Status Updates From The Peloponnesian War

This is Sparta

Additionally important point that the peace to end the war “did not establish a stable balance of power” nor did it create a “new order.” The Spartans lacked the resources to maintain their newfound empire/hegemony. This is key for understanding the decades of violence and contestation that roiled Greece after 404 and enabled later Macedonian supremacy.

Major point about substantial depopulation across the Greek world owing to the war/attendant civil strife (the war considerable increased the prevalence of democrat vs. oligarch civil war, and attendant unprecedented atrocities) and local contestations. drove poverty, which spurred large-scale enlistment of Greeks as mercenaries in foreign armies.

The Athenian population ten years after peace was roughly half of what it had been at the war’s start. The Athenians were alone in being so devastated by plague (1/3 killed, worsened by city crowding following the evacuation of Attic countryside), but the war’s violence, armies’ destruction of crops, and economic/trade collapse all ravaged Greece.

The point being the “rule of the mob/just” narrative that influences political philosophy debates for the next two millennia misunderstands that the generals’ execution (presented as exemplary of a rowdy, unstable Athenian democracy) was a single breach of law that was strongly contested at the time, nearly didn’t occur, and immediately rescinded by the populace.

Important point that much of the political theory/philosophy that is coming out of Athens (i.e, Socrates and Aristotle) and related to questions of democracy and governance bears distinct reflection of the moment. Kagan argues that the unflattering view of democracy we get at certain moments (illegal ordering of Arginusae generals’ deaths; rejection of Spartan peace terms) were quite rational in context.

Alcibiades strategy of “justness and conciliation adopted as a means of recovering the empire” proved extremely effective. He led extremely effectively at the strategic level (whereas Thrasybulus was a remarkably successful operational commander).

He places a heavy emphasis on the failures of what essentially amounted to an Athenian policy of appeasement under Nicias, even as Sparta repeatedly violated the terms of the 421 peace.

In fact, the disentangling of alliance systems and weakening of the two great powers during the first ten years of war made the peace even more unstable. So, the Argives (allied to Sparta at the outset) by 421 were looking to replace Sparta as the main power in the Peloponnese, while Corinth remained unsatisfied and with more rein to attack Athenian allies.

Moreover, the peace solved immediate concerns for Athens/Sparta, but left other aligned states deeply alienated, particularly as both betrayed former allies or states that had revolted against the either’s systems of imperial control

Nor did it establish arbitration as a means of solving competing claims. Threat/force remained a viable means for resolving disputes, making a return to war straightforward once the immediate conditions of the peace were resolved (Athenian suppression of revolt within empire, repatriation of Spartans captured at Sphacteria).

Important point about the Peace of Nicias as a “false peace,” because it in effect could neither restore status quo ante bellum (because of considerable civil war in cities across Greece in the interim), nor “place the international order established in 445 on a secure footing”. Kagan is deeply critical of this peace for essentially settling none of the alliance/great power problems that led to war.

An important theme is the value of strategies of deterrence, but only if backed by sufficient force. The Athenian deterrence strategy against Corinth in defense of Corcyra works only with the supplying of an additional defense force beyond the initial ten ships, whereas Pericles’ deterrence against the Spartans fails owing to lack of its potential danger/damage.

Fascinating, Athenian representatives at a meeting of Spartan allies characterized their empire as essentially gathered in a “fit of absent-mindedness.”