Dimitri’s Reviews > Great War Dawning: Germany and its Army at the Start of World War I > Status Update

Each horse assigned to the heavier gun of the driving battery had to pull approx 370 kg (limber loaded with ammo, sitting crew, share of gun) while in riding batteries with their lighter guns and the crew mounted individually, each horse had to pull only about 275 kg.

[On the accuracy of cavalry reconnaissance] reports can be inadequate or intercepted. The staff's interpretation could be in error or the result wrongly distributed. in the author's experience at the divisional level "the first report is 50 percent wrong"

The authors' conclusion sees an overemphasis in the optimal use of manpower rather than (MG augmented) firepower as the lessons of the Boer & Russo-Japanese wars were translated into the 1906 manual's dispersed formations - insofar as the army corps commanders took notice to really modernise their training.

"The lack of army group commands between the OHL in Luxembourg and the two field armies was certainly a major factor contributing to the Marne disaster" - meaning communication at a pace of 1 Q&A per X hours, via heavy wireless stations ranged 150 km apart, fragile telegraph lines & the time for (D)encryption.

In peacetime, Württemberg formations were based only in Württemberg; non Württemberg troops could be based in Württemberg only with the endorsement of the King of Württemberg, except for the fortress of Ulm, where the Kaiser reserved his right of assigning troops. The issue of the Ulm fortress was regulated in a specific contract between Prussia, Bavaria and Württemberg.

THESE INNER WORKINGS ARE GETTING COMPLICATED.