Classics and the Western Canon discussion

I am finding it helpful to attempt a summary of each part as I read. My summaries may or may not be correct, but I hope you find them useful as a jumping off point for discussion. Terminology might be something we want to discuss as well, especially since translations vary.

6.1 The previous chapters have covered the virtues of character, aka ethical virtues. Now Aristotle proposes to discuss the virtues of thinking. If virtue lies in striking the mean in accordance with right reason, we must examine what it means to reason rightly.

The soul was previously said to be divided into the irrational part and the rational part; the rational part is now divided in two as well -- one part is concerned with knowing things that cannot be otherwise, and the other with deliberating over things that are changeable.

6.2 Contemplative thinking concerns the objects of knowledge, things that are not subject to change or argument. Action-related thinking relates to things that could be otherwise. These require deliberation, which leads to choice as an expression of desire in accordance with reason. It is thinking for the sake of something one desires.

6.3 So how do we think in order to correctly arrive at what we desire? The soul discloses truth in five ways: through art/technology, knowledge/science, prudence/practical judgment, intellect, and wisdom. Knowledge concerns things that cannot be otherwise. (Facts?) Knowledge is demonstrable and teachable, the way particulars are deduced from universals.

6.4 Art is a characteristic of the soul involved with reason that is concerned with making things. Its object of concern is outside the soul itself. (Question: how does art disclose truth?)

6.5 Practical judgment/prudence (Greek phronesis) is a characteristic of the soul involving reason that is concerned with deliberation over actions that are good or bad for human beings. (Different from art because the goal of prudence is acting well itself.)

6.6 Intellect is that which grasps the demonstrable via induction or deduction; it is the faculty that grasps the universal when presented with particular examples of it.

6.7 Wisdom is intellect that is concerned with the most honored sorts of knowledge, the sources of knowledge, the highest things in the cosmos.

6.8 Practical judgment/prudence is concerned with particulars and life experience. Aristotle says it is concerned with “the ultimate particular, of which there is no knowledge but only perception." Does this fit in with his earlier discussion of the mean as something that is sensed?

6.9 Skilled deliberation is over things that are not known or previously determined. It is a thinking through a problem that results in a kind of rightness. It is reasoning to a good end, using sound reasoning. (Discerning the right or good end is a result of ethical virtue; getting to this goal in the right way, using skilled deliberation, is the work of prudence/practical judgment. More on this in 6.12.)

6.10 Astuteness is the ability to quickly make distinctions when deliberating over a problem.

6.11 Thoughfulness, by which people are known as compassionate, is right discrimination of what is decent. He suggests that thoughtfulness, compassion, prudence, and intellect all go together because they are aimed at right discrimination, the first three at right action. Intellect is aimed at perception, which is crucial in its own way to action, but its function is different. Intellect is perception of both the universal and the ultimate particulars from which the universals are derived. Life experience is of particulars; the more experience one has, the more thoughtful and compassionate one becomes. Intellect makes this possible.

6.12 But what good is intellectual virtue anyway? Why do we need to know about health when we have a doctor to tell us what to do to be healthy? (Why are we reading this frustrating book instead of a commentary that makes everything simple?) Aristotle’s answer is that intellectual virtue is choice worthy in itself. Wisdom makes us happy because the work of a human being is intellectual. So is practical judgement and ethical virtue, “since ethical virtue makes the end of which one sets one’s sights right and practical judgment makes the things related to it right."

6.13 Some people are naturally inclined to virtue, but prudence/practical judgment is required for virtuous action "in the governing sense." When we say that virtue is hitting the mean in accordance with right reason, prudence/practical judgment is the "right reason" part. This doesn't mean that virtue is a matter of knowledge (as Socrates claimed) but that it involves reason in the process of deliberation. (Reason is what makes skilled deliberation skilled.)

'It is not possible to be good in the governing sense without practical judgment, nor to have practical judgment without ethical virtue." Ethical virtue reveals the good to us, while practical judgment reveals how best to realize that good.

Thanks, Thomas. I realize these summaries are hard work, but very helpful for the discussion.

I am glad the ball is rolling on Book Six.

I would also like to say that I greatly appreciate the summaries and all of the comments, as well as your patience. :-)

I'm happy to hear the summaries are useful, to whatever degree. Feel free to critique or tweak or amplify or dismiss them as you feel appropriate. This is one of the most interesting chapters in the book, to me anyway, but it is quite technical. I applaud your perseverance!

This book deals primarily with the role of reason in ethics, and it seems a rather abrupt turn from what Aristotle has discussed up to this point. It makes me wonder what the relationship is between reason and "habituated virtue."

Is it true that reason is unable to show us what we should desire? If I've read the first half of the Ethics correctly, it seems that we must be educated or habituated to desire the "proper" good, especially when that good is something difficult to achieve or when it conflicts with our baser instincts. Is it possible instead to choose the good on purely rational grounds?

(Maybe this is more of a Book 2 kind of question, but since the topic here is reason, it occurs to me again.)

There is a sharp break between moral virtues and intellectual virtues, but bear in mind that the use of right reason has been A.'s focus from the beginning- courage, which would seem to require some kind of strength or 'guts' was narrowly defined as the rational control of fear, as if it were just like temperance (the rational control of desire).

One section we did not discuss at all was at the end of Book Four (I think), where A. says shame is not a virtue at all, because it's a passion (or emotion) and not reasoning.

I think I started Book Six, but did not get too far into it.

(I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks)

In Section 6.1 he recapitulates the mean which at first, I questioned but after trying to think of anything excellent at all that exists out of tension, I think I'm coming to agree with the general rule. But it still brings me back to my never-ending of circle of how do I know the excellent things I am thinking of are excellent? Simply because it exists in an intermediate position? Aristotle makes me ramble.

Anyway, I'm stuck on section 2. He says that sensation, reason, and desire control truth. That they control action, I can see. But how do they control truth?? Or does he just mean that they control the assessment of truth?

Christopher wrote: "A. says shame is not a virtue at all, because it's a passion (or emotion) and not reasoning.."

A lot of what Aristotle has to say may be culture-bound, or at least only natural-looking in the context of an ancient Greek city-state. It is easy to miss the fact that he has very little to say on some equally culture-bound subjects that bulk large in later discussions of the topic.

Over on the "Schedule" (etc.) thread, I commented very briefly on the interpretation of Aristotle's ethics (from other works as well as the Nicomachean Ethics itself) by the medieval Jewish philosopher (legal expert, physician, community leader, etc.) Moses Maimonides.

I was there working from a collection of Maimonides' writings on Ethics, both popular and scholarly. During the rest of the week-long break, I've been reading some of the secondary literature on the subject that is available on-line, and found one that specifically points out that one of the places where Maimonides differs from Aristotle is in seeing Shame as a virtue.

A second difference is in counting Awe -- "Fear of God" -- as a virtue, too, something which doesn't seem to have even occurred to Aristotle as a matter for debate.

In both cases, of course, Maimonides was working hard to fit Aristotle into a very different culture and tradition: Rabbinic Judaism in the milieu of (mainly) medieval Islam.

For details, see https://www.researchgate.net/publicat...

Genni wrote: "But it still brings me back to my never-ending of circle of how do I know the excellent things I am thinking of are excellent?"

This is the zetetic paradox that stymies every attempt to arrive at a definition in Plato. (In Meno, the definition of excellence/virtue, in the Republic, a definition of justice, etc...) I'm not sure if there is any way out of it, because it is as you say, a never-ending circle. It is a fascinating problem though.

Anyway, I'm stuck on section 2. He says that sensation, reason, and desire control truth. That they control action, I can see. But how do they control truth?? Or does he just mean that they control the assessment of truth?

Rackham translates "attainment of truth", which supports your interpretation. (There is no "attainment" in the Greek, however. The phrase is kyria praxeos kai aletheias which literally translated means "lord of action and truth")

Thomas wrote: "It seems that we must be educated or habituated to desire the "proper" good, especially when that good is something difficult to achieve or when it conflicts with our baser instincts. Is it possible instead to choose the good on purely rational grounds?"

Though I don't say this with absolute confidence, I'm not sure that Aristotle is suggesting in book 6 that we can arrive at the good by reason alone. Perhaps instead he's looking in more detail at the mental processes and adjustments that help us apply the right action in the right context?

Your very helpful commentaries already touch on this, especially in 6.9. As I understand it, we still need that "habituated virtue" to first propel us to act virtuously and see the target, but before we do so we have to use our practical judgment to deliberate about the right action to take in a specific situation, and then our wisdom to decide about how best to apply this prescription.

Genni wrote: "But it still brings me back to my never-ending of circle of how do I know the excellent things I am thinking of are excellent? Simply because it exists in an intermediate position?"

I get the impression that these intellectual virtues, reason in particular, along with intuition (things whose principles cannot be otherwise?), science, and practical wisdom/prudence are what informs us on excellence.

6.13 [1144b]. . .For it is not merely the state in accordance with right reason, but the state that implies the presence of right reason, that is excellence; and practical wisdom is right reason about such matters. Socrates, then, thought the excellences were forms of reason (for he thought they were, all of them, forms of knowledge), while we think they involve reason.

Dave wrote: "Though I don't say this with absolute confidence, I'm not sure that Aristotle is suggesting in book 6 that we can arrive at the good by reason alone."

I think you're right, and I think Aristotle is right as well. I just think it's interesting that reason is not by itself capable of showing us the good. This leaves us with something like a cultural basis for the good, which I think Ian has touched on a few times during the discussion.

(Though I think it's more complicated than just a cultural basis... it's culture that can also explain itself, i.e. culture that works in a rational way. We learn from our parents/culture what the good is, but if it doesn't make sense to us we turn away in search of a good that makes more sense. )

Cphe wrote: ""In fact, he who knows about and spends his time on things that concern himself is held to be prudent, whereas the politicians are held to be busybodies". Seems some thoughts just don't change."

One of the definitions of justice in Plato's Republic is "minding your own business." :)

David wrote: "I get the impression that these intellectual virtues, reason in particular, along with intuition (things whose principles cannot be otherwise?), science, and practical wisdom/prudence are what informs us on excellence.
6.13 [1144b]. . .For it is not merely the state in accordance with right reason, but the state that implies the presence of right reason, that is excellence; and practical wisdom is right reason about such matters. Socrates, then, thought the excellences were forms of reason (for he thought they were, all of them, forms of knowledge), while we think they involve reason."

But doesn't this bring us back to the part of the circle where different people arrive at different conclusions through reasoning?

Thomas wrote: "Rackham translates "attainment of truth", which supports your interpretation. (There is no "attainment" in the Greek, however. The phrase is kyria praxeos kai aletheias which literally translated means "lord of action and truth") "

Ah, thanks. Although I'm not sure that "lord of action and truth" is much clearer, lol. I'll have to go back and reread it with that in mind.

Thomas wrote: "This book deals primarily with the role of reason in ethics, and it seems a rather abrupt turn from what Aristotle has discussed up to this point. It makes me wonder what the relationship is betwee..."

I continue, as I usually do with these ancient arguments, to struggle with what is (frontal lobe) reasoning and what is (frontal lobe) rationalization of what is "felt" by the more ancient midbrain and brain stem machinations of sensory inputs from the world.

Genni wrote: "David wrote: "But doesn't this bring us back to the part of the circle where different people arrive at different conclusions through reasoning?"

Yes, and doesn't that observation seem to fit the real world? I think that is just Aristotle the realist telling us how it really is.

Given the same set of facts, it is rare when everyone comes to the same conclusion. Given a set of bones in the earth, some see an age where dinosaurs ruled the earth and others see the devil messing with our heads.

As skills, it follows that the intellectual virtues, reason included, are practiced with varying degrees of quality, e.g., given the same set of math problems on a test, the students will more likely produce a range of scores instead of everyone getting them all correct. Aristotle also offers an explanation in the next book about how, despite possessing sufficient knowledge and and right reason, some still fail, e.g., "I know I should not be eating this second piece of cake."

Genni wrote: "But doesn't this bring us back to the part of the circle where different people arrive at different conclusions through reasoning? ."

Aristotle is willing to accept uncertainty when certainty is out of reach. That is why virtue cannot be knowledge -- knowledge for Aristotle is something eternal, something certain that "cannot be otherwise." If virtue were knowledge , then ethics could have rules and deliberation wouldn't be necessary. (I suspect this is also why computers cannot be described as ethical...at least in the Aristotelian sense.)

There is a sort of realism at work here, as David said, but it's also a kind of faith that our close-enough, asymptotic approach to certainty is good enough. Aristotle has faith in the world and the human capacity to work in and understand the world, whereas Socrates believed that certainty was divine. Both require a kind of faith. Aristotle's faith was in the world we live in; Socrates's was in a more perfect, spiritual plane of existence.

Hoping that's not too far off-topic.... :)

Cphe wrote: ""We learn from our parents/culture what the good is, but if it doesn't make sense to us we turn away in search of a good that makes more sense. ) "

The same could be said of religion"

Yes, indeed. Underneath all of ethics is this question of the good. What is the good? It's a question that needs context, and religions provide a cultural context. When a group of people agree on what the good is, it provides a sense of cohesion among them. A family, a city, a state -- maybe this is why Aristotle says politics aims at the highest good and is the master art. Religion is like politics in this way, I think.

I made it through book vi finally--I had a difficult time with the first half, and set it down, though when I read the last half of the book, I seemed to hang on a bit better. It could be I read the first bit too early in the morning.

Anyway, I thought it was interesting that A tied together the virtues with practical wisdom--that a person couldn't truly be virtuous without a kind of guiding principle behind them. (If I'm understanding right.)

Both this and book v were difficult for me--these two (and book iv) were those that I mentioned my book's previous owner had skipped highlighting, even though the rest of the book has 3/4's of ever page underlined. I really think that whoever taught this class must have decided to skip these chapters due to their density. I know that I'll need to re-read them if I want to get any kind of a firm grasp on A's sense of justice and right reason.

Thomas wrote: "Aristotle is willing to accept uncertainty when certainty is out of reach. That is why virtue cannot be knowledge -- knowledge for Aristotle is something eternal, something certain that "cannot be otherwise.""

Ok, I see the "realist" aspect that both you and David mention. But I am wondering about this comment about virtue not being knowledge because in the first section he says, "But such a statement, though true, is by no means clear; for not only here but in all other pursuits which are objects of knowledge it is indeed true to say that we must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts too much or too little...". I am reading this to mean that virtue is an object of knowledge??? So does he distinguish somewhere between knowledge and "objects of knowledge"?? Later in the section is when he divides the rational part of the soul into two. I understand that these two parts work differently according to the types of knowledge they are trying to obtain, but still they are objects of knowledge. Is that right??

Thomas wrote: "6.4 Art is a characteristic of the soul involved with reason that is concerned with making things. Its object of concern is outside the soul itself. (Question: how does art disclose truth?) "

This was interesting to me. At first, I wondered if he considered art to be concerned with the truth because it depicts things as they are, and those are things Aristotle thinks to be "real" or true (if I am understanding correctly)? But the example he gives is architecture and he says"art is identical with a state of capacity to make,involving a true course of reasoning." So does art reveal truth simply because it requires reason to make it?

Genni wrote: ""But such a statement, though true, is by no means clear; for not only here but in all other pursuits which are objects of knowledge it is indeed true to say that we must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts too much or too little...". I am reading this to mean that virtue is an object of knowledge??? So does he distinguish somewhere between knowledge and "objects of knowledge"??"

I guess we can all agree on "is by no means clear."

My take on it is this: knowledge for Aristotle is invariable and demonstrable, and the fact that virtue is "a characteristic apt to hit the mean in accordance with reason" is knowledge in this way.. But this bit of knowledge does not help us to act virtuously -- just as the knowledge that medicine is what a doctor practices does not help us to practice medicine.

When Aristotle says that virtue is not knowledge, I think he is responding directly to Socrates in the Meno. If virtue were knowledge it would be a simple matter of applying a formula, but Aristotle holds that there are no formulas of virtue that apply to every situation. To hit the mean in a given situation means two things: 1. Perceiving the specific details of each situation (and no two real life moral situations are identical) and 2. Deliberating, thinking and reasoning one's way to the mean, given the specifics of that situation.

This whole process might be called an object of "knowledge," but there is no knowledge or science that can tell us what to do without going through the steps of perceiving and thinking for ourselves each time we make a moral decision about something.

I think its important to remember what we see translated as "art" is the greek term technê which is more broadly translated as "craft".

Technê is a disposition (hexis) that produces something by way of true reasoning; it is concerned with the bringing into existence (peri genesin) of things that could either exist or not.

Parry, Richard, Episteme and Techne, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/f...

Perhaps the truth aspect comes into play when we apply something theoretical like geometry to a practical craft like carpentry.

Thomas wrote: "This whole process might be called an object of "knowledge," but there is no knowledge or science that can tell us what to do without going through the steps of perceiving and thinking for ourselves each time we make a moral decision about something."

Was Aristotle an existentialist?

It seems to me Aristotle's ethics are so broad and without specific moral todo's that it was ripe for religion to adopt it and supply those specifics for people, eliminating a lot of the hard thinking and reasoning Aristotle seems to be recommending.

David wrote: "Was Aristotle an existentialist?"

I don't think so, but I think an argument could be made that he was a phenomenologist. The funny thing is that Aristotle's virtue doesn't allow for much leeway or freedom (and an existentialist would probably balk at that.) Freedom is a prerequisite insofar as choices must be made voluntarily, but the target is not a matter of choice. There is only one for each person in each situation. This, of course, is the rub: the target -- the mean -- is situation specific. Laws (religious or otherwise) are unable to be as specific as they need to be to describe where the mean is in every situation. This is why virtue has to be a condition or characteristic (a "hexis") and not a set of guidelines for acting morally.

I'm not sure if I have this right, but it seems that thinking, or "right reason," is also a condition or characteristic. If that is the case, we can be conditioned or educated to think virtuously as well as to desire the right things. If we are thinking virtuously, like Olympic thinking champions, then we don't need anyone to supply specifics. We can reason our way to the mean without difficulty.

(Understanding Aristotle's argument for this is, on the other hand, not easy at all.)

Cphe wrote: "He is searching for perfection."

Or maybe just excellence?

Thomas wrote: "If we are thinking virtuously, like Olympic thinking champions, then we don't need anyone to supply specifics. We can reason our way to the mean without difficulty."

Unless I am missing an important distinction between knowledge and reason as intellectual virtues, I am not sure about this. It sounds too much like Socrates' statement that knowledge is a virtue because if we know, then we will make the right choices and take the right actions, which Aristotle refutes. Socrates' seems to think knowledge is a virtue because it is sufficient for excellence, while Aristotle seems to think knowledge is merely necessary.

David wrote: " Socrates' seems to think knowledge is a virtue because it is sufficient for excellence, while Aristotle seems to think knowledge is merely necessary....."

I don't even know where to start with a discussion here, but I read a sentence of the original and I end up feeling like I am chasing circles. I was listening last week and I felt as if I could hear the sweep of Aristotle's arguments. But then I returned to the sense of trepidation before hope that any single mind, no matter how great, could get its reasoning and its logic around subjects so vast as Aristotle was tackling. We have two millennia of scholarship intervening and it seems to me that stories sometimes get us closer to the issues of justice and happiness than logic per se.

Also, we know only too well the multitude of directions virtuous logic takes humankind -- or is it even valid thinking to speak of "virtuous logic"?

Reasoning melds too easily into rationalization. I think we have learned long ago that whatever we have learned almost always yields new knowledge when re-examined. So -- the meaning of eternal? Or, put meaning aside, the significance? the usefulness?

None of which is to denigrate the value of reasoning. But only rubbing it up against other reasoning seems valid at this point in history. We have some tools to do that, but we still don't know how to do that very well.

Sorry -- enough rambling out of my frustration with trying to understand.

David wrote: "Unless I am missing an important distinction between knowledge and reason as intellectual virtues, I am not sure about this. It sounds too much like Socrates' statement that knowledge is a virtue because if we know, then we will make the right choices and take the right actions, which Aristotle refutes."

Knowledge is of things that don't change, but the mean is something that varies depending on particular circumstances. We have to deliberate about right action, taking into consideration all of the specific details. But as Aristotle says, "No one deliberates over things that don't change," so knowledge alone is insufficient to hit the mean.

The intellectual faculty that corresponds to things that change, which is "apt to hit the mean," is prudence (aka practical judgment, Greek phronesis.) Prudence seems to be the skill that we use in finding the right means to the right end under particular circumstances. Skilled deliberation is a function of prudence, so I guess my Olympic thinking champion is a prudence specialist.

Thomas wrote: "Knowledge is of things that don't change,..."

I have trouble with that statement. It seems to me that the last two centuries are almost totally refute accepting that view. Instead, l.ook at the knowledge one has and ask what are its limits, within what boundaries is it valid, what could be different, let's try that, let's experiment -- out the other end comes "new" knowledge -- which will also "change."

I really stumble over knowledge as "eternal", as "unchanging," and can only attempt to understand Aristotle by finding him self-contradictory, or I'm not understanding what he means with these words -- all of which doesn't feel like a very profitable reading.

Lily wrote: "Thomas wrote: "Knowledge is of things that don't change,..."

I have trouble with that statement. It seems to me that the last two centuries are almost totally refute accepting that view. Instead, ..."

For the sake of clarity, I think it might be acceptable in this case to translate episteme as "fact" rather than knowledge. (As in Daniel Patrick Moynihan's famous quip that "Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not to his own facts." ) The way Aristotle uses the word is fairly technical, but it seems to refer to an objective standard rather than a field of investigation. Science has changed the way we think about a lot of things, but there are still 4 quarts in a gallon.

Four quarts in a gallon is a tautology. A priori analytical.

Is a pint still a pound all the world 'round?

Look at it this way. Aristotle knew enough about astronomy that he could have reliably predicted last year's eclipse, although he wouldn't have dated it A.D. 2017, obviously.

Although Book Six was fairly confusing, I think the conclusion really pulled it together.

i like his remarks about how the young can be very good at geometry, because it is abstract knowledge, while they are not prudent, whereas the old are almost all prudent, just because of the experience gained in life.

I found that was generally true, that older co-workers, say, were general better at 'our' job, regardless of experience with computers, or level of education.

And of course, depending on who you ask, I'm kind of old myself.

David wrote: "Perhaps the truth aspect comes into play when we apply something theoretical like geometry to a practical craft like carpentry. "

This is what I was trying to say, though I did not say it so well. Thanks for clarifying which Greek term he was using.

Christopher wrote: "Four quarts in a gallon is a tautology. A priori analytical.

Is a pint still a pound all the world 'round?

Look at it this way. Aristotle knew enough about astronomy that he could have reliably p..."

Are there such things as standards?

Thomas wrote: "For the sake of clarity, I think it might be acceptable in this case to translate episteme as "fact" rather than knowledge. (As in Daniel Patrick Moynihan's famous quip that "Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not to his own facts." ) .."

And then we have all the questions of the "meaning(s)" that can be attributed to those "facts," especially insofar as political, cultural, artistic, ... facts are concerned.

(Yes, many of us adore Twain's quips about statistics.)

Lily wrote: "And then we have all the questions of the "meaning(s)" that can be attributed to those "facts," especially insofar as political, cultural, artistic, ... facts are concerned. ."

I don't think Aristotle is referring to meanings that are inferred from facts, but the facts themselves. They may amount to no more than mathematical certainties. For example, if I give you directions to a location and say it's so many miles east and so many miles north from where currently are, you are not at liberty to use your own definition of "mile" or you will never find the location. However we define mile (in terms of other smaller or larger measurements) we can all know precisely how long it is.

I think this is what Aristotle means by "knowledge" -- certainties that do not change and are not a matter of opinion.

I took it to mean that a person, were he or she deliberating about an action to take the next day, would not include in those deliberations a contingency plan in case the sun didn't come up. Or, if a person is deliberating on whether or not to eat an apple, doesn't deliberate on whether or not it is an apple. If he was confused about its identity, then that would be a different situation, and a different set of deliberations.

Bryan wrote: "I took it to mean that a person, were he or she deliberating about an action to take the next day, would not include in those deliberations a contingency plan in case the sun didn't come up. Or, if..."

He says a strange thing at the end of chapter 2: "And nothing that has happened is chosen,; for instance no one chooses for Troy to have been sacked..." It seems so obvious that one wonders why he mentions it, but it shows us that his concern is with things that are in motion rather than things that have already been decided.

What precedes this obvious comment is a discussion of choice, which is a kind of motion toward something. Aristotle's Physics is primarily about motion, and he sees the soul as a source of motion. So it makes sense that practical judgment is about things in motion or a process of change rather than things that are already known.

Thomas wrote: "Aristotle's Physics is primarily about motion, and he sees the soul as a source of motion. So it makes sense that practical judgment is about things in motion or a process of change rather than things that are already known."

This is a really cool observation. An interesting derivative is, while A sees practical judgement in relationship to motion, his view of "science" (episteme) accepts less flux and is, as Lily points out, more static. But then, it took almost 2000 years for people to come up with a good alternative to Aristotelean science, so I don't think we can fault him.