Status Updates From Science of Knowledge: with ...

I'm not convinced there needs to be, like Fichte assumes, a single principle of knowledge. Knowledge could be the product of a coherence of several equally necessary principles. He also implies the act of positing precedes any other faculty of the self, but this doesn't seem right either. To posit at all seems to depend on something(s).

This dude a madman and arrogant as fuck in a way that I love though lol. Nevertheless, he is indispensable for understanding the immense effects of the complete Kantian Transcendental Turn on the history of philosophy and Transcendental Idealism in general.

Lucky to be able to be taking a Fichte seminar with a world-class Hegelian. Going back to the original 1794 has been more difficult but interesting than the 1804 lectures I've already reviewed.

"Through this very contradiction, which indeed brings a disjunction with it, realism's empirical principle would become genetic, and in this genesis, perhaps it will become the principle of a higher realism and idealism [united] into"

...basically just describing what Kant did in Transcendental Dialectic, while having supposedly left his system behind to create something new at the very beginning...

Fichte attempts to found transcendentality on a continuous division between mutually exclusive "things"(theres no good word here): concept and "light", which must yet be conceived through another, though light (conditions of appearance) negates insight (into the concept or object) because it is always a prerequisite. Reality is identified with light from the inside, as something that negates any insight.

"Thus away with all words and signs!" lmao this text feels like it's constantly about to end, like every sentence should already wrap it all up but no, it continues...wild and interesting stuff though

"...This(disjunction as absolute) is an important characteristic of the science of knowing and distinguushes it Spinoza's system which also wants abdolute oneness but does not know how to make a bridge from it to the manifold" and, on the other hand, if it has the manifold, cannot get from there to oneness"

this can only mean that its content determines its form and its form determines its content. This particular form can fit only this particular content, and this content can fit only this form.'

No proposition is possible without both content and form. There must be something about which one has knowledge, and there must also be something which one knows about this thing. It follows that the initial proposition of the entire Wissenschaftslehre must have both content and form. Since this proposition is supposed to be certain immediately and through itself, this can only mean...