J.’s Reviews > A History of the Middle East > Status Update

Mansfield shows that empire often justified itself less through overt hostility than through unexamined certainty—about race, capacity, and who was deemed fit to govern.

Reading Mansfield’s account of France’s intervention in Egypt under Napoleon Bonaparte — and his broader schemes to undermine England via India and continental alliances — sharpened an older realization: French involvement abroad during this entire period was driven far less by ideology or benevolence than by a relentless strategic rivalry with Britain.

This cast new light on France’s earlier role in the American Revolutionary War. French support for the American colonies appears less an act of sympathy and more a deliberate effort to weaken Britain wherever possible. In that sense, American independence aligned with French interests at least as much as colonial ones. France had long-standing territorial and commercial stakes in North America and an equally long-standing desire to deny Britain uncontested dominance there.

Napoleon’s later actions reinforce this interpretation. His Egyptian campaign, aborted alliance with Russia, and fixation on cutting Britain off from India suggest continuity rather than aberration — a worldview in which England was the primary obstacle to French power. Within that frame, the sale of Louisiana becomes less obviously generous or accidental. While I have no direct evidence that Napoleon intended to retake American territory later, the possibility that he saw the sale as a temporary expedient — driven by military necessity and shifting priorities rather than abandonment of ambition — no longer feels implausible.

What Mansfield makes clearer is that these theaters — Europe, the Middle East, India, and North America — were not separate stories. They were parts of a single, long geopolitical contest. Nations frequently behave with remarkable consistency across regions, even when rhetoric changes. Seen this way, early American history cannot be fully understood without recognizing that independence emerged not just from colonial resistance, but from imperial rivalry playing out on a global board.

Reading Mansfield’s account of France’s intervention in Egypt under Napoleon Bonaparte — and his broader schemes to undermine England via India and continental alliances — sharpened an older realization: French involvement abroad during this entire period was driven far less by ideology or benevolence than by a relentless strategic rivalry with Britain.

This cast new light on France’s earlier role in the American Revolutionary War. French support for the American colonies appears less an act of sympathy and more a deliberate effort to weaken Britain wherever possible. In that sense, American independence aligned with French interests at least as much as colonial ones. France had long-standing territorial and commercial stakes in North America and an equally long-standing desire to deny Britain uncontested dominance there.

Napoleon’s later actions reinforce this interpretation. His Egyptian campaign, aborted alliance with Russia, and fixation on cutting Britain off from India suggest continuity rather than aberration — a worldview in which England was the primary obstacle to French power. Within that frame, the sale of Louisiana becomes less obviously generous or accidental. While I have no direct evidence that Napoleon intended to retake American territory later, the possibility that he saw the sale as a temporary expedient — driven by military necessity and shifting priorities rather than abandonment of ambition — no longer feels implausible.

What Mansfield makes clearer is that these theaters — Europe, the Middle East, India, and North America — were not separate stories. They were parts of a single, long geopolitical contest. Nations frequently behave with remarkable consistency across regions, even when rhetoric changes. Seen this way, early American history cannot be fully understood without recognizing that independence emerged not just from colonial resistance, but from imperial rivalry playing out on a global board.

Tonight’s reading was brief but clarifying. What continues to stand out is how early Britain had effectively consolidated control over Egypt well before the formal end of the Ottoman Empire. By the time the empire collapsed, Britain had already shifted from overt dominance to a treaty-based protectorate — a pattern that reveals how colonial governance evolved over time from occupation to managed dependence. The tightening and loosening of control became a survival strategy as colonies grew harder to manage, a lesson that would matter profoundly after World War II.

It also struck me that colonialism did not so much end after World War I as it began changing form. The rhetoric softened, the methods diversified, but the underlying power structures largely remained intact.

Mansfield’s account of postwar decision-making underscores how little institutional reality there was on the ground after the Ottoman collapse. Egypt stood out as the only functioning nation-state. Elsewhere, Western leaders — including Woodrow Wilson and his advisers — attempted to assess self-governance through brief visits and consultations. In hindsight, this approach appears deeply naïve: centuries of imperial administration were replaced by ad-hoc judgments, filtered through Western assumptions about legitimacy and readiness.

Mansfield is particularly unsparing in showing how early plans for Palestine were built on contradictions. Zionist leadership sought not merely refuge or coexistence but a durable Jewish homeland capable of political and demographic control. Competing promises made by the European powers made any stable outcome unlikely. The notion of easy partition or harmonious coexistence emerged more as diplomatic convenience than as a reflection of on-the-ground intentions or realities.

What emerges overall is not a story of inevitable failure, but one of haste, overconfidence, and structural misunderstanding — of empire trying to manage decline with tools designed for dominance.