Status Updates From Häving : lugu Putini sõja t...

Good point that the Kremlin assumed Ukrainian leaders would react like Russians (that they could be influenced, bought off), and the West assumed Russians would act like Europeans (that they wouldn’t tolerate the war).

Mega important point: Russia's decision to not fully mobilize and only utilize contract soldiers in the initial invasion entailed deploying units at considerably below full strength, without reducing number of units. Result was motorized infantry "without infantry," which is why it was so heavily smashed by Javelin/NLAW strike groups in the forest/cities of northern Ukraine. No deployable infantry to screen.

Interesting point that American reluctance to supply or allow the supplying of certain heavy weapons to Ukraine (like fighter jets) is more about the Chinese - and their concerns about Putin’s handling of the war and nuclear threats - than about said nuclear threat emanating from Moscow itself.

Really interesting focus on those around Putin as driving decision making, including deciding to go to war.

“Dialogue of the death” between the West and Russia.

Fascinating point about the importance of Boris Johnson’s support in the intensifying discussions around Ukraine’s joining of NATO in the couple years preceding the Russian invasion, as spurred by the multiple Russian assassinations in England.