Status Updates From The Road to Jerusalem: Glub...

The IDF was highly impressed by the Legion's performance. Intel wrote: "The enemy's efficiency, speed & accuracy stood out during the ops." Ben-Gurion himself was filled w/ admiration. He told his Cabinet: "I must say a word in praise...This is a trained, disciplined & brave foe. The Arab Legion sparked our respect. It knows how to fight, doesn't run away, & how to assault, if needed. It has good command & weapons."

Israeli minister Yitzhak Grunbaum commented: "We do not understand, why the Arab Legion didn't advance further. Had it advanced - perhaps it would have conquered all of Jewish Jerusalem. But we were miraculously saved from this catastrophe." It appears in mid-May Ben-Gurion & the Israeli hierarchy were not convinced Abdullah intended to abide by the Nov. 1947 understanding & occupy only the Arab areas of Palestine.

Gelber writes: "Highly bellicose propaganda accompanied the [Arab coalition] invasion was motivated primarily by domestic considerations & secondly by inter-Arab considerations. Nevertheless, the invasion's purpose was not to push the Jews into the Mediterranean but to save the Palestinians from total destruction. Israel claimed an Arab master plan, combining the strategy of all the Arab armies. No such plan existed"

One Haganah intelligence report stated: "Some of the women and children taken prisoner by the LHI were moved…Among the prisoners were a young mother and a baby... The guards killed the baby in front of its mother and after she fainted also murdered her. 7 old persons and women taken prisoner by the IZL were paraded through the streets in trucks. Afterwards the Arabs were taken to Deir Yassin's quarry and murdered."

Peake: "In order that the Jews may filch Palestine from the Arabs, we poor British taxpayers must again produce the money [to pay for the troops in Palestine]. All this trouble over some sentimental nonsense about a promise to the Jews. I do not think that it was ever intended that thousands of Arabs should be shot down in order to carry out a promise which Jews (notorious liars) say was made to them 5,000 years ago.

Glubb grew up in a professional and country gentry milieu in which a genteel superficial anti-Semitism was the norm. Jews were regarded as aliens, and not completely kosher ones at that; they had about them, at the very least, a hint of business malpractice, sharp dealing, manipulation, profiteering.

The focus of Glubb's attentions in the 60s/70s were the Palestinian refugees. There can be no doubt that Glubb was shocked by Israel's swift victory in 1967 & genuinely angered by its subsequent behavior in the occupied West Bank & Gaza Strip (the destruction of Palestinian homes, etc). The misery of Palestinian existence certainly touched him; & in some way he may have felt a responsibility for their lot.

After (& despite) his humiliating ouster from Jordan, Glubb remained "a champion of the Arab cause." Indeed, his anti-Zionism increased with time. During the late 1950s & 60s Glubb concentrated on an autobiography & then a series of histories, rarely interviews or letters to newspapers. But from 1967 on, after the Six Day War & latest Palestinian tragedy, Glubb became a frequent & full-throated pro-Arab propagandist.

Concerning Israel, Glubb's thinking during 1949-56 was dominated by one abiding preoccupation: That it was bent on conquering the West
Bank & moving its eastern frontier to the River Jordan. Already in
July 1949 he noted many people believed the Jordan River to be Palestine's natural frontier, that "the Jews" intend to make it Israel's eastern border. [Declassified IDF papers] reinforces the cogency of Glubb's fears.

As to Israel, [Britain's Chiefs of Staff Committee] wrote: "Israel will menace the integrity of Transjordan", depending on the "final territorial settlement in Palestine." They believed that "extreme Zionism" aimed to absorb "the whole of Palestine & the greater part of Transjordan into the State of Israel" & there was "more than a possibility that these extreme elements will come to power & will pursue their claims"

Glubb responded with a poster, distributed in the West Bank, which stated that the Legion "is still defending the Holy Land, while the other armies have disappeared. When Jerusalem, the Holy City, was in danger, it was the Arab Legion alone which rescued it ... The Arab Legion inflicted more casualties on the Jews than any other Arab army... The Arab Legion is still defending the Holy Land from Jewish attack ..."

Glubb (accurately) charged that this [hypocritical] attitude characterized Israel's approach to the UN. It flouted the arms embargo, by bringing weapons from Czechoslovakia & private arms markets, & regularly subjected UN observers who monitored the truces to "indignities". Since the assassination of UN Mediator, Count Bernadotte, UN personnel in Palestine felt so cowed that they routinely avoided antagonizing Israel

Glubb was now acutely aware that Israel was radically transforming the landscape so none of the refugees would have anywhere to return… "All over, Arab towns & villages are being filled w/ Jews. In some places, whole villages are being demolished & removed for Jewish colonies. In others, Arab towns are being completely taken over & transformed into Jewish towns. This process is being carried out w/ feverish haste."

Glubb's assumption was that no Palestinian refugees would be allowed back. Unknown to Glubb, the Israeli Cabinet had secretly resolved not to allow the refugees back, a decision that sealed the refugees' fate. Glubb, of course, had been completely correct about the Jewish looting, but seemed unaware that many of the empty Arab villages were being systematically razed, to prevent the possibility of a return.

As to the [Palestinian Arab] refugees, on 7 September 1948 Glubb produced a five-page
memorandum, impressive for its clarity and foresight…during 1948 and in later years he was consistently to express empathy with their plight. In his memoirs, he devotes moving passages to graphically describing their trials and tribulations.

As a result of IDF attacks on the Legion, Abdullah's attitude to Israel & possible peace changed…He no longer trusted Israeli assurances…What was to guarantee that after the other Arab armies "were out of the field, the Jews would not turn all their forces against us?" he asked. Abdullah said that the expulsion of the Palestinian Arab population & Jewish pretensions regarding Jerusalem had altered the situation.

On 21 May Glubb ordered the [Transjordanian Arab] Legion's 3rd Regiment (i.e., Battalion), which had been deployed around Nablus since 15 May, into action in Jerusalem. Glubb later described the regiment's soldiers as "simple and straightforward" bedouin, for whom the issue was simple: "The Holy Places of Jerusalem were being attacked. They would save them from the Jews."

But Jerusalem - [international territory] not in the UN-earmarked Jewish zone - was another matter. On 16 May Abdullah himself had cabled Glubb:

The importance of Jerusalem in the eyes of the Arabs, Muslims and Christians, is well known. Any disaster suffered by the people of the city at the hands of the Jews - whether they were killed or driven from their homes - would have the most far-reaching results for us.

Abdullah was clearly chafing at the bit; he wanted Jerusalem…the city was very much on his mind. He himself was a devout Muslim, for whom Jerusalem was a major holy site. Perhaps, too, the idea of "saving" Jerusalem for Islam was linked in his mind to his family's historic role, as custodians of the two main Muslim holy sites (Mecca and Medina)…at least he could lay hold of Islam's third holy site.

Glubb was "full of anxious forebodings. I knew the extent of Jewish preparations. I knew that the Arabs had no plan and that there was no cooperation between them. We still had received no ammunition. The people expected us in two or three days to take Tel Aviv. How was I to act amid so much folly?" Glubb kneeled down and prayed.

[Kirkbride] went on to predict that the Arab forces would enter Palestine, but would not be large, and "the avowed objective of the conquest of Palestine is probably too difficult a task for them." The Arab leaders might limit themselves to occupying Arab areas and the aim of halting further Jewish expansion - but for one thing: Jerusalem. "The
idea of Jerusalem in Jewish hands drives them beyond reason," he wrote.

Rhetorical oscillations aside, [King] Abdullah in practice cleaved to his original intention - of occupying some of the Arab areas, not attacking the Jewish areas, and avoiding battle with the Haganah. Ultimately, as we shall see, he strayed from the original, British-agreed scheme only in the belated dispatch of the Legion to "save" the Arab half of Jerusalem from Jewish conquest.

Golda demanded that the
King "declare peace with the Jews, & not send his army in" & promised that the Jewish Agency "would agree to Hashemite annexation of the Arab part of Palestine." Abdullah "promised that two armies would not fight the Jews & stop at the frontiers, & would not cross it." Tall was to write of how King Abdullah, subsequently, used to "joke about that Jewess's vulgarity, pride & domineering nature"

[Col. Desmond] Goldie then asked whether the Yishuv had in fact accepted partition or "whether you intend to conquer the whole of the country?" [Shlomo] Shamir responded that the future Jewish State's borders was a matter for the Yishuv's political leaders to decide. What would be necessary for the state's security would be conquered "and if need be, also the whole country."

The gathering of Arab leaders on 29 April, "decided in favor of intervention by the regular Arab armies…" public pressure in each state was proving irresistible. Their leaders would probably be assassinated if they did nothing. Azzam noted Jews were able to import arms at will despite the embargo… & said it worked only against the Arabs who were not even getting the arms promised them under existing contracts.

But the crucial event, w/o doubt, was the conquest, by IZL & LHI (assisted by Haganah), of Deir Yassin..[with] the killing, mutilation & rape of dozens of unarmed civilians; about 110 villagers - most of them women, children & elderly - died. Subsequently, its gruesomeness contributed to the Palestinian flight from neighboring & distant towns & sparked feelings of anti-Zionist militancy & vengefulness in the masses.

At the start of April due to circumstances including clandestine arms shipments from Czechoslovakia… the Haganah went offensive, & during the following 6 weeks crushed the Palestinian militias & conquered Arab towns & urban neighborhoods. Dozens of Arab villages were razed & hundreds of thousands of civilians fled or were driven from their homes into (still-) Arab parts of Palestine or out of the country into exile

Glubb was annoyed by the apparent disparity in Israeli and British implementation of the embargo regarding personnel: Britain had ordered its nationals serving in the Legion to pull out while the IDF was employing hundreds of foreign nationals, such as Col. Mickey Marcus (Stone), in its ranks.

During the months before the invasion Glubb repeatedly visited Palestine. In January he toured "Jaffa, Lydda, & Ramle" & other Arab towns and, in his words, "begged them to prepare to defend themselves." The Legion also gave the inhabitants barbed wire and "as many weapons as we could [spare]." In March, he visited and held meeting with notables and local militia leaders in Gaza, Majdal, Hebron, Ramallah & Beersheba.

In his memoirs, written some 9
years after the event, Glubb remembered the key meeting between Abul Huda & Bevin, with himself attending as interpreter, thus:

Abul Huda opened with a statement declaring that the Palestinian Arabs
had not prepared, militarily or politically, for statehood & the likelihood was that the Jews would neglect the UN partition plan & would seize the whole of Palestine up to the River Jordan