Noel’s Reviews > Ethics > Status Update

…which could destroy it, which (by P4) is absurd. Therefore, things and so on, q.e.d.”) I don’t see how that follows. Just because something could destroy another thing doesn’t mean they couldn’t both be part of another, larger thing. It does mean that this larger thing could destroy a part of itself. But this doesn’t even violate 3P4. Spinoza uses this proposition to justify his claim in 3P6 that “Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being.”

Dem.: For singular things are modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way (by IP25C), that is (by IP34), things that express, in a certain and determinate way, God’s power, by which God is and acts. And no thing has anything in itself by which it can be destroyed, or which takes its existence away (by P4). On the contrary, it is opposed to everything which can take its existence away (by P5). Therefore, as far as it can, and it lies in itself, it strives to persevere in its being, q.e.d.

The argument also moves without justification from “…cannot coexist with…” to “…is opposed to…”

I’m reading this snippet out of context, but I have a hard time seeing what “thing” references in 3P4 and whether that “thing” is different from “subject” in 3P5. They must be different, I suppose, if a “thing” can exist in a “subject” but according to 3P6, “things” have their own “being,” which makes “thing” sound like a person and “subject” as something a being occupies.

My initial thought was about concepts. If “5” is a concept that is “evident through itself,” which I am taking to mean true by definition then it cannot be destroyed by any external cause that would cause “5” not to exist. Neither can “5” occupy the same being as “6” because it is different from the being of “5.” But if a “thing as being” is smaller than “subject” then can “subject” be made of multiple beings and can those being maintain their separateness, as opposed to canceling each other out?

I really ought to read this text before trying to talk about it, but the proposed metaphysics here is interesting and confusing.

path, 3P4 is evident from previous definitions and propositions, if “essence” is taken to mean, for the first time, the totality of a thing’s properties (“the definition of any thing affirms, and not deny, the thing’s essence, or it points to the thing’s essence, and does not take it away,” is what Spinoza says). It’s not entirely clear what Spinoza means by “thing.” 3P5 could be an argument about the things’ natures (here apparently synonymous with essences), rather than the things themselves, coexisting together in another thing, in which case the argument would hold redundantly. But 3P6 needs it to be about the things themselves, since Spinoza wants to prove that if something could be destroyed by another thing, and they united, they would become a self-destructible subject, which is impossible (Spinoza seems to consider this subject itself a “thing,” insofar as it has a nature, or apparently, essence—obviously he doesn’t consider every collection of things a “thing”)—therefore the one must fight the other. Spinoza clearly has suicide in mind as a possible objection since he addresses it elsewhere:

Finally, as far as the fourth objection is concerned, I say that I grant entirely that a man placed in such an equilibrium (viz. who perceives nothing but thirst and hunger, and such food and drink as are equally distant from him) will perish of hunger and thirst. If they ask me whether such a man should not be thought an ass, rather than a man, I say that I do not know—just as I also do not know how highly we should esteem one who hangs himself, or children, fools, and madmen, and so on.

Also, it is very interesting :D Spinoza’s argumentation is generally splendid, too. It’s only when he’s taking an important step that there are problems, haha.

Oh, and by “being” Spinoza just means existence—as in, “everything strives to continue its existence.” He goes on to state that this very striving is the essence of the thing itself.

Oops, I just reread this and I meant to say “except through an external cause.” Whoops 😅