spreading rumours as a method for warfare, broadening the concept of war to include non-military action. This endlessly elastic concept is a godsend for conspiracy theorists and provides endless justification for state repression.”

Chapter “Genesis”, page 33”
― Maged Mandour, Egypt under El-Sisi: A Nation on the Edge

“Starting from the premise of the organic unity of the nation, the opposition can be painted as social groups outside the ‘nation’, since, simply put, they threaten the nation’s natural harmony. However, this concept is only plausible if the regime, or, more precisely, the military, is able to portray itself as a representative of the nation and guardian of the state, which it has been very successful in doing. Hence, opposition to the military regime is equated with treason to the nation, and thus should be repressed by any means necessary.
The narrative used to solicit popular support involved the propagation of numerous conspiracy theories, including the claim that the events of 2011, the groups that participated in it, and those who support it are part of a systemic effort to destroy the Egyptian state, which was only thwarted by the military’s intervention in 2013.”
Chapter “Genesis”, page 33”
― Maged Mandour, Egypt under El-Sisi: A Nation on the Edge

“General Abdulatty Kofta (Al Araby, 2021). [quoter’s note: a “kofta” is an Egyptian meatball basically] In February 2014, the general announced that the military had invented a device that could cure both Hepatitis C and H.I.V. The proposed cure was a medical device that could detect and destroy the virus, almost instantly. General Abdulatty stated that he would extract the virus from the patient, and give it back to him as a piece of Kofta, which the patient could eat. Even though there was no scientific evidence to support these claims, the pro-regime media pushed the narrative to new heights (El Dashan, 2014), even after the scientific advisor to the interim President Adly Mansour, Essam Hegy, was extremely critical of the announcement due to its lack of scientific merit (Abdelaziz and Abedine, 2014). The military even announced that the miracle cure would be available in military hospitals and clinics starting from July 2014, only to backtrack a month before that date (Loveluck, 2014). It was later established that General Abdulatty was not a medical professional nor a scientist, and that he was previously sentenced to one month in jail in 2007 for impersonating a doctor and practising without a license (Al Araby, 2021). His connection to the military was also questionable. Abdulatty was granted the rank of honorary general after after the head of the engineering authority became attracted to the general’s ideas, in spite of having no formal affiliation with the military establishment (Armbrust, 2019, p. 229). How Abdulatty was able to convince the military brass to support his bizarre claim to have found a miracle cure remain so a mystery, but it is indicative of the level of prevalent polarisation that a charlatan was able to spin such a ridiculous state-sponsored lie that a large number of Egyptians believed.” Chapter “Genesis”, Page 37”
― Maged Mandour, Egypt under El-Sisi: A Nation on the Edge

“When describing the opposition, remaining true to the regime narrative, Sisi coined a new term: ‘The people of evil’ (BBC, 2016). The term started to gain currency in 2016, when popular opposition to the transfer of the two islands in the Red Sea, Tiran and Sanafir, from Egyptian to Saudi sovereignty became apparent. However, it first made an appearance during Sisi’s speech inaugurating the nee Suez Canal in 2015 (Armbrust, 2019, p. 223). Even though it was never explicitly defined, it became clear that Sisi used it to describe the opposition in general, with specific mention of those who doubted and criticized the regimes ‘achievements’ (RT, 2019). Sisi used a rhetoric that not only framed the opposition as evil but also framed the regime as good, and the conflict between them as an existential struggle between good and evil: a biblical image par excellence. The framing of the opposition as evil and treasonous was not only a rhetorical device but also laid down the foundation of mass repression.” Chapter “Genesis”, Pages 37-38”
― Maged Mandour, Egypt under El-Sisi: A Nation on the Edge

“Before proceeding with a detailed analysis, it is worth elaborating what I mean by the word ‘state’ within the context of this book. Gramsci presented a number of definitions for the term in his Prison Notebooks, written while imprisoned by the fascist regime in Italy(1). The one that I find most relevant to the case of Egypt under direct military rule is a definition that views the state merger between the concepts of civil and political society. In simpler terms, the state as a social reformation contains both: the public apparatus of the state (political society), such as the judicial system, and the private apparatus (civil society), like the media, education system and so on (Carnoy, 1983). Accordingly, the state is everywhere and is the tool used by the ruling class to project their power over society, which is very germane to the Egyptian case. Indeed, the ultimate goal of the Egyptian military establishment is not only dominance over the public state apparatus, but the use of its position to accumulate social power, extending the boundaries of the state so that it swallows up the private sphere—establishing total dominance over society and transforming the public space into a militarized space. This metaphor has been used by Zineb Abu-El Magd in her detailed study of the military’s economic empire (Abu Al Magd, 2018), albeit through a Foucaultian theoretical lens. Abu-El Magd has argued that the military’s economic dominance allowed it to penetrate the lives of ordinary Egyptians, transforming the country into a military camp. In this chapter, however, I intend to use the metaphor to examine the military’s dominance over the state and its ability to use the state apparatus to transform the public space, in a manner that is unique to Sisi and his regime.”
Chapter 2: The New Leviathan, page 51”
― Maged Mandour, Egypt under El-Sisi: A Nation on the Edge

“The most notable amendment is the alteration to Article 200, which describes the constitutional role of the military. This amendment extends the military’s duties to include the ‘protection of the constitution, democracy, the state and its secular nature, and personal freedoms.’ This phrase has radical implications, the most notable of which is that it paves the way for continued military intervention in politics, if and when it deems that the secular nature of that state, democracy or personal freedoms are threatened by an elected civilian government. This is very cynical, considering that the military autocracy has been the main violator of the freedoms mentioned in the amendment. In fact, this is the military’s option of last resort, in the event that popular pressure forces a free election and that a civilian government is elected. This is a very similar argument to the one made by the Algerian military on the eve of the coup in 1992, when elections won by F.I.S. were voided, triggering a bloody civil war that lasted the better part of a decade (Evans and John, 2007). Hidden in the language of the amendment is a very dangerous ideological imperative, which identifies the military with the ‘state’ rather than with the elected government of the day. It assumes that since the military is serving the ‘state’, then the military—and only the military—is able to defend the ‘state’ against the incompetence of civilians. In other words, the amendment assumes that the military’s supremacy over civilians is the natural order of things. This assumption is deeply rooted in the regime’s ideological construct, where the ‘state’ is imagined as an almost mythical entity that has to be protected against the folly of civilian politicians and the demands for democratization. In essence, the amendment turns the concept of popular sovereignty on its head, with the source of sovereignty transferred from the popular will to the military, as the ultimate guardian of the ‘state’. This entrenches a paternalistic attitude towards the citizenry, as incompetent simpletons who, in a moment of folly, might elect a government that could destroy the ‘state’. Finer identifies acceptance of civilian supremacy as one of the pre-conditions for restraining a military’s interventionist appetite (Finer, 2002). This is clearly not the case in Egypt, where prospective future coups now have a solid constitutional basis.”
Chapter 2: The New Leviathan, pages 52-53”
― Maged Mandour, Egypt under El-Sisi: A Nation on the Edge