Jon Hutson > Recent Status Updates

Interesting author. British but fought for the Nationalists. Then the SOE in the Second World War.
Interesting just how clear the bias is. For example any Nationalist atrocities are handwaved or put in a single sentence with little reflection, whilst Republican ones are put into great detail.
As you’d expect downplaying the level of German and Italian support to “a few squadrons” or “very few squadrons”

Wack

Take principles not tactics from one conflict to the next

Initial Co-option of local forces in line with Taliban could, and was working to keep up with irregulars.

Post-2006 partly on Iraq lessons ANSF built up around nation-centric western idea of SF. And paramilitary policing forces created. These western structured units were wholly reliant on external support. Good when ISAF there. Collapsed when it wasn’t.

Taliban won by driving garrisons to surrender through partial encirclement and delivery of services where government was extractive

Momentum drove even commanders who wanted to fight to withdraw to spare lives of troops

Afghan Commandos bled dry in Kandahar and Lashkar Gah, unable to stiffen conventional backbone. Capable units tied down, Taliban advanced elsewhere.

Insurgencies die slowly, governments quickly.

P.202 - Beaumont ‘selection-destruction’ Cycle - as SOF grow become disproportionate to overall security establishment they have a net-negative on overall performance. Capable troops serving as team/junior leaders transfer to SOF. Brain-drain undermines conventional force, are killed off in hazardous operations to make up for conventional force weakness. ANA SOF and ANP specials used as “fire brigades”

COIN requires capable (holistically) host. Despite 4.5b p/a ANSF spend did not win. Implementing “may be impossible” p.180

Afg characterised by Buzzwords over local attitudes and customs

Bost Airport (50 mil) was down road from Bastion, handed to Afg Camp Shorabak

Quantitive measurements do not work for COIN

Goals at odds with capabilities

Herculean generational deployment = so little came lost opportuniy

Failure to knit PRTs to local power brokers + Afghan society. PRT drawdown alongside COIN>SFA in 2014

“For the majority of Afghanistan’s 35 million people the living situation remains much the same as if none of this money had ever been spent” p.178 - growth 18% p/a 2009, 0.5 2019, Kabul-centric

Close to 90% afg women/girls suffered one form of abuse p.179, Coalition mission to prevent this undermined others?

Cycles of revenge in COIN especially with Pashtunwali honour codes. (HUMINT use for + outcomes?)

Neutralisation of support iceberg networks over overt fighters? > “centre of gravity lies deep below the waterline” (p.130) how to defeat within LOAC and ethics?

Crux: non military means need mil stability, creates cycle.

Dec 2014 as COIN > SFA phase - £ Reintegration of Taliban based on IQ, Viet, Malaya

3 - Echoes

Aid to partner want not what you think they need

Close knit kinship societies well to guerilla as lack of power centre to control, Co-opt, or decapitate. Decentralised C2C undermine control of Resistance and central Govt.

“Af-Pak Hands” and role in diminishing practice loss

Foreign forces jumped into deeper tribal/other disputes, not as clear cut as Talib/Govt. Don’t forget fighting skill.

3 - Echoes 2/?

ISAF mil density 9.7/1000 pop compared to sov 37 (+ local)

2021 local power holders much more individually wealthy than during Najibullah - Coalition didnt take advantage of new set of incentives this offered

Competing donor policies allowed (like Syria) brokers to play the field for small scale gains

Winning battles =/= winning contest or defeating enemy

Insurgencies need regional safe havens

3 - Echoes 1/2

Afghan fundamentally regional driven. Karzai compromise candidate had to bargain by design with warlords. 0 incentive ceding to inclusive institutions.

ISAF < 40th Army except surge (own in 85). Not enough for either to hold 21 Provincial Caps. Overall same mistakes.

Sov had hostile regional powers. evolved strategy of holding cities and MSRs, phased Afghanisation, econ reform and reconciliation.

2 - Evolving Campaign

COIN Web, beyond ‘threshold of violence’ mil force counterproductive. COIN pop centric and mil only actor to ensure security

Centralise tendency of Gov, fragmentary of local players/partners

- Combo of local (ie Drugs/Helmand) missions with lack of integrated economic/political strategy post mil defeat of Taliban

Inability to police corruption and involve ‘01 defeat Taliban in process

Introduction

Strikingly personal

Standouts are the refutal of the graveyard of ambition, narco-state, lack of National identity.

Argue that war winnable, “Both of Us are to Blame” is refreshing and sets out as a unique take.

Mission failure does not mean null positives.

Tactical/material breakdowns and strat miscalculations.

Bagram emblematic of lack of understanding/care of local AND ISAF partners.

7 Greed: Simply Love

Isolation and "Me Culture" because of a failure to actualise democracy? Greed as modern invention? It was historically unthinkable to kill someone for (her example) Fashion and no survival benefit? Sources for this? How does this fit into diff governing styles? Imperialism and Materialism as a '70s US Development? Highlights the wider issues with this book no self-reflection, and no evidence.

Chapter 6 'Living by a Love Ethic'

Profession an idealistic view that if public policy were oriented around a 'love ethic' then things such as addiction, homelessness, unemployment. This such a mind-numbingly hollow, surface level, simplistic take.

Loves small towns because of their love ethic, living in one "now only some of the time." A second home owner, unwilling to critically dive into this.