Status Updates From Nothing Less Than War: A Ne...

On cue, the first armed merchant was torpedoed off the Breton coast on 1 April as antiwar rallies reached pitch to no aval & faced harrassment. "ironically in one sense the Chief Executive was requesting war in order to preserve his nation's rights as a neutral" i.e. protect its maritime power.

A string of sinkings in the first quarter of 1917 was pushing public opinion over the brink; the State Department no longer protested the Royal Navy's blockade & the Federal Reserve resumed the purchase of treasury notes [IOU's].
Hoover's Commission for the Relief of Belgium was ordered to pull out of Belgium and France [no note whether it continued its activities, in absentia, via Brotain and/or the Netherlands ?]

USA no longer sounded convincing in its neutral idealism. A final "Peace Without Victory" speech on 25/01/1917 to endorse an international coaltion was dismissed asutopian.
On February 3rd, unrestricted submarine warfare resumed.... but:
"You carry food to an enemy of my country & tough I am sorry it is my duty to sink you." Captain Rose of U-53 rescued the entire crew of his target & dropped them off at Cornwall.

The prevalent cockiness among Europe's governments in turn deepened the split between the two American parties over the pro & con of intervention, but they jointly urged both belligerents to show their true aims; if these weren't "noble enough", the US would take sides. As Lansing sold it to the press: we send a peace note but prepare for entry. This "si vis pacem para bellum" approach caused a short PR panic.

Should he formulate a peace program, rules for restricted submarine warfare or straightforwardly condemn unrestricted submarine warfare? Wilson had difficulty striking the right tone for his Peace Note at the end of 1916. His audience was cocky. Notwithstanding the Central Powers' territorial gains following the fall of Bukarest, the Entente had turned down a German proposal for negotiations under US auspicion.

Wilson personally disliked the famous "he kept us out of the war" slogan, fully aware of the diplomatic tightrope it concealed. Since the summer, it had become clear that nobody in Europe really wanted America to arbiter a peace without reparation. Theodore N. Kaufman could've scored with the cry "Germany must Perish!" in this climate.

The 1916 presidental election was a close run, with very similar platforms. including a World Court or such, a stronger Navy for global post-war interests & an army that would be nurtured but save its strength at the same time. the Democrats could taut domestic legislation that improved wages: so far, neutrality held without scarcity, so it was hard to find and point blame for either Party.

All this economic power could force the blockade. Episodes like the Easter Rising irked more than just the German-Americans & newspapers had long memories of 1902. On the other hand US also needed imports of the Empire (rubber, tin) & would hurt its own economy without large profits from grains&arms: "With American prosperity a reality, the US had far more to gain materially by acquescence than challenge Britain.

Secretary of State Lansing's diary entry: "When we do go into the war & we might as well make up our minds that we are going in, we must go in on the side of the Allies, for we are a democracy... we can determine to a large extent who is to be financed & who is not." True; 30% of British imports came from Neutrals; 40% of its chemicals & alloys for guns 'n shells from the US and Wall Street was its main creditor...

The 1st National Defense Act of June '16 was too cautious to satisfy the preparedness lobby, out of touch with the WWI numbers game & even a disappointment to the isolationists. The National Guard, placed under Federal control, showed (only) defects in training & material when they reinforced their brethern in the southern border states after Pancho Villa's raid on the town of Colombus earlier in March..

the (first) (modern) blacklisting of firms by Britain & next by her Allies was widened to include US based firms under German management in July 16. It was the rivet that resurrected the US merchant marine from the mists of the Civil War.

the Sussex pledge was ripe for criticism. It was an either/or stance, harsh on Germany but without a hard word on the British blockade. By its logic, hostilities would break out the moment the benefits to unrestricted submarine warfare became preferable to those of a neutral America. It steepened the slope.

The Kaiser made a poignant remark about the whole U-boat rules controversy which is often obscured in British & American books: "Sending millions of shells and cartridges to England and her Allies to kill and maim 1000s of German soldiers is not inhuman because profitable"

German Foreign Minster Van Jagow complied on 4.5.16 with the "Sussex Note" on cruiser rules, but not on humanitarian grounds. Taking on a new enemy was unwise during the Verdun deadlock & Somme threat. The small U-boat fleet (43 strong and 9 under construction), patrolling at 25% capacity, was better off without rules.

Lansing's impractical (cowardly?) proposal provoked intense debate in Congress, for example; could the Federal government prohibit U.S. citizens from boarding Britain's armed passenger ships for their own safety? By April 18, Wilson threatened to 'severe diplomatic relations' over the unrestricted U-boats after a new series of sunken spats involving Americans. Couldn't the ships be given the benefit of the doubt ?

the British practice of arming her merchant/passenger ships to opportunistically hunt U-boats raised new questions within U.S. diplomacy. Could these still travel to America, visit its ports, Were these armaments defensive? Germany refused to distinguish the fine points. R.Lansing proposed on 7.1.16 to see all non-military vessels disarmed in return for scrupulously adhered cruiser rules.
Yes, the honour system (!)

Within months (1916) the U.S. found itself involved in far greater debates. The nation experienced outright sabotage efforts, a major diplomatic proposal to strip belligerent merchant ships of their arms, a full-scale Congressional rebellion over the right of American passengers to travel on [these ships] & the sinking of a British passenger in the Channel, a matter that brought the U.S. to the brink of war.

American newspapers cannily summarized the lukewarm German apology to their 125 countrymen perished with the Lusitania under the headline “Sorry, but I’ll do it again”. It put the blame on Britain’s complicated cargo practices. Its not an easy decision to make on the spot for a U-boat captain when the Lusitania carries ammunition or another liner ships mules “from Armenia” to France together with U.S. Negro handlers.

The sinking of the Lusitania on 7 may 1915 is potrayed as the 9/11 of 14-18 but in actuality in only sparked two diplomatic “Lusitania” notes by Wilson that made Germany secretly forbid its U-boats to attack large passenger liners under any flag. The rest of the discussion between him and Foreign Minister von Jagow about rules was little more than wad-throwing.

The peril at sea from an average dozen U-boats went beyond the sentimental value of American lives lost: half the U.S. export trade was carried by U.K. ships, so the sinkings had a transatlantic economic impact that registered in Washington. Yet a proposal for a state-owned merchant marine died in a record session of Congress, replete with 10 hour speeches & cozy cots on the floor.