zulimaditas.epub’s Reviews > Metaphysical Emergence > Status Update

So far this is what I have but It's probably not definitive yet and my speed in reading this is 3-5 pages per hour

My argument - Wilson gives a clear schema for when SE would obtain, but the justificatory bridge from schema to metaphysics is not sufficient. Until we have a positive definition that explains emergent powers metaphysically, the step from “novel power” to “licensed Closure-violation” risks looking stipulative rather than forced by the phenomena of emergence.

Wilson frames the debate about downward causation (by Kim’s exclusion problem) as a tension among six claims: Dependence, Reality, Efficacy, Distinctness, Physical Causal Closure, and Non-overdetermination. Accepting the first four generates pressure on the last two, and Wilson argues this yields two coherent ontological emergence schemes. On a weak emergence (WE) scheme, we keep Closure and avoid overdetermination because the causal powers of the higher-level feature are a proper subset of those of its physical base (macro-causation is real but adds no second sufficient cause). On a strong emergence (SE) scheme, some higher-level features possess at least one novel power, so genuine downward causation occurs and Closure fails in those cases. This second scheme correlates with historical notions of emergence.

This proposal replaces Kim’s largely negative conception of emergence (supervenience and irreducibility, which immediately invites the exclusion worry) with a positive, powers-based conception that classifies emergence by how macro- and micro-powers relate.

But Wilson’s route to strong emergence is not yet sufficient. She secures ontological and causal distinctness by the New Power Condition (a higher-level feature S has at least one token power not identical to any power of its base P) and then argues that, in those cases, Physical Causal Closure fails, hence tackling the possibility of genuine downward causation and SE

The worry is that this move presupposes, but does not fully earn, a complete account of what these novel powers are and how they operate without simply re-labeling gaps in explanation. Wilson treats “power” as a metaphysically neutral notion, leaving the nature of emergent powers largely underdetermined.

That underdetermination of notions is relevant precisely because Kim’s exclusion problem shows how easily higher-level causation is squeezed once Closure is in play. Rejecting Closure in SE-cases looks principled only if we’re told why the macro-power could not, even in principle, be inherited, aggregated, or realized by the base without positing a new fundamental interaction.