Status Updates From Nelson and Napoleon: The Lo...

Nelson's portrait became the only instantly recognizable military hero in British history. He had challenged the gods.

What happened to Nelson's plan? British had followed Nelson's plan as best they could and had burst through, but into an odd, defensive double-strength crescent and then themselves been surrounded and given a terrible pasting by an enemy that was supposed to be inexpert and cowardly.

Lee says we have no proof of the French admiral's tactics but knew he anticipated Nelson's. There is no footnote to substantiate this from another source. Earlier he proposed this because Villeneuve was afraid of Nelson, he knew his mind well, so must have figured out Nelson's tactics. That is not proof he knew Nelson's tactics. That is a big assumption, not fact.

Nelson's plan he dreamed up on paper when he last visited England didn't work as well as he hoped. In part because the French fleet was not in the straight line that was usual for battle & because of the wind wasn't able to achieve speed he hoped to use to crash through line.

Lee speculates that the French admiral had figured out Nelson's new tactics for battle based on the fact he was so in awe of Nelson, might know Nelson's way of thinking, and figured out the line-of-battle concept was outdated (even though that is the way it had been done for decades). There is no basis for this conjecture.

The columns would pierce the enemy lines, split them into at least 3 groups and because the front of the column could be through before the enemy knew what was happening, the French would be fired upon from both sides. Firing into the hull of the enemy reduced chances of hitting your own with friendly fire.

Nelson's idea was to turn his fleet 90 degrees. It would break into 3 columns. 2 would be the main ships of the line. Each column would have 16 ships. The third column would be an advance squadron. This would be half the size, faster and smaller. They would have flexible tactics. If a big ship needed reinforcing they could help.

Nelson saw the weakness in line of battle campaigns as being that things could come to a standstill or captains could fail to see the signals that changed the direction of the conflict during the confusion of battle.

This would have the steering gear, and the command and control center. Overall British purpose was to dye the decks of the enemy ships with the blood of any sailor that could fight. Even a notion that it was better to wound a sailor severely than kill him. His wretched screaming would fill those around him with fear, making them less efficient.

Probably wouldn't fire cannons all at once. The shock effect of firing all at once in broadside would tip a vessel in the opposite direction and make it unstable and dislodging essential equipment. Most effective firing would come from consecutive firing from the line of gun ports. To fire in the rear section of the ship could have equally devastating effect.

French saw advantage of firing into the enemy rigging and spars, on the assumption that the vessel would then be out of control and the crashing timbers would create chaos below. English favored firing into the enemy hull. This killed more people and disabled more guns.

Typically, the sailors in both ships would have seen the enemy quite clearly as they waited to fire. A common engagement for that first broadside into the upper decks and hull would have been 50 yards or even less. It was not uncommon alongside, even touching, and then blast away at point-blank range.

Topgallants and staysails were furled and the main courses hauled in. The triangular sail at the front of the ship, the jib, and the main and fore topsails, were used to maneuver. The mizen, the sail at the stern of the ship, would be used as a sort of brake.

To better maneuver a ship, her sailing master would hand in most of, if not all, the lower sails. It was easier to maneuver using only the top sails. Once action had started, the huge main sails were unnecessary, they could cause havoc below, not to mention appalling ship-handling if struck by enemy shot.

The action of one frigate against another was not unlike the battle plan of two major flotillas. That tactic was to sail parallel to the enemy, fire as many broadsides as possible into her and then grapple alongside to take the surrender.

Naval tactics had not change much in decades, partly because the ships had not. The complexities of engagement that every capt had to follow the commander. But keeping the line and seeing the commander's command in the smoke of battle and chaos were difficult.

His experience told him that the limitations in ship handling caused by the construction and rigging in addition to the influence of weather conditions meant that opportunities to strike mortal blows at sections of the enemy were often lost in the need to conform to the forming of a battle line.