Jeff Ragan’s Reviews > Infantry Combat: The Rifle Platoon: An Interactive Exercise in Small-Unit Tactics and Leadership > Status Update

"The basic principle of leadership in the U.S. Army, and particularly in light infantry units, is to always try to make decisions at the lowest possible level of command so they can be made as quickly as possible. On the battlefield, hesitation often breeds defeat" (348).

"In offensive & defensive tactical actions, commanders fight the enemy throughout the depth of his disposition with fires & with attacks on his flanks & rear. They attack committed & uncommitted forces & synchronize the attack of enemy artillery in depth with close operations. Such in-depth operations degrade the enemy's freedom of action, reduce his flexibility & endurance, & upset his plans & coordination" (337).

"The positioning of the platoon's key weapons and the flexibility of the defense to respond to different threats (day versus night positions) was a critical ingredient for their success. The platoon's use of concentrated fires, delivered from positions that were undetected on the reverse slope of the ridge, surprised the enemy and disrupted his combined-arms synchronization" (328).

"The positioning of the platoon's key weapons and the flexibility of the defense to respond to different threats (day versus night positions) was a critical ingredient for their success. The platoon's use of concentrated fires, delivered from positions that were undetected on the reverse slope of the ridge, surprised the enemy and disrupted his combined-arms synchronization" (328).

"'We have to patrol the high ground on our flank,' Davis said, completely in charge of the situation. The lieutenant unfolded his map and beckoned for the platoon sergeant to bend down to see as he pointed out key terrain on the map...'Send Tyler's squad to check out the high ground on the north wall,' said Davis. 'I want everyone else working on putting in minefields and completing positions'" (313).

"In offensive & defensive tactical actions, commanders fight the enemy throughout the depth of his disposition with fires & with attacks on his flanks &rear. They attack committed & uncommitted forces & synchronize the attack of enemy artillery in depth with close operations. Such in-depth operations degrade the enemy's freedom of action, reduce his flexibility & endurance, & upset his plans & coordination" (303).

"Thus by a rough approximation: 60% of the art of command is the ability to anticipate; 40 percent of the art of command is the ability to improvise, to reject the preconceived idea that has been tested and proved wrong in the crucible of operations, and so rule by action instead of acting by rules" (295).

"In choosing their centurions the Romans look not so much for the daring fire-eater type, but rather for men who are natural leaders and possess a stable and imperturbable temperament, not men who will open the battle and launch attacks, but those who will stand their ground even when worsted or hard-pressed, and will die in defense of their posts" (286).

Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall once said, '...there is no substitute for courage...Troops will excuse almost any stupidity; excessive timidity is simply unforgivable.' Gen. George Patton put the same idea this way: 'There is only one tactical principle which is not subject to change. It is to use the means at hand to inflict the maximum amount of...destruction on the enemy in minimal time'" (275).

"When the larger force concentrates its combat power on a narrow front to break through enemy defenses, the air assault task force may bypass main defenses to destroy artillery positions, command posts, logistics and communications facilities and to secure key terrain in the enemy's rear" (263).