Power Transition Quotes

“It is useful to divide the history of international relations into three periods, though in doing so we must be careful not to confuse these three periods with these three stages of the power transitions though each nation passes...

In the first period, there were as yet no industrial nations. Although.. differed... all were still pre-industrial... in the stage one of the power transition, the stage of potential power. There were differences in power between one nations and another, but these differences were not based upon industrial strength...

The second period, in which we still live (1958 n.n.), is the period of the industrial revolution. In this period some nations have industrialized and others have not. In terms of the power transition, some nations are in stage 1, some in stage 2, and some in stage 3. Differences in power between nations are tremendous. At the beginning of this period, the nations that industrialized first had a great power advantage…, but as the period progressed, they began to be hard-pressed by other nations entering stage 2 behind them.

The third period still lies in the future. It will begin when all the nations of the world have become fully industrial, i.e., when all have entered stage 3 of the power transition. At this point, the nations will again resemble each other more closely, as they did in the first period. Differences in power will continue to exists, if nations continue to be the unties of political organization, but whatever differences there are will not be based upon differential industrial advancement as they are today, but upon other, as yet unknown factors (p. 306).”
― A.F.K. Organski, World Politics

“The first stage can be called stage of potential power… A nation is not industrial. Its people are primarily agricultural and the great majority of them are rural… Such a nation may be very powerful in a world where no nation is industrial. But compared to any industrial nation, even a small one, its power is slight...

The second stage of the power transition is the stage of the transitional growth… to an industrial stage… its power grows rapidly relative to that of the other pre-industrial nations whom it leaves behind.

Fundamental changes take places within the nation. There is great growth in industry and in the cities… Large number of people move out of farming and into industry and service occupations… They move from the country-side to the growing cities. Productivity per man-hour rises, the national income goes up sharply… Nationalism runs high and sometimes finds expression in aggressive action toward the outside…

So many of these changes have the effect of increasing the ability of the nation`s representatives to influence the behavior of other nations, i.e. of increasing the nation`s power… The changes that occur at the beginning of the industrialization process are qualitative, not just quantitative. It is these first fundamental changes that brings the great spurt in national power.

Of course, the speed at which a nation gains power depends largely upon the speed with which she industrializes, and both these factors have a great influence on the degree to which the rise of a new power upsets the international community (302-304).”
― A.F.K. Organski, World Politics

“If the theory of the balance of power has any applicability at all, it is to the politics of the first period, that pre-industrial, `dynastic` period when nations were kings and politics a sport, when there were many nations of roughly equivalent power, and when nations could and did increase their power largely through clever diplomacy, alliance and military adventures.

The theories of this book, and the theory of the power transition in particular, apply to the second period, when the major determinant of national power are population size, political organization, and industrial strength, and when shifts in power through internal development are consequently of great importance. Differential industrialization is the key to understanding the shifts in power in the 19th and 20th centuries, but it was not the key in the years before 1750 or so and it will not always be the key in the future.

Period 3 will require new theories. We cannot predict yet what they will be, for we cannon predict what the world will be like after all the nations are industrialized. Indeed, we may not have nations at all. By projecting current trends we can make guessed about the near future, but we cannon see very far ahead. What will the world be like when China and India are two major powers, as it seems likely they will be? (1958 n.n.)...

We are all bound by our own culture and our own experience, social scientists no less than other men... Social theories may be adequate for their day, but as time passes, they require revision. One of the most serious criticisms that can be made of the balance of power theory is that it has not been revised. Concepts and hypotheses applicable to the 16th century and to the politics of such units as the Italian city states have been taken and applied, without major revision, to the international politics of the twentieth-century nations such as the United States, England, and the Soviet Union. (p. 307)”
― A.F.K. Organski, World Politics

“We have learned that the major determinants of national power are population size, political efficiency and degree of industrialization. It is shifts in such areas as these that lead to changes in the distribution of power (p. 300)”
― A.F.K. Organski, World Politics

“Thus we can say that nations that industrialize go through a power transition somewhat similar to the demographic transition described by writers on population changes. In the courses of the power transition, a nation passes from a stage of little power to a stage of greatly increased power. For convenience, the power transitions can be divided into three distinct stages: the stage of potential power; the stage of the transitional growth; the stage of the power maturity (pp. 300-306).”
― A.F.K. Organski, World Politics

“The third stage of the power transition is the stage of the power maturity… when the nation is fully industrial… technological change is still rapid, economic efficiency is high, national income continues to rise, but at a slower rate than previously… Bureaucratization seems to be increasing both in political and economic institutions... There is still room for much improvement in producing greater wealth and in distributing it…

But the great burst of energy characteristic of nations in the early stages of industrialization lies in the past for mature nations. They cannot again double and triple and quadruple their capital investment as they did in the early years…

The internal qualities that give a nation international power do not disappear in the stage of power maturity. They may even continue to increase, but not at the rate they did before, and to slow down even a little in a race where everyone is running forward is to run the risk of falling behind eventually. This is why the power of a nation must decline in the stage of power maturity, even though the nation continues to grow richer, more industrial and more efficient.

We must remember that power is relative, not absolute… Had all nations of the world gone through the industrial revolution and the concomitant demographic transition at the same time and at the same speed, the result would have been a great change in international relations but not necessarily any major shift in the distribution of power among nations. There would have been no power transition. However, industrialization has proceeded unevenly though the world… It is the differential spread of industrialization to the world and the resulting power transition, not some automatic `balancing` process`, that provides the framework of modern international politics (304-306).”
― A.F.K. Organski, World Politics

“The question is not whether China becomes the most powerful nation on earth, but rather, how long it will take her to achieve this status… (1958 n.n.)
China… need not to fight to become the most powerful.”
― A.F.K. Organski, World Politics

“But the experts do not seem to know much more. It is appalling how little is really known, or, at least, how little is known by those who have to make decisions affecting peace and war. Think a moment about the questions to be treated in this book - beginnings, outcomes, and consequences of war – and think about the performance of leaders in recent military conflicts. For example, the leaders of the major powers at the beginning of World War I did not realize that a war was coming or the nature of the war their nations were going to have to fight. The comment made by one German general on the behavior of British soldiers, << they fight like lions but they are led by asses,>> should not, in justice, be restricted to the British alone. Did French, Italian, or heaven help us, Russian leaders perform any better in World Wars I or II? Stalin, even after being told by both Roosevelt and Churchill that the USSR was about to be invaded, refused to believe that Hitler would violate the 1939 pact and was immensely surprised when he did.”
― A.F.K. Organski, Jacek Kugler , The War Ledger

“Nuclear weapons ought to put the governing elites and mass publics of nations which are potential victims in fear for their lives. And we shall assume that they do. But the reader should be aware that we have by way of proof for this assertions very little and contradictory evidence. We know much less that we should.

We do not know that nuclear weapons will generate sufficient fear to deflect the aggressor from his course. We do not know how to establish a priori the point at which damage will be thought by the potential victim to have reached unacceptable proportions. We do not have firm evidence that terrorizing potential victims does deflect them, as it is alleged to, from their aggression; very different conclusions can be drawn from evidence than those propose by the proponents of deterrence theory.

This last matter is particularly serious, and the answer to the question is raises strikes at the heart pf the belief that nuclear blackmail works”
― A.F.K. Organski, The War Ledger