Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Book Four covers the virtues that "are concerned with sharing in certain words and actions." First, Aristotle addresses generosity. Like other virtues, acts of giving are considered virtuous when they are done in the right way and for the sake of the beautiful. Excessive giving is wasteful and deficient giving is stingy. So it appears that generosity is a mean between these two, and where this mean lies depends on the financial resources of the individual. Tyrants, Aristotle says, are not considered wasteful because they have vast resources. Curiously, Aristotle says that generosity also includes taking when it is appropriate. (1120b30) How are we to understand this?

Aristotle goes on to discuss magnificence and "greatness of soul." Magnificence seems to be a kind of generosity, but on a larger scale. It also has something to do with taste. The amount spent on a work of art, for example, must be proportional to the excellence of the work. Spending too much is vulgar, like "bringing food fit for a wedding to a pot luck," and spending too little, trying to cut corners, is "chintzy."

About "greatness of soul" I only have questions... What is it? How is it different from egotism? Or is it the same as egotism, or self-worth, but in the right measure? Is the magnitude of the soul inborn, or can it be acquired? Who would be a good example of a great-souled person?

Aristotle goes on to discuss other virtues, some of which he has difficulty naming: the passion for honor, gentleness (a mean concerning anger), agreeableness or friendliness (a mean between obsequiousness and contrariness), charm (a mean between buffoonery and boorishness), sincerity (concerning oneself, I gather) and shame. He says shame is more a feeling than a virtue, but it doesn't seem out of place for some reason.

He says at the beginning of chapter 7 that he is going through these virtues individually because "we might get a better knowledge of the things connected with character by going through them each by each, and we might be more persuaded that virtues are mean conditions by noticing that it is that way in all cases." Are we persuaded?

Thomas wrote: "Curiously, Aristotle says that generosity also includes taking when it is appropriate. (1120b30) How are we to understand this?"

To always give and never take would be an extreme condition, about as far from the middle as one could get. I recall a section of a Dale Carnegie class I was fortunate enough to take that gave people experience in publicly expressing gratitude appropriately for awards, compliments, etc that they were given. At the time I just thought it was somewhere between a little silly and polite. I never imagined Aristotle played a part, although I read later that Carnegie was quoted confessing that all of his material was not original but repackaged from the greats.

I'm falling behind (I've got to finish book iii still), but I think I can understand taking as being important, and I would think it would probably have been even more important in A.'s day. To refuse to take or take with bad grace what was offered would be insulting to the person who gave it. Think about people who refuse certain awards--a lot of times they are making a specific statement as to what they think about the awarding institution. They wouldn't do that if it didn't have a powerful meaning. I can also imagine how I would feel if I gave someone something and they refused it--if I gave it in the sense of establishing friendship or at least a business relationship, I would feel snubbed. Maybe this is where 'take it in the spirit in which it is given' comes from

Thomas wrote: "Aristotle goes on to discuss magnificence and "greatness of soul." Magnificence seems to be a kind of generosity, but on a larger scale. "

I was confused by this. He says the right motive for magnificent spending is "for honor's sake". But in Book I, doesn't he describe honor as something that depends on the men who bestow it? I read that to mean that it is concerned with what others say about you. At the end of this section, he makes a negative comment about those who would show off their wealth rather than spending for honor's sake. The difference seems very small??

Genni wrote: "But in Book I, doesn't he describe honor as something that depends on the men who bestow it?..."

My stream of consciousness goes to the British children's hospitals that have said they will return contributions of the Presidents Club Charitable Trust.

Lily wrote:

My stream of consciousness goes to the British children's hospitals that have said th..."

I don't understand the connection. ?

Genni wrote:
"He says the right motive for magnificent spending is "for honor's sake". But in Book I, doesn't he describe honor as something that depends on the men who bestow it? I read that to mean that it is concerned with what others say about you.."

I find it helpful when he says that honor is common to all the virtues. "And the magnificent man will spend such sums for honor’s sake; for this is common to the virtues." The primary reason is for the beauty of the magnificent thing produced, but it's also an honorable thing to do. I tend to think of magnificence in terms of great public works, but apparently there is private magnificence as well. (And the honor, or fame, that accompanies owning magnificent things.)

The honor in magnificence might also be illustrated by the difference between two very valuable works of art -- say, a painting by Vincent Van Gogh, and a 18K solid gold toilet. They are both magnificent in their own way, I guess, but the difference in the honor of owning one over the other is apparent.

Thomas wrote: "They are both magnificent in their own way, I guess, but the difference in the honor of owning one over the other is apparent. ..."

{g} Let alone the honor implied/offered in the giving?

Adelle wrote: "Lily wrote: My stream of consciousness goes to the British children's hospitals that have said th..."

I don't understand the connection. ?"

Does a difference exist between honorable actions by dishonorable men versus honorable actions by honorable men? Who is to judge what is honorable versus what is dishonorable? Under what conditions is "honor" intrinsic to a individual versus when is "honor" a judgment bestowed by the larger community?

Does that make the connection clearer, Adelle? Is it appropriate, iyo?

In a very different way, I jump to Thetis and Achilles -- what are the tradeoffs between choosing honor versus choosing life? She supposedly sent her beloved son to the court of Lycomedes, the king of Scyros to avoid his being called to war. Then there is Odysseus and Achilles: (view spoiler)[ '"Son of Peleus,'" Odysseus answers, with careful reverence, "'far the greatest of the Achaeans, Achilles'":

"...no man before has been more blessed than you, nor ever will be. Before, when you were alive, we Argives honoured you as we did the gods, and now in this place you have great authority over the dead. Do not grieve, even in death, Achilles."

So I spoke, and he turn said to me in answer:
"O shining Odysseus, never try to console me for dying. I would rather follow the plow as thrall to another man, one with no land allotted to him and not much to live on, then be king over all the perished dead." -- Odyssey 11.473ff (hide spoiler)]

Do I really go off the deep end when I ask, does honor have meaning in the context of Gethsemane? That place where what "must" be done seems to come from a call larger than the self, at whatever personal cost. Or Mary, in Luke 1:38.

None of this is to imply that honor need be a call on one's very life. As David says of Dale Carnegie teaching, we are not necessarily well trained either in giving or in receiving the honor of simple gratitude -- or respect.

Since I'm not certain which commentaries/annotations (if any) are being read by others, I'll point out something I found in two of them (and, in fact, knew of beforehand....) which I think are helpful.

When Aristotle talks about Magnificence, he is mostly reflecting a situation in the Greek City States, very much including Athens, in which some civic activities were funded, not from general or specific taxation, but by assigning paying for them to some distinguished, and wealthy citizen. (And possibly prosperous non-citizens? I don't think I've ever seen that discussed.)

These "liturgies" (the technical term) were quite varied, but included such things as outfitting a warship (the city provided the hull), or hosting an embassy, or funding one being sent abroad, or, at least in Athens, by financing (producing) the dramas and comedies seen in what was a state-sponsored religious festival.

In most such cases, the quality of the result could be seen by the public, and evaluated -- an expensive liturgy properly financed brought honor, but not one done "on the cheap."

And simply showing off for the sake of demonstrating how rich you were, by overspending on such things (as with expensive costumes for actors), would probably draw criticism.

Lily wrote: "Does a difference exist between honorable actions by dishonorable men versus honorable actions by honorable men? Who is to judge what is honorable versus what is dishonorable? ."

Aristotle says that "worth is spoken of in relation to external goods.... and of this kind is honor, for this is the greatest of the external goods." (1123b20) I think this goes back to Genni's comment -- that honor depends on those who bestow it.

But just because one expects honor doesn't mean that one is deserving of it. The great-souled person expects the honor he deserves, no more and no less. How this is determined is, once again, a matter of good breeding/education (hexis) and perception. A dishonorable person with bad breeding and bad perception might expect honor he doesn't deserve.

Cphe wrote: "What does A mean by

"Greatness of soul (1124a) then, seems to be like a kind of ornament."

I don't understand."

Greatness of soul isn't a separate virtue; it's the name Aristotle gives to a person who has all of the virtues combined. The true value of the great-souled person is in the individual virtues he has -- he's perfectly generous, perfectly courageous, perfectly moderate, etc.. The whole is greater than the parts, but the parts are all necessary to the whole. The Greek word for "ornament" is kosmos; maybe this hints at the orderliness of the parts (all of the individual virtues) fitting into the whole (greatness of soul.)

The person who has all of the virtues is rather peculiar though. He is slow, uninterested in popular culture, he speaks freely, and exhibits little sense of wonder. He is incapable of living in the way others think he should, and he owns beautiful but useless things. He's also truthful (except when he's being ironic.) He sounds a bit like Socrates.

It's not like "kosmos" is not a key term in Greek philosophy.

At any rate, now we know what a cosmonaut has in common with a cosmetologist.

@13 Thomas wrote: "Lily wrote: "Does a difference exist between honorable actions by dishonorable men versus honorable actions by honorable men? Who is to judge what is honorable versus what is dishonorable? ."

Aris..."

I presume there was no doubt that my comments @9 and @5 were driven by news of the Financial Times exposé: https://www.ft.com/content/075d679e-0...

Ala yours @7 about the Guggenhein's alleged response to a White House request for the loan of a work of art.

Christopher wrote: "It's not like "kosmos" is not a key term in Greek philosophy. At any rate, now we know what a cosmonaut has in common with a cosmetologist."

[Smile!] One of those times I wish Goodreads had a "Like" option to use with posts.

Cphe wrote: "Who today would you identify with as a "great soul"?"

It's a very high standard, one that invites criticism because it is a sort of perfection, but among people we all might know, I would suggest the current Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso. I expect there are many others that aren't public figures.

Cphe wrote: "Who today would you identify with as a "great soul"?"

I wouldn't give the term the same meaning as Thomas outlines it @14, especially in the second paragraph, and I don't know the meaning of "perfect," but I do believe I am privileged to know a good many great souls, most of whom would demur at any suggestion of that appellation. And you, Cphe?

Cphe wrote: "The one I immediately thought of Lily was a young man that I had the great privilege of looking after. He was diagnosed with a rare type of cancer and eventually triumphed over the disease. He show..."

A very believable story, Cphe. Thanks for sharing.

Lily wrote: "I wouldn't give the term the same meaning as Thomas outlines it @14, especially in the second paragraph, and I don't know the meaning of "perfect," but I do believe I am privileged to know a good many great souls..."


"Perfect" is not quite right either. Self-sufficiency seems to be the hallmark of the great souled person, but Aristotle allows for irony, which is a kind of insincerity. He later calls this a charming, or gracious, defect, but it is a defect nevertheless. I can think of no other reason for Aristotle allowing this except that he is thinking of Socrates as a model.

Colin Firth to Samuel Jackson: "Thank you for this- happy- meal."



I was going to say it's not that hard to think of 'great-souled' people being ironic to inferiors, but I can't think of a lot of examples.

One thing to ponder is, if the g.s.m. is superior to everyone and everything, does that mean he is ironic to everyone?

Also, notice that the name of Socrates comes up only in the section where irony is discussed as a flaw.

Thomas wrote: "Lily wrote: "I wouldn't give the term the same meaning as Thomas outlines it @14, especially in the second paragraph, and I don't know the meaning of "perfect," but I do believe I am privileged to ..."

Was watching Neil deGrasse Tyson on a Great Courses video ("The Inexplicable Universe: Unsolved Mysteries") last night where he stated that Aristotle believed that items of different mass fell at rates proportionate to their weights. Tyson pointed out that successive experiments have shown gravitational acceleration to be independent of mass. With the slight mockery in his inimitable style, Tyson commented on the need for "armchair thinking" to be tested by observation. I've been wondering since whether to ponder how much of Aristotle on virtue and morals is "armchair thinking" versus observational recording.

Actually, it IS by observation that denser objects fall faster than lighter ones. What Aristotle said was based on observation.

You try it with, say, a gummi bear and a marble.

Christopher wrote: "Actually, it IS by observation that denser objects fall faster than lighter ones. What Aristotle said was based on observation.

You try it with, say, a gummi bear and a marble."

;-) I didn't know Aristotle had gummi bears.

Christopher wrote: "One thing to ponder is, if the g.s.m. is superior to everyone and everything, does that mean he is ironic to everyone?

Also, notice that the name of Socrates comes up only in the section where irony is discussed as a flaw. "

Perhaps the great souled man is ironic when it's appropriate. In Socrates' case, he uses irony for specific purpose: to teach those who can be taught and to perplex those who profess wisdom they don't have. This gentle insincerity is a flaw, but as Aristotle says, feigning ignorance isn't as bad as false pretense to knowledge.

Socrates isn't mentioned by name at 1124b-1125, but Aristotle's description is so similar in detail to Alcibiades' description of Socrates in the Symposium that I find it hard to believe Aristotle wasn't thinking of him.

Lily wrote: " I've been wondering since whether to ponder how much of Aristotle on virtue and morals is "armchair thinking" versus observational recording. "

How one would experiment with virtue and morals? Doesn't one need a virtuous person to experiment on, and how do we determine the person is virtuous before we know what virtue is?

I'm not sure how much of Aristotle's work is observational exactly, but I think a lot of it is, and this might be problematic. In the case of the character virtues (Books 3 and 4) he posits or assumes what a specific virtue or good is, and then works his way back. He avoids the Socratic question "what is it?" by saying that a properly raised and educated person knows what virtue is -- because he has been properly raised and educated, of course.

Thomas wrote: "He avoids the Socratic question "what is it?" by saying that a properly raised and educated person knows what virtue is -- because he has been properly raised and educated, of course. ..."

Can that be considered an example of circular reasoning? Or more a la Justice Potter Stewart on pornography?

Christopher wrote: "Actually, it IS by observation that denser objects fall faster than lighter ones. What Aristotle said was based on observation.

You try it with, say, a gummi bear and a marble."

Actually this is only true in the presence of air (or other fluids). In the vacuum the weight or mass don't have influence in the speed which objects fall. A cannon ball and a cotton ball will reach the floor in the same time.

Thomas wrote: "I find it helpful when he says that honor is common to all the virtues. "And the magnificent man will spend such sums for honor’s sake; for this is common to the virtues." The primary reason is for the beauty of the magnificent thing produced, but it's also an honorable thing to do. "

I'm behind. Anyway, I'm not sure how honor being common to all virtues changes the understanding of honor I had from Book 1? If it's common to all virtues then doesn't that simply mean that other men will recognize these virtues in someone and praise that?

I am glad that you have pointed out the translation of the word "beautiful" (which my translation does not use so good to know) because it does put a different spin on Aristotle's big picture, and I see how he puts it before honor, but I am not sure why A is concerned about honor at all when he dismissed it earlier. I was surprised by his mention of it, I guess.

Thomas wrote: "How one would experiment with virtue and morals? Doesn't one need a virtuous person to experiment on, and how do we determine the person is virtuous before we know what virtue is? ..."

Thomas -- don't have an adequate response to the question you pose. However, we do have historical records and the recent history of two world wars to give us some clues. And leaders and individuals who have displayed the power (and danger) of peaceful protest. Or perhaps I am just confusedly co-mingling individual virtue with institutional virtue/justice.

I have been reading Reading with Patrick where its author Michelle Kuo points out that as desegregation was implemented, often black teachers were denied positions in the integrated schools. Is the concept of virtue relevant?

Ian wrote: "When Aristotle talks about Magnificence, he is mostly reflecting a situation in the Greek City States, very much including Athens, in which some civic activities were funded, not from general or specific taxation, but by assigning paying for them to some distinguished, and wealthy citizen. (And possibly prosperous non-citizens? I don't think I've ever seen that discussed.)

These "liturgies" (the technical term) were quite varied, but included such things as outfitting a warship (the city provided the hull), or hosting an embassy, or funding one being sent abroad, or, at least in Athens, by financing (producing) the dramas and comedies seen in what was a state-sponsored religious festival.

In most such cases, the quality of the result could be seen by the public, and evaluated -- an expensive liturgy properly financed brought honor, but not one done "on the cheap."

And simply showing off for the sake of demonstrating how rich you were, by overspending on such things (as with expensive costumes for actors), would probably draw criticism. "

Well, this is helpful, Ian. Thanks. I am curious about the last example of buying expensive costumes for actors. This may be a silly question, but why cannot a concern for the beautiful extend to materialistic things? Is it only because there are other things that money can/should be spent on? Or maybe it is because Plato's influence is still so strong that the idea of anything material being good is going to feel off? Why should an expensive costume be seen as an attempt to show of wealth versus a love of something beautiful and well-made?

Thomas wrote: "In the case of the character virtues (Books 3 and 4) he posits or assumes what a specific virtue or good is, and then works his way back. He avoids the Socratic question "what is it?" by saying that a properly raised and educated person knows what virtue is -- because he has been properly raised and educated, of course. "

I have kind of been wondering what his point was in writing this book because it does feel so observational. If one has been properly educated then one would already know these things, no? And if one was not properly educated, A does not leave a lot of room for hope for him. Or I guess the wiggle room is found in A's idea of knowledge..

Genni wrote: "I'm behind. Anyway, I'm not sure how honor being common to all virtues changes the understanding of honor I had from Book 1? If it's common to all virtues then doesn't that simply mean that other men will recognize these virtues in someone and praise that? "

He says in Book 1 that acts of virtue that are done for honor are superficial. Does that mean that the magnificent man is superficial? Or can we read this a different way?

Lily wrote: "Thomas -- don't have an adequate response to the question you pose. However, we do have historical records and the recent history of two world wars to give us some clues. "

I don't have one either, except that Plato's failure to arrive at a definition of virtue led Aristotle to venture on a "second sailing" that relies on a Justice Potter-ish understanding of virtue, a practical common sense understanding.

Speaking of world wars... Winston Churchill was once given a copy of the Nicomachean Ethics by a friend. "Churchill returned it with an expression of his delight, adding simply, 'But it is extraordinary how much of it I had already thought out for myself.' "

Thomas wrote: "Speaking of world wars... Winston Churchill was once given a copy of the Nicomachean Ethics by a friend...."

LOL. Was humility a virtue of Churchill's?

In the edition I have, rather than translate megalopsychia as 'greatness of soul', the translator chose high-mindedness. His reason was that the Greek term was originally translated into Latin as magnanimitas, from which we get magnanimity. But he felt magnanimity didn't cover all of A.'s meaning in this section. Evidently he didn't like 'greatness of soul', either.

High-mindedness makes me think of someone who is proud though not to a fault, but very near to arrogance. But great-souled man makes me think of humility. At least that's what the terms suggest to me, and in that regard, I would have agreed that someone like the Dalai Lama seems like a great-souled person, but that image doesn't really fit when I think of how A. described it. Actually, as A. described a 'high-minded' person, he seemed to me to be someone very isolated from his fellows, not deigning to mix much with those who were beneath him (though not unkind to them--or rather, treating them as they deserve, I guess, though I'm not exactly sure how this is determined, except that the high-minded man would just 'know'), and someone who took as his right the things he knows he deserves. If 'high-mindedness', then, is a mean, it seems as though it would veer quite close to a lot of other characteristics we don't usually look on as positives.

This concept of praise for megalopsychia is interesting--I've known individuals who I think approach this kind of behavior; they seem to have some kind of ineffable presence around them, something beyond qualities like charisma or justice. I can't always say that I like being around them, but when I am, they make me want to be a better person. Brutus reminds me a little of what A. is talking about here, while Cassius sort of exemplified all the ways that he (Cassius) was not great-souled or high-minded. Sort of a foil for Shakespeare to better present Brutus.

But I'm thinking too that Christ's teachings would have not been in praise of the great-souled or high-minded [ETA: as described in this section by A.], because their focus is on worldly things. So, I wonder if a scholar from the middle-ages, coming to A.'s ethics for the first time, would have thought it a little blasphemous, or would it have been eye-opening? Even now, when reading about A.'s definition of high-mindedness as a virtue, I get mixed feelings. Initially, I think it sounds like too much pride, but then I think of the people I've known who I think exemplify what A. is talking about, and they didn't have too much...they had exactly enough.

"Mahatma" (Mohandas Gandhi's honorific) means "great-souled."

Thomas wrote: "He says in Book 1 that acts of virtue that are done for honor are superficial. Does that mean that the magnificent man is superficial? Or can we read this a different way? "

If acts of virtue that are done for honor are superficial and honor is something that is common to all virtue, then are all virtuous men superficial?

As for reading it another way, I suppose I wonder if something superficial can be virtuous, according to A. It seems not, which only makes his comment here more confusing. But since he doesn't ever really say what virtue is, there are holes. And I have his description from Book I stuck in my head so if you are reading his comment here in a different way I'd love to hear it. :-)

Genni wrote: "If acts of virtue that are done for honor are superficial and honor is something that is common to all virtue, then are all virtuous men superficial?"

Well, I hope not.

I think the great-souled person is concerned with honor because he is worthy of it. Aristotle says he is the "best human being." That honor is superficial to the extent that it depends on others to give, but the great-souled person still deserves and expects to be honored to the degree that he is worth it. Aristotle compares the great-souled person to the gods -- they are worthy of the greatest "external goods." I don't think it's possible that he acts only for the sake of honor though. That doesn't make logical sense to me. It would be like saying an Olympian competes for the laurel wreath rather than for victory.

Thomas wrote: "I think the great-souled person is concerned with honor because he is worthy of it. "

I'm sorry if I am just being dense, but I don't understand. Even if one is worthy of honor (and that is an idea that doesn't really compute in my brain, perhaps because of religious background?), why should one be especially concerned with obtaining it or assessing how much honor oneself is worthy of?

Bryan wrote: " Even now, when reading about A.'s definition of high-mindedness as a virtue, I get mixed feelings. Initially, I think it sounds like too much pride, but then I think of the people I've known who I think exemplify what A. is talking about, and they didn't have too much...they had exactly enough. "

In my edition, it translates "great-souled" as pride. So I am reading all of these comments and trying to put pride, high-mindedness, and great-souled all into one concept and have not been even close to successful.

From section 3: "On the other hand, he who thinks himself worthy of great things, being unworthy of them, is vain; though not everyone who thinks himself worthy of more than he really is worthy of is vain." Isn't this explicitly contradictory??

(And I am a little miffed that since I am little, I can only be "neat and proportioned, but not beautiful". :p)

Genni wrote: "In my edition, it translates "great-souled" as pride...."

These abstractions are hard to get a hold of.

Genni wrote: "(And I am a little miffed that since I am little, I can only be "neat and proportioned, but not beautiful". :p)
..."

That was kind of weird, eh? Like out of the blue. 'Here, before I talk about what a great-souled person is like, let me take a quick swipe at people.' Maybe it sounded better in Greek

Aristotle's judgement on undue humility is interesting. "But undue humility is more opposed to pride than vanity is; for it is both commoner and worse." Is he saying what I think he is saying? That undue humility is worse than vanity? And it is worse because it is more common?? I'm beginning to think I did not pick the best translation if I am misunderstanding this simply because of the wording.

Bryan wrote: "That was kind of weird, eh? Like out of the blue. 'Here, before I talk about what a great-souled person is like, let me take a quick swipe at people.' Maybe it sounded better in Greek "

LOL, right? The only thing I could think of to explain it was that that is was a commonly accepted cultural judgement of beauty. He says pride implies greatness and beauty implies a good-sized body. In my book, pride often does NOT imply greatness, it implies littleness or overcompensation. But, if by pride he actually means "great-souled" then sure, it could imply greatness. Though I don't think it follows that beauty implies a good-sized body...

Genni wrote: "In my book, pride often does NOT imply greatness,..."

Pride gets a bad rap, but perhaps there's a mean? Let's say you take a welder who is good at her job. She takes pride in her work. So let's say a new building is going up and the architect wants to give the welding job to another welder who's incompetent, and the good welder says, 'That's a mistake--she's not at good welder, and I am. It's an important job--the correct thing to do would be to give the task to me. Furthermore, if you give the job to her, you'll be saying something about your abilities as well.' All of which is true. She might not have a lot of tact, but she's been fair and truthful, and hasn't over-praised her own abilities. She's ruthlessly realistic.

In some ways, this seems closer to me to what A. is saying about a 'great-souled person'. It might have been better not even to translate the Greek term, and then just translate his definition of it, because when I read 'great-souled', I automatically think of a humble person, and that definitely doesn't seem to be what A. is going for here.

It may help a bit to understand Aristotle's "Great Soul" to consider that upper-class Greeks (the ones we mostly know about) were typically engaged in a competitive pursuit of prestige -- receiving public honors (timos) being a main goal, although those from fellow-aristocrats were probably valued more, and harder to get.

This goes all the way back to Achilles quarreling with Agamemnon over a "prize of honor" (which is really what the two captive women represent in the world of the Iliad).

This pursuit persisted into the world of the democratic polis, when some shows of wealth and power were considered offensive, and others downright banned (like "conspicuous consumption" in the form of burial goods). One reason the Greek tyrant (dictator) was so hated by the old aristocracy was that he monopolized the sources of public honor.

The Spartans managed to channel the impulse into excelling at skill, strength, and courage, by tightly regulating most other aspects of life, including food and clothing. Even so, inner-Spartan frictions often look like they boil down to questions of prestige.

The gods, and dead heroes, too, were assumed to be similarly concerned with receiving due formal respect. Which may be a part of Aristotle's notion of the Great Soul as being godlike.

A good, if now a bit antiquated (1966), sociological approach to this aspect of competition in Classical Greece is Enter Plato by Alvin W. Gouldner. (The paperback edition was published in two volumes -- I've linked to the original.)

Genni wrote: "'...But undue humility is more opposed to pride than vanity is; for it is both commoner and worse.'"

As I read those words, I wondered if Aristotle, with "undue humility," might be referring to something we would be more likely to label "low self esteem," such that an individual's lack of self respect is a deterrent to his acting upon or using his full capabilities.

Today such is widely discussed as an issue for women in the workplace. However, lack of appropriate self confidence hinders many men as well -- and it wouldn't surprise me if Aristotle found self-derogation a drag on achievements that he might well have deemed should have been possible.

Ian wrote: "It may help a bit to understand Aristotle's "Great Soul" to consider that upper-class Greeks (the ones we mostly know about) were typically engaged in a competitive pursuit of prestige -- receiving..."

Thanks, Ian. This is very helpful. In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle specifically mentions Achilles as a great-souled man. Most of us today would not consider modesty to be a vice, but we may just have to acknowledge this as a cultural difference.

For reference, here is the passage from Posterior Analytics (this passage is specifically on the subject of definitions). I don't find it all that helpful in understanding megalopsychia (translated here as "magnanimity") but his examples are telling.

For instance, if we are enquiring into the nature of Magnanimity we should examine the cases of certain magnanimous persons whom we know of, in order to discover what common quality they all possess in virtue of their magnanimity. Thus supposing Alcibiades, Achilles and Ajax to be all of them magnanimous, what common quality did they all possess? We find that it consisted in impatience of insult. The first made war on his country, the second brooded over his wrath, the third slew himself. We next consider other cases such as those of Lysander and Socrates. If we find that their magnanimity induced them to remain unchanged amidst prosperity and adversity we must take these two aspects of magnanimity and consider what common element exists between disregard of external fortune and impatience of dishonour. If no such element be found, these must constitute two distinct species of magnanimity.

Posterior Analytics, Chap 13, "On the Search for a Definition"

Lily wrote: "Today such is widely discussed as an issue for women in the workplace. However, lack of appropriate self confidence hinders many men as well -- and it wouldn't surprise me if Aristotle found self-derogation a drag on achievements that he might well have deemed should have been possible. "

I agree, Lily. After I posted that, I remembered that Aristotle is concerned with beauty in some sense here. Vanity is concerned with it, even if in the wrong way while undue humility is not.