Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Time now to start our revisit to The Republic.

Book 1 is sort of an introduction to the basic issues that the Republic will be dealing with.

It is I think one of only three dialogues (Thomas will correct me if I'm wrong) in which Socrates is the narrator for the entire dialogue, telling what the other speakers say rather than having they speak for themselves in the text. We may want at some point to consider why Plato uses this approach.

Most, if not all, Plato scholars will tell you, as I quoted Simon Blackburn commenting in the Background thread, that the point of reading Plato in general and the Republic in particular is not to read philosophy but to do philosophy. Unlike most philosophers who write to put their view and philosophy before you with the hope that you will agree with them, Plato presents not positions but processes of thinking about philosophical issues. He wants you not simply to read the discussion, but to participate actively in it. So let's get active here!

One thing that struck me is that Plato attempts to equate (332c through about 333a) the just man with the pilot or the doctor or the horse trainer, as though being a just man were a profession like those. I can't see that. I think there can be a just pilot, or just doctor, or just horse trainer; I think being just is an attribute, not a skill. So for me, on its surface this argument doesn't hold water.

But Plato never does anything without purpose, so if I'm right, I'm left to wonder what the point is of this seemingly inappropriate process of equating a general attribute with a skill.

Plato contends, 333a, that when someone has given you weapons to hold and asks for them back, if he is now of unsound mind you should not give them back. But does Polemarchus assent to this too quickly?

There's an underlying assumption here that I have the right to choose to withhold someone's property, to refuse to return it when asked, because I make the judgment that he or she is not capable of using the property properly. That it is unjust to return property if I am not satisfied in its being used appropriately. But what gave me the right to make this decision for another person?

If I owe someone money and promised to pay it back on demand, and the demand is made but I know the person is going to use it to buy illegal drugs, am I entitled to refuse to give him his money? In effect, to steal it?

Why? If you agree with Plato on this, what is the moral or ethical principle that gives me the right to deprive you of what is yours because I don't think you will use it safely or properly?

Everyman wrote: "Plato contends, 333a, that when someone has given you weapons to hold and asks for them back, if he is now of unsound mind you should not give them back. But does Polemarchus assent to this too qui..."

Plato's dilemma here reminds me of the task of taking someone's keys prior to that person drinking. By the end of the night, if the person is obviously unfit to drive, does the sober one have the right or the responsibility to withhold the keys. In my opinion, there are times when we break the letter of the law to observe the spirit of the law.

I think one takes the keys with the explicit understanding they will be returned only if the driver is sober, and it is the host (or key trustee) who makes this decision.

Then again there may be situations that override. Not giving someone back their keys when they can't even stand straight, even if there was no such understanding upon transfer of property, may meet this override condition. Call it a generally understood principle. There should be such a generally understood principle when dealing with weapons too.

Everyman wrote: "One thing that struck me is that Plato attempts to equate (332c through about 333a) the just man with the pilot or the doctor or the horse trainer, as though being a just man were a profession like..."

Plato does this all the time if I remember correctly, and it annoys me no end. Of course you are exactly right: Socrates is intentionally (?) confusing a virtue (quality) with an occupation. What is one to make of this? He certainly knows better.

Another annoying aspect of the dialogs is how the dialectic depends upon Socrates's opponent giving just the right response to keep the train of thought moving along. It appears to me there are many opportunities to derail Socrates's whole point by supplying a different -- and more valid -- response.

What do you make of Thrasymachus? Why the belligerence? Is it that Thrasymachus represents a contemporary criticism of Plato's dialogs? That's what I thought, and Plato is taking this opportunity to respond.

The other thought I had is that Trasymachus's attitude towards and complaint about Socrates tracks closely to the underlying charges Socrates faced at trial.

Everyman wrote: "One thing that struck me is that Plato attempts to equate (332c through about 333a) the just man with the pilot or the doctor or the horse trainer, as though being a just man were a profession like..."

I read this as an ambiguous but simple step in the larger dialog comparing not the just man to various professions but comparing the need for the "harms and benefits" produced by the just arts to the "harms and benefits" produced by professional arts, e.g., the physician and the pilot. The comparison leads to the incorrect conclusion that a time when nobody is sick or needs to travel, the physician and the pilot are not needed is like a time of peace when nobody needs the the "harms and benefits" of the just arts and the just man is not needed. This is disagreed with immediately in 332e “By no means.” “There is a use then even in peace for justice?”. The next step is to discuss other needs for the just arts, for example business dealings; and the dialog continues to evolve.

I think the argument addresses and eventually dismisses the very confusion that comes from thinking a virtue like justice is like a profession itself (judges excepted?). The argument establishes that like there is an art to a given profession there is an art to being just, that like a given profession there are harms and benefits produced by the art of justice, but unlike a given profession and its art the need for justice and its art is ubiquitous and is less constrained, if at all, by times of situational circumstances.

Before they even started the "just man" discussion, I liked what was said about conversation and in particular speaking to elders.

"My other pleasures are withering away now, my bodily pleasures, but just as fast grows my pleasure in talking, and my desire for that."
Cephalos

"...what I enjoy most is talking with men who are really old. It seems right to enquire of them, as if they had traversed a long journey which we perhaps will have to traverse, to ask what the journey is like, rough and difficult, or easygoing and smooth." Socrates
And as Socrates then asks Cephalos about what is it like to be on "the threshold of old age" , they launch into the meat of the discussion focusing on character and then to the just man. I certainly was actively engaged in that piece in my mind.

Xan Shadowflutter wrote: Plato does this all the time if I remember correctly, and it annoys me no end. Of course you are exactly right: Socrates is intentionally (?) confusing a virtue (quality) with an occupation. What is one to make of this? He certainly knows better.

Totally agree!!

Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "What do you make of Thrasymachus? Why the belligerence? Is it that Thrasymachus represents a contemporary criticism of Plato's dialogs? That's what I thought, and Plato is taking this opportunity t..."

Philosophical discussion are certainly not my forte and I do find Socrates' approach very annoying even though I understand his purpose is to elicit critical thinking in his "opponent". So I must admit when Thrasymachos makes is comment ..."so that Socrates may be up to his usual games, I suppose, answer nothing himself and only pick holes in what other people say." I was saying to myself. Right on!

I'm only 15 pages in, so maybe later I'll change my tune and think Brilliant Socrates instead.

Another thing I found interesting is the discussion of "what justice is" is put off till book 2. I would think, at a minimum, agreeing -- if agreement can be reached -- to the definition of justice assists the discussion in book 1, no? Wonder why Plato is doing this too? For example, Thrasymachus confuses justice with injustice, in my opinion.

Jonathan wrote: "Plato's dilemma here reminds me of the task of taking someone's keys prior to that person drinking. By the end of the night, if the person is obviously unfit to drive, does the sober one have the right or the responsibility to withhold the keys. In my opinion, there are times when we break the letter of the law to observe the spirit of the law. ."

If the person gave the keys on that understanding, that's fine. But I don't think that's what Plato meant. Let's take a different scenario -- that you're at a party, you want to go pick up friend A but your car won't start, so friend B at the party says "here, take my car," and hands you the keys. When you get back with your friend, you don't right away give back the keys, but later in the evening friend B is ready to go home and asks you for the keys back so he can drive home. You think he's sloshed (let's assume he is, slurred speech, staggering, and all, clearly way over the legal limit for driving), and decide to refuse to give him the keys, effectively stealing his keys and car for the evening. But he claims to be fine to drive, it's his right to decide whether he's capable of driving, not yours, he refuses your offer to drive him home or get him a taxi because you're insulting him and his ability to drive safely -- he believes he's fine to drive (what all drunks believe) and demands that you return HIS keys to HIS car to drive to his home.

Is it okay to keep possession of his keys and therefore car when he only loaned it to you to do a favor with no assumption or expectation that you would keep the keys and take advantage of his kindness in loaning you the car to get your friend by refusing to return the keys on demand? And if so, what moral or ethical principle makes that okay?

Chris wrote: "Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "What do you make of Thrasymachus? Why the belligerence? Is it that Thrasymachus represents a contemporary criticism of Plato's dialogs? That's what I thought, and Plato is..."

Socrates is famous for this "Socratic Method." I was thinking along the same lines. He is not positing is own thoughts and ideas, he is asking a series of questions and leading these other thinkers into saying what he wants them to say. Basically, he is trapping them. I don't like the method. If you are forced to posit your philosophy only be answering questions, then you are limited in to what you can say. This is how one's beliefs get twisted. This is what is happening here.

I should make a policy clarification here. Normally our group is death on spoilers. But I'm going to relax that a bit for this discussion. We should still stick to the book under discussion, but this is a challenging book, and on occasion bringing in information based on other books (or other dialogues) can be very valuable.

A specific example: Socrates says "I went down to the Peiraeus..." In Plato, as we will find emphasized later in the Republic (the allegory of the cave) and elsewhere, up and down are very important philosophically. Up is good, down is bad, and the terms are regularly used that way. So when he goes down to the Peiraeus, not only is it true that he is going down physically (Athens, his home city, is on a hill, and the Peiraeus is the port city of Athens, on the seashore, and therefore physically lower), but I think he is saying that he is leaving the intellectually more rarefied air of Athens, the cultural center, for the port where trade and not culture is the predominant interest. But if I'm correct, this point may be considered technically a spoiler since it's not strictly based on the Book 1 text.

So this is an example of where I think a technical spoiler will be okay in this discussion if helps our understanding of the dialogue.

Everyman wrote: "Plato contends, 333a, that when someone has given you weapons to hold and asks for them back, if he is now of unsound mind you should not give them back. But does Polemarchus assent to this too qui..."

I believe the philosophers call this paternalism. In modern philosophy it seems this is viewed as a negative thing to do. In my opinion, they are wrong, at least to a certain extent. If I have a philosophy, it is "do unto others." I simply pose the question, "If this situation were reversed, would I want others to do this to me?" If you believe in sowing and reaping, then this is the best way to prevent "what comes around" from being what you don't want.

Everyman wrote: "One thing that struck me is that Plato attempts to equate (332c through about 333a) the just man with the pilot or the doctor or the horse trainer, as though being a just man were a profession like..."

The pilot, doctor, horse trainer can be viewed as being part of the process of leading or shaping a path (navigating the world, finding a path to health, and leading/shaping the animal/horse towards a specific state respectively). Alternatively, could the Greek world view associate an attribute to those professions that we are unable to relate to with our modern lens?

David posted some useful background information and links in Post #3 of the Background thread. If you aren't familiar with the history of Athens during Plato's lifetime, I suggest that you spend a few minutes taking an overall look at it, since I think it's relevant to helping understand the dialogue.

Plato, for example, was brought up during the war between Athens and Sparta (other cities were involved on two sides, but Athens and Sparta were the main contenders), and was a young man of about 24 when Sparta won, destroyed the democracy of which Athens was so proud, and installed the 30 tyrants as rulers.

The Peiraeus was the center of opposition to the tyrants and was central to the defeat of the 30 and the restoration of the democracy. This is, I think, one reason why the Peiraeus is made the location of the dialogue, since it has much to do with how cities should be ruled. And it's useful perhaps to know that, as David noted, Polemarchus was killed fighting to restore the democracy, which also I think is a meaningful thread within the dialogue. (Plato leaves very little to chance in his dialogues; almost everything he says is for a reason. It's not, I think, mere happenstance that Polemarchus plays a significant role in a dialogue about political theory and practice.

Chris wrote: "Before they even started the "just man" discussion, I liked what was said about conversation and in particular speaking to elders."

I liked this for the same reasons. But It can be interpreted another way. Without being malicious about it, Socrates can be seen as being quite rude in a matter of fact manner. It can be more contemporarily viewed as asking, "You are a very old man, what is it like living with one foot in the grave?" In a literary sense it serves as a warning of things to come concerning the nature of philosophy: it is uninhibited and will not be shy in asking those hard and fascinatingly uncomfortable questions.

Everyman wrote: "Jonathan wrote: "Plato's dilemma here reminds me of the task of taking someone's keys prior to that person drinking. By the end of the night, if the person is obviously unfit to drive, does the sob..."

Your scenario is more suited to Plato's. I would still say that the "just" thing to do would be to withhold the keys. The worst thing that can happen to the intoxicated friend in this case is that he would be stranded for a night. If you gave him the keys, he could get a DUI, hit a fire hydrant, or cause a terrible accident and kill "innocent" people. I may be doing a small wrong by withholding his keys, but a huge good by saving him from a lot of trouble. If I hand over the keys and something tragic happens, am I at least partly responsible?

Haaze wrote: "Everyman wrote: "One thing that struck me is that Plato attempts to equate (332c through about 333a) the just man with the pilot or the doctor or the horse trainer, as though being a just man were ..."

I think Socrates' chose these examples because these were people to which others would be vulnerable. He was seeking examples where one could do good to his friends and do harm to his enemies. These fit with the doctor and the pilot, but I don't see where the horse trainer fits.

Glaucon, by the way, who is accompanying Socrates, was Plato's brother. And it seems clear that he actually means this to be the true Glaucon, since he mentions him being the son of Ariston, who was Plato's father.

Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "What do you make of Thrasymachus? Why the belligerence?Thrasymachus"

Thrasymachus was a sophist. The sophists, who have a bad reputation today (think sophistry) were professional (paid) itinerant teachers who went from city to city teaching mostly rhetoric. They sell their learning, whereas Socrates gives his away for free, an obvious cause for strife (college professors wouldn't like it if people came onto campus teaching for free what they expect to get paid nice salaries for. Every profession tries to protect its turf, but Socrates was particularly hated by sophists not only for giving his knowledge away for free, but also because he often showed up sophists and made them look bad (as Plato continues to do in the dialogues).

Basically, they are natural enemies. Not surprising that Thrasymachus is hostile.

Chris wrote: "
I'm only 15 pages in, so maybe later I'll change my tune and think Brilliant Socrates instead. ."

Or perhaps you can keep that tune but also think that Socrates is brilliant??

I've only read Book 1 so far. I don't know if things will become clearer, but as I was reading it, I kept thinking that the discussion of "just" and "unjust" is missing context. It seems to me that at one end of the spectrum is what can be considered "just"; at the other end of the spectrum is what can be considered "unjust." But as you get closer to the middle, the line separating the two blurs. What is considered just in one situation may be considered unjust in another.
I felt the same way during the discussion about the nature of a just ruler. If I understood Socrates correctly (which I probably didn't), he seems to suggest a ruler can only be happy if he is just. It's not that simple or clear cut. History is replete with examples of tyrants who were perfectly contented oppressing their subjects. I have no doubt they convinced themselves they were being just and that the atrocities they perpetrated were for the "good" of their subjects. And those who are ruled by a tyrant may yet find some modicum of happiness as long as they tow the party line.
I'm probably not making much sense. I guess what I'm trying to say is the lines are never that clear cut and that it makes no sense to me to discuss justice and virtue and happiness, etc. etc. without taking into consideration context.

Everyman wrote: "One thing that struck me is that Plato attempts to equate (332c through about 333a) the just man with the pilot or the doctor or the horse trainer, as though being a just man were a profession like..."

Perhaps what Socrates is driving at is the knowledge component of justice. Does one need to know something to be just?

Thrasymachus would say no (at first, anyway) -- justice is whatever benefits the one with the power. So if the King is drunk and wants his car keys, the King justly gets his car keys, because he's the King and whatever he says goes. That the King subsequently wraps his Bentley around a pole does not affect the justice of returning his keys, under Thrasymachus's definition.

But if justice is an art, then an empty definition like Thrasymachus's will falter, as it does when he agrees that the powerful can be mistaken about what benefits them. (E.g., when the drunken King demands his car keys. Bad mistake.)

All arts require some kind of knowledge to make something or to make something better, and also to avoid mistakes. So... What knowledge is required to be just? And, if justice is an art, what good does it tend toward?

Everyman wrote: "Is it okay to keep possession of his keys and therefore car when he only loaned it to you"

The Kantian categorical imperative camp would say to avoid lying at all cost the keys must be returned upon demand back to the owner per the agreement. I suppose you could try to argue on the technicality that you never agreed "when" you would give them back and do so later when he is sober. It seems that everyone in the Republic agrees with Socrates' example of a contraction thus refuting the categorical imperative.

Those in the Utilitarian camp concerned with the probability of consequences in friend B harming himself or others must keep the keys. The characters in Republic seem to agree with this course of action. Of course the Kantian camp might argue that giving the keys back without an argument arousing the anger of friend B might set him on a safer course home where with anger, more mistakes might be made increasing the chance of an accident.

Dostoevsky would just say you are responsible for your friend which may be closer to the paternalism Jonathan mentions.

Cicero might question the friendship due to the dangerous, illegal, and awkward situation friend B has created.

Jonathan wrote: "Your scenario is more suited to Plato's. I would still say that the "just" thing to do would be to withhold the keys. ... I may be doing a small wrong by withholding his keys, but a huge good by saving him from a lot of trouble.... "

You implicitly agree that the trouble he might face is speculative; he might be lucky and get home safely (in fact, most drunk drivers do get home safely). So your view is that it's okay to do somebody an definite "small" (in your view, maybe not in his) wrong to save him from a speculative greater wrong?

But I still don't think you've given a moral or ethical basis for taking over this decision and basically forcing him into a course which is contrary to what he wants to do, when you have no legal authority for doing so. The Christian view, perhaps, would be that I am my brother's keeper. But is that an acceptable moral principle outside its religious context? What if I don't WANT you to be my keeper?

Everyman wrote: "Thrasymachus was a sophist. The sophists, who have a bad reputation today (think sophistry) were prof..."

This is all true, but I don't recall this level of animosity in the Protagorus.

Some interesting quotes from Oliver Wendell Holmes, the famous American Supreme Court Justice:

“force... is the ultima ratio. The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power.”

The “proximate test of a good government,” he wrote, is that “the dominant power has its way.”

A “law should be called good if it reflects the will of the dominant forces of the community,” he wrote to Felix Frankfurter, “even if it will take us to hell.”

Sound familiar?

Everyman wrote: "Is it okay to keep possession of his keys and therefore car when he only loaned it to you to do a favor with no assumption or expectation that you would keep the keys and take advantage of his kindness in loaning you the car to get your friend by refusing to return the keys on demand? And if so, what moral or ethical principle makes that okay?"

I struggle with this. In context it SEEMS ok, even good and right. But then what happens when everyone starts deciding that they know what's better for another person? For example, one person may feel that religion in general is dangerous or damaging to another person, but of course, the religious one does not think so.
And then how do we define "harmful" or "dangerous"? The drunk person has not harmed anyone yet, but there is the possibility. But then, possibility is as endless as the numerous situations that surround 6 billion individuals. I go round and round with this. And since I've read some of Plato's dialogues before, I am not hopeful of finding an answer here...

Everyman wrote: "It is I think one of only three dialogues (Thomas will correct me if I'm wrong) in which Socrates is the narrator for the entire dialogue, telling what the other speakers say rather than having they speak for themselves in the text. We may want at some point to consider why Plato uses this approach. ."

I wondered about this. I remember in some of the other dialogue discussions mention of casting doubt on the narrator, or Plato removing himself from thoughts and ideas discussed by using a "so-and-so told me that so-and-so said that..." approach. I read The Republic a while back and remember some of his (outrageous?) suggestions for his city, and also remember wondering if he was being ironic or serious (or..?). But now noticing that he uses first person, it would seem that his suggestions for his city later are perfectly serious? :o
(Although, I also seem to remember he changes his mind about some of these suggestions in The Laws...)

Thomas wrote: "So if the King is drunk and wants his car keys, the King justly gets his car keys, because he's the King and whatever he says goes. That the King subsequently wraps his Bentley around a pole"

1. Royalty does not drive, they are chauffeured.
2. Mercedes seems the car of choice. . .
3. Keys or chauffer it seems neither royalty nor their staff read Plato's Republic.

Princess Diana's driver was drunk when she died in 1997
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world...

Henri Paul, 41, deputy security chief at the Ritz Hotel, had been off-duty but was ordered into work at the last minute. . .Prosecutors said blood tests showed he had the equivalent of 10 glasses of wine or nine hefty shots of whiskey in his system. . .Officials said that much booze would leave a 165-pound man seeing double and unable to walk without staggering.

Clearly an example of a ruler making a mistake (339c) leading to the contradiction that it is just to do what the stronger wants and it is just to do the opposite of what the stronger wants (339e).

Thomas wrote: "Some interesting quotes from Oliver Wendell Holmes, the famous American Supreme Court Justice:."

Wow.

Reminds me of Mao Tse Tung's comment that political power comes from the barrel of a gun.

Genni wrote: "But then what happens when everyone starts deciding that they know what's better for another person? For example, one person may feel that religion in general is dangerous or damaging to another person, but of course, the religious one does not think so. ."

That's not merely a theoretical question. I don't know whether it's still happening, but in the 70s and 80s there was a major push of some parents to "deprogram" their children who had gotten involved in cults. They would have them kidnapped, held basically in captivity, and "deprogrammed."

Indeed, isn't this the same principle that inspired (inspires?) those parent who sought out programs to "cure" their homosexual children? Probably not all, but certainly some of those parents truly believed that they were doing what was best for their children and saving them from a lifetime of misery.

Weren't these based on the same principle as the friend who refuses to turn over the keys? I know whats best for you, you don't?

I have only just finished Waterfield's Introduction and haven't started Book 1 yet, but it is clear to me from reading this thread so far that I am going to have to keep the Introduction near at hand to remind me of just what Plato is trying to accomplish here.

Waterfield states over and over again that Plato's Republic is not about an ideal city or government, these are only metaphors for Plato's real purpose, which is to show how an individual's mind must be structured in order to seek and attain goodness, which is happiness, which is assimilating God.

That means that for every question posed, I have to look at how the solution leads towards goodness. I haven't read about returning the weapons, but the example in the thread of returning the keys of the car to the drunk owner of the car seems best answered by keeping the keys...

Everyman wrote: "But I still don't think you've given a moral or ethical basis for taking over this decision and basically forcing him into a course which is contrary to what he wants to do, when you have no legal authority for doing so. The Christian view, perhaps, would be that I am my brother's keeper. But is that an acceptable moral principle outside its religious context? What if I don't WANT you to be my keeper? ..."

What you think you want, as a drunk, shouldn't be considered credible. You're drunk, therefore you don't know what you want because you are not in your right mind, reason is beyond you. You might hate me for it and condemn me for it later when you're sober, but that's not the issue. Keeping the keys is contributing to your (and probably others) happiness by preventing a possible horrible consequence. At least, that's how I see this using the criteria Waterfield poses.

Also, I wanted to share a poem by Alexander Pope that Waterfield uses in the Introduction, which I think really illustrates the kinds of problems and paradoxes we are going to have to deal with here:

All nature is but art, unknown to thee;
All chance, direction which thou canst not see;
All discord, harmony not understood;
All partial evil, universal good;
And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,
One truth is clear: Whatever is, is right.

Genni wrote: "And since I've read some of Plato's dialogues before, I am not hopeful of finding an answer here..."

This is my whole problem with philosophy. I feel like it doesn't give you answers, it gives you questions. This is especially true with the Socratic Method.

Everyman wrote: "Genni wrote: "But then what happens when everyone starts deciding that they know what's better for another person? For example, one person may feel that religion in general is dangerous or damaging..."

I agree that no one intrinsically has the right to tell someone else what is best for him or her. But, up to a certain point, parents should have a right to dictate things to their children. But, as far as people who inject themselves into other's affairs, their unsolicited counsel or unsolicited interference is infringing on that person's right to individual freedom.

Everyman, what about the case of someone who suffers brain damage or one who is born mentally retarded? Does society have a right to confine that person to an asylum and treat him or her? If there is a principle that gives family and friends the right to "commit" someone who is mentally ill, then that same principle gives the guy with the keys the right to keep the "intoxicated" person's keys, because he is not in a mental state to make an intelligent decision himself. It's the same principle.

@27David wrote: "Everyman wrote: "Is it okay to keep possession of his keys and therefore car when he only loaned it to you"

The Kantian categorical imperative camp would say to avoid lying at all cost the keys mu..."

Thank you for this, David. This is the sort of comparative look across the centuries that I looked forward to being brought to this discussion of Plato/Socrates -- a comparison for which I'm not trained, but one I relish when others do.

Applicable principle or no, the case of the "drunk" driver's keys is one for which I have known myself to make decisions on both sides, somehow without permanently damaging friendships or waking to remorse. I also willingly would not hand a gun back to a person who might use it maliciously, but I have foolishly and luckily (without harm to myself, my unborn child--I was pregnant at the time, or the person with me) refused to hand over my handbag to a potential thief who brandished a handgun. So life is, a la Pope's little poem above @36? (Which reminds me, rightly or wrongly, of attempting to translate "Yahweh.")

What I see in the opening:

"I went ..." How overwhelmingly important the self is.
That action is necessary.

We see that "Socrates" is telling this. I can suppose that he is telling it from his own perspective or to his own purposes. Also, I remember frequently that the it is an untruth that Socrates is telling this. Plata is telling this---unseen. I wonder if part of the message is that much that seems real and true is only appearance and is false?



"Glaucon, son of.... Polymarchus, son of... brother of... son of"
The importance of family relationships in defining who we are.
Origins. Mmm. Thinking of how much we are shaped and influenced by our parents and our families before we enter the City. (Before we become who we are?)


APPEARANCES:

"I wanted to say a prayer to the goddess"
Not that he want to PRAY to the goddess.

"the Thracian contingent seemed to show up just as well"


The use of force to bring about the desired result:
It may not be just, but it does seem to achieve results:

"Cephalus ....sent his slave ...to tell us to wait for him"

The fact that Cephalus has benefitted directly or indirectly from force---He has a slave to do his bidding.

Cephalus---due to money? prestige? personality?--- does not have the slave ASK them to wait. He TELLS them to wait. Interesting,

"We will," said Glaucon.
Force of personality? Glaucon does NOT consult with Socrates or the others. He assertively makes the decision for all of them. He wants to.

Polymarchus to Socrates, when Socrates says he's on his way back to town: "Do you see how many of us there are?" Force of numbers.

And finally---although this passage tumbles past the preliminary page...so about line 326. SO VERY excellent, I thought:

"You can't persuade who won't listen," he said.
"No," said Glaucon, "you certainly can't."

And much of the back-and-forth dialogue that follows throughout the book, I thought, was people not listening with the object of finding the truth of various arguments, but listening only to hear the hook they need in order to rebut.... so they can return to their OWN point of view with intellectual force.

Jonathan wrote: "Genni wrote: "And since I've read some of Plato's dialogues before, I am not hopeful of finding an answer here..."

This is my whole problem with philosophy. I feel like it doesn't give you answers..."

That may be the point. We can learn facts...but the important questions we have to perhaps answer for ourselves. That was my take-away from The Wizard of Oz. :-)

David wrote: "Clearly an example of a ruler making a mistake (339c) leading to the contradiction that it is just to do what the stronger wants and it is just to do the opposite of what the stronger wants (339e). "

Who needs Plato when we have the NY Daily News?

But it's a good example. The contradiction demonstrates a point that seems obvious, but it must be proved at the outset: if there is such a thing as justice, it cannot be a relative quality that shifts with the situation or the speaker. If it is real, then justice must be self-consistent.

A more difficult question then follows: what is it? Can justice be defined? Can it be articulated?

Cephalus offers the first definition, that justice is "giving back what is owed, and telling the truth." What does the truth have to do with anything? It is interesting that Polemarchus, when he picks up the argument, retains the part about "giving back what is owed" and leaves out the part about telling the truth. What's up with that?

Janice(JG) wrote: "Waterfield states over and over again that Plato's Republic is not about an ideal city or government, these are only metaphors for Plato's real purpose, ..."

What I find fascinating is that different translators find very different "real purposes" for the work. For some it's a political manifesto, for some it's about social justice, for Waterford it's about assimilating God, and there are other views of it. It's a complex work and can indeed support all these "real purposes" and more!

Jonathan wrote: "This is my whole problem with philosophy. I feel like it doesn't give you answers, it gives you questions. "

Well, there are lots of answers you can find by reading lots of different philosophers, from Kant to Wittenberg, from Locke to Hobbes, from Kant to Descartes. But in the end, your philosophy has to come from you. Which is why I say philosophy is not a product but a process. And yes, the process is to ask the right questions, which is Plato's job, and try to find your right answers, which is your job.

Jonathan wrote: "Socrates is famous for this "Socratic Method." I was thinking along the same lines. He is not positing is own thoughts and ideas, he is asking a series of questions and leading these other thinkers into saying what he wants them to say. Basically, he is trapping them. I don't like the method. "

Socrates doesn't make it easy for anyone, and he irritated people then and now. I still have the first copy of the Republic I read in college and it's filled with angry notes in the margins, so I know what you mean. His own people executed him for being an irritant. But there's a method to his madness.

Early in this dialogue he asks Cephalus whether he made his own money or whether he inherited it. It doesn't seem to be a relevant question, but when Polemarchus "inherits" Cephalus's argument, there's a connection made between the the money and the argument. Socrates claims that people who earn their own money are doubly-fond of it, as poets are fond of their own poems and fathers of their own sons.

Socrates doesn't allow us to inherit anything, and if we have anything to begin with he takes it away. We have to fight through the arguments, agree and disagree, listen, respond, and reformulate our own thoughts. It's a difficult, irritating process, at least to begin with. But the end result is worth it, even if all that happens is that we no longer harbor unquestioned opinions.

Adelle wrote: "And finally---although this passage tumbles past the preliminary page...so about line 326. SO VERY excellent, I thought:

"You can't persuade who won't listen," he said.
"No," said Glaucon, "you certainly can't." ."

And what's as important, but not openly said, Socrates and Glaucon DO listen to Polemarchus and the others, and thus can be, and are, persuaded to stay.

at 42Thomas wrote: "Cephalus offers the first definition, that justice is "giving back what is owed, and telling the truth." What does the truth have to do with anything?..."

The truth, I would think, is of paramount importance in justice. But as for Cephalus's definition of justice, I thought that was Socrates/ Plato illuminating "a type." Someone who is not particularly interested in the question of what justice is on more than a superficial level. After all, he doesn't work towards resolving it. He doesn't wrestle with the question. He bequeaths the problems of justice to his son. And, for what it's worth, his son is later killed. Did he die fighting for what he thought was justice? Is justice worth dying for? Might events have turned out differently had Cephalus and others like him wrestled with the question of justice?

It seems to me that Cephalus has adapted 'tell the truth and pay what's owed" as “justice” because not being lied to and being paid back what he is owed is good for business.

His view is the easy conventional view. And Socrates has made it clear that Cephalus likes easy.

He says, “For if men are sensible and good-tempered, old age is easy enough to bear”… Old age (with wealth) is easy enough for Cephalus to bear, therefore Cephalus thinks to himself that HE must be sensible and good-tempered.

He says, “a good man may not find old age easy to bear if he’s poor, but a bad man won’t be at peace with himself even if he is rich” (6). Cephalus makes enough sacrifices to be at peace with himself. Therefore, Cephalus thinks to himself that HE is a good man.

I found it interesting, too, that Cephalus doesn’t say that he hasn’t done wrong. He says, “the man who is conscious of no wrongdoing is filled with cheerfulness and with hope” (7). Cephalus is a conventional man, who has adopted a conventional idea of justice, but has never delved deeply into the subject.

I think he feels he doesn’t need to, as his life is good, and he’s not conscious of wrong-doing, and even if he did, he has made sacrifices to atone for it. Sacrifices that financially aren’t a sacrifice for him.

At 47 Everyman wrote: "And what's as important, but not openly said, Socrates and Glaucon DO listen to Polemarchus and the others, and thus can be, and are, persuaded to stay"

Yes...but do they stay due to the promise of reasoned discourse or the suggestion of force? The slave physically grabbed Socrates' cloak. The slave told them that Cephalus told them to stay. Polymarchus "jokingly" threatens them that they are outnumbered.

I found it of interest that Polymarchus used force to enter the conversation at 331d:

"Well then," I said, "telling the truth and returning what we have borrowed is not the definition of doing right."

Oh yes it is," said Polymarchus, interrupting..."

Just want to say that all of these comments are helpful. Just reading these inspires me to continue reading this work. Thanks to all!

At 2 Everyman wrote: "One thing that struck me is that Plato attempts to equate (332c through about 333a) the just man with the pilot or the doctor or the horse ...But Plato never does anything without purpose, so if I'm right, I'm left to wonder what the point is of this seemingly inappropriate process of equating a general attribute with a skill. "


My theory: The Polymarchus section exchange has a number of statements along the lines of "it follows then" which clearly do NOT follow logically, and equivalences, such as the ones you list, that are not true equivalences.

I recall that Socrates --- who is not Socrates but SO seems to be ---began with "I."

The interest of "I" is pretty strong, S/P attempting to confuse Polymarchus's thinking, attempting to verbally force Polymarchus down the argumentative line of reasoning which S/P himself WANTS the conversation to take.

My take away: Be aware. Be very, very aware that those with strong self-interest will work towards that self-interest and may well be willing to try to confuse you, willing to conflate "facts" that are not in fact the same.

As a voter, I am always wary when a politician says, "The American people are too smart to believe x, y, or z." Probably, I think, the politician is trying to influence me to believe a, b, or c.

S/P wants us to be alert to the fact that people will lie to us. And...if the City is the Self writ large, mayhap we should become aware of when we are lying to ourselves.

Also...