The History Book Club discussion

This is the reading assignment for week four - (January 25, 2010 to January 31, 2010):

Wednesday, July 1, 1863 — 2. Buford (12 pages) 91 - 102 - Week Four and Wednesday, July 1, 1863 — 3. Lee (19 pages) 103 - 121 - Week Four

Hello Everyone,

Today we are continuing our historical fiction discussion on Killer Angels. This is the first historical fiction group selected book. We hope that the membership will participate.

We will open up a thread for each week's reading. Please make sure to post in the particular thread dedicated to those specific chapters and page numbers to avoid spoilers.

This book was kicked off on January 4th.

This discussion will be led by assisting moderator of historical fiction - Elizabeth S.

We look forward to your participation. Barnes and Noble and other noted on line booksellers do have copies of the book and shipment can be expedited. The book can also be obtained easily at your local library, or on your Kindle.

Since we only started this book on January 4th, there is still time remaining to obtain the book and get started. This is a quick and fast paced book.

There is no rush and we are thrilled to have you join us. It is never too late to get started and/or to post.

This thread opens today January 24th for discussion. This is a no spoiler thread.

Welcome,

~Bentley


TO ALWAYS SEE ALL WEEKS' THREADS SELECT VIEW ALL

Michael Shaara

Last week we heard the beginning shots of the battle from afar. This week we see it up close, and we meet death. These chapters show us the battle both from the Union side and from the Confederate side. And we really start using those maps.

In “Chapter 2: Buford” we begin the day with Buford waking his men and preparing them for the battle he knows will come. The plan is to hold the enemy until Reynolds and his infantry can arrive. Because of the good ground Buford selected, and how he prepared his men, his loses are “Not bad. Not bad at all” (page 94). But because of overwhelming numbers, the Confederates start breaking through. And then Buford sees the infantry coming down the road. Buford’s men hold on, Reynolds arrives and places his men, and then is suddenly shot. The men fight on, without a commander.

In “Chapter 3: Lee” we see Lee moving his men into Gettysburg, thinking as he goes of all eventualities. When he gets close, he consults with General Hill, who still doesn’t really know who his men are fighting. We see the same events Buford saw, but now from the Confederate side. Lee is frustrated because he doesn’t have information to make decisions with, mainly because he hasn’t heard from Stuart. On page 106 he says, “I know nothing of what’s in front of me. It may be the entire Federal army.” Or not. He doesn’t have the information to tell. Lee plans a withdrawal, but much of his army is still following the orders to meet at Gettysburg. He wishes Longstreet were there with his troops. Lee sees the importance of Cemetery Hill and asks Ewell to take it if possible. Finally he begins to see this is the main Union army, and they “have marched quicker than [he:] expected. Thank the Lord for Longstreet’s spy.” (page 117). At the end of the chapter, Lee is proud of his soldiers, who are winning. He seems to think this battle is basically over.

In the Buford chapter, we see many examples of a good officer. At the beginning, we see Buford waking his men and preparing them for the battle surely coming. Reynolds personally and carefully placing his men. He does this so well that they fight on without a leader after his death.

In the Lee chapter, we see some examples of officers who aren’t quite making the grade, for whatever reason. On page 105, Lee asks Hill what artillery his men are facing, and Hill just doesn’t know. Lee asks Ewell to take Cemetery Hill if possible. But Ewell doesn’t and Lee doesn’t hear why.

What other good or bad qualities to we see in these officers (both North and South)? Could other officers have done a better job and not made mistakes? What makes a good officer?

Did Lee always give ambiguous orders? Or do we just see a couple of them here? I guess I'm judging the order to Ewell based on what is in Killer Angels. It may have been more clear in reality.

Actually, thinking about these orders, I get the feeling Lee is trusting the judgment of men under him, perhaps too much. Especially when you don't have all the information, which Lee is frequently lamenting in this chapter, you say, "I want X, but I'm only willing to pay Y for it. You know the situation better than I do. If it costs more than Y, don't do it." I think the hard part is defining Y best.

The OODA loop is helpful, again, here. Lee is making decisions without sufficient observations to orient himself. He is hoping his subordinates can fill in those missing observations and adjust the decision accordingly. Some of the problem with that is the subordinates don't have the perspective Lee has of the overall battle. It is difficult to take the hill, so they don't do it. Not taking into consideration the later cost to the whole army.

Perhaps that is much of what was lost with Stonewall. Maybe he was just better at dealing with such orders and making good decisions off of them.

Elizabeth S wrote: "Did Lee always give ambiguous orders? Or do we just see a couple of them here? I guess I'm judging the order to Ewell based on what is in Killer Angels. It may have been more clear in reality.

..."

The other part of this situation is, could Lee gather enough information in a timely manner to make the decisions? The battlefield was fairly well spread out and I don't think Lee could have kept a real time view of the entire array of forces well enough to make decisions - he would need to count on his subordinates to make major decisions after giving them a general plan of action.

Having said that, should Lee have engaged in the battle with so many unknowns? It is a risk he decided to take.

John Keegan discusses how a general controls a battlefield has changed as the nature of warfare has changed in "The Mask of Commmand". It is a great book all around. Incidentally, one of the leaders he covers is Grant so it is relevant to this discussion.

Basically, Mr. Keegan says:

Alexander the Great could lead from the front because he could make the decision on where to attack and lead his army to that point. Once the fighting actually started, he did not have any control over the battle.

Wellington led the his forces from just behind and in sight of the battlefield. Due to the set-piece nature of the battles of the time, he could see the entire battle and move units around accordingly.

Grant, on the other hand, couldn't see all of his units so he had to give general direction to his commanders and expect them to execute in the appropriate fashion.

John Keegan

From what I have read, Lee (like Grant) gave general directions as "orders" and left it up to his subordinates to carry out his intentions. He found that of all his subordinates only Stonewall Jackson thought the same way he did and consistently carried out the orders as intended with the speed intended. So while Jackson was alive he always carried the bulk of the Army of Northern Virginia under his command; when Jackson was killed Jackson's large command was divided and neither of the new Corps commanders had Jackson's ability to think like Lee.

Lincoln's problems with leadership in the Army of the Potomac was similar -- not until Grant showed up did any of them think like Lincoln in terms of how to use the army or what the role of the army was. I liked:
T. Harry Williams

McClellan did have many subordinates who thought like him. His problem was he was a fool and unable to look beyond himself. See Sears excellent biography:
Stephen W. Sears

Jeff wrote: "I don't think the order to Ewell was much different than we read in Killer Angels. The account there is pretty factual.

Did Lee always give ambiguous orders? Good question. My guess is no, or..."

I agree with Jeff that Lee was not always ambiguous in his orders. He can and should be faulted for his ambiguity with Stuart a few days before the battle. However, when Lee reaches Gettysburg, he faces a very different situation. Lee has no good, timely battlefield intelligence, so he must react to circumstances. Telling Ewell to continue the attack "if possible" was really his only option.

When Lee and Longstreet meet late in the day and find that Ewell has not pressed the attack, they have a contentious disagreement about what to do the following day. Jeffry Wert, in his fine book "Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier", describes it as follows, using slightly different words than Shaara:

Jabbing a fist toward the enemy, Lee exclaimed,
"If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack
him."

"If he is there," Longstreet shot back, "it will
be because he is anxious that we should attack
him -- a good reason, in my judgment, for not
doing so." (p.257)

Note that both statements are conditional starting with the word "if". The fact is that neither knows what's happening with the enemy. Longstreet wants a flanking attack, which Wert says "is impractical, and Lee rightly dismisses it out of hand." Lee wants to resume the attack the next morning, which deeply disturbs Longstreet. After the war, Longstreet writes that Lee "seemed under a subdued excitement which occasionally took possession of him when the 'hunt was up' ...

The irony is that due to lack of good intelligence from Stuart, they both may have been right. Lee was right to reject a flanking attack and Longstreet was right to oppose an attack in the morning and to urge that they wait for the enemy to come to them. With intelligence, the dispute might have been avoided and the uncertainty of how to proceed might have been a moot thing.

Here's the Wert link:

Another good book, Robert. Thanks for the info from it.

By the way, please include the author link (and picture if available) along with the book cover. Like this:

Jeffry D. Wert (photo not available)

Also, if you forget, you can edit your own posts to add the links without having to make another comment. Whichever is easier for you.

I like this discussion about Lee. You all have great comments and I am learning so much from all of you. One of the things I wish I'd read before KA is a good bio of Lee. I'd like to have already known him as the great general before reading about this not-so-great moment of his life.

I like what John said about Stonewall and Lee thinking so much alike, and Lincoln and Grant too. It is so much easier to work with people who not only have the same vision, but the same kind of way to get there. The trick is to work with people who have different styles. (Personally, I've never had much success doing that kind of thing.)

In the situation described in KA, should Lee have changed his style to match his new corps commanders? Or should he have spent more time training them to his style? Problem is, I don't think there was time for either option.

It is fascinating to read these comments after reading the chapters. I'm disappointed in Lee's character. He clearly is not "commanding" his officers and is lacking the information about the surrounding area that he should have had as a commander (sending out appropriate spies/messengers). While all is not controllable, in this book, he is characterized as an unskilled officer relying on the "luck" of the moment. This does not match the fame and skill he is so well-known for. What's with this interpretation?

Viviane wrote: "It is fascinating to read these comments after reading the chapters. I'm disappointed in Lee's character. He clearly is not "commanding" his officers and is lacking the information about the surr..."

I hear you, Viviane. I had (and have) some of the same questions. We've been discussing Lee's abilities since last week's reading (see http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/2...). So far I think our consensus is that at the time of Gettysburg Lee is old, and having health problems, and we are seeing him on a "bad day" per se. Even the best generals make some bad decisions and loose some battles. And I think Shaara first shows us this week side of Lee, without helping us see the great general he was at other times. It is part of why the comments from Jeff and others who have read other, nonfiction, books about Gettysburg and the Civil War are so valuable. They help us see the sides of people that Shaara doesn't explore or emphasize in Killer Angels.

By the way, I have to mention how much I love all the little things that really make history come alive in this book. The drama of Buford's men holding, and wondering how long they can hold for. The weather plays a part as people say things like, "Glad the rain is gone. Don’t want anything to slow up Reynolds"(page 95). And then Buford sees the blue line coming up from the south.

Really emphasizes to me why armies wore uniforms. When everyone wears the same color, you know who it is from a distance. Now, we try to hide our armies more. Probably because we have other means of identification besides visual. We want our own people to know who and what we are, but not the enemy.

So that dramatic moment when Buford sees Reynolds coming isn't something that would happen as often in our day.

Question for those of you knowledgeable about military matters. In the end of the Buford chapter this week, Reynolds dies. And no one seems to know who should take command. What should have happened? Who should have taken over?

Thank you Jeff for that explanation in message 20...it cleared a lot of things up.

Thanks, Jeff. That really helped me.

Interesting sidenote about Abner Doubleday. At one point he was considered the inventor of baseball, having supposedly made up the rules and played the "first" game in 1839 at Cooperstown, NY. Hence the reason the Baseball Hall of Fame is in Cooperstown. People widely now agree that this is false. Still an interesting myth about a minor character in Killer Angels.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abner_Do...

http://www.historybuff.com/library/re...

Remember when we were debating about how valuable the spy was in the first chapter of the book? At the end of this week's chapters, Lee says the "spy was correct in his reports. Had it not been for that report, this army might have been destroyed in detail."

To me this is one of the first marks shown in the book of Lee as a great general and man. It takes someone great to admit when he or she is wrong. Here we have Lee admitting to Longstreet that the spy was worth it and probably saved the army. Big concession from a man who didn't believe in spies.

Also at the end of this week's Lee chapter we get some of this ongoing debate between Longstreet and Lee on how to fight the war. They are both excited about the success of this day of fighting, but have different ideas of what to do the next day. Longstreet wants to go find some nice high ground between Gettysburg and Washington and let the Army of the Potomac attack them. Lee is incredulous. He sees every reason to continue the fight where they are.

Now, in light of history, we know what was decided and what the result was. But given what they knew then, who's side would you have argued for? I see some strong arguments on both sides. For me, I'm a cautious person. I like the idea of finding a good place to dig in and let the enemy wear themselves out bashing against my defenses. But the morale of your army is a big factor. And to disengage now may give some confidence to the enemy, which you don't usually want to allow. What do you all think?

I probably would have chosen the taking the higher ground only because of the formidable numbers they were facing. However, there is something to be said about facing the enemy on level ground, less of a direct attack by cannon perhaps. I'm not a war strategist but still am trying to understand their actions in the context of "their times." Longstreet's defensive strategies were perceived as new, partially successful but unproven by time at that point. Makes me want to read their minds more than what Shaara provides. I hear you as well re breaking the morale by disengaging. Was a tough choice for sure.

I would have attacked. For me, having the initiative and staying flexible is very important. The Union army was significantly larger than what the Confederates could field in the same area; so staying mobile would have been critical.

Jeff wrote: "Picked up a bit more of the story on the night of the 1st in the Confederate camp from my reading of Sears' book.

Apparently, the discussion between Lee and Longstreet may have gone on quite awh..."

Now that is a more balanced perspective. Obviously several of these angles were skipped or glossed over in KA. But looking at all these arguments from Lee's perspective, I can see what a difficult decision it would be.

Thanks again, Jeff.

KA is also full of lots of little hints of bigger stories. For example, on page 112, Lee "thought for the first time that day of his son, Rooney, wounded, lying not far from here." I believe that is the only mention of Rooney in KA.

Rooney was the nickname for William Henry Fitzhugh Lee and was Robert E. Lee's third child, second son. (Incidentally, Robert E. Lee was married to the great-granddaughter of Martha Washington by her first husband. So he was the step-great-grandson-in-law of George Washington.) Rooney was in the cavalry under Stuart. He had been seriously wounded in the thigh at the Battle of Brandy Station which took place shortly before Gettysburg on June 9, 1863. On June 26, 1863, Rooney was captured by Union forces while recovering from his wounds. Don't know if Robert E. Lee would have necessarily known about the capture during the days we are reading about in KA, but he must have known about the injury.

All my sources are from wikipedia this time:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_E...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_o...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hickory_...