Isaac Chan’s Reviews > An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding > Status Update

Note n/n:
other editors by miles. He put in the effort to guide the reader section by section, and his notes are self-referencing.

No wonder I couldn't understand 'On liberty' and the Nicomachean ethics.

Note 5/n:
'Nicomachean ethics'. The explanatory notes and introduction by Millican are heads and shoulders above the Mill book. This is unacceptable - I would've thought OWC had a central editor committee that ensures consistent quality across all their books. The Enquiry is much shorter than the Mill and the Aristotle volumes which allows for more room for expert commentary, but still, Millican outshines the...

Note 4/n:
attribute a breakdown in some expected factor return pattern (e.g. the value factor earning me a negative excess return in a given year) to a breakdown in the uniform rule, by chance - I don't usually assume a contrary cause, like value stocks suddenly becoming less risky than growth stocks.

Finally, I compared my copies of Oxford World's Classics 'Enquiry', 'On liberty and other essays' and ...

Note 3/n:
objects) and thus the doctrine of necessity. I get it.

I'm not sure if I agree with Hume's argument that the vulgar commonly attribute uncertainty in events to contingency in the causes, whereas philosophers know that they are due to contrariety in the causes. When I see the clock stopping, yes I assume some defect (a contrary cause); but in the uncertain spheres like the financial markets, I commonly ...

Note 2/n:
explain/ predict empirical phenomena, and not wasting our time with the futile endeavour of speculating about the underlying metaphysics of things.

Humorously, I am currently unsure why Hume has chosen to go into this multi-page ramble about the uniformity of human nature, just to argue that people indeed have become accustomed to human nature's uniformity (as they have to the uniformity of other ...

Note n/n:
Indeed, it was Alex O'Connor's insight to me that one's actions follows from one's will, but one's will IS causally determined, that convinced me of determinism.

Note 5/n:
since it does not matter whether one's will is causally determined. Millican teaches that Hume follows Hobbes and I remain to read how he does so: I also now recall that he touches on liberty and necessity at the tail end of the 'Abstract'. I can imagine that Hume will proceed as follows: that we constantly observe our actions following our will, so custom gives us the idea of liberty. Something like that.

Note 4/n:
anything that Wittgenstein said new, then?

Furthermore, Millican does me a great favour yet again: I would not have known that Hume followed Hobbes in the compatibilist theory, if it were not for Millican. Hobbes posited compatibilism in Leviathan using a somewhat cheap linguistic hack: if you define liberty as 'One's actions being directed according to one's will', then this is obviously compatibilist ...

Note 3/n:
broader instances in the past. I do not imagine a small child would infer that a positive earnings announcement CAUSES a drop in the stock price, just by observing one such instance (because the positive earnings were below the whisper number).

Hume anticipates Wittgenstein here by commenting that much disagreement in philosophy stems from ambiguity of the definitions of the terms we use. So, how is ...

Note 2/n:
we often ascribe causation irl after just observing ONE instance. In fact this is the root of much bad thinking in our politics, in our work, in our investing, and much of daily life. I myself have done this many times in the past. How do you explain this phenomenon then, in the strictly positive sphere?

This can only be explained if the singular instances we observed were derivations of similar, ...