Status Updates From Routledge Handbook of Conte...

"In the 1980s, Reaganomics argued that wealth in a free market..economy trickled down to all. The ideological parallel in Thailand was that unfettered capitalist accumulation..could be made virtuous through donations to royal charities..following the 1997 crisis, Bhumibol pitched..for rural Thais to return to..subsistence farming..a thinly veiled reproduction of an American idea..the austerity economics..by the IMF."

"..the convergence of US and Thai [Cold War] efforts produced a unique relationship that..ultimately transformed Thailand and remain today at the center of Thai identity. For example, the military in effect became a separate socio-economic caste, deeply rooted in the mainstream economy and more illicit enterprises. In 1963, [General] Sarit’s assets alone were worth nearly 30 per cent of the country’s capital budget."

"Zuckerberg’s snub to Prayuth was described as a diplomatic affront against the Thai junta chief. Zuckerberg..played the card of the young and rebellious start-up pioneer who does not bow to state authorities. Reality, however, is different..in October 2016, Facebook cooperated with the Thai authorities and, without the users’ consent, inserted geo-blocking into the privacy settings of individual accounts.."

"After five years under the [junta], a large number of Thais remain convinced that voting rights are not for all, instead these rights should only granted to those with a high level of education..In considering the trajectory of current Thai politics, we may once again be reminded of the famously instructive words attributed to..Voltaire: “Those who can make you believe absurdities, can make you commit atrocities”."

"..Thai elites..promote..unevenness..conspicuously in recent years..to prevent the disadvantaged from effectively using political-electoral means to alleviate socio-economic inequality..Yellow Shirt supporters..including Sino-Thai business elites..have proven remarkably forthright in their expression of..contempt for Red Shirts..such as portraying Red Shirt protestors as water buffalo [i.e. slow, dim-witted]."

With hindsight, Thailand grievously erred by abolishing the local sultans of its southern border provinces in the 1930s & attempted to forge a unitary Thai state via forcible assimilation policies like banning the Malay language. Since its current COIN shows little success & Bangkok seems unwilling to entertain a long-lasting political solution, it's only left with either "Chechnya" or "Xinjiang" solution? #TwoCents

"Since the mid-1970s, Thai state elites have intensified the public cultivation of a form of hyper-royalism with distinctly “religious” overtones. The royalist cult has been centred on king Bhumibol Adulyadej (r. 1946–2016) and articulated in terms of barami (Buddhist royal virtue). As a consequence, the Thai royal family has effectively been turned into “sacred beings and royalism [into] a religion”."

"Observed on the ground, however, Buddhism as..practiced in Thailand appears to be more preoccupied with securing political influence and material wealth than peace and detachment..Thai Buddhism cannot be conceived of as disfranchised from the accumulation of political influence and material wealth, as power is a constitutive part of its history, makeup, continued appeal and relevance in the contemporary world."

The use of ""dharma" & "karma" in Thailand doesn't differ from those in Malaysia using "takdir" or "cobaan". The religious terms disguise or justify socio-economic inequity, lack of development & infrastructure, & widening wealth gap between the haves & have-nots. But what's interesting is that employment of religion in this sense is seems more tightly woven in the social & cultural tapestry of the former? #TwoCents

"Second, Thai policymakers often show a penchant for capital-intensive prestige projects including..high-speed rail, and..often nurture ambitions to create a regional transport hub..investments in transport projects may not necessarily generate sufficient..benefits that can justify the use of public funds. Third, there is a clear policy bias towards private cars and a limited effort to promote sustainable mobility.."

"..Thailand’s xenophobic nationalist policies following the end of the [WWII] made [Sino-Thais] politically vulnerable, forcing them to respond in several ways..Most important response..was the formation of patronage connections with the military and civilian politicians as well as government bureaucrats..provided protection to them but also gave them access to privileges."

Hm. Somewhat similar scenario in Malaysia.

The chapter discussing Thailand's "middle income trap" argues that the royalty, military, & Sino-Thai capitalists are essentially rentiers disinterested in any reforms that could dilute their power & wealth. It also claims that "reforms" undertaken by King Chulalongkorn were superficial & not comparable to that of Japan's Meiji, which is why by 1941, it was Japan that imposed its will on Siam with little resistance.

The title to chapter 10 says it all, 'LÈSE-MAJESTÉ WITHIN THAILAND’S REGIME OF INTIMIDATION'. One of the few "good" things that came out of British colonialism of Malaysia is the various monarchies was never deified to that of the Thai kings. This, combined with the fact that the British bore the brunt of combating the communist insurgency, ensured that the police had primary counterinsurgency role over the military.

"The monarchy was also chided by anti-monarchists for its own great wealth..coinciding with the rise of Sino-Thai conglomerates that came to control..the economy..By linking to the palace, capitalists once seen as alien were “Thai-ified” and..prospered. During political conflict..that, far from matching the palace’s rhetoric, the monarchy was not protecting..its people. Rather..the wealth of a minority and its own.."

"..the [Thai] police..a massive, quasi-independent security institution, have demonstrated a capacity to behave as an alternative army which has tended to fiercely resist military domination..police-military rivalry has often degenerated into military attempts to control the police..the monarchy has generally favored the army over the police, while the police..often found their patrons in powerful elected civilians."

"..the hybrid regime is the most desirable model for [Thai] military leaders who want to stay in power...the hybrid regime looks better than the military government..the fall of the Thai hybrid regime does not stem from economic conditions or from international pressures..it depends on the military leadership to control the army and the parliament. Without them, the regime will..end up with another military coup."

"The long-standing tendency of Thailand’s royalist establishment to cite the threat of chaos – or when that is not enough, to engineer the chaos themselves – in order to make the suspension of electoral democracy appear necessary to “maintaining” or “restoring” order calls to mind an analogy drawn by the late historian..Charles Tilly between the methods of states and organized crime [i.e. protection rackets]."

"Fundamental questioning on..nature of democracy is a symptom of the precarious nature of Thai political conjunctures..12 successful coups and 20 constitutions reflect institutional and ideological flux. Only two constitutions have lasted longer than ten years..The predominant political pattern is a “vicious cycle”: the perennial return of the coup after a new constitution is promulgated and an election takes place."

"In short..from 1900 to the 1920s, the royal nationalistic version of Damrong-Vajiravudh was vigorously promoted, and by the 1930s the military-bureaucratic version of Wichit and the new commoner elite had become dominant. However, by the 1960s these two were blended together to give birth to a hybrid nationalistic historiography..a product of the very long 70-year reign of King Bhumibol, Rama IX (1946–2016).."

"The present inherits the legacies of the past. Histories written in an era of nation-building seek the roots of the present-day nation. They tend to project the contemporary back into the past. Early 20th-century histories of Thailand pictured 13th-century Sukhothai as..governed by a benevolent king and enjoying a liberal economy – uncannily reminiscent of [20th century] Thailand..This approach diminishes change."

"Under Bhumibol, political stability was key..Politics was predictable. Benefits were shared among major [network monarchy] stakeholders...Under Vajiralongkorn, because of his lack of moral authority, the new reign is utilizing fear as a mechanism..The ruthless reputation is also juxtaposed with his bizarre lifestyle..seen numerous times dressing strangely..such as..a tiny crop top with fake Yakuza-style tattoos.."