Status Updates From German Strategy and the Pat...

One cannot improve on John Terraine's witty recap:
"Joffre's authority never wavered. His stature shrank in defeat."

The surprise blow against a feeble Russia had not been without critics, who pointed out that a Cannae style operation (echoes of Sedan or Schlieffen?) worked better than Bite and Swallow at Tarnow w/ divisionary attacks (Courland) & had a point that it failed to either knock out the Tsar or force him to the negotiation table. Did Falkenhayn hold back because of his Russophilia, compared to his loathing of Britain?

the Gorlice-Tarnow offensive is identified as a proto-Verdun by virtue of its reliance on " bite & swallow" tactics of Galician territory more than stormtroops. By september, Russia was neutralized for the time being, with the occupation of Vilnius cutting its only north to south main railway. This left German hands free to defeat Serbia in october, thereby convincing Bulgaria to join the Central Powers.

Verdun had practical value as a salient with good railways, but Falkenhayn couldn't resist linking its (perceived) symbolic value to the low spirit of the French Army, rich in deserters & poor in first-trench troops. That last fact was due to the evolution towards a defence in depth.

Ironically, because of his limited means, One Big Attack was also supposed to trigger a premature attack by the green Kitchener Army.

Verdun was a synthesis but also a throwback to the idea of "knock one front out". Originally he'd envisaged 3 (!) attacks along the whole French line but ran into practical problems. For Eaxmple, the storming of Belfort was originally an offensive plan copied off an Italian original. Once Italy entered the Allied camp, it probably passed on this plan to France. Scratch that.

Foley attributes his doubts to the different lessons from both fronts in 1915: great successes in the East, but in the West the artillery of a stretched defender could break the French attack in the Champagne.

Falkenhayn already entertained the notion in November '14 that the main enemy was Britain, who would perhaps fight on after the defeat of her ally France. At the same time, he couldn't decide (yet) beween Ermattung or knocking out 1 front - but which ? [ Most authors see Falkenhayn as a pure Westerner]

If Falkenhayn knew of the artillery-based advantage to the defenders in the West, why didn't he approve plans to attack Verdun on both banks ?

Two Front War : the world's deadliest juggle !

"There remains only France" ; Falkenhayn's familiar words at Verdun. But he already identified Britain as the main enemy, who might even continue the fight after the defeat of her continental allies, as First Ypres winded down.

We don't think we can win by a short war.
But we know we can't win a war of attrition.

A fact of German strategy that interwar authors and WWII archive-bombing made hard to see.