Classics and the Western Canon discussion

After reading the first six paragraphs, I started writing my opening comment on this section with “it seems pretty clear to me (anybody want to dispute the point?) that Hume prefers the “active being” approach to philosophy to the “reasonable being” approach.”

But then he seemed to turn 180 degrees and started justifying the “reasonable being” approach.

By the end of the section, I wasn’t sure where his heart lay. It seems perhaps that he will prefer a hybrid approach, a sort of Aristotelian mean. But does combining the two create a stronger philosophy, or does it dilute the power of both as watering milk makes two beverages which are wholesome and enjoyable on their own into one which is unpalatable and unpleasant? But I admit to being unclear. If anybody else is clearer, please help me out here.

However, his discussion of these two approaches, whatever system he eventually settles on, seems to raise several initial questions for discussion, before we get to agreeing or disagreeing with him.

Does Hume make the distinction clear enough to you, or are you unsure about the significant differences between the two approaches?

Are you content to accept the assertion that these two broad major approaches to philosophy adequately divide the field of different approaches to philosophy, and that any philosophy can be identified with one or the other (or may have parts based on one and other parts based on the other), or do you think that there are other major approaches to philosophy which cannot be considered under either of these heads, and if so how would you describe those?

To the extent that you know their work, does his assignment of Cicero, La Bruyere, and Addison to the “active” approach and of Aristotle, Malebranche, and Locke to the “rational” approach agree with your understanding of their philosophies? (An aside: as far as their reputations today, it seems to me that he could hardly be more wrong that Addison will be read with pleasure when Locke shall be entirely forgotten.)

And in which camp would you put Plato? If Hume’s distinctions are clear and definitive, there should be easy agreement on that, but I find myself wavering, seeing aspects of both approaches in Plato’s work.

The first section I take as a direct appeal to the readers, Hume's contemporaries. I wonder to what degree the distiction between the two types of philosohy is his and to what degree he's just echoing the common opinion of his time. In general, he contrasts two types of philosophy, rejects them both and offers a third alternative, his way.

He seems to contast "popular" and "scholarly" types of writing. Popular writers are widely read but lack depth. Scholarly writers are only read by a small number as they are too abstruse; yet, this type of writing is considered deep and profound and has greater authority.

Hume offers a third way. He does not wish to be purposely abstruse, and if the reader finds him that way, well, just stick with it and the reader will find that he's a really witty guy. But at the same time the reader should understand that Hume is a real serious guy too, as serious as those difficult and abstruse philosophers.

It's an argument to his reader: read me to the end, don't give up when the going get tough, and you'll be rewarded with deep insight and maybe some witticism to use at the next cocktail party.

I don't think the difference between Plato and Hume is that one is scientific and the other is not. Neither of them is scientific in the narrow sense of the word as used today. In a broad sense, they are both scientific: they both consider the reality of human nature, but they draw different inferences from the same empirical data and come to different conclusions. In other words, their interpretations of the book of nature are different.

Patrice wrote: "would rousseau be a better opponent to rousseau?"

Patrice, I don't get what you're saying here.

And what did you mean in message 3 when you said Plato "often gets kind of woo woo."

What does it mean to be woo woo? I'm not familiar with that expression.

In my reading Hume prepares us in this introduction for a text that will demand some effort. He admits that there is much to said for books that pleasure and inspire a large public (I imagine Hume would consider his essays to belong to this category), but philosophy also needs more fundamental and (therefore) more obscure enquiries (still a joy for some).

Hume also observes that while fundamental research is usually obscure, the opposite is not true. Much obscure philosophy is in fact of little value. The cause may be that it ignores the limits of human knowledge. But precisely these limits are the object of the present study, so if the reader does not find pleasure in demanding books, (s)he may still have good reason to continue this one.

Hume is in fact using two criteria here to classify books. One, are they popular or obscure and, two, do they take the limits of human knowledge in account or not. This last criterium seems promising to me, so I’ll continue reading though my inclinations are such that I’m not very fond of 'difficult'.

As a preliminary observation I would like to suggest that books that ignore the limits of human knowledge may still be appreciated as works of fiction (Plato?).

Hume speaks of "moral philosophy" at the very beginning, and "moralists" at the end of section 1. I have a sneaking suspicion that one of the main purposes of his writing is to overthrow the moral philosophy up till his time, not unlike what Nietzsche attempted a century later.

Nemo wrote: "Hume speaks of "moral philosophy" ..."

"Moral philosophy, or the science of human nature", as opposed to the philosophy of nature in general (science) is not the same as ethics. Hume is concerned with the theory of knowledge (epistemology).

Epistemology is not without interest, though, when we question the formal basis of ethics. An interesting problem, given Hume's radical skepticism. Regarding the content of his ethics however, I would expect the mild-mannered Hume to be rather conventional.

Wendel wrote: "Nemo wrote: "Hume speaks of "moral philosophy" ..."

"Moral philosophy, or the science of human nature", as opposed to the philosophy of nature in general (science) is not the same as ethics. Hume ..."

Hume seems to be using the word science in the broad sense of knowledge, not the narrow sense as in the scientific method.

Epistemology and ethics are very closely related branches of philosophy. According to Plato, the former is the foundation of the latter. In other word, unless we know what is good, we cannot live a good life.

Hume is keenly aware of that, which is probably why he is focusing on epistemology to "undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy", that is, the ethics of the "moralists", or what Hume calls "superstition".

In this regard, I think both Plato are Hume are consistent, whereas Kant is not. Kant advocates absolute ethics on the one hand, while denying that knowledge of human nature is possible, on the other.

Everyman wrote: "Are you content to accept the assertion that these two broad major approaches to philosophy adequately divide the field of different approaches to philosophy, and that any philosophy can be identified with one or the other..."

I smiled at this question. It was one of my early ones about Hume, as he seemed to keep categorizing in groups of two, almost true-false style. Since I hate categorization (it always fails for me; I can always find a categorization other than the one I may be attempting to use) and yet deeply respect those who do difficult and abstract work (e.g., Dewey, Linnaeus), I've decided for the moment to ride with Hume's approach and to see where it does or doesn't take one.

Are there already categories you would like to add? Can you explain what and why? I ask because I stumbled when I attempted that first question and then tried to deal with the qualifier "why." It became sort of a where to put a crayon when the categories started as writing materials versus drawing materials. Well, that might not be quite an adequate parallel.... But still along the lines of a decision must be made, so...just call it. Republican. Democrat. Or....Male. Female. Or.... Black. White. Or...

Nemo wrote: "Hume seems to be using the word science in the broad sense of knowledge, not the narrow sense as in the scientific method. "

I agree with you here. Even after Bacon, science was still often considered an aspect of philosophy.

Everyman wrote: "Even after Bacon, science was still often considered an aspect of philosophy. ..."

The subtitle of Hume’s earlier 'Treatise …' reads: "An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects".

The 'experimental method' must be that of Newton’s physics, i.e. science. A method that had recently delivered so many exciting insights. As always, the philosopher is mirroring developments elsewhere, trying to take away some of the fuzziness we feel in 'real life’. Even when we succeed.

I take it that 'experimental' should be read as 'empirical', and that the 'moral subjects' may be anything but nature (?). But as it happens, the subject is epistemology. So Hume attempts to introduce the scientific method (as it was taking shape) to the study of our thinking and knowledge in general.

That leaves us somewhere between philosophy and psychology, without the experimental side of the latter. Eventually ending up in a logical blind alley - though not after cleaning up a lot of fuzziness, for some of us at least.

As I see it, it was through the study of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle that people learned to reason, to think right. Logic was a branch of philosophy.

Science, in every sense of the word, did and still does depend on Logic. To measure, observe and experiment is only half of the scientific method, the other half, I would say the more important half, is logical reasoning, to draw inferences from the empirical data and test those ideas again with experiments.

Now when I hear some people, even few scientists, argue that science has made philosophy obsolete, it makes me wonder whether they have been affected by some kind of madness.

We cannot observe or measure the laws of nature directly, nor do we know the nature of those laws themselves, but we can observe the laws of nature in action, so to speak. People believe in the existence of the laws of nature because of that.

The same argument can be and has been made for the existence of the mind.

Patrice wrote: "so much philosophy is either or when the truth is both. yes logic and reason is necessary but not enough. a scientist can have aha moments every day and turn out wrong when tested. without proof wh..."

I have no proof, but I "see" the pendulum in you is swinging again. :)

Can we prove our feelings and impressions? No we can't. Does it mean they are not there?

Everyman wrote: "I agree with you here. Even after Bacon, science was still often considered an aspect of philosophy."

Very true. The word science, if memory serves, simply means knowledge. So traditionally, all the way back into the middle ages, when the word science is used it is synonymous with knowledge. Distinctions were made to the specific type, such as natural sciences, philosophical sciences, or theological sciences, etc. The reductionism of the word to only mean natural science is a recent development coming out of the Enlightenment.

Nemo wrote: "Can we prove our feelings and impressions? No we can't. Does it mean they are not there? "

Ah, you hit the bull's eye here! No one can measure a feeling or see a thought, yet we know they exist. You can slice a dead man's brain every which way you like, but you will never recover his memories and experiences, yet we know he had them.

Nemo wrote: "Patrice wrote: "so much philosophy is either or when the truth is both. yes logic and reason is necessary but not enough. a scientist can have aha moments every day and turn out wrong when tested. ..."

Would these feelings and impressions come under Hume's idea of the 'secret springs and principles by which the human mind is actuated'? As motivators to action...

If that's the case, then while we cannot prove what they were specifically, I think Hume is suggesting that they ways they work within the mind are knowable. With reasoned and detailed investigation we can see the process and the result even if not the specifics of each individual.



Or may be i'm just completely out as i'm finding Hume truly challenging, his style is so hard for me to read.

Patrice wrote: "emma, you are not alone in the struggle."

Thanks so much for that, Patrice. I'm behind on this one anyway, so struggling to catch up and just struggling too.

Enjoying the discussions though...

Emma wrote: "Would these feelings and impressions come under Hume's idea of the 'secret springs and principles by which the human mind is actuated'?"

Feelings and impressions themselves are not secret. Everyone experience them, though they are different for each individual. However, the cause(s) of those feelings and impressions are secret, and the question is whether or how the secret may be known.

You mentioned "with reasoned and detailed investigation", and I tend to agree with you, but it is precisely reason itself that is being questioned by Hume here: is the way we reason, i.e., make logical inferences, valid?

I think Hume contradicts himself by suggesting that the way we reason is invalid, and yet using the same reasoning to draw his conclusions.

Nemo wrote: "Emma wrote: "Would these feelings and impressions come under Hume's idea of the 'secret springs and principles by which the human mind is actuated'?"

Feelings and expressions themselves are not se..."

I see what you mean. I think.

He's arguing that we can only know from experience (sensation/perception/ideas) and that will inform our ideas about what will happen. We assume that what has happened before or what we 'know' directs what comes next (logical inferences as you say). Cause and effect. Or this observed thing + this observed thing = must mean this....

Except it takes for granted that experience can explain what comes next. He says we don't know the causes of these mental impressions and feelings but with investigation we could know them. You'd have to go back to basics and start from what you definitely 'know' to build up that knowledge. If that's even possible...


I don't know. Hume is officially not my favourite.

Nemo wrote: "I think Hume contradicts himself by suggesting that the way we reason is invalid, and yet using the same reasoning to draw his conclusions."

Does Hume say all reason is invalid in every case or distinguish between reason and logic?

Isn't he just saying that if our reasoning assigns causes to their effects when these associations are only habit that give the appearance of cause and effect, then it is logical to conclude that our reasoning is wrong on that case?

Emma wrote: "Hume is officially not my favourite...."

And I am unable to assign a cause to the impression just communicated by the reading of your statement... {g?]

David wrote: "Nemo wrote: "I think Hume contradicts himself by suggesting that the way we reason is invalid, and yet using the same reasoning to draw his conclusions."

Does Hume say all reason is invalid in eve..."

Spoiler Alert: The answer is in Section 4.

I do not understand him to being saying the way we reason is invalid or that he is contradicting himself. I think he only emphasizes that we are mistaken in attributing the role of connecting our ideas by resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect to reason instead of properly to experience

The proposition that causes and effects are discoverable not by reason but by experience will be freely granted

Then soon after this he defines the role reason does play

That’s why no reasonable scientist has ever claimed to know the ultimate cause of any natural process, or to show clearly and in detail what goes into the causing of any single effect in the universe. It is agreed that the most human reason can achieve is to make the principles that govern natural phenomena simpler, bringing many particular effects together under a few general causes by reasoning from analogy, experience and observation.

This is Hume's empiricism stating that one cannot derive the universe or how it functions in one's head from nothing or reason TO experience a priori. We must have our experiences first and then we may reason from those experiences to extrapolate the best descriptive explanations for them as we can.

I do not see Hume contradicting himself here because his conclusion is drawn by reasoning from his experience with the origin of ideas.

David wrote: ".The proposition that causes and effects are discoverable not by reason but by experience will be freely granted..."

I would not grant it. That proposition itself is arrived at not by experience, but by reason. For nobody can see or hear "cause" or "effect", or have any direct experience of them.

Our rational faculty has the capacity for abstract and logical thinking, independent of sensory experience, as Hume concedes in the case of mathematics. The whole of the natural world is mathematically describable --this is freely granted, which means that, at least in theory, man can reason out the course of the world without actually experiencing it.

There are many ways to look at the relationship between experiences and ideas. Hume takes a "bottom-up" approach, others "top-down", or a combination of both. I tend to think of them as a built-in check and balance in the nature of man. On the one hand, there is the power of rational and creative mind, on the other hand, there is the power of sense and desire. Only when the two are in harmony can we live a good life. This is what Plato is envisioning in his Chariot Allegory in Phaedrus.

Nemo wrote: "David wrote: ".The proposition that causes and effects are discoverable not by reason but by experience will be freely granted..."

I would not grant it. That proposition itself is arrived at not b..."

I somewhat simpler view here: "pure reason", e.g., mathematics, may predict an external world independent of experience ("impressions"), but if the world of "impressions" did not "follow" those predictions, the system of "pure reason" is thrown into question. The history of science has shown the existence of systems of "pure reason" that here-to have not been confirmed -- or necessarily refuted -- by experience/observation/"impressions." Likewise, observations have led to the development of systems of reason that here-to-fore not been considered; the most well-known of these is probably non-Euclidean geometry. I'm not sure of the "correct" terminology, but I tend to put 10-dimensional systems of space into the same or at least similar category.

I'm reminded of what Aristotle writes about the relation between poetry and history, for the same relation exists between mathematics and "the real world".

It is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen — what is possible according to the law of probability or necessity. … Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history: for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular.

Nemo wrote: "David wrote: ".The proposition that causes and effects are discoverable not by reason but by experience will be freely granted..."

I would not grant it. That proposition itself is arrived at not by experience, but by reason."

Hume cites experience for this proposition in Section 2 On the Origin of Ideas:

1. . .Those who maintain that this isn’t universally true and that there are exceptions to it have only one way of refuting it—but it should be easy for them, if they are right. They need merely to produce an idea that they think isn’t derived from this source. . .
2. . . If a man can’t have some kind of sensation because there is something wrong with his eyes, ears etc., he will never be found to have corresponding ideas. . .

Have there been any convincing contradictory examples? Even Hume's own suggestion of the missing blue seems to fail to contradict the proposition.

As an aside, I wonder if the missing blue is a brilliant trick played on us by Hume that forces us to refute the proposed contradiction and convince ourselves of his argument?

David wrote: "....They need merely to produce an idea that they think isn’t derived from this source. . ..."

Cause and effect, among other things.

Nemo wrote: "The whole of the natural world is mathematically describable --this is freely granted,..."

Nemo, I don't understand this statement. It seems to me that it is one of the wonders of this world (and the human mind) that so much of it can be mathematically describable. But I don't read Hume, or any other mathematician/philosopher I have encountered, saying all of it "can be."

Lily wrote: "Nemo wrote: "The whole of the natural world is mathematically describable --this is freely granted,..."

Nemo, I don't understand this statement..."

And vice versa. :)

"so much of it can be", but not "all of it"...Which part of the natural world do you think is not mathematically describable?

David wrote: ". . . If a man can’t have some kind of sensation because there is something wrong with his eyes, ears etc., he will never be found to have corresponding ideas. . ...."

I tend to think of Helen Keller when I ponder comments such as this one. What were "clouds," e.g., in the neurons of her mind? Certainly she had access to the impressions/experiences that could be offered by human words. But what did her brain do with those?

I haven't quite followed how Hume deals with the impressions that derive from extensions of the human ones of see, touch, taste, smell, hear -- such as those provided by X-rays or sensors or ....Insofar as I can tell, he treats them as if primary sources of sensory perception.

Nemo wrote: "David wrote: "....They need merely to produce an idea that they think isn’t derived from this source. . ..."

Cause and effect, among other things."

Hume implies that we either experience the association of cause and effect or reason from our experiences to it, as we do the associations by resemblance and contiguity.

I don’t think there will be much doubt that our ideas are connected by these factors. •A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the thing that is depicted in it; •the mention of one room naturally introduces remarks or questions about other rooms in the same building; and •if we think of a wound, we can hardly help thinking about the pain that follows it.

What are some of the others that you alluded to?

David wrote: "Nemo wrote: "David wrote: "....They need merely to produce an idea that they think isn’t derived from this source. . ..."

Cause and effect, among other things."

Hume implies that we experience th..."

Again, Spoiler Alert.

Hume spends a large part of his treatise arguing that what people commonly designate as cause and effect from experience are not actually cause and effect. He even goes on to argue that the cause is "secret", and not known by us from any experience. Therefore, he should have reflected on his own thoughts, and concluded that many ideas are not based on experience.

Nemo wrote: ""....so much of it can be", but not "all of it"...Which part of the natural world do you think is not mathematically describable? ..."

I'll start with gravity.

Humankind will continue to attempt to extend mathematics to describe as much as possible of the natural world, but my perception is there is much that it does not yet describe.

On the other hand, Nova has made many aware that mathematics has managed to describe worlds that we do not yet know whether they are "natural."

Nemo wrote: "Spoiler Alert"

(view spoiler)[Our state of determination on the cause of any effect appears independent of and does not circumvent the associative experiences from which we form the idea of cause and effect even if we are skeptical about it to some degree. Even if the assumed cause is spuriously wrong we still can still form the association from the experience. For example, Associating high ice cream sales and an increase in pool drownings may prompt one to think high ice cream sales cause an increase in pool drownings, when in fact the warm summer days may result in more ice cream sales and an increase in pool use which may result in an increase in pool drownings (hide spoiler)]

Lily wrote: "Nemo wrote: ""....so much of it can be", but not "all of it"...Which part of the natural world do you think is not mathematically describable? ..."

I'll start with gravity. ."

Isn't Newton's equation F=Gm1m2/r2 a mathematical description of gravity? I don't follow you.

David wrote: "Nemo wrote: "Spoiler Alert"

[spoilers removed]"

Association is not causation. We may experience association as animals do, e.g., things that frequently follow each other in time or space, but we don't experience cause and effect. We arrive at them by reason.

I'm not sure I can make my point any clearer.

Nemo wrote: Isn't Newton's equation F=Gm1m2/r2 a mathematical description of gravity? I don't follow you. ..."

But an incomplete one. Not enough of a physicist to be certain this is the correct way of qualifying, but "within the boundary conditions of Euclidean geometry." Some seem to imply that observation of gravitational waves (last year) provided the last evidence for quantum or relativistic (again, I am struggling with terms) statements about gravity. But looking at articles about cosmic mysteries, I find gravitation still there, which syncs with what I listened to being described at a World Conference on Science a couple of years ago. As best I can tell, it is a back and forth issue between mathematics (reason?) and observation. In some cases, what is predicted by the math has not been observed; in other cases, what has been observed has not (yet?) been reconciled with the mathematics. Still, there seems to be a belief that reconciliation is or will be possible.

Nemo wrote: "Association is not causation. We may experience association as animals do, e.g., things that frequently follow each other in time or space, but we don't experience cause and effect. We arrive at them by reason...."

What is the "them" in your last statement, Nemo? "Cause and effect"?

Help me here with Hume. Is he saying we cannot know cause and effect from observation? But, reason (math?) can predict, and hence can provide cause and effect? Or is that too simplistic a reading? (I suspect it is.)

Lily wrote: "Is he saying we cannot know cause and effect from observation? But, reason (math?) can predict, and hence can provide cause and effect?

More like the opposite. If all our ideas arise from impressions, and are all vaguer than impressions, then our idea of cause and effect is never more than repeated, even invariable impressions of one thing following another.

Human reason is incapable of anything 'firmer.'

Somehow *this* is a philosophy of science. I don't see how, but...

As a 'complete idiot' in both science and philosophy I do find Hume remarkably conservative concerning the prospects of science to explain causal relations. But then, the most impressive scientific discovery of the time, gravity, could not be explained.

That was, according to Millican - in the introduction to his edition of the Enquiry - not a problem for Hume’s instrumentalist position: if a theory produces correct predictions it should be accepted, even if it cannot explain these results.

Millican: "Intelligibility is not to be had, but nor is it required, and the proper ideal of science is rather to discover and simplify the laws that describe phenomena." I’m not sure, though, that scientists are really so modest when not under duress.

Just to make sure we are talking about the same thing, I think we agree with Hume on the first part of the quote below, but, if I understand correctly we are in contention over the acceptance of the second part in bold.(view spoiler)[

No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact.

(hide spoiler)]

What is reason based on?

If, as you say, we are going to arrive at a cause by reason (alone?), do we not have to follow a few rules? For example:
1. There must be an association. I.e., A:B
2. Temporal order must not be violated. e.g. B always occurs after A.
3. Spurious causes are eliminated. I.e. There is no C that causes both A and B.
And 4. as mentioned, association is not causation.

Aren't these rules and other criteria behind the "reason" used to arrive at a cause just other ideas from other experiences? Does not experience inform us if we violate rules like the ones above we are not reliably establishing a cause? Without the aid of experience it appears reason would have nothing to work with.

Christopher wrote: "Lily wrote: "Is he saying we cannot know cause and effect from observation? But, reason (math?) can predict, and hence can provide cause and effect?

Human reason is incapable of anything 'firmer.'

Somehow *this* is a philosophy of science. I don't see how, but... ..."

Maybe because both philosophy and science started from doubting and questioning anything being absolute and firm.. even reason itself.

Borum wrote: "doubting and questioning anything being absolute and firm.. even reason itself. ..."

But it is impossible to doubt reason itself, because without reason, there is no reasonable doubt. :)

David wrote: "Just to make sure we are talking about the same thing, ..."

Here is what I mean when I talk about cause in the context of this discussion.

If A, then B; If not A, then not B

IOW, A is the sufficient and necessary cause of B.

One doesn't need experience to understand the logic, and one can apply the same logic to any specific circumstances and life experiences. Experience may help you understand the logic and correctly apply them to real life situations, but experience is not the basis of that logic.

Lily wrote: "Help me here with Hume. Is he saying we cannot know cause and effect from observation? But, reason (math?) can predict, and hence can provide cause and effect? Or is that too simplistic a reading? (I suspect it is.)"

It might be better to defer this discussion to the end of the book. But here is a brief summary of what I think Hume is saying.

First, cause and effect that we observe/experience are not cause and effect strictly speaking, and there is nothing science or reason can do about it.

Second, ideas are derived from experience, including the ideas of cause and effect.

I think there is a contradiction here: If the cause and effect we experience are not really cause and effect, then it follows that the ideas of cause and effect are not based on experience.

Nemo wrote: "I think there is a contradiction here: If the cause and effect we experience are not really cause and effect, then it follows that the ideas of cause and effect are not based on experience. ..."

It seems to me that we are back more to semantics and language as used by humans rather than contradiction. Past of my basis for that argument is a little piece from "big data" analysis I encountered recently -- what is sought is correlation of observations and that correlation is then assumed as at least clues to causes.

Lily wrote: "Nemo wrote: "I think there is a contradiction here: If the cause and effect we experience are not really cause and effect, then it follows that the ideas of cause and effect are not based on experi..."

Contradiction is part of language. One of the difficulties of doing philosophy, as Hume duly noted, and Plato and Aristotle long before him, is being precise about the meaning of words we use.

Hume doesn't define his terms as precisely as Aristotle does, but, by enumerating and explaining what is not cause, e.g., correlation is not causation, he makes his idea of cause quite clear to his reader. I've enjoyed reading his observations, though I disagree with the inferences he draws from them.

Nemo wrote: ". . .one can apply the same logic to any specific circumstances and life experiences"

Let me see if I can summarize the issue. Hume's point is:

nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence.

The dissenting argument seems to be:

P1. Logic and the development of logical operations is by reason alone and does not depend on experience.
P2. We can apply logic to any specific circumstances and real life.
C. Therefore, we can draw inferences to specific circumstances and real life by using reason alone.

I hope I have that right, I think we need to be academically skeptical of applying logic to real life because the notion itself appears to be founded on experience. Given only the abstract reason of logic and mathematics we can certainly derive additional abstract points of logic and mathematics. But how do we go from abstract reasoning to deriving anything real without experience?

As a thought experiment, would a brain in a vat that is never given any sensory input be able to develop an abstract system of logic or math? How could it conceive of A or B or that one is necessary and sufficient for the other? This questions the possibility to begin to discover the abstractions of logic and math themselves without experience?

It seems to me that we only learned to apply logic to specific circumstances and real life by our association by resemblance between the abstract constructs of logic and math to our real empirical experiences and sense data.

If that is true, would it also be true that the association of the abstract constructs to real experiences is also subject to the inherent uncertainty entailed by Hume's academic skepticism concerning associations of experience and further compounded by our limited experience?

Look at it this way: we all know it's easy to infer cause from correlation. As humans we do it all the time.

But Hume seems to say there is never any way to infer cause from correlation, ever. We only become accustomed to 100 percent correlation, and therefore we THINK one thing causes another, but there is no way to *know* this.

That, to me, is too skeptical.

Also, again, bringing up physics. I believe that physics goes beyond experience. It deduces things of which we have no experience.- and it does so by making *valid* inferences.

It's like the fable we learned in school, that until Magellan sailed west and around the world, nobody knew the world was round.

It may be nobody knew the Straits of Magellan, but Thales, Aristotle, et al, knew the world was round by looking at its shadow on the moon, for one thing.

I'm sorry neither one of us seems to be 'converting' the other.