Status Updates From Money and Government: Unset...

Note 2/2:
... Did Keynes (and I mean the Keynes in TGT, not the ‘Monetary Reform’ or the ‘Treatise of Money’ Keynes) even advocate the relinquishing of central bank independence? Skidelsky is a radical.

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What in the actual fuck? Skidelsky advocates a relinquishing of central bank independent control of interest rates to the government. Has decades (or even centuries) of economic history not already taught us that political pressure will just jack rates down to oblivion? ...

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... although underlying US productivity remains shit.

Furthermore, this gets me thinking - Hayekians think that a declining price level is desirable because it is natural under productivity growth. But my point is that you can't observe underlying productivity, and what if the stable/declining price level is caused by cheap imports? That would be a misguided price-level policy, then.

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A good, practical example of the perhaps slightly abstract concept of China's current account surplus causing the US's capital surplus, which pushed down r* and thus allowed developed market central banks to run expansionary monetary policy - the massive entry of cheap Chinese goods flooding the world market, which subdues inflation. I can imagine a story of cheap Chinese goods keeping down inflation ...

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... productivity. And what makes Skidelsky so certain that such schemes invariably raise productivity? He certainly hasn't cited any research so far that suggests so.

Who knew that criticising is easy but finding solutions difficult?

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Lmao, it is undeniably hilarious that Skidelsky is quick to criticise orthodoxy, but when it's his time to propose a solution, i.e. his Public Investment Banks idea (intellectually justified by the crackpot Mariana Mazzucato's key ideas), he falls back to Laffer-style, supply-side logic by claiming that although state investment does not directly 'pay for themselves', they do so 'indirectly' by raising ...

Note 3/3:
... capital flowing from a capital-scarce country to a capital-rich one?

Does China really have no social safety net tho? I wanted to find out, and ig that's 1 of my vague motivations for visiting China, but guess where that plan went? It's fine.

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... next page, he quotes Rajan who explains American overconsumption by literally 'growing inequality and (a) thin social safety net' which creates political pressure to encourage easy credit to keep the economy going. Wtf man? Fantastic example of how you can just pick and choose whatever story you want, and run with it. But anyway, the key paradox is clear - how on earth is ...

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The argument that Skidelsky is making - that China's savings glut is explained by high inequality and the absence of a social safety net (which he quotes Pettis on), which forces the Chinese to intensively save whatever excess wealth they have, and even invest them in strong foreign asset markets (i.e. the US here), is novel and got me seriously pondering ... BUT the only problem is that, right on the ...

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Furthermore, Skidelsky’s commentary also made me concede my own naivety, that most of the capital liberalization will just be used by investors for global speculative purposes (say, the carry trade), rather than productive investment in the real economy lol.

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I remain strongly supportive of global capital liberalization, as per my neoliberal belief that this can only serve to allow capital to flow to their most productive uses, but I had no idea that the IMF ‘forced’ developing countries to open up their capital accounts LOL. How would the IMF even 'force' a country to do so? By imposing this T&C in their development loans? Washington consensus.

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ii) I haven't even encountered the possibility of our bank selling one of our loans, nor can I imagine the scenario. Presumably a bank would sell a loan to another bank, and also thru secondary markets like CDOs or Synthetic Risk Transfers. But I would presume that the latter avenue is nowhere near sophisticated in Msia

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Skidelsky discusses banks managing a liquidity crisis by having to fire-sell their assets, which got me thinking:
i) What other assets do banks own, other than their loans? Money-market instruments that they invest in, I presume, or other financial assets, most notably Treasuries and repo

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... use it? I find it hard to believe that a regular regional bank, say HLB, has a team of sophisticated quant researchers toggling statistical loan default data.

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Hmm I'm way more interested in bank VaR usage now, for obvious reasons.

i) Does HLB use VaR? Our management can surely understand it, right? The executive output def isn't rocket science.

ii) Which sorts of banks can use VaR, and for which sort of portfolios? All banks? For just regular commercial banking portfolios? Or do only investment banks with prop trading books ...

Skidelsky clowns EMH for justifying policymakers’ pre-crash unfettered liberalisation of financial markets, but my intrusive thought is the dichotomy between policymakers and practitioners in markets - efficient-market policymakers choosing to liberalize inefficient-market practitioners. Clearly, practitioners believe markets are inefficient, so why didn’t this view spill over to the central bankers regulating them?

My vague thought (and I have no idea if this is a 'no shit' thought) - since it's obvious that the bulk of payments now are made with electronic money (and will continue to increase), then this swings the debate between the 2 money schools firmly towards the 'soft money' camp. Monetary policy should thus be made assuming the soft money story is true.

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... himself] and fought hard to avoid a repetition of that experience.
‘Economic psychology’ at its finest, and I certainly don’t dismiss this interesting read of the events.

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Fascinating psychological/ mindset read by Skidelsky here (imo lol) — the ECB was slow to act because its historical experience was the early 1920s hyperinflation; whereas the Fed obviously was scarred by the Great Depression [and not to mention Bernanke being a Depression scholar (this just makes me realize how incredibly funny it is that you can misconstrue Bernanke as being a mental health scholar) ...

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... the large part themselves, why do they make policies that benefit the rich. This may be a naive oversimplification, however, since being a policymaker can pave the way to becoming a kleptocrat.

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... minds lol — let’s just consider economic or monetary policymakers for the time being, to narrow down the scope of consideration. The salary of a central bank economist isn't high lol, at least, nowhere near a hedge fund manager’s. My point is that policymakers are normies too, to an extent, so I wonder what they think and feel, when they parse economic data like these, and, if they’re normies for ...

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The median UK household held only around £1500 of gross assets (whatever TF that means). WTF?! £1500 for the whole frickin household?

Top 5% of households held £175k on average — BoE (2012) quarterly bulletin, 'The distributional effects of asset purchases'.

Making my own money starts to give me real lived context to numbers like these lol. I'm also starting to wonder what goes thru policymakers' ...

‘Operation Twist’ = The Fed’s strategy of selling short-term Treasuries and buying long ones, to more aggressively twist the yield curve. I didn’t even know this bruh

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2. In the 1998 BoE Act: ‘for each path of the official rate given by the decisions of the MPC, there is an implied path for the monetary aggregates,’ TF does this even mean? Note that this policy goal was learned from the experience of the failed monetarist experiment of the 80s, i.e. not targeting monetary aggregates directly, but still retaining it as the most important indicator.