Status Updates From Investigación sobre el cono...

Note n/n:

we are still trapped by black swan dangers.

The bottom line is that Hume still distinguishes between better and worse inductive inferences. Hume wasn't an absolute skeptic; he was a mitigated skeptic, and traders already live with this philosophy.

Note 4/n:
already largely see the world in probabilities. In the markets, probabilistic thinking certainly anchors our analyses and contains our biases, but we all know the hidden risk of probabilities in the markets - the risk of a black swan event.

Hume doesn't add much to resolve this conundrum, then! I am already skeptical of causation, and I don't know why he leaps to proposing thinking with probabilities - ...

Note 3/n:
central tension that persists in Hume's thinking: why is he skeptical of causation, yet allows for empirical reasoning from probability (essentially, merely a more sophisticated, mathematical induction from past observations)?

Thus, Hume adds little much to my existing mode of thought, then. Following my reading of books like 'Fooled by randomness' and 'Superforecasting', and writers like Mauboussin, I ...

Note 2/n:
Hume's methodology results in a peculiar probability scale that spans from -1 to 1 (because he deducts negative observations from positive), instead of the modern convention of 0 to 1 (because we now only count the positive observations and divide them by the total observations). Nice! Good value-add by Millican yet again.

But now that I have some grasp on 'Of miracles', I now direct my attention to the...

Note 1/n:
I have finally reached 'Of miracles' and I may be in a good position to critique my own (largely negative) 2025 review of 'Of miracles'. The notes made me understand that this lengthy ramble of i) proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence, ii) deducting negative from positive evidence is just Hume's 18th-century, rambly way of stating his doctrine of probabilistic thinking. Millican also taught me that...

bit yapping of his life, triết học dễ tiếp cận và triết học sâu xa, lẫn hệ luỵ

Note n/n:

governed by the same maxims as the vulgar, especially in the active parts of life.

(I can also see now how deeply seeped in scholasticism the pre-Cartesians were, with their dogma of the superiority of human reason; and this allows me to see how compatible Aristotelianism is with Christianity, which made it so popular.)

Note 8/n:
less prestigious university, or people who speak in a heavy accent. I do not necessarily possess any superior insight into the 'real', deeper nature of things than anyone else - we are all bound by analogical reasoning and induction.

A Platonist might hold that philosophers are intellectually superior to others due to our deeper understanding of the Forms, but a Humean humbly realises that we are ...

Note 7/n:
goes to Dr Millican, as always.

'On the reason of animals' was humbling not just on an inter-species level, but on an intra level as well. If all living things possess but the same animalistic mode of reasoning, then there is zero justification for me to feel superior about my own reasoning compared to certain groups of people, e.g. people who may have less formal education than I have, or attended a ...

Note 6/n:
the Treatise. But my challenge to Hume last night was that he must now explain why humans are so intellectually superior to the beasts. And I read this morning that Hume answers this in his endnote: I will read it tonight. Ha.

I would not have known that Darwin's personal notes show that he read 'On the reason of animals' around the time that he was embarking in his groundbreaking revolution. The credit...

Note 5/n:
reasoning (there must be a medium). I wonder if Hume even realised this fallacy in his reasoning.

Also, I am smugly feeling like a philosophical genius now, because I accurately anticipated the key objection to Hume's 'Of the reason of animals'. I had accepted Hume's argument that humans possess merely the same mode of reasoning as the beasts (i.e. analogical reasoning and custom) since my reading of ...

Note 4/n:
in non-humans, I cannot infer that this means that homosexuality SHOULD be allowed among humans. There is a missing link from the premise to the conclusion.) So Hume's approach runs into the is-ought problem as well. I observe that all ideas correspond with an impression, yes, but I cannot rush to the conclusion that every idea SHOULD correspond with an impression! There is a missing link in the logical ...

Note 3/n:
experience, i.e. doing experiments and not relying on metaphysical speculation and armchair theorizing.

I wonder if this approach has philosophical grounding. For example, there is the is-ought problem, of course expounded by Hume himself! When I observe a set of phenomena of what IS, pure reason cannot infer from that observation of what SHOULD be! (e.g. when I observe that homosexual behaviour occurs...

Note 2/n:
cleanse our reasonings with analogical reasoning, i.e. ranking the quality of the evidence of our reasoning by how closely they resemble the original object. A clearer example of what I mean by how Hume directly imposes positivity into normativity is that he deduces that all human knowledge is grounded in experience, then the takeaway of this philosophy is that all human knowledge SHOULD be grounded in ...

Note 1/n:
1 key observation from Hume's epistemology thus far is that he seems to be deducing a positive philosophy of human reasoning, and then he imposes that positive deduction into the normative sphere. What I mean is that he (probably correctly) concludes that all our reasonings concerning matters of fact are grounded in analogical reasoning and custom, then the takeaway for this deduction is that we should ...

Note n/n:

It is obvious to me that God loves us and knows us so well as his people, that he granted us free will, but at the same time he already knows what choices we will freely make, like how a father knows his children will choose candy over plain bread.

Note 6/n:
circumstances. That does not mean they were determined to make said choices! I also KNOW (in the common, natural language sense of the word) that my boss would be furious if I slapped him across the face, and I KNOW that I will get fired if I slapped GMD across the face, but that doesn't mean they are determined to happen.

Note 5/n:
influenced Hume which influenced Smith.

And in response to ii), Hume says that it is a 'mystery', to evade accusations of heresy.

As a theist, I never really bought into the view that God having perfect foreknowledge means that all events must necessarily be determined. It is obvious to me, that if I know a person extremely well, let's say Joyce, I would know what they would choose to do in certain ...

Note 4/n:
action is right or wrong, because pure reason seemingly only tells us that there is no moral responsibility due to the deterministic argument), we must adopt a sentimentalist moral philosophy, which Hume, of course, does, and which I am looking forward to reading in the 'Enquiry concerning the principle of morals'. To my knowledge, Hutcheson pioneered this sort of sentimentalist moral philosophy, which ...

Note 3/n:
response to i) - this may be the conclusion from abstract philosophical reasoning, but our 'sublime reflections' crumble under the heated emotions of blame or a moral crisis. I can certainly attest to this - many times have all my profound reflections vanished when I am in a crisis or in great pain. Since, in practice, all moral reasoning are grounded in the passions (our emotions tell us whether an ...

Note 2/n:
compatible with morality, but necessary for it: because we can only ascribe moral responsibility to a durable character. This hardly solves the problem of moral accountability, however, hence -

2 objections: i) There is NO moral responsibility because everything has already been predetermined, ii) The prime mover is the author of all sin (basically the problem of evil).

Hume raises a great point in ...

Note 1/n:
I finally see now how Hume is a compatibilist - well first of all, he accepts/ borrows Aquinas's prime mover argument. It is clear that everything has a cause, and every cause has a cause ..... going down this infinite regress of causes we can deduce that there was a prime mover.

But how can there be moral responsibility if everything was predetermined?

Hume says that this determinism is not only ...

La raison, pierre angulaire de la méthode scientifique n’est pas fiable et ne permet pas de faire de lien cause-effet. En fait, il est impossible d’établir un lien de causation selon Hume.