Mislav Kužić’s Reviews > The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940 > Status Update

Everyone in Vichy had come to terms with the fact that the Third Republic was over, and that a dictatorship with Pétain at the helm was better in the current situation. But he was only a figurehead, and this was recognized by the 80 deputies of the assembly who voted against the proposal to grant expanded powers and agree on a new Constitution. History has crowned their courageous gesture with eternal glory.

The attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir was a logical sequence for Churchill because nobody is interested in keeping one's word when national interests are at stake, it is pure pragmatism. However, this also had negative consequences because society in France showed solidarity with the government in Vichy. Pierre Laval refused all attempts to maintain the third republic and began to dismantle it with ease.

The government moved to Vichy and it quickly became clear that it would be an authoritarian creation that would lean completely on Nazi Germany. Pétain, Darlan and others expressed absolute contempt for democracy, the politicians of the Republic, almost all of whom were immediately arrested. The sentiment that the British had betrayed them reached its peak with the events of Operation Catapult.

The members of the government only formally discussed certain clauses of the armistice in order to ostensibly preserve the honor of France for history. Everyone had had enough of the war and the public welcomed the armistice. Only de Gaulle and some generals in North Africa wanted to continue the fight, but they were pacified. More shameful for the French was the signing of the armistice with Italy.

Pétain's government was ready to accept all the conditions that the Germans gave it in order to end the war. The surrender of Jews and political prisoners to Germany, the stay of French prisoners, etc. They were also quick to accuse all supporters of continuing the fight of treason for pushing France into the war. The only positive thing about the Compiègne diktat was that fleet stayed in French hands.

The outlines of what the new France would look like under Pétain's leadership were soon visible. An attempt to transfer part of the government to North Africa was thwarted, and all who resisted were arrested or retired. De Gaulle's call for resistance fell on deaf ears, as most people had given up. A delegation was sent to the negotiations, knowing that they were going to a funeral of liberty, but fleet was the key.

Paul Reynaud had the opportunity to save France from the humiliation of Vichy, but at the moment when he could clean up all the defeatists, he decided to resign. It simply cracked under the pressure. All the later reminiscences of the parties involved was an attempt to repair the damage because they knew what would follow the moment Pétain became prime minister. So de Gaulle fled to London and decided to resist.

Telegrams were exchanged between London and Bordeaux offering various solutions. Britain initially allowed the acceptance of the terms of a separate armistice between France and Germany to be explored. The other option was a Union of the two Allies. All this was ad hoc and unconvincing to the defeatists, and the Prime Minister himself did not help matters by losing his confidence, which ultimately brought him down.

Reynaud had one last chance to keep hope that his government would continue to resist the German attacks, if only he called on Churchill to address the ministers and reassure them in person that all was not lost. He avoided it and thus made the victory of the defeatists inevitable. Weygand began to disobey, and Pétain to assemble future traitors.

With the entry of the Germans into Paris and the subsequent collapse of the last possibility of a strategic retreat, Maxime Weygand's will to resist evaporated. All alternative solutions, Brittany and North Africa were rejected. Even Churchill saw that the French would surrender. They, on the other hand, were looking for a way to get out of the obligation that France should not sign the accompanying peace.