Michael Seltzer

“As history abundantly shows, Congress, for all its faults, has not been the unbroken parade of clowns and thieves and posturing windbags so often portrayed.”
― David McCullough, The American Spirit: Who We Are and What We Stand For

“In sum, part I has shown that administrative law revives prerogative legislation, together with the prerogative of suspending and dispensing with law—thus restoring an extralegal regime of making and unmaking law. And lest it be thought that this is improbable, it should be recalled that some leading advocates of administrative law candidly admitted that their project was to return to prerogative power. John Dickinson, for example, observed that “the question of whether or not the king can issue ordinances parallels our modern question as to whether or not an executive body or officer can establish regulations; and the arguments used pro and con have followed much the same lines.”25 Put more theoretically, administrative lawmaking is not a power exercised through law, but a power outside it. Indeed, as will become more fully apparent in part III, it is a power above the law. But even when considered simply as a power outside the law, this extralegal regime revives what once was considered absolute power. Administrative law thus returns to the very sort of power that constitutions developed in order to prohibit. The prerogative to issue law-like commands was the primary point of contention in the English constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century. In response, the English developed a constitution and Americans enacted a constitution that placed all legislative power in the legislature. It therefore is mistaken to assume that American administrative law is a novel mode of governance, which could not have been anticipated or barred by the U.S. Constitution. On the contrary, administrative power revives extralegal rulemaking, interpretation, dispensing, and suspending, and thus almost the entire regime of extralegal lawmaking once associated with absolute prerogative power. It thereby restores what constitutions barred when they located legislative power in their legislatures.”
― Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?

“This breadth of constitutional law in barring extralegal legislation is revealing about more than the past. The reader will have to wait patiently until chapter 7 for details of the current regime of extralegal lawmaking, but the significance of the history can already be anticipated. In an era of administrative legislation, it often is assumed that when the U.S. Constitution grants legislative power to Congress, it does not bar the executive from issuing binding rules, making interpretations, or setting taxes—as long as the executive has legislative authorization or at least acquiescence. The history of constitutional law, however, reveals that constitutions developed to bar all extralegal lawmaking—the point being to confine government to ruling through the law. Thus, administrative legislation—whether by proclamation, rulemaking, interpretation, or taxation—is not a novel form of lawmaking, and it cannot, on account of its alleged novelty, escape constitutional restrictions. On the contrary, it is a return to the extralegal legislation that constitutions were established to prohibit.”
― Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?

“In general, the natural dividing line between legislative and nonlegislative power was between rules that bound subjects and those that did not. Legal obligation seemed by nature to require consent. It therefore was assumed that the enactment of legally binding rules could come only from a representative legislature and that the resulting rules could bind only subjects, not other peoples.3 As put by John Locke, the “legislative authority” is that by which laws “are in force over the subjects of th[e] commonwealth.” Blackstone elaborated, “Legislators and their laws are said to compel and oblige.”
― Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?