Status Updates From Ocean of Reasoning: A Great...

The previous chapter was a continuation of textual analysis, but there weren't any new philosophical concepts presented.

The previous chapter was a continuation of textual analysis, but there weren't any new philosophical concepts presented.

Tsongkhapa once again reiterates that action cannot happen in a vacuum, nor can it arise through anything other than causes and conditions. The only reason that we can impute both action and agent is because actions have effects, and these effects imply both an agent and prior conditioning. If action did not have an agent, action would happen endlessly. If agent were not the basis for action, no action could happen

Tsongkhapa makes an interesting point that exhaustion of a phenomena is not the same thing as a phenomena not existing. Exhaustion is based on an object referent (meaning that something that used to be there is no longer there) whereas nonexistence is simply an absence of causes, conditions, and effects. The effect of an action destroys the causes and conditions phenomenologically, leading to their exhaustion.

Tsongkhapa makes another complicated argument about why arising necessarily entails enduring and ceasing. If arising existed but not endurance and ceasing, then the produced would be like space. If enduring existed but not arising or ceasing, the produced could not endure (because it never arose nor ceased). If the produced ceased without arising or enduring, this is nonsensical, because nothing arose at all

Tsongkhapa makes another interesting point, saying that if space were accommodating to objects in a positivistic way, you would be able to have two objects in the exact same spatial location. However, since space is merely the absence of an object, it cannot accommodate two objects in one location--You have to move one object in order to place another one in its stead. Space is therefore dependent on material form

So at this point we're refuting the elements, and Tsongkhapa gives a very convoluted explanation of the untenable sequential arising of characteristics and the things that they characterize. Basically, he is saying that they are both dependent on one another and their ultimate absence--They cannot arise sequentially, because if one existed without the other, the syllogism would fall apart

Okay so, I think the first two chapters of the commentary are the most important--If you can understand those chapters, you will probably be able to understand the rest of the commentary without any issue. Tsongkhapa is very adamant in pointing out that 1) nothing has an inherent, permanent essence, and that 2) action produces the agent, not the other way around (although neither are essentially real)

In these previous few pages, Tsongkhapa refutes the essence of phenomena in both temporal and grammatical senses. Temporally, an action does not inherently exist because it once it stops, there is no more action to be found. You cannot find it in the past, present, or future. Grammatically, neither the agent nor the action can essentially exist, because otherwise they would have to be identical to one another.

Tsongkhapa makes a further point saying that while capacity is the agent of activity, the substance is not. The capacity for an action belongs either to the noun or the verb as a referent, but not both. Because activities themselves lack an inherent substance, they can only be determined by their effects, and subsequently by identifying the proper predicate as a mental deduction.

Tsongkhapa makes another complicated grammatical argument here: he says that if either a noun or a verb is connected to a referent, then it is impossible for the other to be connected to the referent. In other words, they cannot belong to the same continuum--If "going" can only be found in relation to space-time, then it cannot be found in the "goer" in any inherent sense of the word.

Tsongkhapa makes an interesting observation here: he says that the referent of the word "going" does not refer to the object that is moving, but instead the space or interval being gone over. In other words, you can only determine motion interdependently based on an object's position in space-time. Therefore, motion does not exist essentially, but only relationally.

Tsongkhapa refutes coming and going by making two arguments: One is that since two things cannot arise and fall away at the same time, motion has to be understood as a continuum of infinite moments where there is, in fact, no essential motion to be found. The other argument he makes is actually rather flimsy in my opinion, and it has to do with the non-existence of the front and back of the foot as well as the path.

Tsongkhapa explains that Buddhist scriptures which proclaim the unarisen nature of all phenomena do so in the sense of their ultimate, non-inherent arising rather than their conventional compound arising. If everything were simply non-arisen, they would not have a modality by which to appear in one's consciousness, which would be like something perceived by the son of a barren woman. This is not a Buddhist teaching.

The effect does not exist essentially, in whole or in part, in its causes. If the former were the case, such as a cloth residing in the thread, loom, and scissors, each cause could give rise to the complete cloth on its own. If the latter were the case, and part of the effect existed essentially in each of its causes, then the effect would arise in differentiated parts (multiple causes would equal multiple effects)

Tsongkhapa says here that the arising of an effect and the ceasing of the cause are simultaneous. He also states that the ceasing of one moment of consciousness is the immediate cause of the proceeding moment of consciousness, meaning that a cause can only be considered a cause once it is no longer existent. Since ceasing cause and rising effect are simultaneous, they are both necessarily empty and completely unborn

These next couple of pages would also be hard for a non-Buddhist to understand. Tsongkhapa here is refuting the idea of predestination--That something can exist ahead of its cause. Buddhists believe that causes and conditions create karma, but also that you have the ability to change previous karma by counteracting those causes and conditions with different behavior. The doctrine of karma is not based on fatalism.

Similarly, Tsongkhapa mentions that actions do not arise ultimately but only conditionally, because if actions could arise without conditions, they would simply appear out of nowhere. This is untenable because all action and non-action occurs in intertwined with our sensory interpretations of those actions and non-actions.

This next section would be practically incomprehensible to people who aren't familiar with Indian schools of philosophy. Tsongkhapa is arguing that consciousness is not the pre-existing basis of all phenomena--He instead argues that the consciousness is a mental deduction that comes from perceiving arising phenomena, because consciousness could not exist without conditions such as the various sense organs

According to Tsonkhapa, the efficient condition refers to the five aggregates, the objective condition refers to the perceptions of the six kinds of consciousness, the immediate condition refers to the cause that has just ceased, and the dominant condition refers to the six kinds of causes (facilitative cause, simultaneous cause, homogenous cause, psychological causes, ubiquitous causes, and ripening causes)

Before Tsongkhapa moves on to the next verse in the MMK, he mentions that "not arising from other" is not the same as arising from causes and conditions. This is because the Buddha taught the four conditions in abhidharma: The efficient condition, the objective condition, the immediate condition, and the dominant condition

Before moving on to his analysis of the next verse in the Mulamadhyamakakarika, Tsongkhapa mentions that ignorance exists only in conventional reality and not in the ultimate reality. This is to explain ignorance as the source of arising in the so-called 12 links of dependent arising as described in the Pali canon. The ultimate reality is both empty of ignorance and empty of emptiness.